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INTRODUCTION

Is the right to jury trial in civil cases a historical relic for "pickling," or is it a valuable right for preserving? What effect has the
merger) of Law and Equity2 had on the jury right? These issues have
been faced by lawyers and judges all over the country. In Maryland,
the issues came into focus in 1984 with the adoption of new rules of
procedure.
In 1993, Professors Richard Bourne and John Lynch published
a book on Maryland Civil Procedure. 3 A chapter of that book deals
with the right to jury trial in civil cases. 4 Professors Lynch and
Bourne also "taught this course" before in a law review article. s
1. The phrase "merger of Law and Equity" is used to denote that certain, separate procedural rules for trying Law cases on the one hand, and Equity cases
on the other hand, have been united. The merger of Law and Equity occurred in 1984 in Maryland. See MD. RULE 2-301. The merger of Law and Equity in federal courts occurred in 1938. See FED. R Crv. P. 2.
As suggested by the framers of the revised MARYLAND RULES, the idea of
a merger of Law with Equity is complex. MD. RULE 2-301 provides: "There
shall be one form of action known as 'civil action.' " A committee note to
the rule provides: "The effect of this Rule is to eliminate distinctions between law and equity for purposes of pleadings, parties, court sittings, and
dockets. It does not affect the right to jury trial."
Separate courts of Equity were abolished before the 1984 revision. As
the committee note provided, the revision affected pleadings, parties, court
sittings, and dockets, but not the right to jury trial. Commentators have
noted that the revision did not affect distinctions between legal and equitable causes of action and remedies. See PAUL V. NIEMEYER & LINDA M.
SCHUETT, MARYLAND RULES COMMENTARY 153 (2d ed. 1992). The distinction
between Law and Equity continues as to other matters, such as subject matter jurisdiction of the district court and application of statutes of limitations
(or laches). See MD. CODE ANN., Crs. & JUD. PROC. §§ 4-402(a), 5-101 (1995).
Of course, the "merger of Law and Equity" is also complicated because
it refers to one element of procedural reform that often includes other elements, such as elimination of common-law forms of action, ready joinder of
claims and parties, comprehensive discovery, liberal amendment of pleadings, and simplified appeal. See generally FLEMING JAMES, JR. ET AL., CML PRO.
CEDURE 19-22 (4th ed. 1992).
2. "Law" and "Equity" are capitalized in this Article to reflect traditional usages, and to distinguish Law and Equity as separate systems of procedure
from other meanings of the words. See MD. CONST., DECL. OF RIGHTS arts. 5,
23. Quotations from outside sources, however, have not been capitalized.
Rather, I will take their words as I find them.
3. See JOHN A LYNCH, JR. & RICHARD W. BOURNE, MODERN MARYLAND CML PROCEDURE (1993).
4. Chapter 5 is entitled "Trial by Jury." [d. at 305.
5. See Richard W. Bourne & John A. Lynch, Jr., Merger of Law and Equity Under
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Here, I review their book chapter and their earlier article and set
forth my own ideas about the right to jury trial.
Professors Lynch and Bourne and I are colleagues at the University of Baltimore School of Law, teachers of Civil Procedure, and
friends. Yet, we are in fundamental disagreement about the nature
of the Maryland Constitution, its guarantee of the right to trial by
jury, and the relative merits of trial by judge and by jury. This is
more than an intramural squabble over some fine procedural point.
Our dispute goes to the heart of the legal system: whether that system is one of law or expedience, and whether it is one of democratic government or rule by the elite.

A.

The Lynch and Bourne Book Chapter and Article

In their book chapter and article, Professors Lynch and Bourne
assess the Maryland Constitution's provisions for the right to trial by
jury in civil cases from an historical perspective. They ask basic
questions about the jury right contained in those provisions: What
happens to the common-law right to jury trial now that the 1984
Maryland Rules merged Law and Equity? How is the jury right to be
adapted to other procedural innovations, such as the declaratory
judgment? Should Maryland's jury right be interpreted independently of the federal jury right contained in the Seventh Amendment to the United States Constitution, which has been held inapplicable to state courts? Should the state jury right mirror the
federal right because Maryland cases, rules, and the Maryland Constitution have tended to follow the federal example?

B.

My Thesis

I believe Lynch and Bourne try to pickle, not preserve,6 the
constitutional right to trial by jury. They do recognize recent developments in Maryland and federal courts favoring the jury right.
However, they seem less interested in preserving the jury right than
in limiting its scope to what it was before the merger of Law and
Equity. I believe this approach is unsatisfactory in three respects.
First, it largely ignores the constitutional aspect of the jury right.
Second, it restricts, or does not protect, the jury right in both theory and practice. Third, it is apparently premised on the belief that
trial by a jury is inferior to trial by a judge.
the Revised Maryland Rules: Does It Threaten TriallTy Jury?, 14 U. BALT. L. REv. 1
(1984).
6. See generally infra note 59 and accompanying text.
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The Lynch and Bourne Approach

Lynch and Bourne largely ignore the constitutional aspect of
the right to jury trial. They are like the college instructor who reads
to students the school catalog description of the course on the first
day of class, and then boldly departs from that description in his syllabus, proceeding to teach the course the way he always has, reluctantly incorporating a few new developments. Lynch and Bourne's
"principled discretionary" theory gives lip service to the Maryland
Constitution's jury right. However, they then abandon this theory in
favor of an "approximation of pre-merger" approach, relying on
pre-1984 Maryland precedent to resolve current problems, except
where they reluctantly accept recent Maryland cases or persuasive
federal authority.
Lynch and Bourne do quote Article 57 and Article 23 8 of the
7. See LYNCH & BOURNE. supra note 3, at 305 n.2 (quoting MD. CaNST.. DECL. OF
RIGHTS art. 5 (the "Reception Provision"»; see also Bourne & Lynch, supra
note 5, at 30 n.192. The Reception Provision provides:
a. That the Inhabitants of Maryland are entitled to the Common Law of England, and the trial by Jury, according to the course
of that Law, and to the benefit of such of the English statutes as existed on the Fourth day of July, seventeen hundred and seventy-six;
and which, by experience, have been found applicable to their local
and other circumstances, and have been introduced, used and practiced by the Courts of Law or Equity; and also of all Acts of Assembly in force on the first day of June, eighteen hundred and sixtyseven; except such as may have since expired, or may be inconsistent with the provisions of this Constitution; subject, nevertheless,
to the revision of, and amendment or repeal by, the Legislature of
this State. And the Inhabitants of Maryland are also entitled to all
property derived to them from, or under the Charter granted by
His Majesty Charles the First to Caecilius Calvert, Baron of
Baltimore.
b. The parties to any civil proceeding in which the right to a
jury trial is preserved are entitled to a trial by jury of at least 6
jurors.
c. That notwithstanding the Common Law of England, nothing
in this Constitution prohibits trial by jury of less than 12 jurors in
any civil proceeding in which the right to a jury trial is preserved.
MD. CaNST.. DECL. OF RIGHTS art. 5.
8. See LYNCH & BOURNE, supra note 3, at 305 n.l (quoting MD. CaNST.. DECL. OF
RIGHTS art. 23); see also Bourne & Lynch, supra note 5, at 3 n.2 (quoting provision before amendment increasing amount from $500 to $5,000). In pertinent part, Article 23 provides:
The right of trial by Jury of all issues of fact in civil proceedings in the several Courts of Law in this State, where the amount in
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Maryland Declaration of Rights which guarantee the right to jury trial.
They also quote a fragment of the convention debate on the forerunner to Article 23, intended by its framers to protect the jury
right from legislative encroachment. 9

1.

Principled Discretionary Theory

Mter a description of the Maryland Constitution's provlSlons
and a fragment of the convention debate, Lynch and Bourne set
forth their own theory of how the right to jury trial is to be determined after the merger of Law and Equity. Theirs is what might be
called a "principled discretionary" theory.l0 That is, the jury right
controversy exceeds the sum of five thousand dollars, shall be inviolably preserved.
MD. CONST., DECL. OF RIGHTS art 23.
9. See Bourne & Lynch, supra note 5, at 32 n.21O. The forerunner was MD.
CONST. of 1851 art. X, § 4. The convention debate, in a longer version than
that quoted by Lynch and Bourne, includes the following dialogue:
MR CONSTABLE said that there was no guaranty in the Constitution of Maryland for the trial by jury in civil cases. In the Federal Government there was a provision, but it was only applicable to
the Federal courts.
MR CONSTABLE read the third article of the declaration of
rights [the Reception Provision].
MR CONSTABLE added that the Legislature had the express
right to repeal the whole of this article, and they had constantly exercised the power to modify it. He had little fear of any inroad
upon the trial by jury; but he should prefer to have it in the Constitution rather than have it left with the Legislature.
MR CHAMBERS inquired if the gentleman meant to be understood that the expression in relation to repeal by the Legislature
was applicable the trial by jury?
MR CONSTABLE replied in the affirmative. It applied to the
whole article; and the Legislature had exercised the power upon
every point but this one. They had changed the common law in a
hundred respects. If this were a doubtful point, it should be placed
beyond all controversy; for it was the great safeguard and bulwark
of security for property and persons ....
2 DEBATES AND PROCEEDINGS OF THE MARYLAND REFORM CONVENTION 766-67
(1851) [hereinafter 1851 DEBATES].
10. Lynch and Bourne's theory is best developed in their law review article. See
generaUy Bourne & Lynch, supra note 5.
Characterization of their theory as a unified "approach" may be problematic. That characterization rests on the following evidence. Lynch and
Bourne recognize that approaches to the question of the right to jury trial
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should be within the discretion of Maryland trial judges,l1 guided by
certain standards. First, they contend that the judge's discretion
should be guided by four traditional principles governing the separation of Law and Equity:
The first principle is that Maryland's Constitution preserves
the right to trial by jury as it existed at the time of the
adoption of the Constitution vis a vis the scope of equity.
Second, the scope of equity has historically been measured
with due respect to the importance of the right to trial by
jury. Third, the scope of equity is necessarily limited by the
principle that equity will not intervene where the remedy at
law is full, expeditious and adequate. Finally, it has been
recognized that the scope of equity in Maryland may be expanded by statute or judicial decision. 12
Second, Bourne and Lynch assert that the discretion of Maryland
trial judges should be guided by the common-sense notion that judicial economy is better served by trial by judge than by trial by
jury.13 Third, the discretion of trial judges should be guided by the
implicit notion that Equity is superior to Law as a mode of trial.

2.

Approximation of Pre-Merger Approach

When Lynch and Bourne actually determine the situations in
which the jury trial right should apply, they largely ignore the Maryland Constitution and abandon their own "principled discretionary"
theory. Instead, absent recent Maryland precedent or persuasive fedafter merger of Law and Equity may be generalized. For example, after the
merger of Law and Equity in the federal courts under the FEDERAL RULES OF
CML PROCEDURE, several approaches developed. See Bourne & Lynch, supra
note 5, at 16-17 (jury priority); id. at 17-19 (basic issue analysis); id. at 19-20
(waiver of jury by joinder of legal and equitable claims); id. at 4, 46, 64, 6769, 78 (Beacon doctrine); see also LYNCH & BOURNE, supra note 3, at 334-37
(Beacon doctrine). Lynch and Bourne's theory, which criticizes unbridled judicial discretion as eroding the jury right, suggests that the trial judge's discretion and certain principles guiding that discretion can coexist. See LYNCH
& BOURNE, supra note 3, at 328, 331; Bourne & Lynch, supra note 5, at 16,
20, 23, 29, 44.
11. See Bourne & Lynch, supra note 5, at 59; see also id. at 34, 29, 4647, 77;
LYNCH & BOURNE, supra note 3, at 326, 328, 331.
12. Bourne & Lynch, supra note 5, at 59-60 (footnotes omitted); see also LYNCH &
BOURNE, supra note 3, at 305, 312 (first principle); id. at 306-07, 326 (second
principle); id. at 307, 326 (third principle); id. at 316-17, 321 (fourth principle).
13. See Bourne & Lynch, supra note 5, at 2-3, 60.
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eral authority, their actual approach is what might be called "approximation of pre-merger." In other words, they reflexively follow
pre-1984 precedent regarding whether a matter was to be tried at
Law or in Equity in determining whether a matter is now to be
tried by jury or judgeY

D.

The Jury Trial as Constitutional Right

In contrast, the usual way of interpreting a constitutional provision, such as the right to jury trial, is to consider the following: its
text (the words of the constitution); its history (the intent of the
framers); its structure (the framework of government and the relationships between citizens and government); prudential concerns
(the practical wisdom of using courts in a particular way); doctrine
(principles derived from precedent and commentary on that precedent); ethical ~atters (the sort of people we are and the sort of institutions we have);15 and the nature of the constitution (its paradoxical character as both "written" or unchangeable, and "living"
or adaptable to new circumstances).
This article next takes an in-depth look at the usual ways of interpreting the Maryland Constitution's provisions for the right to
jury trial, the Lynch and Bourne theory, and their actual approach
14. See LYNCH & BOURNE, supra note 3, at 312, 316, 318, 319, 335, 338; Bourne &
Lynch, supra note 5, at 16, 28-29, 44, 46-47, 54, 62, 78. But see LYNCH &
BOURNE, supra note 3, at 331; Bourne & Lynch, supra note 5, at 52.
15. See PHILIP BOBBITT, CONSTITUTIONAL FATE: THEORY OF THE CONSTITUTION 7-8,
94-95 (1982); see also Reed v. McKeldin, 207 Md. 553, 560-61, 115 A.2d 281,
285 (1955) (considering text, entire Md. Const., historical context, purpose,
convention or legislative proceedings); Norris v. Mayor of Baltimore, 172 Md.
667, 675-77, 192 A. 531, 535 (1937) (considering language, historical context,
purpose, usage, and subsequent history); cf BOBBITT, supra, at 8. Philip Bobbitt stated:
My typology of constitutional arguments is not a complete list, nor
a list of wholly discrete items, nor the only plausible division of constitutional arguments. The various arguments illustrated often work
in combination. Some examples fit under one heading as well as
another. . . . A different typology might surely be devised through
some sort of recombination of these basic approaches, and there
can be no ultimate list because new approaches will be developed
through time.
BOBBITT, supra, at 8. The question of how the constitutional arguments fit together or weigh against each 9ther is considered in Richard H. Fallon, Jr., A
Constructivist Coherence Thevry of Constitutional Interpretation, 100 HARv. L. REv.
1189 (1987).
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to determining how the jury right should be interpreted after the
merger of Law and Equity.
II.

USUAL WAYS OF INTERPRETING THE CONSTITUTION

As stated above, a constitution is ordinarily interpreted by considering its nature, text, history, structure, doctrine, prudential concerns, and ethical matters.

A.

Nature

Paradoxically, the Maryland Constitution is both "written" and
"living." It is at the same time unchangeable other than by amendment, and adaptable to new circumstances~
1.

Written Constitution

By its nature, a written constitution is specific, enacted, enforceable and supreme. 16 The early Maryland case of Whittington v. PolA, 17
which established the power of judicial review, described these qualities. A written constitution is specific-it has prescribed limitations
and restrictions. IS "It is enacted-it is a compact of the people
through an elected convention. 19 A written constitution is enforceable-it is law to be applied by courts. 20 A written constitution is supreme-it prevails when in conflict with other law, such as acts of
the legislature. 21
A good example of the concept of a written constitution comes
16. See Thqmas C. Grey, Constitutionalism: An Analytic Framewark, in CONSTITUTIONALISM: NOMOS XX, at 189-209 (1. Roland Pennock & John W. Chapman eds.,
1979); IRVING BRANT, THE BILL OF RIGHTS 15-16 (1965).
17. 1 H. &J. 236 (Md. 1802).
18. See id. at 242.
19. See id.
20. See id. at 244; Brawner v. Curran, 141 Md. 586, 602-04, 119 A. 250, 255 (1922);
see also MD. CONST. art. I, § 9 (requiring oath of office to support the constitution and laws of Maryland); MD. CONST., DECL. OF RIGHTS art. 8 (separation
of powers); id. art. XIV (providing amendment of MD. CaNST. only by the
people); id., DECL. OF RIGHTS art. 5 (Reception Provision, declaring what law
is in force and directing the judiciary as to what law is to apply, including
the MD. CaNST.); id. art. IV, § 2 (providing judges selected from those admitted to practice law in the state, and distinguished, among other things, for
sound legal knowledge); Whittington, 1 H. & J. at 243 (noting powers of making, judging, and executing law are separate and distinct)."
21. See Whittington, 1 H. & J. at 242, 244; Perkins v. Eskridge, 278 Md. 619, 624-26,
636-39, 366 A.2d 21, 26, 32-33 (1976), overruled in part by Parrott v. State, 301
Md. 411, 425, 483 A.2d 68, 75 (1985) (per curiam); see also Marbury v.
" Madison, 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 137, 176 (1803).
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from outside the jury trial arena. In Brawner v. Curran,22 the Court
of Appeals of Maryland sustained 'a challenge to the Soldiers' Bonus
Act of 1922. Because its validity was conditioned upon the approval
of a majority of the qualified voters of the state,23 the court held
that the Act violated the Maryland Constitution's provisions that endowed the legislature with the power of making laws24 and the governor with the veto power. 25 Thus, the legislature may not itself
amend the written Maryland Constitution by adding a referendum
provision.
2.

Living Constitution

The nature of a living constitution is probably best stated by
the idea that the Maryland Constitution is to be interpreted by "the
spirit ... , and not by the letter."26 Stated another way:
While the principles of the Constitution are unchangeable,
in interpreting the language by which they are expressed, it
will be given a meaning which will permit the application of
those principles to changes in the economic, social, and political life of the people, which the framers did not and
could not foresee. 27
Again, a good illustration of the nature of the living constitution
comes from outside the jury trial arena. In Norris v. Mayor of Baltimore,28 the court of appeals held that a clause in the Maryland Constitution, which provides that "[a]ll elections shall be by ballot"29
permits voting by voting machine. The court reasoned that this
method of voting comported with the constitutional meaning of
22. 141 Md. 586, 119 A. 250 (1992).
23. See Brawner, 141 Md. at 593-604, 119 A. 250-51 (1922). The proposed referendum was neither attached to a purely local bill, which has been permitted in
Maryland, nor petitioned by a percentage of the voters pursuant to the referendum amendment. See generally MD. CONST. art. XVI. The nature of the written constitution was underscored by a later amendment to the Maryland
Constitution, adopted in 1924, which permitted the legislature to pass a
Soldiers' Bonus Act and make it subject to a statewide referendum of the
people. See MD. CONST. art. III, § 34. See generally Carl N. Everstine, The Legislative Process in Maryland, 10 MD. L. REv. 91, 138-54 (1949).
24. See MD. CONST. art. III.
25. See id. art. II, § 17.
26. Norris v. Mayor of Baltimore, 172 Md. 667, 675-77, 192 A. 531, 535 (1937).
27. [d.
28. 172 Md. 667, 192 A. 531 (1937).
29. MD. CONST. art. I, § 1.
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elections by "ballot"-an accurate and secret means of voting. 30
Thus, courts may give the Maryland Constitution life by applying it
to new circumstances.
These principles are equally applicable to the right to jury trial.
As part of the written constitution, the jury right must be recognized by the legislature and by judges. However, the interpretation
of a living constitution requires the adaptation of the jury right to
new circumstances, such as the merger of Law and Equity.

B.

Text

The right to jury trial in civil cases appears in a number of
places in the Maryland Constitution-the Reception Provision, the
Principal Provision, and other provisions. The text of the Maryland
Constitution is also noteworthy for its omissions.
1.

The Original Provision: Article 5 (Reception Provision)

The original provision is the Reception Provision, now Article 5
of the Maryland Declaration of Rights. 31 It dates back to 1776. 32 That
Reception Provision receives as the law of the new state of Maryland, the common law of England (including trial by jury), certain
English statutes, and certain acts of the provincial legislative Assembly. While its meaning is not absolutely clear, the text of the Reception Provision may establish whether jury trial is a right, what law
supplies the jury right, as of when (if at any particular time) that
law is adopted, and whether that law may be modified by the legislative or judicial branches.
The Reception Provision seemingly provides a right to trial by
jury. First, because the provision makes express reference to the jury
trial-a traditional common-law "right,"33 it cannot be argued that
the provision merely recognizes the jury trial as one of the laws to
be in force after independence, such as the common law, English
statutes, and acts of the Assembly.34 Second, although the provision's
text uses the. term "entitled" as opposed to "right," the provision itself is contained in the Maryland Declaration of Rights. Furthermore,
elsewhere in the same document the two terms are used
30.
31.
32.
33.
34.

See Norris, 172 Md. at 673-81, 192 A.2d at 534-37.
See MD. CONST., DECL. OF RIGHTS art. 5.
See MD. CONST. of 1776, DECL. OF RIGHTS art. III.
See infra notes 97-100 and accompanying text.
Cf. MD. CONST. of 1776, DECL. OF RIGHTS art. XLI (stating resolutions of colonial conventions also in force as laws).
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synonymously.35
The law supplying the jury trial right is the common law of England. 36 The Reception Provision provides that "the Inhabitants of
Maryland are entitled to the Common Law of England, and the
trial by Jury, according to the course of that Law .... "37
It is not clear when, if at any particular time, Maryland adopted
the English common-law jury right. Because of the order, punctuation,38 and language of the Reception Provision,39 the date of reference, July 4, 1776, appears to apply only to the reception of English
statutes, not to the reception of English common law and trial by
jury.
Regardless of the date of reference, the Reception Provision arguably leaves the jury right subject to modification by the legislature. 40 A proviso expressly makes certain laws "subject, nevertheless,
35. See id. art. III (providing that inhabitants of Maryland are "entitled" to property derived from grants under the original Maryland charter); see also id.
art. XXXIII (providing that Christians are "entitled" to protection in their
religious liberty and that clergy of the church of England are "entitled" to
support for a time).
Later, in the debates on the MD. CONST. of 1851, the Reception Provision trial by jury was characterized as a constitutional right "considered so
conclusive and imperative that it had even been doubted whether even by
consent of parties, a trial of facts could be submitted to the court." 2 1851
DEBATES, supra note 9 at 767.
36. But if. infra notes 609-10 and accompanying text (Maryland common law); infra notes 612-613 (idealized common law).
37. Mo. CONST., DECL. OF RIGHTS art. 5.
38. See id. The date of reference follows immediately after "the English statutes"
without commas in later Maryland Constitutions. See id.; MD. CONST. of 1864,
DECL. OF RIGHTS art. 4; MD. CONST. of 1851, DECL. OF RIGHTS art. 3. But if.
MD. CONST. of 1776, DECL. OF RIGHTS art. III.
39. The earliest MD. CONST. received English laws that "existed at the time of
[the inhabitants of Maryland] first emigration" and "such others as have
been since made in England." MD. CONST. of 1776, DECL. OF RIGHTS art. III
(emphasis added). The making of law applies better to statutes than com. mon law or the trial by jury. Further, the Reception Provision refers to English laws that "have been introduced, used and practiced by the Courts of
Law or Equity." [d. The use of "laws" in "Courts of Law or Equity" applies
better to statutes than common law or the trial by jury, both traditionally applicable only to courts of Law.
40. That was the understanding of the Reception Provision held by the proponent of the principal provision for the jury right adopted in 1851. See supra
note 9 and accompanying text. In contrast, other provisions of the MD.
CONST. of 1776 expressly made rights subject to legislative revision. See, e.g.,
MD. CONST. of 1776, DECL. OF RIGHTS art. XX (privilege against self-incrimination); id. art. XXVIII (prohibition against quartering of soldiers in wartime);
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to the revision of, and amendment or repeal by, the Legislature of
this State."41 The proviso immediately follows the reception of acts
of the Assembly. However, because of punctuation42 and logic,43 the
proviso appears to relate both to English statutes and English common law, perhaps including the jury right as well.
Arguably, the Reception Provision also leaves the jury right subject to modification by the judiciary. Maryland did not receive all
existing laws, but only those "which, by experience, have been
found applicable to their local and other circumstances."44 Further,
the common law which supplied the jury trial right is by definition
shaped by judges. 45 Thus, while the Reception Provision did provide
a jury right, it may have been one subject to modification by the
legislature and the judiciary.

2.

The Principal Provision: Article 23

The principal provision in the Maryland Constitution for the
right to jury trial in civil cases is Article 23 of the Maryland Declaration of Rights. 46 Article 23 dates back to the Maryland Constitution of
1851,47 and its meaning is clearer than that of the Reception
Provision.
Article 23 expressly recognizes the "right" to trial by jUry48 and
id. art. XXXVII (rights, privileges, and benefits of the City of Annapolis).
41. MD. CONST., DECL. OF RIGHTS art. 5 (Reception Provision).
42. See id. The proviso includes punctuation setting it apart from the immediately preceding phrase, "Acts of Assembly," causing the proviso to modify
the "Common Law of England" and "English statutes" as well. See id. (semicolon). But see MD. CONST. of 1864, DECL. OF RIGHTS art. 4 (commas); MD.
CONST. of 1851, DECL. OF RIGHTS art. 3 (commas).
43. If the whole of English common law may be changed by statute, so may the
part of English common law governing trial by jury. But cf. MD. CONST. of
1776, DECL. OF RIGHTS art. XLII (stating that provisions of the MD. CONST.,
DECL. OF RIGHTS ought not be changed by the legislature, except as the Convention prescribes); MD. CONST. of 1776 art. LIX (permitting amendment of
MD. CONST., DECL. OF RIGHTS by acts of two successive legislatures).
44. But cf. MD. CONST., DECL. OF RIGHTS art. 5. This phrase may only relate to
"English statutes," not to the "Common Law of England" and "trial by Jury."
45. But cf. infra notes 97-99 and accompanying text (noting jury right is based on
the Magna Carta and the Bill of Rights, as well as common law molded by
judges). See generally infra note 612 and accompanying text (noting that theoretically, common law is "found," not "made" by judges).
46. See supra note 8 and accompanying text (quoting MD. CONST., DECL. OF
RIGHTS art. 23).
47. See MD. CONST. of 1851 art. X, § 4.
48. Presumably, the right to trial by jury is a "civil right," conferred by positive
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is contained in the Maryland Declaration of RightS. 49 The Article also
provides for the jury right in courts of Law, as distinguished from
courts of Equity,50 also known as courts of chancery.51 Article 23 also
demands recognition of the jury right; it uses the mandatory term
"shall," instead of a directory term such as "should," 52 or a permissive term such as "may." Moreover, unlike the Reception Provision, .
Article 23 contains no terms tending to subject the jury right to legislative or judicial modification. 53 Indeed, according to the 1851
convention debate, the purpose of the provision was to safeguard
the jury right from legislative change or repeaI.54
That Article 23 "preserves" the jury right raises two questions.
First, why is the right not "granted" or "established"? The answer is
that the jury trial was already a right in the colony under English
law55 and in the state under the Reception Provision. 56 Article 23
simply continued, or "preserved" that right.
Second, what does "preserve" mean? Does "preserve" mean dynamic-synonymous with terms like "guarantee,"57 "uphold," "safeguard,"58 "protect," "perpetuate," and "secure"? Does "preserve"

49.

50.
51.
52.

53.

54.
55.
56.
57.

58.

law, rather than a "natural right," superior to positive law. Cf MD. CONST.,
DECL OF RIGHTS art. 1 (" [I]nalienable right to alter, reform or abolish [the
People's] Form of Govemment.").
An amendment transferred the right from the body of the MD. CONST. to the
MD. CONST., DECL. OF RIGHTS. See 1977 Md. Laws ch. 681; cJ. MD. CONST. of
1867 art. XV, § 6 ("MISCELLANEOUS" article); MD. CONST. of 1864 art. XII, § 5
("SCHEDULE" article); MD. CONST. of 1851 art. X, § 4 ("MISCELLANEOUS" article).
See MD. CONST. of 1851 art. IV, § 11; see also id. art. IV, §§ 15, 28.
See id. art. IV, §§ 8, 23.
The distinction, useful in interpreting statutes, has been criticized in interpreting constitutions. See 1 THOMAS M. COOLEY, CONSTITUTIONAL LIMITATIONS
159 (8th ed. 1927).
Cf MD. CONST. of 1851, DECL. OF RIGHTS arts. 20 (providing privilege against
self-incrimination exists except with regard to past court practice or future
legislative direction); id. art. 28 (discussing wartime quartering of soldiers in
houses, without the consent of the owners, only as the legislature directs);. id.
art. 37 (discussing Annapolis's existing rights, privileges, and benefits subject
to legislative alteration).
see supra note 9 and accompanying text.
See Maryland Act for the Liberties of the People (1639), reprinted in 1
ARCHIVES OF MARYLAND 41 (1883). See generally COOLEY, supra note 52, at 865.
See supra notes 33-35 and accompanying text.
Albert Constable, the proponent of the jury right provision in the 1851 convention, implied that the provision would be a "guaranty" for trial by jury in
civil cases. See 2 1851 DEBATES, supra note 9, at 766.
Constable viewed trial by jury as "the great safeguard and bulwark of security
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mean static-synonymous with terms like "conserve," "defend,"
"keep," "maintain," "save," and "retain"?59 While the same ambiguous term exists in the free press provision60 of the Maryland Constitution of 1851, the term takes on a dynamic meaning in other provisions of that constitution. 61 This ambiguity in the term "preserve"
is apparent in dictionaries of that period62 and today.63
Finally, Article 23 provides that the jury right shall be inviolably
preserved. 64 The early constitutions of other states suggest that the
inviolable nature of the jury right might relate to its historically "sa-

for property and persons." [d. at 767.
59. An even less dynamic, or degenerative meaning, synonymous with terms like
"pickle," "freeze," "can," "cure," "embalm," and "mummify," seems precluded by the modifying adverb "inviolably."
60. See Mn. CONST. of 1851, DECL. OF RIGHTS art. 38 ("[T]he liberty of the press
ought to be inviolably preserved.").
61. See id. art. 10 ("[F]or the redress of grievances, and for amending, strengthening, and preserving the laws, the Legislature ought to be frequently convened." (emphasis added». That is, active measures-the frequent convening of the legislature-are needed to preserve the laws. See id. art. II, § 23.
Section 23 provides:
[The secretary of state] shall carefully keep and preserve a record
of all official acts and proceedings, (which may, at all times, be inspected by a committee of either branch of the legislature), and
shall perform such other duties as may be prescribed by law, or as
may properly belong to his office.
[d. In other words, existing records of official acts and proceedings will be
supplemented by subsequent official acts and proceedings. Furthermore, the
aging of documents may require, and advances in technology may permit,
additional steps for preservation. See MD. CONST. of 1851 art. VI, § 2 ("The
comptroller shall ... 'adjust, settle, and preserve all public accounts."). That
is, public funds are not really preserved by inaction because of the ability to
earn interest on idle funds and the likelihood of inflation. See, e.g., Luke
19: 12-27 (parable of the talents).
62. See, e.g., 2 NOAH WEBSTER, AN AMERICAN DICTIONARY OF THE ENGLISH LANGUAGE
42 (1828).
63. See WEBSTER'S THIRD NEW INTERNATIONAL DICTIONARY OF THE ENGLISH LANGUAGE 1794 (1993).
64. See MD. CaNST. OF 1851 art. 23. Another right "inviolably preserved" by the
1851 MD. CaNST. was the liberty of the press. See MD. CONST. of 1851, DECL.
OF RIGHTS art. 38. However, that provision was subsequently amended to expressly qualify the right of free expression: "[T] he liberty of the press ought
to be inviolably preserved; that every citizen of the State ought to be allowed
to speak, write and publish his sentiments on all subjects, being responsible
for the abuse of that privilege." MD. CONST.. DECL. OF RIGHTS art. 40 (emphasis added).
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cred" character,65 its protection "forever,"66 or its exemption from
legislative change. 67 Therefore, by keeping the jury right provision
free from legislative or judicial modification, Article 23 established
the jury right on a surer basis than did the Reception Provision.
3.

Other Provisions

Two other provisions in the Maryland Constitution protect the
right to jury trial in civil cases,68 and specific provisions of the constitution guarantee the jury right in eminent domain cases. 69
First, the Due Process Clause of the Maryland Declaration of
Rights provides that no person shall be "deprived of his life, liberty
or property, but by the judgment of his peers, or by the Law of the
land. "70 The phrase ''judgment of his peers" has been understood
to mean trial by jury.71 That phrase may even suggest a requirement
that the jury be drawn from a cross-section of the community.72
Second, Article 20 of the Maryland Declaration of Rights provides
that "the trial of facts, where they arise, is one of the greatest securities of the lives, liberties and estate of the People. "73 This provision
may rather indefinitely74 establish a right of local venue for jury and
65. See N.C. CONST. of 1776, DECL. OF RIGHTS art. XVI; PA CONST. of 1776, DECL.
OF RIGHTS art. XI; VA CONST. of 1776, DECL. OF RIGHTS art. 11.
66. See NJ. CONST. of 1776 art. XXII.
67. See N.H. CONST., BILL .OF RIGHTS of 1784, art. XX.
68. Cf. MD. CONST., DECL. OF RIGHTS art. 21 (right to speedy trial by an impartial
jury in criminal cases); id. art. 23 (right to jury trial of law as well as fact in
criminal cases).
69, See MD. CONST. art. III, §§ 4040C. Traditionally, eminent domain was considered a special proceeding, not an ordinary common-law proceeding triable
by a jury. See, e.g., Bouton v. Potomac Edison Co., 288 Md. 305, 309-11, 418
A.2d 1168, 1170-71 (1980).
70. MD. CONST., DECL. OF RIGHTS art. 24.
71. See Tichnell v. State, 278 Md. 695, 713-15, 415 A.2d 830, 840 (1980). But cf.
FREDERICK POLLOCK & FREDERIC WILLIAM MAmAND, THE HISTORY OF ENGliSH
LAw BEFORE THE TIME OF EDWARD I 173 (2d ed. 1968) (contending that the
original meaning of "judgment of his peers" was trial by men of equal or
greater rank, not trial by jury).
72. Cf. PENNSYLVANIA FRAME OF GoVERNMENT OF 1682, LAws AGREED UPON IN ENGlAND § VIII, reprinted in 1 BERNARD SCHWARTZ, THE BILL OF RIGHTS: A DocuMENTARY HISTORY 141 (1971) ("[A]ll trials shall be by twelve men, and as
near as may be, peers or equals, and of the neighborhood and men without
just exception.").
73. MD. CONST., DECL. OF RIGHTS art. 20.
74. The Court of Appeals of Maryland has held that the common-law rule requiring cases of a criminal nature to be tried in the county where the offense was committed is not required by the MD. CONST. However, the com-
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other trials.?5 Indeed, one early commentator equated "trial of the
fact in the neighborhood" with "jury trial of the vicinage" in original state constitutions.?6 Thus, these two additional constitutional
provisions support the jury right in Maryland: one provision requiring a trial by peers, a second providing for local venue.
4.

Omissions

Omissions from the Maryland Constitution are noteworthy. The
text of the constitution includes neither a requirement of separate
courts of Law and Equity, nor a square right to trial by judge.
There is no explicit constitutional requirement of separate
courts of Law and Equity. There are references to separate courts of
Law and Equity in the Maryland Constitution in the Reception Provision?? and the principal jury trial guarantee.?8 However, those references appear to assume, rather than mandate the separation. Separate courts of Equity (the court of chancery?9 and the Circuit
Court of Baltimore City)80 have been abolished, and their jurisdictions reassigned by the Maryland Constitution. The constitution
grants the legislature certain power over the courts: the Reception
Provision makes English common law and statutes subject to legislative revision,8l the "necessary and proper" clause provides for legislative law-making for any department,82 and a third provision authorizes the legislature to prescribe circuit court jurisdiction. 83 The
Maryland Constitution also grants power to the court of appeals to

75.

76.

77.
78.

79.
80.

81.
82.
83.

mon-Iaw rule continues to be the general rule, subject to legislative revision.
See Kisner v. State, 209 Md. 524, 530-32, 122 A.2d 102, 105-06 (1956); see also
William Wirt Blume, The Place of Trial in Criminal Cases: Constitutional Vicinagr3
and Venue, 43 MICH. L. REv. 59, 69-70, 87 & n.127 (1944).
Cf. DEL. CONST. of 1776, DECL. OF RIGHTS § 13 (" [T]rial by jury of facts where
they arise is one of the greatest securities of the lives, liberties and estates of
the people.")
Letter IV of Letters from the "Federal Farmer" to "The Republican" (Oct.
12, 1787), reprinted in 1 THE DEBATE ON THE CONSTITUTION 279 (Bernard
Bailyn ed., 1993).
See MD. CONST., DECL. OF RIGHTS art. 5.
See MD. CONST., DECL. OF RIGHTS art. 23; see also MD. CONST. art. IV, § 1 (A)
(permitting continuation of existing courts "at Law and in Equity"); id. at
§ 8(c) (allowing removal of "suits or actions at law").
See MD. CONST. of 1851 art. IV, §§ 8, 23.
See 1980 Md. Laws ch. 523 (amending MD. CONST. art. IV, § 20(a), and repealing MD. CONST. art. IV, § 29).
See MD. CONST., DECL. OF RIGHTS art. 5.
See MD. CONST. art. III, § 56.
See MD. CONST. art. IV, § 20.
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make rules regarding practice and procedure for all the courts. 84
Legislative and judicial modifications of the respective jurisdictions
of Law and Equity, when not infringing on the right to jury trial,85
have apparently withstood constitutional scrutiny.
There is no explicit constitutional right to trial by judge86 in
the same way that other provisions recognize the right to trial by
jury. Section 8(a) of Article IV of the Maryland Constitution does
provide that "[ t] he parties to any cause may submit the cause to the
court for determination without the aid of a jury. "87 However, that
provision does not establish a right to trial by judge for five reasons.
First, the provision does not contain the term "right."88 Second,
section 8(a) provides that the parties "may" submit their case to the
court, a term that suggests discretion, not right. 89 Third, the submission of a case to a judge for determination requires the consent of
"[t]he parties,"90 which is not typical of a "right."91 Fourth, it may
84. See MD. CONST. art: IV, § 18; see also MD. CODE ANN., CTS. & JUDo PROC. § 1-

85.

86.

87.
88.

89.

90.

201(a) (1995) (providing that the rule-making power of the court of appeals
is to be liberally construed to include "unification of practice and procedure
in actions at law and suits in equity").
See C. Christopher Brown, The Law/Equity Dichotomy in Maryland, 39 MD. L.
REv. 427, 44344 (1980); see also MD. RULES BF40, 43 (1977) (repealed 1984).
Cf. Maryland Community Developers, Inc. v. State Roads Comm'n, 261 Md.
205, 213-14, 274 A.2d 641, 646 (1971) (stating that there is no right to trial
by judge in the MD. CONST.); Beacon Theatres, Inc. v. Westover, 359 U.S. 500,
510 (1959) (holding that there is no constitutional right to trial by judge in
federal courts). See generally Note, The Right to a Nonjury Tria~ 74 HARv. L.
REv. 1176 (1961). But if. Luppino v. Gray, 336 Md. 194,209-10,647 A.2d 429,
437 (1994) (holding that, under MD. CONST., there is a constitutional right to
trial by judge for all consenting parties to a case, not anyone party). See also
HYMAN GINSBERG, EQUITY JURISPRUDENCE & PROCEDURE IN MARYLAND 290
(1928) ("The right to have an equity suit dealt with by equitable methods is
as sacred as the right to a trial by jury at law. . . . "). Ginsberg cited no authority for his proposition. Ginsberg's precursor cites only a case from Michigan. See CHARLES EDWARD PHELPS. JURIDICAL EQUITY 170 n.4 (1894).
MD. CONST. art. IV, § 8(a).
See MD. CONST. art. IV, § 8(a); if. MD. CONST. art. IV, § 8(b) (c) (providing for
"right" of removal to have a fair trial).
The convention debate on the provision which is now MD. CONST. art. IV,
§ 8(a), includes reference to the "privilege" or "option" of the parties. See 2
DEBATES OF THE CONSTITUTIONAL CONVENTION 1395 (1864) [hereinafter 1864
DEBATES]; see also Desche v. Gies, 56 Md. 135, 137 (1881) (referring to the
provision for consent or agreement to trial by judge).
See 2 1864 DEBATES, supra note 89, at 1395; Desche, 56 Md. at 137. A waiver of
the right to trial by jury does not constitute consent to trial by judge. See
Luppino, 336 Md. at 210, 647 A.2d at 437.
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well be that a judge has discretion in deciding whether or not to
determine a case once submitted by the parties because there is no
language in Section 8(a) directing the judge do SO.92 The 1864 convention debate on Section 8(a) notes that judges may want juries,
not themselves, to hear serious criminal cases, or cases where the
facts are complicated. 93 Fifth, the discretionary power a court of Equity had before 1961 94 to refer disputed issues of fact to a court of
Law for an advisory jury verdict95 apparently withstood constitutional
challenge. Thus, the text of the Maryland Constitution provides
comprehensive protection for the right to jury trial in civil cases.
The Maryland Constitution's provisions protecting the jury
right are interrelated. 96 Each provision identifies the source of the
right as the common law of England. Each describes the issues to
be tried by jury-issues of fact, not law, and issues in courts of Law,
not Equity. The provisions perhaps even describe the jury and place
of trial-a cross section of the local community in a local venue.
Each provision inviolably preserves the right by putting it beyond
the reach of the legislature. Finally, the Maryland Constitution contains no provisions, such as for separate courts of Law and Equity or
for a right to trial by judge, which might detract from the jury
right.

C.

History

The history of the civil jury trial right in England and in Maryland, including the circumstances surrounding the adoption of the
original and the principal jury trial provisions, shows a tradition
protective of the right. A brief sketch follows.
91. Thus, if one party claimed a right to trial by jury and another claimed a
right to trial by judge, the jury right would prevail. See Lanahan v. Heaver, 77.
Md. 605, 26 A. 866 (1893).
92. Cf MD. CONST. art. IV, § 8(b)-(c) (stating that the court "shall" order the
case transmitted to another court for trial if removal for a fair trial is properly demanded); MD. RULE 12-207 (stating that the court "shall" determine
the matter so submitted without a jury in eminent domain cases after an
election of all the parties for court determination without a jury).
93. See 2 1864 DEBATES, supra note 89, at 1394-95.
94. This ancient, seldom-used practice was abolished by court rule. See MD. RULE
517 & committee note (1977) (repealed 1984).
95. See Brown, supra note 85, at 458-66 (describing transfer practice).
96. But cf. ALFRED S. NILES, MARYLAND CONSTITUTIONAL LAw 343 (1915) (arguing
either the principal provision, on one hand, or the Reception Provision and
the Due Process Clause, on the other hand, are surplusage).
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1.' English History

In England, the history of the jury trial right began in 1215
with the Magna Carta. In Chapter 39, the Due Process Clause of the
Magna Carta granted a "judgment of . . . peers. "97 The Petition of
Right in 1628 restated that grant,98 and the Bill of Rights in 1689
more plainly provided for jury triaI.99 Blackstone praised the jury
trial as the "principal bulwark of our liberties," "the glory of the
English law," and "the best criterion, for investigating the truth of
facts, that was ever established in any country."IOO
The English Parliament has subsequently restricted the right of
civil jury trial to certain specified situations, such as fraud, defamation, malicious prosecution, and false imprisonment. 101 However,
the Court of Appeals of Maryland has noted that acts of Parliament
are not limited by a written constitution, as are acts of the Maryland
legislature. 102

2.

Colonial Maryland History

In colonial Maryland, Article X of the Maryland Charter of
1632 granted colonists all the rights of English citizens, including
the right to jury trial.103 In 1639, the Maryland Act for the Liberties
of the People restated and reinforced that general grant. 104

3.

History of the Original Jury Right Provision

The circumstances surrounding the original jury right provision
began with a protest and ended with a new Maryland Constitution.
A convention of delegates from the counties of Maryland adopted
the Declaration of July 6, 1776, charging that the legislative and executive powers of England, among other abuses, had deprived the
97. 1 SCHWARTZ, supra note 72, at 12. But if. POLLOCK & MAITLAND, supra note 71,
at 173 (stating original meaning was trial by men of equal or greater rank,
not trial by jury).
98. See 1 SCHWARTZ, supra note 72, at 20.
99. See Uf. at 43.
100. 3 WILLIAM BlACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES ** 350, 379, 385.
101. See Supreme Court Act, 1981, ch. 54, § 69(1) (Eng.) (providing that the
court of general jurisdiction is the Queen's Bench Division of the High
Court of Justice); County Courts Act, 1959, 7 & 8 Eliz. 2, ch. 22, § 94(3)
(Eng.) (providing that the courts of limited jurisdiction are the county
courts).
102. See McCoy v. Johnson, 70 Md. 490, 17 A. 387 (Md. 1889).
103. See WILLIAM KILTY, THE LAws OF MARTIAND (1799).
104. See 1 ARCHIVES OF MARYlAND 41 (1883).
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colonists in many cases of their right to trial by jury.I05 Of course,
the protest resembled that then being made in the colonies generally.loo A similar convention later adopted the Maryland Declaration of
Rights and Maryland Constitution in November of 1776. The Maryland Declaration of Rights included a Reception Provision accepting
the jury trial as part of the common law of England,107 and a Due
Process Clause providing for a ''judgment of ... peers."I08 On May
25, 1776, even before the declaration, the convention had established a court of admiralty with a right to trial by jury. 109 This court
was recognized in the Maryland Constitution of 1776,110 and heard
prize cases during the Revolutionary War. 1I1 However, the Maryland
Constitution also authorized a chancellor and a court of chancery
(without a jury) for the administration of equity.1I2
4.

History of the Principal Jury Right Provision

The circumstances of the principal jury right provision were reformatory in nature. The proponent of that right in the 1851 convention, Albert Constable, specifically wanted to put the jury right
105. See PROCEEDINGS OF THE CONVENTION OF THE PROVINCE OF MARYLAND IN 1774,
1775, & 1776, at 201 (1836) [hereinafter 1774 PROCEEDINGS]. The cases were
actions for penalties and forfeitures for violations of various trade and revenue acts. In England, those actions were heard in common-law courts. However, in America the actions might be brought either in common-law courts
or in admiralty courts. If brought in adiniralty courts, there was no jury trial,
and perhaps no local venue. See JUUUS GoEBEL, JR, ANTECEDENTS AND BEGINNINGS TO 1801, at 85-88 (lC The Oliver Wendell Holmes Devise History of
the Supreme Court of the United States, 1971).
106. See Declaration of Rights and Grievances, 1765, in SCHWARTZ, supra note 72, at
196, 197 (stating that extension of the jurisdiction of the Court of Admiralty
deprived the colonists of their right to jury trial); see also The Rights of the Colonists and a List of Infringements and Violations of Rights, 1772, in SCHWARTZ,
supra note 72, at 200, 209; THE DECLARATION OF INDEPENDENCE para. 19 (U.S.

1776).
107. See MD. CONST. of 1776, DECL. OF RIGHTS art. 3.
108. MD. CONST. of 1776, DECL. OF RIGHTS art. 21. See supra notes 70-72 and accompanying text for a discussion of the current provision.
109. See 1774 PROCEEDINGS, supra note 105, at 155.
110. See MD. CONST. of 1776 art. LVI.
111. See generally DAVID ROWEN & MICHAEL C. TOlLEY, COURTS OF ADMIRALTY IN
COLONIAL AMERICA: THE MARYLAND EXPERIENCE, 1634-1776 (1995). A sample of
cases is referred to in GoEBEL, supra note 105, at 154-55 n.44.
112. See MD. CONST. of 1776 arts. 40, 48, 56; if. THE FEDERALIST No. 83, 54647 (Alexander Hamilton) (Modern Library 1937) (providing that eight of the
other 13 states had no courts of chancery after the American Revolution).
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beyond the reach of the legislature and, generally, to extend democratic limitations on the power of government.
Under the Maryland Constitution of 1776, the legislature had a
double check on the jury trial right. Under the Reception Provision,1I3 the jury right, as part of the common law of England, was
arguably subject to amendment or repeal by the legislature.ll 4 Also,
the legislature, by acts of two successive sessions, could amend the
constitution.ll 5 The Maryland Constitution of 1851 removed both of
those checks. First, it included the new principal jury right ll6 which,
according t6 the convention debate, was not subject to legislative
change. 1l7 Second, the new Maryland Constitution provided for constitutional amendment only by the action of a convention of the
people. liS
_. Other provisions of the Maryland Constitution of 1851 indicate
concern with the legislature encroaching on the right to jury trial.
Those other provisions guaranteed the right to jury trial in eminent
domain cases ll9 and on appeals to the circuit courts from the judgments of justices of the peace. 120
The intent of the framers of the principal jury right was generally to increase democratic 121 limitations on the powers of govern113.
114.
115.
116.
117.
118.
119.
120.

121.

See supra note 7 for the current provision.
See supra notes 37, 3940, 43 and accompanying text.
See MD. CONST. of 1776 art. LIX.
See MD. CONST. of 1851 art. X, § 4. See supra note 8 for the current provision.
See supra note 9 for the legislative history. See also supra notes 48, 52-54 and
accompanying text.
See MD. CONST. of 1851 art. Xl.
See ill. art. III, § 46.
See ill. art. IV, § 19. But see ill. art. III, § 25. (continuing the legislative power
of contempt unchecked by jury trial); cf. Charles W. Wolfram, The Constitutional History of the Seuenth Amendment, 57 MINN. L. REv. 639, 705-07 (1973)
(noting civil jury trial was generally considered to be a check on legislative
excesses in taxation).
Here, the term "democratic" is used in the sense of limiting the power of
government in favor of the rights of individuals. The jury may also be democratic in three other respects: (1) it permits popular participation in the administration of justice; (2) it permits determination by a group representing
the community, rather than determination by a single judge; and (3) it permits nullification of law in order to do justice in a particular case. See HARRy
KALVEN, JR & HANs ZEISEL, THE AMERICAN JURY 5, 7-9 (1966).
In other ways, of course, the right to jury trial is not democratic. First,
individual rights may limit the exercise of power by the legislature, the most
democratic .branch of government and one that may best reflect the will of a
majority of the people. Second, individual rights may require enforcement
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ment. That was the general intent of Constable, his political party,
and a majority of the convention. Constable was a member of the
Democratic Party,122 the "reform" party at the convention.123 He
proposed limits on the taxing, spending, and borrowing powers of
the legislature. 124 The convention adopted other popular reforms:
reapportionment of the legislature; limitations on legislative power
to contract debts and create corporations by special act, popular
election of judges and local officials; and the right of the people to
amend the Constitution by convention. 125
5.

Subsequent History of the Jury Right in Maryland

The subsequent history of the jury right in Maryland has also
been protective of the right. The original and principal jury rights
were restated in the 1864 126 and 1867 Maryland Constitutions.127 The
principal jury right was restated in a 1970 amendment that increased the amount in controversy requirement from $5 to $500,128
in a 1973 amendment that transferred the guarantee from the body
of the Maryland Constitution to Article 23 of the Maryland Declaration of Rights,129 and in a 1992 amendment that increased the
amount in controversy from $500 to $5,000.130 The original jury
right was also restated in a 1992 amendment providing for juries of
at least six persons and allowing for juries of fewer than twelve. 131

122.
123.
124.
125.

126.
127.
128.
129.
130.
131.

by the judiciary, the least democratic branch of government, based on its
professional tradition, its initial appointment by the executive, and its election for long terms (ten or fIfteen years). See MD. CONST. art. N, §§ 3, 5,
5A(b)-(d), 41D.
See BIOGRAPHICAL DIRECTORY OF THE AMERICAN CONGRESS, 1774-1971, S. Doc.
No.8, 92d Cong., 1st Sess. 842 (1971).
See JAMES WARNER HARRY, THE MARYLAND CONSTITUTION of 1851 at 15, 24, 25,
28 (1902).
See 1 1851 DEBATES, supra note 9, at 395.
See MD. CONST. of 1851 art. III, §§ 3, 22, 47; id. art. N, §§ 4, 8-9, 12-13, 17-20;
id. art. V, § 1; id. art. XI; id., DECL. OF RIGHTS art. 1. See generaUy HARRy, supra
note 123; FLETCHER MELVIN GREEN, CONSTITUTIONAL DEVELOPMENT IN THE
SOUTH ATLANTIC STATES, 1776-1860 at 272-87 (1930).
See MD. CONST. of 1864, DECL. OF RIGHTS art. 4; id. art. XII, § 5.
See MD. CONST. of 1867, DECL. OF RIGHTS art. 5; id. art. XV, § 6.
See 1969 Md. Laws ch. 789.
See 1977 Md. Laws ch. 681.
See 1992 Md. Laws, chs. 205, 206.
See id. chs. 203, 204. Of course, the decrease in the number of jurors, from
the traditional twelve to as few as six, and the increase in the amount in
controversy requirement from $5 to $500 and then $5,000, can be seen not
only as not protective of the jury right, but as reducing its importance. It
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Two rejected constitutional proposals underscore a tradition
protective of the jury trial right. After ratifying the United States
Constitution, the Maryland Convention of 1788 appointed a committee to draft amendments to the proposed Maryland Constitution.
The committee proposed certain amendments, including a right to
jury trial in .civil cases. When a minority of the committee insisted
on presenting to the convention other proposals rejected by a majority of the committee, the majority decided to report no amendments to the convention. 132
The Maryland Constitutional Convention of 1967-68 proposed a
constitution that would have included a right to jury trial in civil
cases. The right would have been similar to a provision drafted by
the Constitutional Convention Commission, which commented that
the right "is firmly rooted in the Maryland tradition."133
Of course, the more recent reaffirmations of the right to civil
jury trial came in the face of criticisms of the civil jury in general,l34
and in Maryland in particular. 135
Thus, the history of the civil jury right in England and in
America, and the circumstances surrounding the adoption of the
original and the principal jury trial provisions, evidence a tradition
protective of the right.

D.

Structure

"If men were angels, no government would be necessary."136
Men are not angels, thus government is necessary. In order to promote liberty and avoid tyranny,137 the government must be structured in a way to make it subject to external and internal controls.
The external controls are the powers retained by the people-a further security being the multiplicity of interests the people have. 138
The internal controls include federalism (the division of powers be-

132.
133.
134.
135.
136.
137.

138.

also is outside the scope of the present inquiry, which is, in what situations
does the jury right apply? Cf Colgrove v. Battin, 413 U.S. 149, 157 (1973)
(stating that the size of the jury is incidental, not essential to the right to
jury trial under the Seventh Amendment).
See 2 SCHWARTZ, supra note 72, at 729, 732.
REpORT OF THE CONSTITUTIONAL CONVENTION COMMISSION 105 (1967).
See KALVEN & ZEISEL, supra note 121, at 4 n.2, 9 n.9, for a collection of authorities.
See GEORGE KENNETH REIBUCH, A STUDY OF JUDICIAL ADMINISTRATION IN THE
STATE OF MARYLAND 79-80, 84, 137-38 (1929).
THE FEDERALIST No. 51, at 337 Games Madison) (Modern Library 1937).
See ill. No. 47, at 312-13 Games Madison).
See ill. No. 51, at 337, 33940 Games Madison).
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tween state and national governments) and the separation of powers among the legislature (further divided into two different
houses), the executive, and the judiciary139 (further divided into
trial and appellate courts) .140 Regarding external controls, some
powers are retained by the people. 141 Regarding internal controls,
governmental powers are divided between the United States and the
State of Maryland. 142
The legislative, executive, and judicial powers of state government are expressly separated,143 although each branch has checks
on the others. For example, the executive may veto bills passed by
the legislature l44 and fill vacant judicial offices. 145 The legislature
may impeach executive or judicial officers. 146 The judiciary may
hold the acts of the executive 147 and legislative 148 branches to be unconstitutional and void.
The jury trial is another check against the legislative,149 executive 150 and judicial 151 branches. 152 The jury trial illustrates many of
the structures established by the Maryland Constitution to promote
139. See id. at 337-39.
140. See id. No. 81, at 522-33 (Alexander Hamilton).
141. See MD. CONST., DECL. OF RIGHTS arts. 34; see also id. art. I (elective franchise);
id. art. XIV (providing for amendments to the constitution); id. art. XVI (the
referendum); cf id., DECL. OF RIGHTS art. 45 (retained rights).
142. See MD. CONST., DECL. OF RIGHTS arts. 2-3.
143. See id. art. 8; see also id. art. II (executive); id. art. III (legislative); id. art. IV

(judiciary) .
144. See id. art. II, § 17.
145. See id. § 10; id. art. IV, §§ 5, 5A.
146. See id. art. III, § 26.
147. See Watkins v. Watkins, 2 Md. 341 (1852).
148. See Perkins v. Eskridge, 278 Md. 619, 366 A.2d 21 (1976).
149. See THE FEDERALIST No. 29, at 177 (Alexander Hamilton) (Modem Library
1937) (power of taxation).
150. See id. No. 83, at 543 (Alexander Hamilton) (barrier to the tyranny of a popular magistrate).
151. See id. No. 65, at 426 (Alexander Hamilton) (noting that the jury stands between the judge who pronounces sentence and the party who receives it); see
also id. No. 83, at 545 (Alexander Hamilton) (stating that judge and jury offer double security against corruption). But if. id. No. 65, at 427 (Alexander
Hamilton) (noting that juries are frequently influenced by the opinions of
judges and sometimes are asked to find special verdicts, which leave the
main questions to the decision of judges).
152. Of course, in addition to these "structures," there are other controls on the
government, such as a written constitution, a federal government having
only limited powers, and individual rights. See BRANT, supra note 16, at 16-22.
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liberty and avoid tyranny. The right to jury trial l53 establishes a role
for the people in our representative democratic form of government,I54 with its separation of powers. 155
Jury procedures that make exceptions to strict separation of
powers between judge and jury provide checks and balances. 156 For
example, the judge provides a check on the jury by ruling on the
admissibility of evidence, by instructing the jury on the law, and by
setting aside erroneous verdicts. 157 The appellate courts l58 provide a
further check on the jury by reviewing judgments on jury verdicts. 159
The jury provides a check on the judge l60 by finding facts l61 and by
softening the harshness of legal doctrine. 162 Where a judgment may
be unpopular with the legislature, the executive, or the people, the
jury, by supporting the judge, provides a check on the popular
branches of government. 163
Thus, the right to jury trial is worth preserving as one of the
structures of government established to retain powers of the people,
and to check the judiciary and other branches of government.
153. See MD. CONST., DECL. OF RIGHTS arts. 5, 23; see also supra notes 31-76 and accompanying text.
154. See A FARMER, Essay IV (1788), reprinted in THE COMPLETE ANTI-FEDERALIST 36,
38 (Herbert]. Storing ed., 1981).
155. One commentator noted that a government enactment must avoid the vetoes
of five bodies-lower house, senate, executive, judge, and jury. See L\SANDER
SPOONER, AN ESSAY ON THE TRIAL BY JURY 11 (1852); see also infra notes 37Cr88
and accompanying text.
156. See KALVEN & ZEISEL, supra note 121, at 417, 498. See generally LAWRENCE M.
FRIEDMAN, A HISTORY OF AMERICAN LAw 155-56 (2d ed. 1985).
157. See MD. RULE 2-513 to 2-517, 2-520, 2-532 to 2-535; see also MD. RULE 2-520(d)
(providing that the judge'S power to summarize or comment on the evidence also provides a check on the jury). See generally CHARLES W. JOINER,
CIVIL JUSTICE AND THE JURY 19-20, 67-68 (1962).
158. See MD. CaNST. art. IV, § 14 (Court of Appeals of Maryland); id. § 14A (intermediate courts of appeal).
159. However, reexamination of facts tried by a jury is implicitly limited by the
MD. CaNST. See Board of Shellfish Comm'rs v. Mansfield, 125 Md. 630, 94 A.
207 (1915).
160. See MD. CONST., DECL. OF RIGHTS art. 23.
161. See infra notes 1043-1103 and accompanying text.
162. See generally A FARMER, supra note 154, at 39. Judges may need checking because of their excessive power, arbitrariness, corruption, or class or political
biases. See Stephan Landsman, The History and Objectives of the Civil Jury System, in VERDICT: AsSESSING THE CIVIL JURY SYSTEM 22, 23, 33, 3843 (Robert E.
Litan ed., 1993).
163. See generally Landsman, supra note 162, at 20; see also supra notes 149-50 and
accompanying text.
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Doctrine

Traditionally, Maryland courts and commentators have been
protective of the right to jury trial in civil cases. Before the merger
of Law and Equity in Maryland in 1984, however, there were both
favorable and unfavorable interpretations in particular situations.
Since the merger, Maryland courts have clearly taken a protective
approach, following the federal courts. However, Maryland's approach raises several questions. Exactly what is the protective approach? That is, how is that approach to be applied in particular
cases? Is Maryland's protective approach tied to Seventh Amendment precedent in the federal courts? Why is the protective approach better than alternatives that other courts adopted after the
.merger of Law and Equity?
1.

Traditional Interpretations

Maryland courts have generally endorsed the right to jury trial.
In one case, the Court of Appeals of Maryland, citing a Supreme
Court opinion, stated that" [t]he trial by jury is justly dear to the
American people."I64 The court of appeals has also noted that the
constitutional guarantee was a limitation on the legislature's power
to fix the jurisdiction of Law and Equity courts. 165
Commentators from Maryland have also generally endorsed the
jury right. Professor Alfred S. Niles wrote that "the courts will be
careful to preserve the (jury] right and declare any law in substantial violation thereof unconstitutional." 166 Professor Christopher
Brown, anticipating the merger of Law and Equity in Maryland, predicted that the right to jury trial, which had been undermined in
164. Allender v. Ghingher, 170 Md. 156, 167, 183 A. 610, 616 (1936) (quoting Parsons v. Bedford, 288 U.S. 433, 455 (1830»; see LYNCH & BOURNE, supra note
3, at 306 n.5; Bourne & Lynch, supra note 5, at 31.
165. See Fooks' Ex'rs v. Ghingher, 177 Md. 612, 625-26, 192 A. 782, 788 (1937),
noted in Bourne & Lynch. supra note 5, at 32-33. Fooks' apparently eroded a
contrary precedent. See Capron v.·Devries, 83 Md. 220, 34 A. 251 (1896),
noted in LYNCH & BOURNE. supra note 3, at 321; Bourne & Lynch. supra note
5, at 31-32; see also infra notes 792-837 and accompanying text. However, in
Capron the court of appeals did note that the statute, which conferred power
theretofore exercised by Law courts on courts of Equity, was enacted in
1841, before adoption of Article 23. Article 23 is the principal guarantee of
the civil jury trial right in Maryland, and puts the right beyond legislative
reach. See generally supra note 8.
166. NILES, supra note 96, at 344. However, Niles wrote that the jury right may be
waived, and that the right was not infringed by reasonable conditions or by
initial trial without a jury if a jury trial was held on appeal. See id. at 343.
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several ways, would be revitalized in a merged system. 167 Lynch and
Bourne, while adopting an ambiguous stance regarding the right to
jury trial,168 noted that Maryland courts have traditionally been quite
protective of the jury right. 169
2.

Pre-Merger Interpretations

Before the merger of Law and Equity in 1984, Maryland practice was not uniformly protective of the right to jury trial. Legislative and judicial interpretations of the right in particular situations,
relevant to the distinction between Law and Equity and their
merger, varied. Favorable interpretations, many of which have been
noted by Lynch and Bourne, include the following: (1) the occasional conclusion that the legislature may not abridge the right to
jury trial by conferring on courts of Equity the jurisdiction to determine legal rights;170 (2) the equitable prerequisite of no adequate
remedy at Law;171 (3) the transfer from Equity to Law;172 (4) the
transfer from district court to circuit court for jury trial;173 (5) the
injunction as ancillary relief in an action at Law;174 (6) the conclusiveness of earlier jury factual findings on the judge as to such ancillary injunctive relief;175 (7) the right to jury trial in certain situations
10 Equity cases;176 (8)the right to jury trial in certain special pro167. See Brown, supra note 85, at 427.
168. As we have seen, Lynch and Bourne adopt a principled discretionary theory.

169.
170.

171.
172.
173.
174.
175.

176.

See supra notes 10-13 and accompanying text. In practice, they use an approximation of pre-merger approach. See supra note 14 and accompanying
text.
See LYNCH & BOURNE, supra note 3, at 306; see also Bourne & Lynch, supra
note 5, at 29-34.
See Fooks' Ex'rs v. Ghingher, 177 Md. 612, 192 A. 782 (1937); McCoy v. Johnson, 70 Md. 490, 17 A. 387 (1889).
See Pratt v. Vanwyck's Ex'rs, 6 Gill & J. 495, 498 (1834).
See 1896 Md. Laws ch. 229; MD. RULE 515 (1977) (repealed 1984).
See MD. CODE ANN., CTs. & JUD. PROC. § 4402(e) (1995).
See MD. RULES BF40-43 (1977) (repealed 1984), cited in LYNCH & BOURNE,
supra note 3, at 319, n.126; accord Bourne & Lynch, supra note 5, at 55-56.
See Beane v. McMullen, 265 Md. 585, 613-14, 291 A.2d 37, 52 (1972).
For example, interpleader, see MD. RULE BU73 (1977) (repealed 1984), attachment on an Equity judgment, see MD. RULE F5 (1977) (repealed 1984),
appointment without consent of a personal guardian for a disabled person,
see MD. RULE R77(b)(I)(a) (repealed 1997), and challenge to commitment
after a finding of not guilty to criminal charges by reason of insanity, see MD.
CODE ANN., HEALTH-GEN. § 12-114(c)(l) to (3) (1982), repealed Uy 1984 Md.
Laws ch. 501, § 1.
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ceedings;177 and (9) the right to jury trial on appeal from certain
special proceedings. 178
Unfavorable interpretations before the merger of Law and Equity, many of which have been noted by Lynch and Bourne, include
the following: (1) the abolition of the practice of chancellors in Equity referring disputed issues of fact to Law courts for jury trial;179
(2) the erosion of the equitable prerequisite of no adequate remedy
at Law;180 (3) the growth of "clean-up" jurisdiction in Equity;181 (4)
the denial of jury trial initially, although not on appeal, in administrative agency determinations, workers' compensation decisions, and
medical malpractice arbitration awards;182 and (5) the denial of jury
trial in certain special proceedings. 183
3.

Post-Merger Interpretations

Since the merger of Law and Equity in 1984, Maryland courts
have clearly taken a protective approach to the right to jury trial in
civil cases. The seminal case is Higgins v. Barnes. l84 There, Barnes
sued Higgins for an equitable remedy: specific performance of a
contract. Higgins answered and demanded a jury trial, asserting a
counterclaim for legal relief and damages for breach of the same
contract. Barnes opposed the jury demand on the ground that the
initial claim was equitable and, once equitable jurisdiction attached,
the entire case had to be determined by a judge.
The court of appeals upheld Higgins's demand for jury trial.
The court held that, where Barnes's claim and Higgins's answer and
177. For example, mandamus, see MD. CODE ANN., CTS. & JUD. PROC. § 3-8A-02
(1995), declaratory judgments, see id. § 3404, and paternity proceedings, see
MD. CODE ANN., FAM. LAw §§ 6-1026 to 6-1027 (1991).
178. For example, administrative agency determinations, see MD. RULE B11 (1977)
(rescinded 1993); see also infra note 1594, workers' compensation decisions,
see MD. CODE ANN., LAB. & EMPL. § 9-745(d) (1991), and awards of medical
malpractice arbitration panels, see MD. CODE ANN., CTS. & JUD. PROC. § 3-2A06(b) (1995).
179. See infra notes 561-62 and accompanying text.
180. See infra note 563 and accompanying text.
181. See infra note 564 and accompanying text.
182. See supra note 178 and accompanying text.
183. For example, juvenile causes, see MD. CODE ANN., CTS. & JUD. PROC. § 3-812(f)
(1995), habeas corpus cases, see Roscoe v. Warden, 23 Md. App. 516, 328
A.2d 64 (1974), attorney disciplinary proceedings, see MD. RULE BV1O(d), and
contempts, see Meyers v. State, 23 Md. App. 275, 326 A.2d 773 (1974).
184. 310 Md. 532, 530 A.2d 724 (1987), noted in LThlCH & BOURNE, supra note 3, at
315, 327-37.
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counterclaim contained the common legal issue of breach of contract, Higgins had a right to jury trial of that issue before the judge
considered any equitable claims of Barnes for specific performance
and reformation.
Higgins stands for a number of propositions. First, the historical
division between Law and Equity survives in that claims and remedies are still characterized and sorted out for trial by judge or jury.
Breach of contract is a legal claim and damages is a legal remedy,
both triable by a jury.185 Specific performance and reformation are
equitable remedies, both triable by a judge. 186
Second, Higgins adopts a protective approach to the jury right.
''Jury decisions of disputed legal issues are clearly favored . . . . "187
Indeed, jury trial of legal issues may be denied only under the
"most imperative circumstances."188
Third, because the Maryland Constitution protects the right to
jury trial, not the right to a bench trial,189 factual issues common to
both legal and equitable claims must be tried first by the jury.190
Otherwise, an earlier judicial determination would bind and delay a
later jury determination. 191
Fourth, Higgins relied on federal precedent-the line of cases
beginning with Beacon Theatres, Inc. v. Westover 92-as persuasive authority for interpreting the Maryland Constitution's right to jury
trial. The Higgins court relied on the federal cases for the following
reasons: (1) those cases give primacy to the constitutional jury
right;193 (2) federal courts faced the same situation as Maryland
courts of interpreting the jury right after the merger of Law and

185.
186.
187.
188.

189.
190.

191.
192.

193.

See Higgins, 310 Md. at 552, 530 A.2d at 733.
See id. at 552, 530 A.2d at 734.
[d. at 541, 530 A.2d at 728.
[d. at 551, 530 A.2d at 733 (quoting Dairy Queen v. Wood, 369 U.S. 469, 47273 (1962) (quoting Beacon Theatres, Inc. v. Westover, 359 U.S. 500, 510-11
(1959»); see also id. at 545-47,530 A.2d at 730-31.
See id. at 547, 551 n.12, 530 A.2d at 730, 733 n.12.
See id. at 552, 530 A.2d at 733-34. But cf. id. at 545-47, 551 n.12, 530 A.2d at
730-31, 733 n.12 (noting that "most imperative circumstances" may justify
judge trial ahead of jury trial of common factual issues).
See id. at 545, 530 A.2d at 730.
359 U.S. 500 (1959). But cf. Bourne & Lynch, supra note 5, at 16 (suggesting
that because of the Beacon court's distortions of jury right and scope of Equity, Maryland might look to federal cases decided after merger and before
Beacon for guidance).
See Higgins, 310 Md. at 541-51, 530 A.2d at 728-33.
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Equity by court rule;194 (3) federal interpretations of Federal Rules
have traditionally been relied upon by Maryland courts interpreting
analogous Maryland Rules 195 and Maryland Rule 2-301196 merging
Law and Equity was patterned after Federal Rule 2; and (4) other
approaches to the right to jury trial after the merger of Law and
Equity failed to safeguard the right. 197
4.

Current Questions

Mter Higgins, exactly what is the protective approach? Philosophically, the Higgins court endorsed the federal approach, permitting denial of the constitutional right to jury trial of legal issues
only under "the most imperative circumstances."198 Practically, the
Higgins court also endorsed the federal application of the jury right
in a number of situations. There is a right to jury trial of facts in a
legal counterclaim for contract damages, or in an answer alleging
breach of contract raised in an equitable proceeding for specific
performance of the contract. Where facts are common to both the
legal counterclaim or defense and the equitable claim, there is a
right to· have the jury determine those facts first.199 The court in
Higgins also cited with approval federal cases that "saw through" a
party's attempt to characterize legal issues in equitable terms;200 federal cases that saved the right to jury trial of facts in a legal claim
for damages, although the claim was joined with an equitable claim
for injunctive relief;201 federal cases that found legal issues triable of
right by a jury in an equitable procedural device, such as the shareholders' derivative action;202 and federal cases that analogized newlycreated actions to those that existed at common law to determine if
See id. at 543-44, 530 A.2d 729.
See id. at 543, 530 A.2d at 729.
See id.
See id. at 548, 530 A.2d at 732.
Id. at 54445 n.5, 54647, 551, 530 A.2d at 730 n.5, 731, 733.
See id. at 54347, 551-52, 530 A.2d at 729-31, 733-34. The court of appeals
noted the similarity of Beacon Theatres, Inc. v. Westover, 359 U.S. 500 (1959).
200. See Higgins, 310 Md. at 54546, 551, 530 A.2d at 728, 730, 733 (citing Dairy
Queen, Inc. v. Wood, 369 U.S. 469 (1962». In Dairy Queen, the Supreme
Court held that a plaintiff's claim for an equitable accounting for breach of
contract or for infringement of trademark could be remedied by legal damages.
201. See Higgins, 310 Md. at 54546, 551, 530 A.2d at 728, 730, 733 (citing Dairy
QJi,een, Inc., 369 U.S. at 469).
202. See id. at 541, 54546, 530 A.2d at 728, 730-31 (citing Ross v. Bernhard, 396
U.S. 531 (1970».
194.
195.
196.
197.
198.
199.
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they were triable of right by a jury.203 In Higgins, the Court of Appeals of Maryland also speculated that neither procedural "complexity"204 nor equitable protection of a plaintiff from irreparable
harm 205 was a likely ground for denying a jury trial.
The protective approach, however, will not save the jury right
in all Law cases. 206 In Higgins, the court of appeals assumed that an
earlier determination of fact properly tried by a judge would collaterally estop a later trial of the same issue by a jury.207 In a later case,
the court of appeals assumed that reasonable regulations of the jury
right, such as the requirement of a timely demand, do not violate
the right. 208
Maryland cases show that parties themselves can protect their
right to jury trial by the way they structure their claims. A plaintiff
may assert a claim triable by a jury, such as breach of contract,
rather than a claim not triable by a jury, such as breach of trust. 209
A plaintiff may seek a remedy triable by a jury, such as damages or
declaratory judgment, rather than a remedy not triable by a jury,
such as an injunction. 210 A plaintiff may also join legal and equitable
203. See id. at 546, 530 A.2d at 731 (citing Tull v. United States, 481 U.S. 412
(1987), which followed Curtis v. Loether, 415 U.S. 189 (1974), and Pernell v.
Southall Realty, 416 U.S. 363 (1974»; see also Attorney Gen. v. Johnson, 282
Md. 274, 296, 385 A.2d 57, 70 n.19 (1978) (dictum) (citing Pernell with approval); Potomac Elec. Power Co. v. Smith, 79 Md. App. 591, 628, 558 A.2d
768, 785-86 (1989) (citing Curtis for the proposition that the right to jury .
trial applies to newly-created statutory causes of action).
204. See Higgins, 310 Md. at 547 n.7, 530 A.2d at 731 n.7.
205. See id.; see also supra note 191.
206. See infra note 269 and accompanying text.
207. See Higgins, 310 Md. at 545, 551-52, 530 A.2d at 730, 733-34. In Higgins, the
fact issue in one case was common to both legal and equitable claims. Thus,
it was reversible error for the judge to hear the trial of fact first. However, if
the fact had been subject to separate judge and jury determinations in two
different actions, a determination of fact first tried properly by a judge
would likely have collaterally estopped a later trial of the same issue by a
jury. Cf Parklane Hosiery Co. v. Shore, 439 U.S. 322 (1979) (holding that
precluding a party from relitigating facts resolved in an equity proceeding by
a judge did not violate Seventh Amendment right to jury trial).
208. See State v. Attman/Glazer P.B. Co., 323 Md. 592, 606-07, 594 A.2d 138, 145
(1991) .
209. See Fink v. Pohlman, 85 Md. App. 106, 120-21, 582 A.2d 539, 546 (1990).
210. See Attman/Glazer P.B. Co., 323 Md. at 606-07, 594 A.2d at 145 (dictum); see
also Bourne & Lynch, supra note 5, at 33-34, 61, 63-64 (punitive damages may
be awarded only at Law, not at Equity). However, a plaintiff's ability to avoid
a jury trial by choosing an equitable remedy may be limited because of the
equitable prerequisite that there be no adequate remedy at Law, and be-
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claims having common issues of fact, which would be triable by a
jury. 211
Similarly, a defendant may raise issues triable by a jury by way
of answer or counterclaim212 or, absent res judicata, by way of a separate action. 213 Of course, in structuring the counterclaim or defense, a defendant may also choose one triable by a jury.214
Mter Higgins, a second question is whether Maryland's protective approach is tied to interpretations of the federal courts. As has
been shown,215 Higgins relied on the Beacon line of cases. Some of
the reasons for that reliance suggest similar Maryland and federal
interpretations: Maryland and federal courts faced the same situation after the merger of Law and Equity; Maryland's merger rule
was patterned after the federal merger rule, and Maryland traditionally has relied upon federal interpretations of analogous rules. However, other reasons for the Higgins court's reliance on federal cases
suggest that Maryland's primary allegiance is not to federal cases,
but rather to the Maryland Constitution. Federal cases are persuasive insofar as they give primacy to the constitutional jury right,
while other approaches inadequately safeguard the right.
A recent commentator on the Maryland Constitution noted
that our constitutional history includes evidence of all three typical
approaches to state constitutional development in relation to fed-

211.

212.

213.

214.
215.

cause of the right to jury trial of legal issues regardless of how they are characterized. See Dairy Queen v. Wood, 369 U.S. 469 (1962), cited in Higgins, 310
Md. at 546, 530 A.2d at 731.
See Hashem v. Taheri, 82 Md. App. 269, 273, 571 A.2d 837, 840 (1990). In
Hashem, a shareholder joined a legal claim for his own damages with a traditionally equitable derivative suit for an injunction. The court of special appeals held that the issue of whether plaintiff was a shareholder, which was
common to both legal and equitable claims, was triable by a jury. But cf
Bourne & Lynch, supra note 5, at 6 (under Bourne & Lynch's approximation
of pre-merger approach, plaintiff could protect the jury right on the legal
claim by filing separate suits).
See Higgins, 310 Md. at 535 & n.l, 552, 530 A.2d at 725 & n.l, 733-34. For this
reason, "winning a race to court" is unlikely to be helpful for one in the
natural position of a defendant. See LYNCH & BOURNE, supra note 3, at 328,
337 (discussing Higgins); see also Bourne & Lynch, supra note 5, at 49 & n.309
(discussing Beacon).
See Kris Jen Ltd. Partnership v. Fairfax Sav., F.S.B., 100 Md. App. 25, 639 A.2d
206 (1994), rev'd, 338 Md. 1, 655 A.2d 1265 (1995); Bourne & Lynch, supra
note 5, at 6.
See Kahle v. John McDonough Builders, Inc., 85 Md. App. 1441, 1147-53, 582
A.2d 557, 560-63 (1990).
See supra notes 192-207 and accompanying text.
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eral constitutional development. 216 In the first approach, the "lockstep" model, state courts rely on federal analogues. 217 In the second
approach, the primacy model, state courts undertake an independent analysis of the text, structure, and historical intent of the state
constitution and use decisions of the United States Supreme Court
and of other state courts for guidance. 218 In the third approach, the
supplemental model, state courts "fill in the gaps" in areas unprotected, unsettled, or not addressed by federallaw. 219 This commentator concluded that the Maryland courts followed "lockstep" with the
developments in federal law regarding the right to trial by jury in
criminal cases. 220 Of course, the Sixth Amendment right to jury trial
in criminal cases has become binding upon the states through the
Fourteenth Amendment. 221 The Seventh Amendment, providing for
a right to jury trial in civil cases, has not become binding upon the
states. 222
Several things suggest that Maryland's protective approach to
the jury right in civil cases need not follow "lockstep" with federal
court interpretations of the Seventh Amendment, but instead may
be more protective. 223 First, Higgins gave primacy to the Maryland
Constitution, not federal precedents. 224 Second, the Maryland Constitution does not just provide that the right to jury trial shall be
"preserved," as does the Seventh Amendment. 225 Rather, the Maryland Constitution provides that the right shall be "inviolably preserved. "226 Third, the convention debate on the principal Maryland
216. See MICHAEL CARLTON TOLLEY, STATE CONSTITUTIONALISM IN MARYLAND 13-16,
153-59 (1992) (using the approaches described in MARy CORNELIA PORTER &
G. ALAN TARR, STATE SUPREME COURTS IN STATE AND NATION (1988».
217. See id.
218. See id.
219. See id. at 97-102.
220. See id.
221. See id. at 86.
222. See infra notes 34648 and accompanying text.
223. See generaUy ROBERT F. WILLIAMS, STATE CONSfITUTIONAL LAw 166-203 (2d ed.
1993). Williams suggested a number of general considerations justifying state
courts exercising independence in the interpretation of their constitutions:
the primacy of state constitutions, historically and logically; the utility of state
experimentation in our federal system; the diversity of state circumstances
and interests; state courts' familiarity with their states' own circumstances
and interests; and the United States Supreme Court's increasingly conservative interpretation of individual rights in the 1970s and 1980s. See id.
224. See supra note 192 and accompanying text.
225. See U.S. CaNST. amend. VII.
226. See MD. CONST., DECL. OF RiGHTS art. 23. See supra note 8 for text of Article 23.
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jury right shows a specific intent to protect it from encroachment
by the legislature. 227 Finally, the right to jury trial is protected at a
sub-constitutional leveF28 by Maryland statutes229 and rules. 230
Mter Higgins, a third question is why the protective approach is
better than alternatives adopted or considered by other courts after
the merger of Law and Equity. In adopting a protective approach to
the jury right, the Higgins court considered and rejected a variety of
other approaches. The court reasoned that an approach making the
jury right dependent upon whether the issues in a case were
predominantly legal or predominantly equitable 231 is unpredictable 232 and fails to safeguard the right to jury triaF33 of a legal issue
which might be characterized as incidental to an equitable issue. 234
227. See supra note 9 and accompanying text.
228. See WIWAMS, supra note 223, at 194-203.
229. See MD. ANN. CODE art. 23, §§ 318-19 (1996) (actions against telegraph or telephone company for damages to land from construction of lines); id. art. 25,
§ 80 (1996) (review of determination by county commissioners regarding injury to land from ditch or drainage improvement); MD. CODE ANN., REAL
PROP. § 8-332 (b) (1996) (review of action of distress for rent); MD. CODE
ANN., CTS. & JUD. PROC. § 3-2A-06(b) (2) (1995) (action to nullify an award of
health care malpractice claims arbitration panel); id. § 3-404 (action for declaratory judgment); id. § 3-8A-02 (action for mandamus); MD. CODE ANN.,
HEALTH-GEN. I § 7-507(e) (1994) (action for release of person with mental
retardation from state residen tial center); id. § 10-805 (e) ( 1994) (action for
release of person with mental disorder from residential facility or Veterans'
Administration hospital); MD. CODE ANN., TAX-PROP. § 4-403(b) (1994) (state
action against county collector of taxes or surety for failure to remit taxes);
MD. CODE ANN., FAM. LAw § 5-1026(a) (1991) (alleged father in an action for
paternity); MD. CODE ANN., LAB. & EMPL. § 9-745(d) (1991) (review of decision of Workers' Compensation Commission); MD. CODE ANN., NAT. REs. II
§ 9-305(b) (1990) (review of administrative determination of designation of
land as wetlands); MD. CODE ANN., TAX-GEN. § 13-526(a) (1988) (issue referred from Tax Court).
230. See infra notes 1541-1621 and accompanying text.
231. See Higgins, 310 Md. at 540, 542, 546, 530 A.2d at 728, 729, 731; see also
Bourne & Lynch, supra note 5, at 17-19, 57-59 ("essentially" or "basically" legal or equitable).
232. See Higgins, 310 Md. at 548, 530 A.2d at 732; see also Bourne & Lynch, supra
note 5, at 18, 58, 68. Lynch and Bourne also suggest that the characterization of what relief is primary is outmoded after the merger of Law and Equity, and may leave too much discretion in making the characterization to
the trial judge, who may be biased against trial by jury. See Bourne & Lynch,
supra note 5 at 52, 58-59.
233. See Higgins, 310 Md. at 548, 530 A.2d at 730, 732; Bourne & Lynch, supra
note 5, at 20, 54-55.
234. See Higgins, 310 Md. at 544-45, 530 A.2d at 730.
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An approach which would make the jury right depend upon the nature of the first claim asserted 235 might deprive defendants of a
right to jury trial of legal issues later asserted by giving plaintiff a
unilateral choice of trial by judge. 236 An approach which deems a
defendant to have waived a jury right by joining a legal counterclaim to an equitable claim237 might, in light of res judicata, deprive
the defendant of a right to jury trial of a legal counterclaim. 238 An
approach that, in deference to history239 or efficiency,240 would have
a judge determine an entire case involving any equitable issue,241
might deprive the parties of a right to jury trial of legal issues.242
Interestingly, Higgins itself is an example of how the protective
approach safeguards the jury right where each of these other approaches might not. First, the court of appeals compared the facts
of the case, which combined an equitable claim and a legal counterclaim, with similar federal appellate court cases. Those federal
cases ultimately overturned trial court decisions denying the jury
right on the ground that equitable issues predominated over legal
issues. 243 Second, the court held that the legal issue of breach of
contract, raised by answer and counterclaim, was not precluded
from trial by jury because the first claim asserted was equitable. 244
Third, the court held that jury trial of the legal issue in the counterclaim was not waived by being joined to the plaintiff's equitable
claim. 245 Fourth, the court rejected Barnes's contention 246 that, be235. See id. at 54849, 530 A.2d at 732.
236. See id.
237. See id. at 543, 548, 530 A.2d at 729, 732. Joinder of claims is encouraged by
the revised Maryland Rules. See Bourne & Lynch, supra note 5, at 3, 56.
238. See Higgins, 310 Md. at 54344, 548, 55(}'51, 530 A.2d at 729, 732, 733; see also
Bourne & Lynch, supra note 5, at 6-10, 57, 67..Q8.
239. See Higgins, 310 Md. at 536-37, 530 A.2d at 726; Bourne & Lynch, supra note
5, at 44, 46; see also id. at 61..Q2, 64, 69, 76-77. But cf id. at 54-55 (stating
merger eliminates the justification for equitable clean-up due to the cost, delay, and inconvenience of separate actions at Law and Equity in a bifurcated
system).
240. See Higgins, 310 Md. at 540, 530 A.2d at 728; see also Bourne & Lynch, supra
note 5, at 2-3, 63..Q4 & nA08, 69 & nA37, 78. But if. infra notes 889-96 and
accompanying text (providing that modern procedures permit expedition
while preserving the jury right).
241. See Higgins, 310 Md. at 535-36, 530 A.2d at 725-26.
242. See id. at 545, 54849, 530 A.2d at 730, 732.
243. See id. at 54344, 530 A.2d at 729-30.
244. See id. at 535 n.!, 552, 530 A.2d at 725 n.l, 734.
245. See id. at 552, 530 A.2d at 733-34.
246. See id. at 535-36, 530 A.2d. at 725-26.
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cause specific performance was historically an equitable action, the
entire case must be tried by a judge. 247
The protective approach of Higgins may also be compared with
a variety of alternatives adopted by other jurisdictions or suggested
by commentary. First, some courts have taken an approximation of
pre-merger approach: cases which would have been tried at Law
before merger are to be tried a jury; cases which would have been
tried in Equity before merger are to be tried by a judge. 248 However,
the approximation of pre-merger approach is deficient because it
erodes the right to trial by jury of legal issues. 249 For example, in
Higgins, that approach would have denied Higgins a right to jury
trial of factual issues in the defense and counterclaim for damages250 for breach of contract due to equitable clean-up.251 Also, the
approximation of pre-merger approach is difficult to apply because
of definitional and timing problems.
Even before merger, the distinction between Law and Equity
was often difficult to make because of overlaps, such as remedies
for violation of contract/52 due to Law's borrowing from Equity, or
joinder of parties253 and discovery254 because of the development of
new rights and remedies, such as the declaratory judgment. 255 The
merger of Law and Equity makes the distinction even more difficult
because of the liberal joinder of legal and equitable claims and defenses in an action. 256
As to timing problems, if an approximation of pre-merger approach is taken, it may not be clear what time before merger is to
be approximated-immediately before merger,257 the time during
adoption of the Maryland Constitution,258 or some other time. 259 In
247. See id. at 551-52, 530 A.2d at 733-34.
248. See, e.g., JONATHAN M. LANDERS ET AL., CML PROCEDURE 701 (3d. ed. 1992); see
also supra note 14 and accompanying text; infra notes 1128-1514 and accompanying text.
249. See LYNCH & BOURNE, supra note 3, at 331; see also Bourne & Lynch, supra
note 5, at 52.
250. See Higgins, 310 Md. at 551-52, 530 A.2d at 733-34.
251. See id. at 540, 530 A.2d at 728; see also id. at 535-36, 530 A.2d at 725-26.
252. See Bourne & Lynch, supra note 5, at 61.{')2.
253. See id. at 38, 73-76.
254. See id. at 3940, 45 n.291, 71.
255. See id. at 4546.
256. See id. at 55-71.
257. See id. at 4446.
258. See id. at 59 ("Maryland's Constitution preserves the right to trial by jury as it
existed at the time of the adoption of the Constitution vis Ii vis the scope of
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any event, the approximation of pre-merger approach seems outmoded after the merger of Law and Equity.
Merger eliminates the justification for much of the traditional
Equity jurisdiction. As the Beacon court stated, whether there is no
adequate remedy at Law, the prerequisite for Equity jurisdiction
"must be determined, not by precedents decided under discarded
procedures, but in the light of the remedies now made available by
the Declaratory Judgment Act and the Federal Rules."26o Merger
also eliminates the justification for the equitable clean-up doctrine:
the idea that once Equity jurisdiction attached, Equity would resolve
all aspects of a controversy, even those aspects being litigated in a
court of Law. 261
Second, some courts have taken an approach which largely
leaves the mode of trial, by judge or by jury, to the discretion of the
trial judge. 262 In this sense, "discretion" means judicial action largely
unrestricted by standards. 263 However, the discretionary approach is
defective because it threatens the right to jury trial,264 at least where
standards for exercising that discretion are undefined,265 and appel-

259.

260.

261.
262.
263.

264.
265.

equity."). Compare supra notes 31-45 and accompanying text (discussing MD.
CONST., DECL. OF RIGHTS art. 5, and 1776 constitutional jury right), with supra
notes 46-68 and accompanying text (discussing MD. CONST., DECL. OF RIGHTS
art. 23, and 1851 constitutional jury right).
The time prior to Maryland's adoption of its Uniform Declaratory Judgments
Act may serve as an example. See Bourne & Lynch, supra note 5, at 47-50.
The Act was adopted in 1939. See 1939 Md. Laws 294.
Beacon Theatres, Inc. v. Westover, 359 U.S. 500, 507 (1959). Interestingly, the
Beacon Court cited Maryland Theatrical Corp. v. Brennan, 180 Md. 377, 24 A.2d
911 (1942) (demonstrating the utility of the declaratory judgment). That
case held that a court may issue a declaration of the unconstitutionality of
legislation, notwithstanding that an injunction instead of a declaratory judgment was sought, because the defendant was not charged with enforcing the
legislation, and because the official charged with its enforcement would presumably abide by the judgment. See Maryland Theatrical Gorp., 180 Md. at 388,
24 A.2d at 917.
See Bourne & Lynch, supra note 5, at 13-15.
See id. at 19-20, 66; see also id. at 16, 57; LYNCH & BOURNE, supra note 3, at
326, 328, 330 n.191, 331.
See infra note 459 and accompanying text; if. Bourne & Lynch, supra note 5,
at 19, 58-59, 65 (providing "discretion" in characterizing a case as basically,
essentially, or predominantly legal or equitable); supra notes 10-13 and accompanying text ("principled discretionary theory").
See Bourne & Lynch, supra note 5, at 16, 20, 23, 29, 44; see also LYNCH &
BOURNE, supra note 3, at 326, 328, 331.
See Bourne & Lynch, supra note 5, at 20; see also LYNCH & BOURNE, supra note
3, at 331; cf Bourne & Lynch, supra note 5, at 2-3, 58-59 (discussing bias of
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late review is limited to abuse of discretion. 266
The third and fourth approaches that are suggested by commentary would characterize cases as legal or equitable not according to what rights are asserted and what remedies are sought,267 but
according to which courts try the case. Thus, the third approach
considers all civil actions to be actions at Law triable by a jury,268
subject only to constitutional limitations-fact, not law, and more
than $5000 in controversy.269 That is, Equity courts have been abolished and all courts are "Courts of Law" within the meaning of the
Maryland Constitution's jury right.21° Those courts, in addition to
their historical functions, may administer traditionally equitable discovery procedures271 and joinder devices272 and may issue declaratory judgments273 and injunctive relief.274 There is some basis for
~his all-Law approach in the Maryland Constitution. The principal
jury trial provision does provide for the right in civil proceedings in
the "Courts of Law,"275 not, as the Seventh Amendment does, in
"suits at common law. "276 Even before merger, it was standard practice for Equity courts to refer disputed issues of fact to Law courts
for jury trial.277 The term "Courts of Law" was adopted in 1851.278 At
some trial judges against jury trial).
266. See Bourne & Lynch, supra note 5, at 59 & n.374.
267. See Higgins v. Barnes, 310 Md. 532, 540, 551-52, 530 A.2d 724, 728, 733-34
(1987) .
268. See JAMES, supra note 1, at 448; Arthur F. Kingdon, The New Rules are Inadequate, 23 J. AM. JUD. SOC'y 133, 135 (1939). Kingdon, speaking of the merger
of Law and Equity under the Federal Rules, saw bringing the jury in every
case as a "step backward" because the jury has no special qualifications, it is
too large, it is not under close enough control by the judge, and it delays
the trial of cases. See id.
A variation on this approach would be to treat all actions as legal because of the availability of "legal" declaratory relief. See supra note 260 and
accompanying text; infra note 1176 and accompanying text. Supplementary
injunctive relief would be available, if necessary, to secure compliance with
the declaratory judgment. See MD. CaDE ANN., CTS. & JUD. PRaC. § 3412
(1995).
269. See MD. CaNST., DECL. OF RiGHTS art. 23.
270. See id.
271. See Bourne & Lynch, supra note 5, at 36, 45 n.291, 76.
272. See id. at 45 n.291, 72-76.
273. See id. at 47-50.
274. See supra note 174 and accompanying text.
275. See MD. CaNST., DECL. OF RiGHTS art. 23.
276. See U.S. CaNST. amend. VII.
277. See infra notes 304-06 and accompanying text. The reference practice was
later abolished. See supra note 179 and accompanying text.
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the same time, the office of chancellor and the court of chancery
were marked for abolition,279 and that court's jurisdiction was assigned to the circuit courts,280 denoted as "courts of law. "281 However, that interpretation seems contrary to an existing practice
which was continued after 1851. The existing practice was for the
trial courts (the county courts) to have separate sittings as courts of
Law or courts of Equity.282 The jurisdiction of the county courts was
assigned to the circuit courts in 1851.283 The circuit courts' separate
sittings284 and dockets continued until their abolition in 1984 by the
revised Maryland Rules. 285 The 1984 reforms, according to their
framers, were not intended to affect the right to jury trial either. 286
The fourth approach is the opposite-to consider no civil actions to be actions at Law triable by a jury.287 That is, the courts existing after the merger of Law and Equity are a hybrid, they are not
"Courts of Law" or courts of Equity. If they must be categorized as
one or the other, they are more like Equity courts. 288 They may administer traditionally equitable discovery procedures289 and joinder
devices. 29o They may issue essentially equitable declaratory judgments,291 and, like traditional Equity courts,292 may order other ap278.
279.
280.
281.

282.
283.
284.
285.
286.
287.
288.

289.
290.
291.

See MD. CONS[. of 1851 art. X, § 4.
See id. art. IV, § 23.
See id. art. IV, § 8.
See id. art. IV, § 10 (Court of Common Pleas of Baltimore City); id. § 11 (Superior Court of Baltimore City); id. § 24 (filling judicial vacancies); id. § 28
(transfers of venue); id. § 31 (pro se appearances); see also id. art. I, § 2; id.
art. IV, §§ 4, 9, 14; id. art. V, § 1 (criminal convictions disqualifying government officials). But see id. art. IV, § 11 (Superior Court of Baltimore City
with jurisdiction also as a "court of equity").
See EDGAR G. MIllER, EQUITY PROCEDURE 2-3 & n.8 (1897); see also MD. CONS[.
of 1851 art. IV, § 15.
See MD. CONST. of 1851 art. IV, § 8.
See id. art. IV, § 28.
See MD. RULE 2-301 & com.
See id.
See MILTON D. GREEN. BASIC CNIL PROCEDURE 179-80 (2d ed. 1979).
See generaUy Stephen N. Subrin, How Equity Conquered Common Law: The Federal
Ruks of Civil Procedure in Historical Perspective, 135 U. PA. L. REv. 909, 922-26
(1987); Louise Weinberg, The New Meaning of Equity, 28 J. LEGAL EDUC. 532,
534 & n.18 (1977).
See supra note 254 and accompanying text.
See supra note 253 and accompanying text.
See Bourne & Lynch, supra note 5, at 47 n.297. But cJ. id. ("[TJhe courts have
steadfastly refused to so hold."); id. at 47-50 (declaratory judgments are categorized as legal or equitable depending upon the relief for which they are
substituted) .
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propriate relief even if not requested. 293 However, this all-Equity approach has little basis in the Maryland Constitution or practice.
Maryland's Constitution contains various provisions protecting the
right to trial by jury,294 but no right to trial by judge. 295 The merger
of Law and Equity in 1984, according to the framers of the revised
rules, was not intended to affect the right to jury trial. 296 Further, if
other approaches permitting choice between trial by a judge or by a
jury unduly restrict the right to jury trial,297 then considering no actions to be actions at Law triable by jury is improper.
Fifth, commentary suggests that where legal and equitable issues are joined, the case should be tried by a jury. The verdict is
then binding as to legal issues and advisory as to equitable issues. 298
However, the advisory verdict has been abolished in Maryland. 299
Therefore, Maryland doctrine is protective of the jury right. Although Maryland's protective approach is somewhat difficult to define, it has followed federal interpretations of the jury right. There
is some basis, however, for Maryland being even more protective of
the jury right than the federal courts have been. In any event, Maryland's protective approach is better than other alternatives that have
been suggested.

292. See MD. RULE 370(a} (3) (1977) (repealed 1984) (permitting the general equitable plea for "such other and further relief as is just").
293. Cf FED. R CN. P. 54(c} ("Except as a party against whom a judgment is entered by default, every final judgment shall grant the relief which the party
in whose favor it is rendered is entitled, even if the party has not demanded
such relief in the party's pleadings.").
294. See supra notes 31-76 and accompanying text.
295. See supra notes 86-95 and accompanying text.
296. See supra note 286 and accompanying text.
297. See supra notes 233, 236, 238, 242, 249-51, 264-66 and accompanying text.
298. See Fraser v. Geist, 1 F.RD. 267, 269 (E.D. Pa. 1940) (dictum); see al50 JAMES,
supra note 1, at 441-42; if. Bourne & Lynch, supra note 5, at 28 & n.181 (stating jury verdict in a tort claim against the United States and others was
merely advisory against the United States).
299. See MD. RULE 2-511 (d), discussed in Bourne & Lynch, supra note 5, at 35 &
n.221; see also id. at 44 n.284. But if. Fitzgerald v. United States Lines, 374
U.S. 16 (1963) (a seaman's related claims under the Jones Act, triable of
right by a jury, and under admiralty doctrines of unseaworthiness and maintenance and cure, not triable of right by a jury, should both be tried by the
jury). Of course the advisory verdict could be reinstated either by legislative
act or court rule. See infra notes 1531-66 and accompanying text.
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Prudential Concerns

Courts may sometimes avoid deciding issues of constitutional
law, and other times decide issues in subtle, indirect ways rather
than on principle. Courts often invoke doctrines such as case-orcontroversy or justiciability, abstention, vagueness, and overbreadth
to avoid deciding a case on the merits. In order to keep from creating new principles of law, courts may decide the merits but invoke
case-by-case adjudication techniques of balancing the benefits of an
action against its costs or considering all the facts and circumstances
of a situation. Courts use these techniques to safeguard their own
positions, saving their authority for other cases that should be decided on the basis of new legal principles. They also do so to activate the political processes, permitting resolution of problems by
legislators. 300
The right to jury trial presents three prudential concerns. First,
which is superior, trial by judge or by jury? This general issue is
treated in some detail in two other contexts below. 301 Second, in
view of our system of separated powers and checks and balances,
are not both judge and jury desirable? This other general issue is
discussed above as the structural mode of constitutional interpretation. 302 Third, and I believe the most pressing prudential concern,
what are the benefits that flow to judges and our justice system generally when juries, instead of judges, decide cases?
Traditionally, the benefits of trying issues of fact by jury have
been taken for granted in Maryland. Cases on the Law side were
historically tried by jury. It was not until 1864 that the Maryland
Constitution expressly permitted submission of a case for determination by the court without a jury.303 Historically, issues of fact in suits
300. See BOBBfIT, supra note 15, at 62-71.
301. See infra notes 867-955 and accompanying text (discussing judicial economy);
infra notes 956-1124 (discussing the argument that Equity is superior to Law
as a mode of trial). Bourne and Lynch appear to treat these matters as pure
policy concerns, unrelated to constitutional interpretation. See infra notes
870, 959-1124 and accompanying text. In any event, these prudential concerns were specifically overridden when the jury right was adopted as part of
the MD. CONST. See infra notes 933-35, 1114-15 and accompanying text.
302. See supra notes 136-63 and accompanying text.
303. See MD. CONST. of 1864 art. IV, § 8 (providing in part that "the parties to any
cause may submit the same to the Court for determination without the aid
of a jury"). In the convention debate, an opponent argued that the provision was "imposing upon the judge a duty which has not hither been devolved upon him." 2 1864 DEBATES, supra note 89, at 1394.
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in Equity were regularly referred to Law courts for jury triaP04 Professor Brown summarized the reasons for the referral procedure.
Jury resolution of factual disputes on the basis of live testimony was
viewed as superior to the chancellor's fact-finding on the basis of
sworn pleadings and written depositions. 305 Jury trial was considered
to be required in several situations-where facts were strongly disputed, causing reasonable doubt in the chancellor's mind, where
documentary evidence would not clearly resolve the conflict, or
where the credibility of witnesses was important. 306 However, the
chancellor would resolve factual issues where proof was clear, leaving no reasonable doubt, or where the referral to Law for a jury
trial was impractical considering the small amount in controversy.307
Generally, commentators have noted a number of benefits to
judges and our justice system of having juries. First, by providing for
public participation in trials, the jury helps legitimize outcomes. 308
That legitimacy comes from opening the jury to all citizens,309 thus
bringing the authority of the people-the sovereign in a democratic
society-to the execution of the laws. 310 That legitimacy is particularly needed where the decision is difficult. 311
Second, the jury may be a "lightning rod for animosity" that
might otherwise center on the judge.3!2 Because the jury is repre304. See Brown, supra note 85, at 458-65.
305. See id. at 463-64. Oral testimony did not become part of Equity proceedings
until 1890. See id. at 464 n.237.
306. See id. at 462·M & n.238.
307. See id. at 462-64. Amendments to the principal jury trial provision, increasing
the amount in controversy from $5 to $500 in 1970 and from $500 to $5,000
in 1992, may alleviate this concern. See supra notes 128, 130 and accompanying text.
308. See AMERICAN BAR AsSOCIATION/BROOKINGS INSTITUTION, CHARTING A FUTURE
FOR THE CIVIL JURY SYSTEM 10 (1992) [hereinafter ABA/BROOKINGS];
Jonathan D. Casper, Restructuring the Traditional Civil Jury: The Effects of
Changes in Composition and Procedures in VERDICT: AssESSING THE CIVIL JURY SYSTEM 414, 420 (Robert E. Litan ed., 1993).
309. See 2 ALEXIS DE TOCQUEVILLE, DEMOCRACY IN AMERICA 378 (Phillips Bradley
ed., Vintage Books 1954).
310. See id. at 294, 297.
311. See KALVEN & ZEISEL, supra note 121, at 7.
312. See id.; see also Landsman, supra note 162, at 49 ("safety valve"); if. 2 1864 DEBATES, supra note 89, at 1395 (discussing a provision, adopted as MD. CONST.
of 1864 art. IV, § 8, expressly permitting submission of a case for determination by the court without a jury, and a proponent's argument that judges
would likely not want to try onerous cases, such as serious criminal matters,
without a jury); THE FEDERALIST No. 65, at 426 (Alexander Hamilton) (Mod-
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sentative, largely anonymous, and discontinuous, it can deflect criticism that might otherwise be concentrated on a single, visible, and
continuously sitting judge. 313
Third, the jury provides a "black box" decision 314 in some situations where the giving of a reasoned decision might not be appropriate. 315 The jury's "judgment call" might be best where all the
facts and circumstances require an individualized decision,316 where
the facts are difficult to resolve,317 where the jury's decision is more
"equitable" than a strict application of the law,318 or where a conflict between fundamental values leaves only a "tragic choice. "319
Moreover, this "black box" decision is subject to only limited appellate review. 320

,ern Library ed. 1937) (stating a court for the trial of impeachments was
. needed because "[ tJ here will be no jury to stand between the judges who
are to pronounce the sentence of the law, and the party who is receive or
suffer it").
313. See George L. Priest, Justifying the Civil Jury, in VERDICT: AsSESSING THE CIVIL
JURY SYSTEM 103, 107, 124-25 (Robert E. Litan ed., 1993). But if. id. at 124-25,
129, 132 (stating most civil jury cases are routine, rather than notorious). Of
course, to most parties, as well as the jury, no case is "routine." See Landsman, supra note 162, at 49; Marc Galanter, The Regulatory Function of the Civil
Jury in VERDICT: AssESSING THE CIVIL JURY SYSTEM, 61, 88, 101 n.102 (Robert E.
Litan ed., 1993).
314. See Abram Chayes, The &le of the Judge in Public Law Litigation, 89 HARv. L.
REv. 1281, 1287 (1976).
315. Cf Galanter, supra note 313, at 61-62 (stating jury decisions in the aggregate,
along with other predictors, provide a kind of precedent, signaling what
other juries might do).
316. See GUIDO CALABRESI & PHILIP BOBBITT, TRAGIC CHOICES 55, 206·{)7 n.5 (1978).
317. See supra note 306 and accompanying text. In the convention debate on a
provision, adopted as MD. CONST. of 1864 art. IV, § 8, expressly permitting
submission of a case for determination by the court without a jury, an opponent objected that in such cases the judge would have to try the facts as well
as construe the law and that the facts might be complicated. See 2 1864 DEBATES, supra note 89, at 1394. See generally Richard Lempert, Civil Juries and
Complex Cases: Taking Stock After Twelve Years, in VERDICT, AssESSING THE CIVIL
JURY SYSTEM 181 (Robert E. Litan ed., 1993) (concluding that juries may do
as well as judges in deciding complex cases).
318. See KALVEN & ZEISEL, supra note 121, at 107-08 & n.7. lnterestingly, the authors did call this "jury equity."
319. See CALABRESI & BOBBITT, supra note 316, at 57, 110. But if. Priest, supra note
313, at 107-09, 125-26 (stating civil jury does not make decisions involving life
and death, but does determine liability and damages).
320. See supra note 159 and accompanying text.
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Ethical Matters

As noted above, "ethical matters" reflect "the sort of people we
are" and the sort of institutions we have. 321 However, in order for
ethical argument to be a mode of constitutional interpretation, it
must be tied to the constitution, unlike ethical and moral argument
generally.322 Professor Philip Bobbitt described three varieties of ethical interpretation of the United States Constitution. One is a general principle in the constitutional text itself, a principle that may
need interpretation in specific cases. The Ninth Amendment rights
retained by the people 323 and the Fourteenth Amendment "liberty"
protected by due process are good examples. 324 A second variety of
ethical interpretation is a "textual cousin," or an analogy to the
constitutional text. 325 The best example is the incorporation of provisions of the Bill of Rights against the states through the Fourteenth Amendment. 326 A third variety of ethical interpretation is the
use of the constitutional text, not for its own force, but as evidence
of a more general, non-textual principle. 327 The best example is the
general right of privacy described in Griswold v. Connecticut,328 which
was suggested by the specific provisions of the First (right of association) , Third (prohibition of quartering of soldiers), Fourth (right
against unreasonable searches and seizures), Fifth (right against selfincrimination), and Ninth Amendments (other retained rights).329
Ethical argument may help answer two questions. First, how
protective of the jury right should Maryland courts be? Second,
should Maryland courts be at least as protective of the jury right as
the federal courts have been in interpreting the Seventh Amendment? Next, this article examines the three modes of ethical argument-explicit principles, textual cousins, and non-textual principles-to try to answer these two questions.

321.
322.
323.
324.
325.
326.
327.
328.
329.

supra note 15, at 95.
See BOBBITT, supra note 15, at 94-95, 138-41.
See id. at 101, 144, 152, 172-73.
See id. at 98-99, 172-73.
See id. at 142-43.
See id. at 100, 143, 147-53, 168.
See id. at 142.
381 U.S. 479 (1965).
Cf BOBBITT, supra note 15, at 169-75 (classifying various types of constitutional arguments in Griswold).

BOBBITf,
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Explicit Principles

Several explicit principles330 in the Maryland Constitution bear
on the interpretation of the jury right. Two provisions in the Maryland Constitution appear not to protect the jury right. The first provision refers to separate courts of Law and Equity. However, as has
been shown, those provisions assume, as opposed to mandate, separate courts of Law and Equity.33) The second provision allows a party
to submit a case to the court for determination without a jury. However, as previously demonstrated, that provision establishes no right
to trial by judge. 332
Another provision in the Maryland Constitution arguably requires application of the federal, jury-protective Seventh Amendment to Maryland courts. Article 2 of the Maryland Declaration of
Rights makes the federal Constitution and laws supreme over the
Maryland Constitution and laws. That provision states:
The Constitution of the United States, and the Laws made,
or which shall be made, in pursuance thereof, and all Treaties made, or which shall be made, under the authority of
the United States, are, and shall be the Supreme Law of the
State; and the Judges of this State, and all the People of
this State, are, and shall be bound thereby; anything in the
Constitution or Law of this State to the contrary
notwithstanding. 333
However, the convention debates regarding Article 2 make clear
that this supremacy clause was a recognition that the United States
was a union of states, not a compact of sovereign states that remained free to claim "states' rights," to nullify federal law, or secede from the Union. 334 Specifically, Article 2 was held not to affect
330. The principles discussed here are general principles. Specific principles bearing on the jury right are discussed above as part of the constitutional "text."
See supra notes 31-76 and accompanying text.
331. See supra notes 77-83 and accompanying text.
332. See supra notes 86-95 and accompanying text.
333. MD. CONST., DECL. OF RIGHTS art. 2.
334. See DEBATES OF THE MARYLAND CONSTITUTIONAL CONVENTION OF 1867, at 99-107
(1867) [hereinafter 1867 DEBATES]. The predecessor to Article 2 provided:
The Constitution of the United States and the laws made in pursuance thereof being the supreme law of the land, every citizen of
this State owes paramount allegiance to the Constitution and Government of the United States, and is not bound by any law or ordinance of this State in contravention or subversion thereof.
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Supreme Court holdings concerning incorporation of the Bill of
Rights. 335 Thus, Article 2 does not require application of the unincorporated Seventh Amendment to state court proceedings.
Yet another provision in the Maryland Constitution might limit
the jury right in certain cases. As Lynch and Bourne suggest, Maryland's Due Process Clause may limit the jury right in "complex
cases" for two reasons. 336 First, the jury could not comprehend the
issues and evidence in a case. 337 Second, the length of time to try
the case would make business and professional people unable to
participate, depriving the parties of a fair cross section of the comMD. CONST. OF 1864, DECL. OF RIGHTS art. 5. However, the convention debates on Article 5 and the one case interpreting Article 5 are silent on any
intent to make the Bill of Rights generally, or the Seventh Amendment particularly, applicable to the State of Maryland.
The convention debates on the supremacy clause of Article 5 have suggestive references to the Bill of Rights and to its specific provisions. However, there is little support for the idea that the supremacy clause requires
application of the Seventh Amendment or any other provisions of the Bill of
Rights. The many references to the "bill of rights" are not to the first ten
Amendments to the U.S. Constitution, but to the MD. CaNST., DECL. OF
RIGHTS, the MAss. CaNST., BILL OF RIGHTS, or bills of rights generally. See 1
1864 DEBATES, supra note 89, at 296, 306, 326, 327, 328, 329, 469, 494, 497,
502, 504, 510, 515, 525, 526 (referring to the MD. CaNST.); id. at 502 (referring to the Massachusetts Bill of Rights); id. at 305, 329 (referring'to bills of
rights generally). No references to the Seventh Amendment could be found
in the convention debates.
There are references to other provisions of the Bill of Rights. However,
those references are not to rights to be applied against the state. See id. at
445-46 (rights which limit the federal government); id. at 520 (rights improperly suspended during the Civil War by the federal government); cf. id. at
295-97, 510 (comparing Maryland free speech in parliamentary debate with
federally protected speech).
Similarly, the one case interpreting the 1864 version of Article 5 viewed
it as a supremacy clause requiring allegiance to federal law, not as a provision requiring incorporation of the Bill of Rights against the state. See Anderson v. Baker, 23 Md. 531, 617 (1865).
335. Two Maryland cases rely on the old rule from Barron v. Baltimore, 32 U.S. (7
Pet.) 243 (1833), that the Bill of Rights did not apply to the states. See Robb
v. State, 190 Md. 641, 60 A.2d 211 (1948) (holding Fifth Amendment double
jeopardy does not apply in Maryland state proceedings), overruled by Benton
v. Maryland, 395 U.S. 784 (1969); Slansky v. State, 192 Md. 94, 63 A.2d 599
(1949) (holding Sixth Amendment jury trial does not apply in Maryland
state criminal cases), overruled by Duncan v. Louisiana, 391 U.S. 145 (1968).
336. See LYNCH & BOURNE, supra note 3, at 334; see also infra note 969 and accompanying text.
337. See In re U.S. Fin. Sec. Litig., 609 F.2d 411, 419, 427 (9th Cir. 1979).
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munity.338 Nevertheless, a complexity exception has been rejected in
Maryland. 339 Therefore, these explicit principles neither add nor detract from the protection of the right to jury trial.

2.

Textual Cousins

Three federal constitutional and two state constitutional textual
cousins may protect the right to jury trial in civil proceedings in
Maryland courts. The first federal textual cousin is the Sixth
Amendment. Of course the Sixth Amendment, via the Fourteenth
Amendment, requires a jury trial in state criminal prosecutions. 340
By analogy, the Sixth Amendment may protect the right to jury trial
in some civil cases, such as administrative proceedings341 and civil
contempt proceedings,342 that substitute for criminal proceedings. 343
In such cases, a civil jury operates like the criminal jury to protect
citizens from arbitrary or unlawful state prosecution. 344 The Sixth
Amendment makes no distinction between Law and Equity, but excepts "petty offenses"345 and may be more protective of the jury
right than Maryland constitutional provisions.
The second federal textual cousin is the Seventh Amendment.
The Supreme Court has held that the Seventh Amendment is not
applicable to the states directly346 or through the Fourteenth
Amendment. 347 Those holdings have recently been reaffirmed. 348
338. See id. at 427 n.54.
339. See infra notes 959-73 and accompanying text.
340. See Duncan v. Louisiana, 391 U.S. 145 (1968).
341. Cf Camara v. Municipal Court, 387 U.S. 523 (1967); See v. City of Seattle,
387 U.S. 541 (1967) (stating that the Fourth Amendment limits administrative, not just criminal, searches for health violations and fire hazards, respec-·
tively).
342. Cf Juidice v. Vail, 430 U.S. 327, 335-36 (1977) (stating that the state's interests in punishing contempt, whether labeled civil, criminal, or quasi-criminal'
are important enough to cause a federal court to abstain under Younger v.
Harris, 401 U.S. 37 (1971».
343. Cf. Beacon Theatres, Inc. v. Westover, 359 U.S. 500, 515 (1959) (Stewart, J.,
dissenting); Gulfstream Aerospace Corp. v. Mayacamas Corp., 485 U.S. 271,
284 (1988) (stating that declaratory judgments are neither legal nor equitable, but may be considered as substitutes for either legal or equitable relief
for purposes of jury trial and appeal).
344. See generaUy Priest, supra note 313, at 109.
345. See, e.g., Bloom v. Illinois, 391 U.S. 194 (1968).
346. See Lessee of Livingston v. Moore, 32 U.S. (7 Pet.) 469, 551-52 (1833).
347. See Walker v. Sauvinet, 92 U.S. (2 Otto) 90 (1875).
348. See, e.g., Melancon v. McKeithen, 345 F. Supp. 1025 (E.D. La. 1972), afl'd sub
nom., Mayes v. Ellis, 409 U.S. 943 (1972); Bringe v. Collins, 274 Md. 338, 335
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However, the reaffirmations have come without consideration of the
change in the test for determining whether a right housed in the
Bill of Rights is applicable to the states by the Fourteenth Amendment. Previously, the formulation was whether a right was "of the
very essence of a scheme of ordered liberty, "349 'a formulation relying on a more conceptual than historical basis. Currently, the formulation is whether a right is "fundamental to the American
scheme of justice,"350 a formulation relying on American tradition
and practice.
Regarding American tradition, the right to jury trial in civil
cases was continued by state constitution, statute, or common-law
practice in each of the thirteen original states after independence. 351 The lack of a guarantee of the civil jury right in the
United States Constitution was a leading cause for the anti-federalist
attack before its adoption, and a catalyst for the adoption of the Bill
of Rights soon after ratification. 352
Nearly every state constitution guarantees the right to jury trial
in civil cases. 353 Upon reconsideration, therefore, the Supreme
Court might conclude that the Seventh Amendment right to jury
trial is "fundamental to the American scheme of justice" and,
hence, should be applied to the states. Likewise, the Supreme Court
might abandon the process of deciding which provisions of the Bill
of Rights should be applied against the states and conclude that all
provisions should be incorporated. 354
The third federal textual cousin is the Equal Protection Clause
of the Fourteenth Amendment. Professor Don Sampen argued that
the right to jury trial should apply in all cases. 355 He concluded that
the distinction between Law and Equity is grounded solely on historical circumstances and has no rational basis. Thus, the distinction
A.2d 670 (1975).
349. Palko v. Connecticut, 302 U.S. 319, 325 (1937), overruled Uy Benton v. Maryland, 395 U.S. 784 (1969).
350. Duncan v. Louisiana, 391 U.S. 145, 149, 150 n.14 (1968).
351. See Wolfram, supra note 120, at 655.
352. See id. at 656-Q6.
353. See JACK H. FRIEDENTHAL ET AL., CIVIL PROCEDURE 473 (1993); if. id. at 473 n.2
("Colorado, Louisiana, and Wyoming have no constitutional guarantee to
jury trial in civil cases.").
354. Virtually the entire Bill of Rights has been applied against the states. See 2
RONALD D. ROTUNDA & JOHN E. NowAK, TREATISE ON CONSTITUTIONAL LAw 423
(2d ed. 1992).
355. See Don R. Sampen, Law and Equity, the Right to a Jury Trial, and Equal Protection, 70 ILL. BJ. 376 (1982).
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does not even satisfy deferential scrutiny.356 He opined that the distinction is not justified by the parties' expectations, by considerations of efficiency, nor by suitability of issues for jury consideration.
Therefore, the distinction violates the equal protection rights of
persons denied jury trial of fact in equity cases. 357 However, that argument is unlikely to prevail. Deferential scrutiny rarely results in a
holding of unconstitutionality.358 Further, the distinction between
Law and Equity is reflected in another provision of the Constitution
itself - Article 111.359
Two state textual cousins also offer some support for a protective interpretation of the right to jury trial in Maryland. The first
state textual cousin is the right to jury trial in criminal cases under
Articles 5, 21, and 23 of the Maryland Declaration of Rights. As explored above, the Sixth and Fourteenth Amendments of the United
States Constitution may by analogy protect the right to jury trial in
some civil cases. 360 Similarly, the Maryland Constitution's right to
jury trial in criminal cases, which has been interpreted to mirror
the Sixth Amendment,361 may protect the right to jury trial in some
nominally civil cases because of the blurring of lines between civil
and criminal cases. 362 Interestingly, the application of the criminal
right to jury would put jury nullification of the law363 on a firmer
basis because of Article 23's provision making the jury "the Judges

356. See id. The right to jury trial in state courts is not a fundamental right protected by the Seventh and Fourteenth Amendments. See supra notes 34648
and accompanying text. Therefore, discrimination against the exercise of the
right to jury trial would not be subject to strict scrutiny, requiring a compelling state interest and narrowly tailored means. C/, e.g., Zablocki v. Redhail,
434 U.S. 374 (1978) (applying strict scrutiny to a classification interfering
with the exercise of the right to marry, part of the fundamental right to privacy). But see Douglas v. California, 372 U.S. 353 (1963); Griffin v. Illinois,
351 U.S. 12 (1956) (access to appellate courts); Reynolds v. Sims, 377 U.S.
533 (1964) (right to vote in state elections).
357. See Sampen, supra note 355.
358. See City of New Orleans v. Dukes, 427 U.S. 297 (1976) (overruling Morey v.
Doud, 354 U.S. 457 (1957». But see, e.g., City of Cleburne v. Cleburne Living
Ctr., Inc., 473 U.S. 432 (1985).
359. See U.S. CONST. art. III, § 2, cl. 1 ("The judicial Power shall extend to all
Cases, in Law and Equity .... n).
360. See supra notes 337-42 and accompanying text.
361. See generally TOLLEY, supra note 216, at 97-102.
362. See State v. Roll, 267 Md. 714, 298 A.2d 867 (1973) (analyzing civil and criminal contempt).
363. See infra notes 956-1103 and accompanying text.
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of Law, as well as of fact."364
The second state textual cousin is the implied guarantee of
equal protection in the Due Process Clause of Article 24 of the Maryland Declaration of RightS. 365 Generally, the state and federal guarantees of equal protection have been similarly interpreted. 366 The right
to jury trial is a fundamental right under the Maryland Constitution. 367 Classifications significantly interfering with fundamental
rights are subject to strict scrutiny.368 Therefore, classifications such
as the one between Law issues (triable by a jury) and Equity issues
(not triable by a jury) might be subject to strict scrutiny. The distinction between Law and Equity has been described as "outmoded"369 and a "historical fortuity,"370 "historically accidental,"371 and
"accidental and anomalous."372 These descriptions suggest the distinction no longer has any rational basis. If the distinction between
Law and Equity does not satisfy deferential, rational basis scrutiny,373
then the distinction does not satisfy strict scrutiny, requiring a compelling governmental interest and narrowly tailored means. On the
other hand, this argument may not prevail. It may well be that the
distinction between Law and Equity does not significantly interfere
with the right to jury trial,374 which exists only at Law. 375
364. MD. CONST., DECL. OF RIGHTS art. 23. This provision has been narrowly interpreted to include the law of the crime and not procedural and evidentiary
law within the province of the judge. See, e.g., Stevenson v. State, 289 Md.
167, 177-80,423 A.2d 558, 564 (1980).
365. See, e.g., Attorney Gen. v. Waldron, 289 Md. 683, 426 A.2d 929 (1981).
366. See id. at 705, 426 A.2d at 941. But see id. at 717-22, 426 A.2d at 948-50 (stating
that occupation, although not mentioned in the MD. CaNST., is an "important private right"· requiring "heightened scrutiny"); Hornbeck v. Somerset
County Bd. of Educ., 295 Md. 597, 650-51, 458 A.2d 758, 786-87 (1983) (providing that education, although an express right in the MD. CaNST., is not a
"fundamental right" requiring strict scrutiny).
367. See Attorney Gen. v. Johnson, 282 Md. 274, 309, 385 A.2d 57, 77 (1978).
368. See id.
369. Brown, supra note 85, at 444.
370. [d. at 455.
371. WILLIAM CALVIN CHESNUT, SIXTY YEARs IN THE COURTS 21 (1958).
372. PHELPS, supra note 86, at 184 (citing other commentators).
373. See Sam pen, supra note 355 and accompanying text; see also Kirsch v. Prince
George's County, 381 Md. 89, 626 A.2d 372 (1993).
374. Cf Murphy v. Edmonds, 385 Md. 482, 601 A.2d 102 (1992) (holding that a
legislative "cap" on noneconomic damages violates neither the right to jury
trial nor equal protection); Attorney Gen. v. Johnson, 282 Md. 274, 385 A.2d
57 (1978) (holding that medical malpractice arbitration violates neither the
right to jury trial nor equal protection), overruled on other grounds by Newell v.
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Non-textual Principles

The text of the Maryland Constitution provides evidence of a
number of general, non-textual principles bearing on the interpretation of the jury right. Although some of these principles are protective of the jury right, others are ambiguous.
The first general, non-textual principle is that of limited government. 376 Express limits on government in the Maryland Constitution include the following: the reservation of powers and rights in
the people-a general reservation of powers;377 the right to alter, reform, or abolish the form of government;378 the right to vote;379 the
right of referendum;380 and the rights and liberties typical of bills of
rights. 381 Express limits on government also include the following: a
constitution;382 the supremacy of federal law;383 the separation of
government powers among legislative, executive, and judicial
branches;384 a bicameral legislature;385 checks and balances among
the branches;386 the grant of "home rule" powers to local governRichards, 323 Md. 717, 594 A.2d 1152 (1991).
375. See MD. CONST., DECL. OF RIGHTS art. 5 (granting right of "trial by Jury, according to the course of that [Common] Law"); id. art. 23 (granting "right
of trial by Jury ... in the several Courts of Law").
376. Even the inherent plenary authority of the states, as opposed to the supposedly limited enumerated powers of the federal government, is limited. See
BOBBITT, supra note 15, at 147-53; see also Whittington v. Polk, 1 H. & J. 236,
242-43 (Md. 1802).
377. See MD. CONST., DECL. OF RIGHTS art 3.
378. See id. arts. 1, 6.
379. See id. art. 7; id. art. I, § 1.
380. See id. art. XVI, § 1.
381. See, e.g., id. DECL. OF RIGHTS art. 13 (right to petition); id. art. 19 (right to
remedy); id. arts. 16, 21, 23, 25-27 (rights of accused); id. art. 24 (due process); id. art. 31 (quartering of soldiers); id. arts. 36-37 (freedom of religion);
id. art. 40 (free press and speech); id. art. 45 (other retained rights); id. art.
23 (right to trial by jury); see also MD. CONST., DECL. OF RIGHTS art. 46 (equal
rights); id. art. 47 (rights of victims of crime); supra notes 32-69 and accompanying text.
382. See MD. CONST., DECL. OF RIGHTS art. 44 (stating that the MD. CONST. is applicable in time of war, as well as peace, notwithstanding any plea of necessity).
383. See id. art. 2; U.S. CONST. art. VI, d. 2.
384. See MD. CONST., DECL. OF RIGHTS art. 8.
385. See id. art. III, § 1.
386. See, e.g., id. art. II, § 10 (senate advice and consent of executive appointments); id. DECL. OF RIGHTS art. 17 (executive veto of legislation); id. art. 20
(executive pardon); See also id. art. III, § 24 (house of delegates as grand inquest of the state); id. § 26 (impeachment by legislature).
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ments;387 and many others.388
The principle of limited government requires that the jury
right be protected. The jury, through its functions of finding fact
and applying law to fact, may limit the executive branch, which enforces public law and represents the government in criminal and
civil cases. 389 Through the power of nullification, juries may limit
the legislature, which enacts the laws that courts apply. The jury
may also limit the judiciary, which, without the jury, would have
sole discretion to find facts and apply laws. 390
The second general, non-textual principle is that of government by the people, or popular participation in government. 391 Express provisions in the Maryland Constitution which illustrate this
principle include the following: the making of the constitution by
the people;392 the origination of government from the people;393 the
right of the people to alter, reform, or abolish the government;394
the right of the people to regulate the internal government and police of the state;395 the right of citizens to vote for government officers;396 the right of the people to petition the legislature;397 freedom of speech and of the press;398 the right of victims to be heard
in criminal proceedings;399 the ability of citizens to hold public office;400 citizen participation on government commissions;401 the right
387. See id. art. XI (Baltimore City); id. art. XI-A (charter counties); id. art. XI-E
(municipal corporations); id. art. XI-F (code counties).
388. See, e.g., id. DECL. OF RIGHTS art. 6 (accountability of government officers); id.
art. 30 (subordination of the military to the civil power); id. art. 35 (prohibition 6f multiple office-holding); id. art. 41 (prohibition of monopolies); id.
art. II, § 1 (limiting the governor's tenn in office); id. art. III, § 21 (open
legislative proceedings); id. §§ 27-35, 52, 55 (other procedural and substantive limitations on legislation).
389. See, e.g., id. art. II, § 1 (executive power).
390. See Landsman, supra note 162, at 38-39 (Seventh Amendment purposes); see
also supra notes 149-63 and accompanying text (jury role in checks and balances).
391. See BOBBITT, supra note 15, at 129 (government of the people or republican
fonn of government).
392. See MD. CONST. preamble ("We, the People ... declare .... ").
393. See id. DECL. OF RIGHTS art. 1.
394. See id. arts. 1, 6.
395. See id. art. 4.
396. See id. art. 7; id. art. I, § 1.
397. See id. DECL. OF RIGHTS art. 13.
398. See id. art. 40.
399. See id. art. 47.
400. See, e.g., id. art. III, § 9 (right of state citizens to hold office of senator or
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of citizens to nominate persons for office;402 and the right of
referendum. 403
The principle of government by the people requires that the
jury right is preserved. As de Tocqueville put it, the jury is above all
a "political institution," a consequence of "the sovereignty of the
people," and a "means of making the people rule."404
The third general, non-textual principle is government for the
people. The purpose of government is to secure the liberty of the
people. 405 The Maryland Constitution expressly states that it was established to secure "our civil and religious liberty.''406 The principle
of government for the people also requires that the jury right be
protected. Like the jury in criminal cases, in civil cases, when the
government is a party, the jury provides a safeguard from the arbitrary or unlawful exercise of governmental authority.407 That safeguard is needed where the government brings suit against a citizen,408 where a citizen sues the government,409 and in other cases
where the government, its agent, or employee is a party.410 Of

401.
402.
403.
404.
405.

406.

407.
408.

409.
410.

delegate).
See, e.g., id. art. IV, § 4A (Commission on Judicial Disabilities).
See, e.g., id. art. XI-A, § 1 (members of charter county board).
See id. art. XVI, § 1.
1 DE TOCQUEVILLE, supra note 309, at 291-97.
See BOBBITT, supra note 15, at 98-100, 172-73; see also THE DEClARATION OF INDEPENDENCE para. 2 (U.S. 1776) (stating that governments are instituted to
secure certain inalienable rights, including life, liberty, and the pursuit of
happiness).
MD. CONST. preamble; see id. DECL. OF RIGHTS art. 6 (stating that the people
may reform the old government or establish a new government when public
liberty is manifestly endangered); id. art. 7 (providing that the best security
of liberty is the right of suffrage); id. art. 33 (stating that the independence
and uprightness of judges are a great security to the rights and liberties of
the people).
See Priest, supra note 313, at 109-10.
For example, for condemnation of property. See id. at 110. The need for a
safeguard may explain why there may be a jury right in proceedings by the
government to collect taxes. See Allnutt v. Comptroller of Treasury, 61 Md.
App. 517, 527 & n.3, 487 A.2d 670, 675 & n.3 (1985) (dictum); see also infra
notes 1597-1621 and accompanying text (discussing jury right by court rule
in certain proceedings for guardianship of the person). But if. Allnutt, 61
Md. App. at 524-27, 487 A.2d at 674-76 (finding no jury right in Maryland
Tax Court), noted in LYNCH & BOURNE, supra note 3, at 322 n.148. See generally
Wolfram, supra note 120.
Perhaps for damages for false arrest, false imprisonment, assault, or malicious prosecution by a police officer. See Priest, supra note 313, at 110, 118.
See id. at 117-18. Priest found that these cases were infrequently heard by ju-
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course, if the possibility of arbitrary or unlawful governmental authority includes the actions of the judge in a case,411 the jury may
be needed as a safeguard in all civil cases as well.
The fourth general, non-textual principle is the rule of law.
That is "ours is a government of laws, and not of men. "412 Express
provisions of the Maryland Constitution which support the principle
of the rule of law include the following: the making of a constitution;413 the reception of English common law and statutes and acts
of the provincial assembly as law in the new state;414 the accountability of government officials for their official actions;415 the reformation or replacement of arbitrary and oppressive government;416 the
principle that the laws and their execution ought not be suspended;417 the principle that the law should provide remedies and
justice for injuries;418 the principle that martial law should not prevail, except for persons in the armed services;419 that the constitution applies both in time of war and in time of peace and should
not be departed from under the plea of necessity;420 the requirement that officers take an oath to support the constitution and
laws;421 the duty of the governor to take care that the laws are faithfully executed;422 the principle that judges are to be selected from
those who have been admitted to practice law and who are most
distinguished for sound legal knowledge;423 and the principle that
judges are to be disqualified for interest in their cases or for relation to the parties involved. 424

411.
412.

413.
414.
415.
416.
417.
418.
419.
420.
421.
422.
423.
424.

ries. See id. at 118. However, these cases may be increasing in number because of the erosion of governmental immunities and expansion of remedies. See id. at 110.
See supra note 162.
BOBBITf, supra note 15, at 217; see also Comptroller of Treasury v. M.E. Rockhill, Inc., 205 Md. 226, 234, 107 A.2d 93, 98 (1954) (quoting United States v.
Dickson, 40 U.S. (15 Pet.) 141, 162 (1841».
See MD. CONST. preamble.
See id. DECL. OF RIGHTS art. 5.
See id. art. 6.
See id.
See id. art. 9.
See id. art. 19.
See id. art. 32.
See id. art. 44.
See id. art. I, § 9.
See id. art. II, § 9.
See id. art. IV" § 2. Judges are also to be distinguished for their integrity and
wisdom. See id.
See id. art. IV, § 7.
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The principle of the rule of law is ambiguous in relation to the
jury right. On the one hand, the jury seems to be the rule of men,
not the rule of law,425 because the jury is "aresponsible"-it need give
no reason for its decision,426 which is generally unreviewable.427 The
jury has also been characterized as capricious428-as "a twelve-man
ephemeral legislature not elected by voters"-and as a "lawbreaker. "429 On the other hand, the right to jury trial is expressly
provided for in the highest law, the United States Constitution. 430
Indeed, the Due Process Clause prohibits the deprivation of life, liberty, or property except by the judgment of one's peers431 or by the
law of the land. 432 The jury may ensure that the spirit of the law
governs, rather than insisting on strict applications, to ensure justice
in particular cases.433 In view of these ambiguities, the principle of
the rule of law offers little help in determining whether the jury
right should be protected.
The fIfth general, non-textual principle is equal justice under
the law. 434 Express provisions in the Maryland Constitution which
support this principle are the guarantees of due process and an impartial trier of fact. The Maryland Due Process Clause435 has been
held to guarantee, by implication, the equal protection of the
laws. 436 The guarantee of an impartial trier of fact includes the following: the oath taken by all officeholders to act without partiality
425. See KALVEN & ZEISEL, supra note 121, at 8. This conclusion is a complaint of
critics of the jury.
426. See CAiABRESI & BOBBTIT, supra note 316, at 57.
427. See Priest, supra note 313, at 105; see also supra notes 159, 315, 320 and accompanying text. But cf. MD. RULE 2-532 (motion for judgment notwithstanding
the verdict); MD. RULE 2-533 (motion for new trial); MD. RULE 2-535 (revisory
power).
428. SeeJEROME FRANK, LAw AND THE MODERN MIND 192 (1930).
429. JEROME FRANK, COURTS ON TRIAL 129-30 (1949).
430. See supra notes 31-76 and accompanying text.
431. See supra note 71 and accompanying text.
432. See MD. CONST., DECL. OF RIGHTS art. 24.
433. See KALVEN & ZEISEL, supra note 121, at 8-9.
434. See BOBBTIT, supra note 15, at 217; cf. State v. Hutchinson, 287 Md. 198, 222,
411 A.2d 1035, 1048 (1980) (Smith, J., dissenting) (providing that the State
and the defendant stand in a position of equality in criminal case).
435. See MD. CONST., DECL. OF RIGHTS art. 24.
436. See, e.g., Attorney Gen. v. Waldron, 289 Md. 683, 426 A.2d 929 (1981). The
Constitution includes more specific guarantees of equal protection of the
laws. See, e.g., MD. CONST., DECL. OF RIGHTS art. 46 (equality of rights based
on sex).
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or prejudice,437 the requirement of an impartial jury,438 the requirement of an impartial judge,439 and the right of removal upon a
showing that a fair and impartial trial could not be had in the court
where the case is pending. 44o However, the principle of equal justice
under the law is ambiguous as it relates to the jury right. On the
one hand, the jury may be an equalizer between the poor and oppressed and the rich and powerful. 441 On the other hand, it may be
argued that justice requires that all litigants be treated alike. 442 In
view of this ambiguity, the principle of equal justice under the law
offers little help in determining whether the jury right should be
protected.
The sixth general, non-textual principle is that of free political
exchange,443 or, more specifically, the free flow of information from
government to the people. 444 Express provisions in the Maryland
Constitution supporting that principle are as follows: freedom of
speech and of the press;445 the diffusion of knowledge and virtue,
and a system of general education;446 open legislative proceedings;447 .
437. See MD. CONST. art. I, § 9.
438. See id., DECL. OF RIGHTS art. 21 (right to impartial jury in criminal prosecutions); see also MD. CODE ANN .. CTS. & JUD. PROC. § 8-21O(b)(2) (1995) (excuse from a particular jury for inability to render impartial jury service).
439. See MD. CONST. art. IV, § 7 (disqualification of judge for interest, relation, or
representation); see also id. art. IV, § 15 (disqualification of judge who participated in the same case in a lower court).
440. See id. art. IV, § 8(c).
441. See ABA/BROOKINGS, supra note 308, at 9. In the 18th century, a leveling
force may have been needed against creditors. See Landsman, supra note 162,
at 37-38. In the 19th century, a leveling force may have been needed against
merchants, bankers, and industrialists. See id. at 43. In the 20th century, a
leveling force may be needed against manufacturers of toxic substances and
defective products. See id. at 53. However, the research on whether the jury
actually functions as a leveler is ambiguous. See Galanter, supra note 313, at
71-72.
442. The ambiguity as to whether equal justice requires a leveling on the one
hand, or a strict neutrality on the other hand, is similarly present in arguments over affirmative action-whether equal protection requires a raceconscious or a color-blind Constitution. See, e.g., Regents of the Univ. of Cal.
v. Bakke, 438 U.S. 265 (1978).
443. See BOBBITT, supra note 15, at 101.
444. Free political exchange, more broadly, might also involve people informing
the government through popular participation. See supra notes 391403 and
accompanying text. It might also include people-to-people exchanges, intragovernmental exchanges, and inter-governmental exchanges.
445. See MD. CONST., DECL. OF RIGHTS art. 40.
446. See id. art. 43; id. art. VIII, § 1 (free public education).
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membership on government commissions open to the public;448
publication of reports of appellate judicial decisions;449 publication
of an abstract of the accounts of the treasurer;450 and publication of
proposed amendments to the constitution. 451 The principle of free
political exchange requires that the jury right be protected. The
jury is one way to assure public access to information about our system of justice. 452
Thus, four of the six general, non-textual principles suggest a
protective interpretation of the jury right. The other two principles
are ambiguous.
This detailed study of the usual ways of interpreting the constitutional provision for the right to jury trial reveals a solid basis for a
protective approach to the jury right in Maryland. Lynch and
Bourne take a different approach with their principled discretionary
447. See id. art. III, §§ 21, 22, 30 (referring to open meetings, published journals
of proceedings and published laws, respectively).
448. See, e.g., id. art. IV, § 4A (Commission on Judicial Disabilities).
449. See id. arl. IV, § 16.
450. See id. art. VI, § 4.
451. See id. arl. XIV, § 1.
452. Cf Buzbee v. Journal Newspapers, Inc., 297 Md. 68, 465 A.2d 426 (1983) (addressing public and press access to pre-trial proceedings in criminal cases).
Early praise of the civil jury as the people's "school in public affairs" has
come under criticism. An example of such praise can be found in A FARMER,
supra note 154, at 36, 39. For a commentary thereon, see 5 THE COMPLETE
ANTI-FEDERALIST, supra note 154, at 7. See also FEDERAL FARMER, LETTER IV
(Oct. 12, 1787), reprinted in 2 THE COMPLETE ANTI-FEDERALIST, 245, 249-50
(Herbert J. Storing ed., 1981). de Tocqueville praised the jury as a "public
school" in which jurors learn their rights, habits of reason, the spirit of the
laws, equity in judging others, and their duties to society and its government.
See supra note 309, at 294-97. More recently, the jury has been praised for facilitating public understanding of, support for, and confidence in, our legal
system, and for spreading knowledge of law and legal process throughout
the nation. See ABA/BROOKINGS, supra note 308, at 10-11.
There have been several criticisms of the jury as a public school. Jury
service does not come often enough for most citizens to provide them with
much education. See Priest, supra note 313, at 121-23. Even when jury service
comes, the case may be routine, rather than one providing educational opportunities in civic virtues such as a case involving government power or
complex societal values. See id. at 123-24, 126. When jury service does influence citizens, it may disenchant them and cause them to lose confidence in
the administration of justice. See KALVEN & ZEISEL, supra note 121, at 8. Other
mechanisms for educating citizens in civic responsibility, such as public
schools and the media, have developed since de Tocqueville's time. See
Priest, supra note 313, at 120-21, 126-27.
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and actual approximation of pre-merger theory, to which we now
tum.
III. THE LYNCH AND BOURNE PRINCIPLED DISCRETIONARY
THEORY
In their book chapter453 and in an earlier law review article,454
Lynch and Bourne largely ignore the constitutional aspect of the
right to jury trial. The authors do quote the original· and the principal jury trial provisions in the Maryland Constitution and a fragment of the relevant convention debate. 455 They then set forth their
own "principled discretionary" theory, which maintains that the
right to jury trial after the merger of Law and Equity is to be left to
the discretion of Maryland's trial judges, who in turn must be
guided first by standards which reflect four traditional principles
governing the separation of Law and Equity:
The first principle is that Maryland's Constitution preserves
the right to trial by jury as it existed at the time of the
adoption of the Constitution vis a vis the scope of equity.
Second, the scope of equity has historically been measured
with due respect to the importance of the right to trial by
jury. Third, the scope of equity is necessarily limited by the
principle that equity will not intervene where the remedy at
law is full, expeditious and adequate. Finally, it has been
recognized that the scope of equity in Maryland may be expanded by statute or judicial decision. 456
Second, the principled discretionary theory directs that the discretion of Maryland's trial judges should be guided by the common
sense notion that judicial economy is better served by trial by a
judge than trial by a jury. Third, their theory directs that the discretion of trial judges should be guided by the notion that Equity is su-.
perior to Law as a mode of trial. 457
.
The principled discretionary theory may be criticized on four
grounds-two in passing and two in detail. In passing, Lynch and
Bourne do not actually apply that theory when deciding the proper
situations in which the jury right is to apply-their approximation
453. See LYNCH & BOURNE, supra note 3.
454. See Bourne & Lynch, supra note 5.
455. See generally supra notes 7-8 and accompanying text; supra note 9 and accompanying text.
456. Bourne & Lynch, supra note 5, at 59-60 (footnotes omitted).
457. See supra notes 10-13 and accompanying text.
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of pre-merger approach. 458 Also, Lynch and Bourne's principled discretionary theory is a hodgepodge of inconsistent policies. It is like
a faculty meeting without an agenda-interesting, but lackingstructure. That structure should be provided by the constitutional right
to jury trial.
Of course, the idea of principled discretion is an apparent contradiction in terms. To the extent that judges have discretion, they
are not limited by standards. To the extent that judges are limited
by standards, they have no discretion. 459 However, as developed below, discretion and standards often go together. 460
The standards themselves are also inconsistent with each other
and come from different sources. Regarding sources, the six standards include two pure policy matters, three policies describing equitable jurisdiction, and one matter of constitutional law. The pure
policy matters concern the common sense notion that judicial economy is served by trial by a judge, rather than a jury,461 and Equity'S
superiority to Law as a mode of trial. 462 The three policies undergirding equitable jurisdiction include Equity'S respect for the importance of the jury right,463 Equity's prerequisite that there be no adequate remedy at Law,464 and Equity'S expansion and contraction of
the jury right by statute or judicial decision. 465 The matter of constitutional law is the preservation of the jury right as it existed at the
time of the Maryland Constitution's adoption. 466
On their faces, these standards reflect different attitudes towards the constitutional right to jury trial. Three of the standardsexpansion of Equity (and contraction of the jury right) by statute or
judicial decision,467 the common sense notion that judicial economy
is better served by trial by a judge than by a jury,468 and Equity'S su458. See supra note 14 and accompanying text; see also infra notes 1128-1514 and
accompanying text.
459. See Martha Minow, The Supreme Court, 1986 Term-Foreword: Justice Engendered,
101 HARv. L. REv. 10, 13, 26, 71-72 (1987).
460. See infra notes 974-1003 and accompanying text.
461. See infra notes 867-70 and accompanying text.
462. See infra notes 956-68 and accompanying text.
463. See infra notes 636-38 and accompanying text.
464. See infra notes 704-07 and accompanying text.
465. See infra note 788 and accompanying text.
466. See infra note 600 and accompanying text. But see infra notes 591-632 and accompanying text.
467. See infra notes 838-39 and accompanying text.
468. See infra notes 918-19 and accompanying text.
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periority to Law as a mode of trial,469 obviously restrict the jury
right. Three of the standards-preservation of the jury right as it
existed at the time of the constitution's adoption,47o Equity's respect
for the jury right,471 and Equity's prerequisite that there be no adequate remedy at Law472-are nominally protective of the jury right.
Thus, instead of having a unifying theme of the right to jury trial
under the Maryland Constitution, Lynch and Bourne patch together a theory based on a variety of inconsistent standards from
different sources.
The principled discretionary theory suffers from two additional
defects. Each aspect of Lynch and Bourne's theory restricts, rather
than protects, the right to jury trial. Each aspect of their theory is
also contrary to many of the usual ways of interpreting the Maryland Constitution. Those criticisms will now be considered in detail.

A.

Trial Judges' Discretion

The first aspect of the principled discretionary theory advanced
by Lynch and Bourne is the notion that the right to a jury trial is
within the discretion of Maryland trial judges473 who are to be
guided by specified standards. This idea is not protective of the
right to trial by jury and is contrary to accepted methods of interpreting the Constitution.
1.

Not Protective of the Jury Right

The idea of allowing trial judges the discretion, subject to certain standards, to determine whether a trial should be by judge or
by jury may not fully protect the constitutional right to a jury trial.
Lynch and Bourne recognize that judicial discretion may erode the
jury right, at least where standards for exercising that discretion are
undefined and where appellate review is limited to abuse of discretion. 474 That erosion is particularly likely because of the bias held by
469. See infra notes 1104-06 and accompanying text.
470. See infra notes 531-90 and accompanying text.
471. See infra note 633 and accompanying text. But see infra notes 685-93 and accompanying text.
472. But see infra notes 719-86 and accompanying text.
473. See LYNCH & BOURNE, supra note 3, at 326; Bourne & Lynch, supra note 5, at
44; LYNCH & BOURNE, supra note 3, at 328, 330 n.191, 331; see also Bourne &
Lynch, supra note 5, at 34, 29, 4647, 59, 77. But cJ. LYNCH & BOURNE, supra
note 3, at 331 (stating that the discretion of trial judges must be restricted in
some circumstances to protect the right to trial by jury); see also Bourne &
Lynch, supra note 5, at 29, 44, 47.
474. See supra notes 262-66 and accompanying text.
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many trial judges against trial by jury.475
As developed below, Lynch and Bourne try to define the standards which should guide judicial discretion in determining
whether trial should be by judge or jury. However, their definition
does not protect the jury right. Moreover, their position is contrary
to discernible trends in state and federal law to curtail judicial discretion regarding the jury right. In Higgins v. Bames,476 the Court of
Appeals of Maryland described judicial discretion and quoted the
Supreme Court in Beacon Theatres, Inc. v. Westovef77 for the proposition that "such discretion is very narrowly limited and must, whenever possible, be exercised to preserve jury trial. "478 Maryland trial
judges have traditionally had substantial discretion concerning the
conduct of a trial,479 including determinations as to whether a case
is equitable and triable by a judge, or legal and, thus, more properly tried by a jury.480
475. See Bourne & Lynch, supra note 5, at 58-59; see also id. at 2-3. But if. infra note
681 and accompanying text (noting that judges generally favor retention, not
abolition, of the jury trial).
476. 310 Md. 532, 551 n.12, 530 A.2d 724, 733 n.12 (1987).
477. 359 U.S. 500, 510 (1959).
478. Higgins, 310 Md. at 544, 530 A.2d at 730; see also LYNCH & BOURNE, supra note
3, at 331.
479. See generally Pitts v. Pitts, 181 Md. 182, 190-91, 29 A.2d 300, 304 (1942) (dictum) (consolidation of cases); Mead v. Tydings, 133 Md. 608, 612, 105 A. 863,
864 (1919) (dictum) (continuance of proceedings); Connor v. Celanese Fibers Co., 40 Md. App. 452, 459, 392 A.2d 116, 120 (1978), overruled on other
grounds by Eastern Stainless Steel v. Nicholson, 60 Md. App. 659, 670, 484
A.2d 296, 301 (1984), a/I'd, 306 Md. 492, 510 A.2d 248 (1986) (dictum) (separate trial order).
480. See Bourne & Lynch, supra note 5, at 44 & n.280; Brown, supra note 85, at
477-48, 465 (1980). See generally LYNCH & BOURNE, supra note 3, at 328, 330
n.191; Bourne & Lynch, supra note 5, at 16, 57, 66.
Thus, the determination of whether a case is an equitable one or a legal
one might be of the same variety as the application of a procedural rule to a
particular factual situation. See Northwestern Nat'l Ins. Co. v. Samuel R. Ros- _
off, Ltd., 195 Md. 421, 73 A.2d 461 (1950). However, it is not clear to what
extent the determination of whether a case was equitable or legal was a matter for the -discretion of the trial judge. In part, this uncertainty is a result of
the different contexts in which the determination was made. For instance, a
judge's discretion may be limited because the scope of Equity may be overshadowed by a defendant's right to a jury trial. See Bourne & Lynch, supra
note 5, at 31-32, for a review of cases holding that Equity should not have
exercised jurisdiction when it deprived the defendant of the jury trial to
which he otherwise would have been entitled. Adding to the confusion is the
fact that the line between Law and Equity is slowly evaporating. For instance,
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even where there is an adequate remedy at Law, Equity may still exercise jurisdiction. For a discussion of cases allowing Equity courts to support the jurisdiction of a court of Law, see id. at 37-44.
Even the characterization of issues as either legal or equitable guides
the judge's decision. See id. at 47-50 (noting that Law and Equity have concurrent jurisdiction in declaratory judgment situations); id. at 51-53 (typically, claims of title to land are treated as legal); id. at 53-55 (recission and
restitution based upon fraud is handled by a court of Law because merger
overcomes the shortcomings of an Equity court alone hearing the case). Further confusion arises when Equity "cleans up" legal claims. See id. at 55-71.
The compatibility of the defenses and replications available between the two
courts also may direct a judge's decision toward one court as opposed to another. See id. at 29, 34, 64 n.412. The judge may also have less discretion
when determining the appropriateness of dismissing or transferring a case to
a court that lacked jurisdiction originally. See id. at 72-73 (noting a judge has
less discretion because transfer from Equity to Law is mandated for various
questions of fact). A judge'S decision to refer an equitable suit to a Law
court is disfavored. See id. at 35-35, 44 n.284 (noting abolition of advisory juries in Equity). Some issues, however, are individually triable by jury. See id.
at 72. Also, the judge's decision may be facilitated by the fact that Maryland
courts maintain, as much as possible, the separation of legal and equitable
claims. See id. at 34.
The classification of a claim as either legal or equitable is also made
more difficult by the traditional complexities involved in distinguishing
among matters of discretion, law, and fact, and in deciding among applicable standards of appellate review. Of course, deciding whether the nature of
a case is a matter of discretion or is instead a question of law or a mixed
question of law and fact is itself a question of law, fully reviewable upon appeal. See Emory v. Faith, 113 Md. 253, 256-57, 77 A. 386, 387 (1910) (noting
that no appeal lies from an order determining a matter committed to the
discretion of the lower court; the appellate court decides whether the
judge'S decision was within that discretion and whether that discretion was
so exercised as not to impair the established rights of a party).
There are cases suggesting that the scope of Equity jurisdiction or the
requirements of the constitutional right to jury trial are questions of law for
determination by the trial judge. Cf Capron v. Devries, 83 Md. 220, 223-24,
34 A. 251, 251-52 (1986) (holding statutory Equity jurisdiction existed, notwithstanding the jury right); Spangler v. Dan A. Sprosty Bag Co., 183 Md.
166,174,36 A.2d 685, 689 (1944) (holding jurisdiction lies in Equity because
of its more flexible and adaptive remedies). But if. McCoy v. Johnson, 70
Md. 490, 490-92, 17 A.2d 387, 387 (1989) (holding Equity had no jurisdiction
because of the jury right); Clorius v. Watkins, 203 Md. 546, 548-52, 102 A.2d
274, 275-77 (1954) (holding Equity had no jurisdiction because there was an
adequate remedy at Law). Thus, the determination might be of the same variety as the construction of a statute in a case that required the court to determine whether a sled was a vehicle. See generally Moon v. Weeks, 25 Md.
App. 322, 333-36, 333 A.2d 635, 64143 (1975) (holding a sled is a vehicle as
opposed to a motor vehicle, which made it subject to the state's vehicle
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Presumably, a trial judge's determination that a case should not
be tried by jury was reviewable by an appellate court under an
abuse of discretion standard. 481 That appellate review was not prolaws). If the determination is a question of law, it would be fully reviewable
on appeal. See Rohrbaugh v. Estate of Stem, 305 Md. 443, 447 n.2, 505 A.2d
113, 115 n.2 (1986) (holding lower courts' interpretations of law are afforded no presumption of correctness).
Other cases suggest that the determination is a mixed question of law
and fact for the trial judge. See, e.g., Moore v. McAllister, 216 Md. 497, 50511, 141 A.2d 176, 181-83 (1958) (reasoning that whether Equity has jurisdiction is in essence a determination of whether the party seeking equitable relief is entitled to it on the merits under the historic principles of Equity).
Thus, the determination might be of the same variety as the application of
the constitution to a case determining whether or not a motion picture was
obscene. See gencraUy Wagonheim v. Maryland State Bd. of Censors, 255 Md.
297, 305-06, 258 A.2d 240, 244-45 (1969), a/I'd sub nom. Grove Press, Inc. v.
Maryland State Bd. of Censors, 401 U.S. 480 (1971). If the determination is a
mixed question of law and fact, the standard of appellate review the court
would probably apply would be the full independent review normally afforded determinations of constitutional fact, rather than the deferential
clearly erroneous standard afforded to review of facts tried by a trial judge.
See Wagonheim, 255 Md. 297 at 306, 258 A.2d at 244.
Even if the determination of whether a case was an equitable one or a
legal one is for the discretion of the trial judge, that discretion varies. Only
in some cases is it absolute and not open to review. See Newcomer v. Miller,
166 Md. 675, 680-81, 172 A. 242, 244 (1934). The trial judge's discretion is
not absolute where its exercise invades established rights. See id.; if. Bourne
& Lynch, SUPRA note 5, at 23 (stating that in the federal courts, Beacon requires that judicial discretion be limited by the constitutional jury right); id.
at 46 n.295 (stating that a few states have adopted a rule similar to Beacon).
In any event, an appellate court reviewing the exercise of a trial judge's
discretion in determining whether a case is an equitable one or a legal one
may, as a practical matter, require a statement of reasons supporting the determination. If no reasons are stated, the appellate court may find it difficult
to affirm that exercise of discretion. If reasons supporting the determination
are stated, the appellate court may review those reasons to see that the trial
judge's discretion was not abused. Cf Canterbury Riding Condominium v.
Chesapeake Investors, Inc., 66 Md. App. 635, 648-53, 505 A.2d 858, 865-67
(1986) (discussing discretion in certifying as final a judgment as part of a
multiple claim and multiple party action). But see Allnutt v. State, 59 Md.
App. 694, 478 A.2d 321 (1984) (stating that in a tax court proceeding, where
no right to jury trial exists, but where a statute provides that the court in its
discretion may submit issues of fact to a court of Law for trial by jury on a
party's request, the tax court did not abuse its discretion by not submitting
issues without stating reasons).
481. See Brown, supra note 85, at 447-48, 464, 465; see also Moore v. McAllister, 216
Md. 497, 512, 141 A.2d 176, 184 (1958) (stating in dicta that a court might
abuse its discretion by raising lack of equity jurisdiction and dismissing a
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tective of the jury right, however. First, the abuse of discretion standard is a very lenient one, requiring substantial deference to the decision of the trial judge. 482 The trial judge's choice regarding the
mode of trial may have reflected hostility toward the jUry483 and was
often, according to Lynch and Bourne, based upon principles which
provided little guidance. 484 Second, the trial judge's determination
of the mode of trial was not immediately appealable and may have
eluded review altogether. The decision to conduct a trial by judge
or jury was interlocutory, not a final decision from which an immediate appeal might be taken before conclusion of the case in
chief. 485 That the determination of the mode of trial may have
eluded review is most apparent where the party desiring jury trial
prevailed in a trial by judge. 486 Even where the party seeking a jury
trial lost in a trial by judge, the error would be harmless if the appellate court concluded that a jury would have reached the same
decision. 487 The error might also elude review if the jury right was
waived by the parties. In that event, the mode of trial would have
been reviewed on appeal only if the trial court raised the issue sua-

482.

483.
484.
485.

486.
487.

case after a defendant has waived the question of jurisdiction). See generally
Bourne & Lynch, supra note 5, at 59 & n.374.
See Narthwestern Nat'[ Ins., 195 Md. at 436, 73 A.2d at 467; cf. supra note 480
(stating that discretion varies). Only in some cases is discretion absolute and
closed from review. But cf. Narthwestern Nat'[ Ins., 195 Md. at 436, 73 A.2d at
467 (noting that the equitable/legal determination may be outside the trial
judge'S discretion; it may be a question of law fully reviewable upon appeal,
or a mixed question of law and fact, or constitutional fact, subject to independent appellate review).
See supra note 475 and accompanying text.
See supra note 265 and accompanying text.
See Ex parte Johnson, 215 Md. 391, 138 A.2d 347 (1958). Some doubt about
this proposition developed because of the general principle that a decision
settling a constitutional right is an immediately appealable final judgment.
See Condon v. Gore, 89 Md. 230, 234, 42 A. 900, 902 (1899). However, the
Condon principle was eroded and then, sub silentio, overruled. See Old Cedar
Dev. Corp. v. Jack Parker Constr. Corp., 320 Md. 626, 579 A.2d 275 (1990)
(holding that an order striking a demand for a jury trial was not immediately appealable as a "final judgment" under the "collateral order doctrine"). Old Cedar did leave open the possibility that denial of the jury right
might be reviewable by mandamus under extraordinary circumstances. See id.
at 633 n.2, 579 A.2d at 279 n.2 (citing Gulfstream Aerospace Corp. v. Mayacamas Corp., 485 U.S. 271 (1988».
Cf. Master Royalties Corp. v. Mayor of Baltimore, 235 Md. 74, 96, 200 A.2d
652, 664 (1964) (holding that grant of jury trial was not prejudicial error).
But see Brown, supra note 85, at 44748 (denial of jury trial may be prejudicial
error).
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sponte. 488 Thus, that aspect of Lynch and Bourne's principled discretionary theory which states that the jury right should be left to the
trial judge's guided discretion is not protective of the right to jury
trial.

2.

Contrary to the Usual Ways of Interpreting the Constitution

The idea of leaving the determination of the right to jury trial
to the discretion of trial judges is also contrary to accepted notions
of constitutional construction. 489 This judicial discretion is contrary
to the nature of a written constitution-specific, enforceable, and
supreme. 490 The constitutional jury right aims to restrain governmental power. Leaving the jury right to the discretion of trial judges
frustrates this larger purpose. The constitutional right to trial by
jury is clearly not a matter properly left to judicial discretion.
Moreover, such judicial discretion is also contrary to the text of
the constitution. The principal jury right provision provides for a
"right" of trial by jury that is "inviolably preserved. "491 While the
text of the original jury right provision may have left the right sulr
ject to modification by the judiciary,492 that original provision has
been supplemented by the principal jury right provision. 493
The breadth of judicial discretion urged by Lynch and Bourne
is also contrary to the history of the Maryland Constitution. In England, the jury right was intended in part to function as a check on
royal power. 494 In Maryland, the purpose of the right to a jury trial
was to put the right beyond the reach of the legislature and, presumably, the judiciary.495
Such judicial discretion may be contrary to the structure of government. This discretion may be used to eliminate trial by a jury,
which may otherwise soften the harshness of legal doctrines and
serve as a check on the trial judge. 496 The standard of appellate review of a trial judge'S discretion also limits the scope of appellate reSee Moore v. McAllister, 261 Md. 497, 511, 141 A.2d 176, 184 (1958).
See generally supra note 15 and accompanying text.
See supra notes 16-21 and accompanying text.
See supra note 8; see also supra notes 48, 52-69 and accompanying text.
See supra notes 4045 and accompanying text.
See supra note 491 and accompanying text.
See 1 SCHWARTZ, supra note 72, at 4-7, 17-19, 4041; see also supra notes 97-100
and accompanying text.
495. See supra notes 9, 21, 117 and accompanying text.
496. See supra notes 160.62, and accompanying text.
488.
489.
490.
491.
492.
493.
494.
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view, another check on the trial judge. 497
Such judicial discretion is contrary to current doctrine in Maryland. As we have seen, by following the Supreme Court's opinion in
Beacon, the Court of Appeals of Maryland has curtailed judicial discretion to protect the jury right. 498 That doctrine has clarified an
ambiguity as to whether a trial judge has discretion to determine
whether a case was equitable or legal and, thus, triable by a jury.499
Such judicial discretion may be contrary to prudential concerns. Absent clear proof, the jury benefits judges and our justice
system by legitimizing outcomes by being a "lightning rod" for animosity, and by providing a "black. box" decision. 5°O Those benefits
are lost if a trial judge's discretion is exercised to deny trial by jury.
Judicial discretion is contrary to some ethical matters. Subjecting the determination of the right to jury trial to the trial judges'
discretion may violate equal protection. Where the determination is
not made on a rational basis, the judge'S decision a fortiori fails to
meet the strict scrutiny standard required for an infringement of a
fundamental right. 50l Additionally, a trial judge .exercising the jury's
functions of fact-finding and applying law to fact violates the principle of limited government by eroding an express limitation on governmental power. 502 Similarly, the trial judge eliminates popular participation in government by exercising jury functions, thereby
violating the principle of government by the people. 503 When exercising jury functions, a judge essentially eliminates the jury, a safeguard for the liberty of the people. In doing so, a judge might be
violating the principle of government for the people. 504 The trial
judge, exercising jury functions, may also violate the principle of
free political exchange. 505

497.
498.
499.
500.
501.
502.
503.
504.
505.

Cf

supra note 320 and accompanying text (discussing appellate court review
of jury verdicts).
See supra notes 476-78 and accompanying text; see also supra notes 184, 187-88,
189-97 and accompanying text.
See supra note 480 and accompanying text.
See supra notes 312-15, 320 and accompanying text.
See supra notes 365-73 and accompanying text.
See supra notes 376-82, 390 and accompanying text.
See supra notes 391, 404 and accompanying text.
See supra notes 405-11 and accompanying text.
See supra notes 443-52 and accompanying text.
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Strict Historical Test

The second aspect of Lynch and Bourne's principled discretionary theory is that "Maryland's Constitution preserves the right
to trial by jury as it existed at the time of the adoption of the Constitution vis a vis the scope of equity."506 Thus, Lynch and Bourne
suggest that federapo7 and Maryland508 courts have used, or should
use, a static historical test in determining the right to a jury trial.
That is, if a matter would have been heard at Law by a jury at the
time the Maryland Constitution was adopted, it should so be heard
now; if a matter would have been heard in Equity by a judge, it
should so be heard now.
Lynch and Bourne's strict historical test may be criticized on
three grounds. First, the test is unworkable. Problems arise from the
use of history generally, and the history of Law and Equity in
particular.
General problems of arguing from history include the nature
of history and the motivations of those invoking an historical argument. Regarding the nature of history, a strict historical test would,
presumably, be based on patterns,509 not on isolated occurrences.
However, gleaning patterns from practices, which may be patternless,510 may be based on fiat,511 not on history. Of course, history
506. Bourne & Lynch, supra note 5, at 59; see also LYNCH & BOURNE, supra note 3,
at 305, 312.
507. See Bourne &: Lynch, supra note 5, at 11, 15, 29. Elsewhere, of course, Bourne
& Lynch recognize that the effect of Beacon and its progeny has been to
soften the strictness of the historical test in favor of the jury right. See id. at
20-29; LYNCH & BOURNE, supra note 3, at 313, 330, 337.
508. See LYNCH & BOURNE, supra note 3, at 305, 312; Bourne & Lynch, supra note
5, at 36 & n.232, 59. Elsewhere, of course, Bourne & Lynch recognize that
the effect of Higgins, relying on Beacon and other federal precedents, may be
to soften the strictness of the historical test in favor of the jury right. See
LYNCH & BOURNE, supra note 3, at 334-35, 337.
509. The use of history is not easy even when only a single item, not a pattern of
occurrences, is considered. See, e.g., Stanley Fish, Fish v. Fiss, 36 STAN. L. REv.
l325, l327 (1984). The inquiry includes the following questions: What is history? Is this item history? If this item is history, what is the item's meaning?
510. Cf Edith Guild Henderson, The Background of the Seventh Amendment, 80 HARv.
L. REv. 289, 336 (1966) (noting that judge-jury relations in the l3 original
states at the time of the adoption of the Seventh Amendment were nearly
patternless). Another commentator has noted a dispute about the early practice of the chancellor's referral of issues of fact to a Law court for jury trial.
See Brown, supra note 85, at 458-60.
511. Cj., e.g., Garcia v. San Antonio Metro. Transit Auth., 469 U.S. 528, 544 (1985)
(noting that reliance on history to determine what state governmental func-
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may be perceived as a process, not a set of occurrences. 512
Regarding motivation, history may be perceived as establishing
a particular set of results, for example, the duplication of traditional
judge or jury trial practices, or as establishing a principle such as
the preservation or denial of the right to a jury trial. 513 Even if history is used to establish a particular set of results-a strict historical
test- that test may be used, depending upon the motivation of the
user, to preserve the jury right or deny it. As will be demonstrated,
as often as not, the test is not used. 514 Moreover, when it is used,
the historical test generally causes denial of the right. 515
Problems arise from the history of Law and Equity, particularly
in construing a strict historical test as of 1776. These problems include the evolutionary' nature of our civil justice system, the uncertainty of the boundary between Law and Equity, and the encroachment on Law by Equity since 1776, notwithstanding the test.
Coordinate systems of Law and Equity were just one stage in
the evolution of our Anglo-American civil justice system. Earlier
stages included a system of justice that was basically administrative,516 followed by the development of the common law,517 and then
by the development of a supplementary system of Equity.518 The coordinate systems of Law and Equity as they existed in 1776519 have
been largely replaced by a system which has merged Law and Equity
in most instances. 52o In view of that evolution, a strict historical test
of the right to jury trial is arbitrary in several respects. First, that
test freezes the right at a particular time, without regard to earlier

512.

513.

514.
515.
516.
517.
518.
519.
520.

tions were "governmental" and therefore immune from federal governmental regulation, and which functions were "proprietary" and therefore not immune, furnishes an arbitrary standard because of the historical continuum of
practices from before the American Revolution the present).
See CHARLES A MILLER, THE SUPREME COURT AND THE USES OF HISTORY 27-28
(1969); if. Henderson, supra, note 510,' at 336 (the common law is a system,
not just a set of rules).
See John C. McCoid, II, Procedural Reform and the Right to Jury Trial: A Study of
Beacon Theatres, Inc. v. Westover, 116 U. PA. L. REv, 1, 10-15 (1967); see also
Wolfram, supra note 120, at 735.
See infra notes 532-90 and accompanying text.
See infra notes 539-42, 546 and accompanying text.
See THEODORE PLUCKNETT, A CONCISE HISTORY OF THE COMMON LAw 15-16, 81,
355 (5th ed. 1956).
See id. at 20-21,27.
See id. at 673, 675, 681, 684.
See id. at 681-82, 684, 692.
See MD. RULE 2-301; see also FED. R CIY. P. 2.
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and later developments in the relationship between Law and Equity.
Second, the choice by litigants between Law and Equity might have
been based not only on whether a judge or a jury was the trier of
fact, but upon a number of other considerations, such as avoidance
of multiplicity of suits, varying rules of evidence, and the availability
of particular remedies.521 However, the merged procedure has abolished many of the considerations for choosing between Law and Equity.522 Third, the selection of the year 1776 as a benchmark is
pro blematic. 523
The boundary between Law and Equity in 1776, as at other
times, was uncertain. 524 The distinction between Law and Equity, has
often been difficult to discern because of overlaps between the two
systems, because of Law and Equity's borrowings from each other,
and because of the development of new rights and remedies.525
Notwithstanding the strict historical test, Equity has encroached
on Law since 1776. The traditional reference by the chancellor to a
Law court for a jury trial of disputed issues of fact has been abolished,526 the equitable prerequisite that there be no adequate remedy at law has been eroded,527 and the dean-up doctrine has been
extended.528 Apparently, these encroachments have come without
challenge to the right to jury triaP29
.
Thus, Lynch and Bourne's strict historical test is unworkable.·
As developed below, the federal and Maryland courts are now tak521. See JAMES ET AL., supra note 1, at 418-20. Other considerations which might
have influenced a litigant'S choice between Law and Equity procedures include different officials (judge or chancellor), different procedures for commencement of actions (summons or subpoena), pleadill:gs, joinder of claims
and parties, discovery, presentation of evidence (orally or in writing), final
order (judgment or decree), execution (levy or contempt), scope of appellate review, different grounds for relief (of right or by discretion), and different principles of adjudication (precedent or "reason and conscience"). See
generally GINSBERG, supra note 86; MILLER, supra note 282; PHELPS, supra note
86.
522. See LYNCH & BOURNE, supra note 3, at 319-20, 329-30; Bourne & Lynch, supra
note 5, at 45 n.292, 52, 54-55, 76.
523. See infra notes 602-08 and accompanying text.
524. See LYNCH & BOURNE, supra note 3, at 326; Bourne & Lynch, supra note 5, at
33, 44-46; see also id. at 29, 34.
525. See Bourne & Lynch, supra note 5, at 45-46.
526. See infra note 562 and accompanying text.
527. See infra note 563 and accompanying text.
528. See infra note 564 and accompanying text.
529. See Brown, supra note 85, at 451, 469.
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ing a more dynamic historical approach. 530 More importantly, for
the purposes of this Article, Lynch and Bourne's strict historical test
may be criticized because it is not protective of the jury right and
because it is contrary to accepted constitutional principles.
1.

Not Protective of the Jury Right

A strict historical test is nominally protective of the jury right.
That is, if a matter would have been heard at Law by a jury at the
time the Maryland Constitution was adopted, it should be heard by
a jury now. However, Lynch and Bourne use the strict historical test
for determining whether trial should be by judge or jury because
this test tends to restrict rather than protect the right to jury trial. 53!
The test is like a college quota system originally used to assure the
admission of a minimum number of minority students, but later
used to cap the number of minority admissions.
Lynch and Bourne cite a number of Maryland532 and federal 533
cases as authorities for a strict historical test. The Maryland cases include Higgins v. Barnes,534 Impala Platinum Ltd. v. Impala Sales
(US.A.), Inc.,535 Pennsylvania ex rel. Warren v. Warren,536 and Fooks' Executors v. Ghingher. 537 A strict historical test in Maryland courts, according to Lynch and Bourne, would freeze the right to jury trial in
Law actions as of 1776, the date of the first constitutional jury
right. 538
There is language in Higgins, citing Knee v. Baltimore City Passenger Railway,539 supporting a strict historical test. 540 However, Higgins
is not a good example of the use of a strict historical test. There,
530. See infra notes 628-29 and accompanying text.
531. But cf. Brown, supra note 85, at 457-69 (discussing the strict historical test
used to protect the jury right).
532. See LYNCH & BOURNE, supra note 3, at 312 n.48; Bourne & Lynch, supra note
5, at 33, 36 & n.232.
533. See Bourne & Lynch, supra note 5, at 11 n.46, 15.
534. 310 Md. 532, 530 A.2d 724 (1987).
535. 283 Md. 296, 389 A.2d 887 (1978).
536. 204 Md. 467, 105 A.2d 488 (1954).
537. 172 Md. 612, 192 A. 782 (1937).
538. See LYNCH & BOURNE, supra note 3, at 305, 312; see also Bourne & Lynch, supra
note 5, at 33, 36, 59. See generally Fleming James, Jr., Right to a Jury Trial in
Civil Actions, 72 YALE LJ. 655, 655 & n.4 (1963) (providing that a state constitution generally preserves the right to jury trial as it existed in English history at the date of that state's first constitution).
539. 87 Md. 623, 40 A. 890 (1898).
540. See Higgins, 310 Md. at 542-43, 530 A.2d at 729.
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Barnes sued Higgins for specific performance of a contract. Higgins
answered and counterclaimed for damages for breach of the same
contract, and demanded a jury trial. The court of appeals assumed
that because specific performance was historically an action in Equity, once equitable jurisdiction attached, the entire case would
have been determined by the judge and not a jury. Thus, Equity's
"clean-up" jurisdiction would have included Higgins's answer and
counterclaim for damages for breach of contract, legal issues historically triable by jury. However, the court of appeals held that, after
merger of Law and Equity, the constitutional right to jury trial required that the legal issues in Higgins's answer and counterclaim
must be heard by a jury, before the judge decided upon the equitable specific performance claim. Because a jury trial was granted as
to certain legal issues in a context which would have been heard
historically by the judge exercising equitable clean-up jurisdiction,
Higgins did not use a strict historical test, although the case was protective of the jury right.
There is language in Knee supporting a strict historical test. 54 !
Knee is also a good example of the use of a strict historical test, but
in a different context. Knee claimed that a statute, requiring that
costs of his earlier trial be paid before a new trial began, deprived
him of the right to jury trial in the new action. The court of appeals upheld the statute because a similar common-law practice antedated the Maryland Constitution. 542 Thus, Knee used a strict historical test, not to distinguish between actions at Law triable by a jury
and suits in Equity not triable by a jury, but to determine what regulations of the jury right were permitted. Knee's use of a strict historical test in that context was used to restrict the jury right.
There is language in Impala supporting a strict historical test. 543
Nevertheless, Impala is not a good example of the use of a strict historical test. In Impala, the plaintiff sued at Law for contract damages. One of two defendants counterclaimed, asserting a number of
legal and equitable claims and remedies. Presumably, a case combining legal and equitable issues could only have been heard in Equity; once equitable jurisdiction attached, the entire case would
have been determined by the judge. When the plaintiff objected to
trial by jury, the defendant was allowed to strike from the counter541. See Knee, 87 Md. at 625, 40 A at 891.
542. See id. at 632-33, 40 Aat 892.
543. See Impala Platinum Ltd. v. Impala Sales (U.S.A.), Inc., 283 Md. 296, 320-21,
389 A2d 887, 901 (1978).
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claim all relief other than the legal remedy of damages. The verdict
for defendant on the counterclaim was upheld on appeal as properly tried by a jury. Plaintiff's objection, that defendant was allowed
to recover damages on an equitable claim for breach of fiduciary relationship, was rejected because that issue was held to be one which
might be tried at Law as equitable estoppeP44 or fraud. 545 Because a
jury trial was granted as to issues in a context which would have
been heard historically by the judge, Impala did not use a strict historical test. Yet, Impala was protective of the jury right.
There is language in Warren supporting a strict historical test,546
and that case is also a good example of the use of such a test. Warren was an action for support of wife and children brought at Law,
with a demand for jury trial. The court of appeals held that the action should have been brought in Equity, where such actions had
been tried in Maryland as early as 1727. Warren used a strict historical test, but used it to restrict the jury right.
There is language in Fooks' supporting a historical test, but not
a strict historical test. 547 The receiver of an insolvent bank sought to
liquidate the bank's assets by enforcing its stockholders' liability
under an assessment statute enacted in 1910. In a related case, Allender v. Ghingher,548 the court of appeals held that two of the receiver's suits against the stockholders in Equity were improper,
among other reasons, because joinder rules at Law provided an adequate remedy precluding Equity jurisdiction based on multiplicity,
and because of the constitutional right to jury trial. Other stockholders in Fooks' then claimed that a decree entered against them
several years before in a third suit was also void as outside the jurisdiction of Equity. The court of appeals concluded that because of
the "vague and shadowy" distinctions between Law and Equity, the
decree was not void, but only voidable. Being several years after the
time for seeking appellate review had run, the stockholders' challenge to the decree was untimely.

544. Apparently, equitable estoppel could not be heard on the Law side until
long after 1776. See 1888 Md. Laws ch. 547.
545. Apparently, fraud historically could be heard either in Law or in Equity, depending upon the relief sought. See Impala, 283 Md. at 321 n.ll, 389 A.2d at
902 n.ll; see also Richardson v. Stillinger, 12 G. &J. 477 (Md. 1842).
546. See Pennsylvania ex reL Warren v. Warren, 204 Md. 467, 474, 105 A.2d 488, 491
(1954).
547. See Fooks' Ex'rs v. Ghinger, 172 Md. 612, 625, 192 A. 782, 788 (1937).
548. 170 Md. 156, 183 A. 610 (1936).
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Apparently, no claim to the jury right was made in Fooks', as it
had been in Allender, although the issue was similar-the respective
jurisdictions of Law and Equity. However, a strict historical test
would not have helped the stockholders in Fooks' and Allender. The
assessment statute under which the receiver sued the stockholders
was not enacted until 1910. Accordingly, no right to jury trial existed in 1776. Fooks', therefore, could not have used a strict historical test. Although the related case, Allender, was protective of the
jury right, no claim to that right was made in Fooks'. Had such a
claim been made as part of the stockholders' belated claim in
Fooks: that case would not have been protective of the right.
Thus, four out of five of these Maryland authorities-Higgins,
Knee, Impala, and Warren-have language supporting a strict historical test. The fifth, Fooks', has language supporting a historical test,
but not a strict historical test. However, three out of the five authoritie&-Higgins, Impala, and Fooks '-do not actually use a strict historical test. Of the two authorities that do use a strict historical test,
Knee and Warren, both restrict the jury right. Knee uses the test not
to distinguish between Law and Equity, but to determine what regulation of the jury right is permitted. Thus, while Lynch and
Bourne's Maryland authorities have language supporting a strict historical test, more often than not, the test is not applied. Furthermore, when the strict historical test is applied, it is used to restrict
the jury right.
Many other Maryland authorities not cited by Lynch and
Bourne do not use a strict historical approach. Some of those authorities ignore a strict historical test, while protecting the jury
right. By statute in the nineteenth century and by court rule in the
twentieth century, ancillary injunctive relief was provided in actions
at Law; thus, jury trial of legal issues could be had in cases which
earlier could only have been heard in Equity.549 Similarly, by court
rule in the twentieth century a number of other equitable procedures, including discovery, class actions, and intervention, were provided in actions at Law. 550 By court rule in the twentieth century
certain issues in interpleader actions were specifically permitted to
be transferred to Law courts for trial by jury.55) By statute in the
twentieth century the jury right was preserved in certain new pro-

549. See supra note 174 and accompanying text.
550. See Bourne & Lynch, supra note 5, at 72-73.
551. See id. at 73-74.
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ceedings, for example, declaratory judgment actions.552
Other cases and authorities refuse to apply a strict historical
test, while restricting the jury right. Among the cases are Attorney
Grievance Commission v. Kerpelman553 and Houston v. Lloyd's Consumer
Acceptance Corp.554 Kerpelman denied an attorney a right to jury trial
in disciplinary proceedings because the Maryland Rules provided
that such proceedings should be governed by rules which applied in
Equity. However, the Court of Appeals of Maryland cited no historical authority that attorney disciplinary proceedings were equitable
in 1776, although the court did cite later precedents from federal
and state courts. The court also noted that a statutory procedure
for referring factual issues from Equity Law courts for jury determination had been abolished. 555 Houston upheld a court rule requiring
a written election for jury trial, although no such requirement existed at the time the Maryland Constitution was adopted. Analogizing the requirement to the rule of costs in Knee v. Baltimore City Passenger Railwaf56 and the federal jury demand requirement,557 the
court of appeals upheld the rule as a re1asonable regulation of the
right to jury trial.
There are still other authorities that refuse to apply a strict historical test, while restricting the jury right. Bringe v. Collins5 58 upheld
the practice of providing a jury trial only on appeal to a circuit
court from a landlord's action in a district court to recover property. The court of appeals upheld the practice, although the action
was historically one at Law which the right to jury trial attached, although a 1793 statute provided for jury trial in the initial proceedings, and although the jury in the initial proceedings was not abolished by statute until 1886. Summary judgment559 and directed
verdict560 also have been approved, although they did not exist in
1776.

552. See id. at 47-50; if. MD. CODE ANN .. FAM. LAw §§ 5-1026(a), 5-1027(b) (1991)
(paternity proceedings).
553. 288 Md. 341, 420 A.2d 940 (1980).
554. 241 Md. 10,215 A.2d 192 (1965).
555. See infra note 586 and accompanying text.
556. 87 Md. 623,40 A. 890 (1898). See generally supra notes 54142 and accompanying text.
557. See FED. R Cw. P. 38.
558. 274 Md. 338, 347 n.3, 335 A.2d 670, 676 n.3 678-79 (1975).
559. See Fletcher v. Flournoy, 198 Md. 54, 81 A.2d 232 (1951).
560. See Frush v. Brooks, 204 Md. 315, 323-24, 104 A.2d 624, 627-28 (1954).
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One commentator noted three other developments. First, the
eighteenth century practice of a chancellor in Equity referring disputed issues of fact to a Law court for jury triaJ561 became discretionary in the nineteenth century, and was abolished by court rule
in the twentieth century.562 Second, the equitable prerequisite of no
adequate remedy at Law was eroded by a nineteenth century statute
and by a twentieth century court rule that damages at Law were inadequate unless the party against whom damages were sought
posted a bond or otherwise showed property ownership from which
the damages could be satisfied. 563 Third, equitable clean-up jurisdiction grew after 1776. 564
The federal cases Lynch and Bourne cite, including Baltimore &
Carolina Line Inc. v. Redman,565 Dimick v. Schiedt,566 and Liberty Oil Co.
v. Condon National Bank,567 illustrate the strict historical test. According to Lynch and Bourne, a strict historical test in federal court
would freeze jury trial practice as of 1791, the date of the Seventh
Amendment. 568
There is language in Redman supporting a strict historical
test. 569 However, given that Redman arose in a different context, that
case is not a good example of the use of a strict historical test. 570
In Redman, the Supreme Court held that the court of appeals
had the power to give judgment notwithstanding a jury verdict for a
plaintiff, and that a judgment notwithstanding the verdict did not
violate the jury right. The Supreme Court referred to a commonlaw practice of a trial judge submitting a case to the jury while re561. See infra note 586 and accompanying text.
562. See Brown, supra note 85, at 458-66; see also Bourne & Lynch, supra note 5, at
34-35, 44 n.284, 72.
563. See Brown, supra note 85, at 450, 466-69; see also LYNCH & BOURNE, supra note
3, at 318 n.113.
564. See Brown, supra note 85, at 470-73; see also JAMES ET AL., supra note 1, at 41617 (noting that in 1786, English and then American Equity courts began
granting legal relief rather than dismissing a case when the basis for equitable jurisdiction failed).
565. 295 U.S. 654 (1935).
566. 293 U.S. 474 (1935).
567. 260 U.S. 235 (1922).
568. See LYNCH & BOURNE, supra note 3, at 312; Bourne & Lynch, supra note 5, at
11, 15, 29.
569. See Redman, 295 U.S. at 657.
570. Redman qualified Slocum v. New York Life Insurance Co., 228 U.S. 364 (1913),
which did use a strict historical approach, and used it to protect the jury
right. See id. at 656.
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serving a point of law for later decision. 571 A commentary on
Redman has noted that the later decision was made by the court en
banc at Westminster. 572 However, the old common-law practice differs in at least two respects from the practice approved in Redman.
First, the trial judge at common law reserved the point for the
judges en banc; he did not decide it himself. 573 In Redman, the trial
judge reserved the point only until after verdict. He then decided
the point himself, rejecting the defendant's motion to dismiss and
motion for directed verdict. 574 Second, the judgment notwithstanding the verdict at common law came from a court sitting en banc. 575
In Redman, the judgment notwithstanding the verdict came from an
appellate court, the Supreme Court. 576 Thus, Redman dealt not with
a distinction between Law and Equity, but with the judgment notwithstanding the verdict, a device with which the judge in a case at
Law may control the jury. Redman, therefore, arose in a specific context, did not use a strict historical test, and restricted the jury right..
There is language in Dimick supporting a strict historical test. 577
Interestingly, Dimick s holding, but not its dictum, is a good example
of the use of a strict historical test. Like Redman, Dimick arose in a
specific context. In Dimick, the Supreme Court rejected the additur
device of granting a new trial if the defendant did not consent to
an increase in damages. The Court held that additur violated the
Seventh Amendment because no such practice existed in 1791.
However, the Court in dictum endorsed the remittitur device of
granting a new trial if the plaintiff did not consent to a decrease in
damages. The Court rested its endorsement of remittitur on federal
practice dating back only to 1822, and on "the practice of some of
the English judges-a practice which has been condemned .. , by
every reasoned English decision, both before and after the adoption
of the federal Constitution," as contrary to common-law principles. 578 Thus, Dimick dealt not with a distinction between Law and
Equity, but with the conditional new trial, a device by which the
judge may control the jury in a Law case. Therefore, Dimicks holding, which rejected additur, used a strict historical test and pro571.
572.
573.
574.
575.
576.
577.
578.

See id. at 659-60.
See RICHARD H. FIELD ET AL .• CIVIL PROCEDURE 651 (6th ed. 1990).
See Redman, 295 U.S. at 659-60.
See id. at 659.
See supra note 572 and accompanying text.
See Redman, 295 U.S. at 659, 661.
See Dimick v. Schiedt, 293 U.S. 474, 476 (1935).
[d. at 484.
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tected the jury right. By endorsing remittitur in dictum, however,
Dimick did not apply a strict historical test, and restricted the jury
right.
Liberty Oil contains language supporting a strict historical test,579
and is a good example of the use of that test. In Liberty Oil, a contract purchaser of oil lands deposited money with a bank pending
the vendors' proof of titles. Alleging a defect in title, the purchaser
sued the bank for damages. The bank, claiming that it was a disinterested stakeholder and that the vendors had also claimed the deposited money, interpleaded the vendors and asked to be
discharged.
The Supreme Court upheld the Law and Equity Act of 1915,
which permitted the bank's use of equitable interpleader defensively
in an action at Law. The Court held that the defensive interpleader
under the Act was like historical practice. Under the Act, the judge
not only had authority to decide the equitable interpleader, but had
discretion to try any legal issues. Historically, a defendant with an
equitable defense to a Law action could file a bill in Equity to enjoin the action, determine the equitable defense, and, in the judge's
discretion, clean up the legal issues. While a jury had been waived
in writing, the issue was similar, characterizing the case as one at
Law or one in Equity. Moreover, the Supreme Court in dictum considered the implications of the Seventh Amendment right. The
Court held that the case was one in Equity which could be more
fully reviewed by appeal, rather than one at Law subject to more
limited review by writ of error. Liberty Oil, therefore, used a strict
historical test. No claim of jury right was made. Had such a claim
been made, the case would not have been protective of the right
because of the judge's discretionary clean-up jurisdiction.
Thus, all three of these Supreme Court authorities-Redman,
Dimick, Liberty Oit-have language supporting a strict historical test.
Redman and Dimick use the test in determining which of the judge's
devices to control the jury are permitted, but not in distinguishing
between Law and Equity. The Redman and Dimick dicta do not actually use a strict historical test. The Dimick and Liberty Oil holdings do
use a strict historical test. In Dimick, the Court uses the test to protect the jury right, while in Liberty Oil, the Court uses the test to restrict the jury right. Thus, although Lynch and Bourne's Supreme
Court authorities have language supporting a strict historical test, as

579. See Liberty Oil Co. v. Condon Nat'l Bank, 260 U.S. 235, 243 (1922).
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often as not, those cases do not apply the test. When the test is applied, it is used to restrict the jury right.
In other ways, Lynch and Bourne depart from a strict historical
test in order to restrict the jury right. They assume that with Equity
having broad discretion to try all the issues without a jury, in 1776
virtually any combination of legal and equitable claims could be
joined.580 In this context, however, Lynch and Bourne's assumption
is inconsistent with the state of affairs in 1776-the separation of
Law and Equity;581 the limitations on joinder of legal and equitable
claims;582 Equity's respect for the jury right;583 Equity's prerequisite
of no adequate remedy at Law;584 the possibility that Equity's discretion to hear legal issues was very narrowly limited;585 and the power
of Equity to refer issues of fact to Law courts for trial by jury.586
Moreover, elements of Lynch and Bourne's restrictive principled discretionary theory seem inconsistent with a strict historical
approach given the expansion of Equity by statute or judicial decision since 1776,587 and the modern notions that judicial economy is
better served by trial by a judge than trial by a jury588 and that Equity is superior to Law as a mode of triaP89 This departure from a
strict historical test may reflect a more dynamic historical approach-the approximation of pre-merger approach (reflecting developments up to 1984) Lynch and Bourne take when they actually
decide the situations in which the jury right applies. 590

580. See Bourne & Lynch, supra note 5, at 46; see also id. at 54-55, 60, 62,75-77; cf.
id. at 12-15 (federal practice in 1791); see generally LYNCH & BOURNE, supra
note 3, at 307.
581. See LYNCH & BOURNE, supra note 3, at 306, 326; Bourne & Lynch, supra note
5, at 11, 29, 34, 44-45, 55, 64.
582. See BOURNE & LYNCH, supra note 5, at 34-35, 55, 64.
583. See infra notes 633-703 and accompanying text.
584. See infra notes 704-87 and accompanying text.
585. See James, supra note 538, at 693.
586. See LYNCH & BOURNE, supra note 3, at 307 n.12; Bourne & Lynch, supra note
5, at 34-35, 72. One commentator described this practice as virtually creating
a right to have factual issues in Equity resolved by a jury at Law. See Brown,
supra note 85, at 458-66.
587. See infra notes 788-89 and accompanying text.
588. See infra notes 867-955 and accompanying text.
589. See infra notes 956-1124 and accompanying text.
590. See infra notes 1128-1514 and accompanying text.
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Contrary to the Usual Ways of Interpreting the Constitution

A strict historical test is also contrary to many of the usual ways
of interpreting the constitution. A strict historical test is contrary to
the nature of a "living Constitution," one to be interpreted by its
"spirit," not by its "letter. "591 Generally, the constitutional right to
jury trial should be protected, not restricted, in new circumstances
such as the development of substantial rights and remedies,592 the
"borrowing" by Law of procedural devices from Equity such as joinder and discovery,593 and the merger of Law and Equity.594
Analogously, changes in jury qualifications and selection since
the framing of the Maryland Constitution indicate the unworkability
of a strict historical test in interpreting another aspect of the right
to jury trial. Shortly after the Maryland Constitution was adopted,
persons qualifying for jury service were freemen, residents of the
county having the most wisdom and experience, possessing a freehold of fifty acres in the county or possessing property in the state
worth three hundred pounds or more. 595 Selection of jury panels
. 591. See supra notes 26-27 and accompanying text; see also McCoid, supra note 513,
at 11. The inconsistency of constitutionalism with a strict historical test for
interpreting the Seventh Amendment to the United States Constitution has
been noted even by a proponent of that test:
[B]lind adherence to history would seem to place modem judicial
administration in an historical strait jacket, controlled by the policies of a society of 200 years ago. Traditional constitutional analysis
has never been so limited. Ever since Chief Justice Marshall admonished that it "is a Constitution we are expounding," courts generally
have been willing to read the broad language of the Constitution to
account for changing social conditions. A rigid historical approach
in the interpretation of the seventh amendment would seem to be
out of step with the more flexible interpretive approaches generally
employed in delimiting the scope of other constitutional provisions.
Martin H. Redish, Seventh Amendment Right to Jury Trial: A Study in the Irrationality of Rational Decision Making, 70 Nw. U. L. REv. 486, 487 (1975) (footnote
omitted). But cf. id. at 517, 531 (stating that the rigid historical approach
provides flexibility by allowing the legislature to authorize a jury trial).
592. See LYNCH & BOURNE, supra note 3, at 313-15, 337-38; Bourne & Lynch, supra
note 5, at 45-46.
593. See LYNCH & BOURNE, supra note 3, at 319-20; Bourne & Lynch, supra note 5,
at 31, 36, 55-76.
594. See supra note 1 and accompanying text.
595. See Feb. 1777 Md. Laws ch. 15, § 10; Oct. 1777 Md. Laws ch. 16. Apparently,
the person was required to be 21 years of age or older. See 1797 Md. Laws
ch. 87, § 5 (age set at 25); cf. Judiciary Act of 1789, ch. 20, § 29 (providing
that federal courts apply standards of the state in which they sit).
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was apparently left to the discretion of the county sheriffs. 596 Today,
persons qualifying for jury service are citizens of Maryland, residents
of the county in which the court sits, registered voters, at least eighteen years old, and proficient in English. 597 In addition, selection of
jury panels is random 598 and discrimination on the basis of race,
color, religion, sex, national origin, or economic status is
prohibited. 599
A strict historical test is also contrary to the text of the Constitution, namely Article 23, the original Reception Provision, and the
principal jury trial provision. The test is also contrary to the legal
implications that stem from constitutional omissions. The Reception
Provision appears to adopt a strict historical test. That provision
states that "the Inhabitants of Maryland are entitled to the Common Law of England, and the trial by Jury, according to the course
of that Law, and to the benefit of such of the English statutes as existed on the Fourth day of July, seventeen hundred and seventySix."600

However, further investigation of that provision does not support a strict historical test. First, because of the order, punctuation,
and language of the Reception Provision, the July 4, 1776 reference
date may apply only to the reception of English statutes, not the reception of English common law and the trial by jury.601 Thus, the
jury right would not be tied to any historical date.
Second, there are other ambiguities in the Reception Provision
about time and place, casting doubt upon a strict historical test.
With respect to time, it is not clear whether a historical test would
use 1634, 1776, 1851, 1867, or some other year as the time of reference. As developed above, the Reception Provision now establishes
the date for the reception of English law as July 4, 1776.602 However,
596. See Feb. 1777 Md. Laws ch. 15, § 10 (incorporating provincial law); see also
1715 Md. Laws ch. 37, § 1; if. 1797 Md. Laws ch. 87, §§ 1-2 (sheriff'S oath,
assuring integrity, experience, and intelligence of jurors).
597. See MD. CODE ANN., CTS. & JUDo PROC. §§ 8-102, 8-207 (1995); if. 28 U.S.C.
§§ 1863(b) (2), 1865(b) (1994) (federal qualifications).
598. See MD. CODE ANN., CTS. & JUDo PROC. §§ 8-102, 8-205, 8-208 (1995); if. 28
U.S.C. §§ 1861, 1863(b) (1994) (provisions for random selection).
599. See MD. CODE ANN., CTS. & JUDo PROC. § 8-103 (1995); see also U.S. CONST.
amends. 13-15, 19, 24, 26; if. 28 U.S.C. § 1862 (1994) (non-discrimination
provision) .
600. MD. CONST., DECL. OF RIGHTS art. 5.
601. See supra notes 3647 and accompanying text.
602. See supra note 600 and accompanying text. That date was set in 1851. See MD.
CONST. OF 1851, DECL. OF RIGHTS art. 3.
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the original version of the Reception Provision 603 established a
much earlier time for the reception of English law: that of the first
immigration to Maryland in 1634. 604 Of course, the principal provision, Article 23 of the Maryland Declaration of Rights, may have
changed the time of reference. The predecessor of Article 23, which
was initially adopted in 1851, "inviolably preserved" the right. 6oS It
was re-adopted as part of a new Maryland Constitution in 1864,606
was again adopted as part of the current Maryland Constitution in
1867,607 and was subsequently amended in 1970, 1978, and 1992.608
Regarding place, it is not clear whether the English commonlaw jury right was an idealized right, or the right as practiced in England or in Maryland. Maryland jury trial practice is suggested by
the Reception Provision's reference to the use of presumably local,
provincial Maryland "[c]ourts of Law or Equity."609 However, a complaint of Maryland residents was that English authorities had deprived them in many cases of trial by jury.610 English jury trial practice is suggested by the provision of Article 5 that trial by jury is to
be "according to the course of that [English Common] Law. "611
. However, a truer idea of the common-law jury right was one of an
idealized eternal system of principles, of which judicial practice was
only evidence. 612 Thus, the common-law jury right was not amenable
603. See MD. CONST. OF 1776, DECL. OF RIGHTS art. III.
604. The first English settlement in Maryland was in 1634 under a charter granted
in 1632. See MARYLAND MANUAL 1994-1995, at 17.
605. MD. CONST. of 1851 art. X, § 4.
606. See MD. CONST. of 1864 art. XII, § 5.
607. See MD. CONST. of 1867 art. XV, § 6.
608. See supra notes 128-30 and accompanying text.
609. MD. CONST., DECL. OF RIGHTS art. 5. See supra note 7 for full text of the Reception Provision.
610. See 1774 PROCEEDINGS, supra note 105, at 201. The residents of all 13 colonies
made the same complaint. See THE DECLARATION OF INDEPENDENCE para. 20
(U.S. 1776).
611. MD. CaNST., DECL. OF RIGHTS art. 5; cf. Markman v. Westview Instruments,
Inc., 116 S. Ct. 1384, 1389 & n.3 (1996) (stating that the historical test for
determining the meaning of the Seventh Amendment does not deal with
"the possibility of conflict between actual English common-law practice and
American assumptions about what that practice was, or between English and
American practices at the relevant time").
612. See State v. Buchanan, 5 H. &J. 317, 356-59 (Md. 1821). Put another way, the
common law was not just a body' of rules, but a system of jurisprudence combining stability (adherence to precedent) and change (adaptation to new circumstances). See generally ARTHUR R HOGUE, ORIGINS OF THE COMMON LAw 5,
244-45,247 (1966).
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to a strict historical test. 613 Third, the Reception Provision expressly
makes the received English law, perhaps including the jury right,
subject to modification by the legislature,614 and impliedly makes
that law subject to modification by the judiciary.615
A strict historical test is also contrary to the principal jury trial
provision, Article 23. That provision has language suggesting a historical test, stating that the right of trial by jury in "Courts of Law,"
distinguished from courts of Equity (or Chancery),616 shall be "inviolably preserved. "617 However, there is no hint in Article 23 of a strict
historical test, freezing the jury trial practice as of a certain date.
Even if such a test were adopted, Article 23 offers no guidance as to
what the date should be.618
A strict historical test as used by Lynch and Bourne, which
more often restricts the jury right,619 is contrary to implications
which stem from omissions from the Maryland Constitution. As developed above, the Maryland Constitution preserves the right to
trial by jury, not trial by judge or even separate courts of Law and
Equity.620 The strict historical test should be used to preserve, not
just restrict, the jury right. 621

613. See Wolfram, supra note 120, at 736-39, 744-45 (1973); if. supra notes 567-75
and accompanying text (a strict historical test is contrary to the nature of a
"living" constitution). A strict historical test may not work even in longstanding statutory schemes such as those embodied in federal statutes enacted before the FEDERAL RULES OF CML PROCEDURE which conform federal
procedure to state procedure as of certain dates. See CHARLES ALAN WRIGHT,
FEDERAL COURTS 424-26 (5th ed. 1994).
614. See supra notes 4043 and accompanying text.
615. See supra notes 44-45 and accompanying text.
616. See supra notes 47-48 and accompanying text.
617. See supra notes 52-69 and accompanying text'. Interestingly, Bourne and
Lynch often use the term "preserve" and its variants, not in a historical
sense, but as a synonym for "protect." See LYNCH & BOURNE, supra note 3, at
328, 331; Bourne & Lynch, supra note 5, at 15 n.77, 16, 44, 47, 49, 57, 65, 66
n.417, 70-73.
618. See supra notes 602-08 and accompanying text. Such dates could include,
among others, 1634, 1776, 1851, 1864, 1867, 1970, 1978, and 1992.
619. See supra notes 531-90 and accompanying text.
620. See supra note 77 and accompanying text.
621. See Wolfram, supra note 120, at 735-36 (1973) (providing that the historical
test under the Seventh Amendment should "preserve" the right to jury trial,
not jury practice in 1791); McCoid, supra note 513, at 14 (providing that the
Seventh Amendment's pro-jury bias, reflected in Beacon's flexible historical
test, operates only to expand, not curtail, the jury trial).
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A strict historical test is contrary to the history of the jury right.
That history spans a period from the Magna Carta in 1215 to the
most recent amendment in Maryland in 1992.622 Selection of the
date of July 4, 1776 to freeze the jury right seems particularly arbitrary given that colonists were then complaining that they were being deprived of their jury right. 623 Selection of that date also seems
contrary to the purpose of Article 23, which put the jury right beyond the power of amendment or repeal by the legislature, a power
held by these branches in 1776.624
A strict historical test may be contrary to the structure of government. Juries, which find facts and soften the harshness of legal
doctrine, provide a check on the trial judge. 625 When the strict historical test is used to restrict rather than protect the jury right, this
check on the trial judge is eliminated.
The strict historical test is also contrary to doctrine. There is
some past support in Maryland626 and federal 627 doctrine for a strict
historical test. However, Lynch and Bourne recognize that the federal courts now take a dynamic, rather than a strict historical approach,628 which Maryland follows. 629
A strict historical test may also be contrary to prudential concerns. Having the jury decide cases benefits judges and our justice
system. The jury helps legitimize the outcome, acts as a "lightning
rod," and provides a "black box" decision. 630 These benefits are lost
when the strict historical test is used to restrict, rather than protect
the right to jury trial.
A strict historical test may also be contrary to some ethical matters. A strict historical test as of 1776, and one used more often to
restrict than protect the jury right, seems likely to fail deferential
equal protection scrutiny under either the Fourteenth Amendment
of the United States Constitution, or Article 24 of the Maryland Dec622.
623.
624.
625.
626.
627.
628.

See supra notes 97-131 and accompanying text.
See supra notes 105-06 and accompanying text.
See supra notes 113, 115-17 and accompanying text.
See supra notes 160-62 and accompanying text.
See supra notes 53148 and accompanying text.
See supra notes 565-72 and accompanying text.
See LYNCH & BOURNE, supra note 3, at 330, 337; see also Bourne & Lynch, supra
note 5, at 4; if. JAMES ET AL., supra note 1, at 422 ("elastic" historical test);
McCoid, supra note 513, at 14, 23-24 ("flexible" or "principled" historical
test); Redish, supra note 591, at 487-502, 530-31 ("rational" historical test).
629. See LYNCH & BOURNE, supra note 3, at 337.
630. See supra notes 308-20 and accompanying text.

386

Baltimore Law Review

[Vol. 26

laration of RightS. 631 Used in this way, a strict historical test may also
violate the principles of limited government, government by the
people, government for the people, and free political exchange. 632
Thus, the aspect of Lynch and Bourne's principled discretionary theory that the Maryland Constitution requires use of a strict
historical approach in determining the jury right, is not protec·tive
of the jury right and is contrary to many of the usual ways of interpreting the constitution.

C.

Equity Respects the Jury Right

The third aspect of Lynch and Bourne's principled discretionary theory is that "the scope of equity has historically been measured with due respect to the importance of the right to trial by
jury. "633 That principle applies in both federal 634 and Maryland635
courts. Apparently, this principle of Equity's respect for the jury
right is more a policy of Equity than a matter of constitutional
right636 in both federal 637 and Maryland638 courts. Lynch and Bourne
seem to make the right to jury trial discretionary with trial judges. 639
This reduction of a constitutional right to a discretionary policy
is somewhat like the disclaimer in many college catalogs. Mter setting forth admission, tuition, curriculum, degree, and other requirements, the catalog notes that those requirements are subject to
change at any time, and that the catalog is not to be considered a
contract.
A number of examples illustrate the principle that Equity respects the jury right. Some examples of limitations on equitable jurisdiction based on respect for the right to jury trial mentioned by
Lynch and Bourne include the following: the equitable prerequisite
that there be no adequate remedy at Law,640 the ability of Equity to
631. See supra notes 365-74 and accompanying text.
632. See supra notes 376441, 443-52 and accompanying text.
633. Bourne & Lynch, supra note 5, at 59-60; see also LYNCH & BOURNE, supra note
3, at 306·07, 326.
634. See Bourne & Lynch, supra note 5, at 17; see also id. at 23.
635. See id. at 17, 34, 59-61; see also id. at 29-33, 50, 78.
636. See LYNCH & BOURNE, supra note 3, at 335.
637. See Bourne & Lynch, supra note 5, at 16. But if. id. at 23, 49 (emphasizing
jury trial being a constitutional right in Beacon).
638. See id. at 29, 31-33, 34. But if. id. at 50; LYNCH & BOURNE, supra note 3, at 328
(emphasizing jury trial being a constitutional right).
639. Cf supra notes 473-505 and accompanying text (stating that the first aspect of
principled discretionary theory was the trial judge'S discretion).
640. See infra notes 704-09 and accompanying text.
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transfer cases with legal issues to Law courts,641 the unwillingness of
Equity courts to identify declaratory judgment actions as inherently
equitable,642 and the ability of Law courts to issue injunctions as ancillary relief. 643
Examples of limitations on equitable jurisdiction based on respect
for the right to jury trial which Lynch and Bourne fail to mention
include the following: the right to jury trial of the issue of paternity
in equitable paternity proceedings,644 the right to jury trial regarding the appointment by Equity of a guardian for an allegedly disabled person who has not consented to the appointment,645 and the
reluctance of Equity courts to issue injunctions in certain cases.646
Still other limitations on Equity might indicate respect for the
right to jury trial, but seem to be motivated by other concerns.
Those limitations include both the gradual evolution of Maryland
courts from separate courts of Law and Equity to a merged court
system647 and the statutory limitations on equitable power.
In early colonial Maryland, common-law courts adjudicated legal matters and a chancellor administered Equity.648 The grants of
641. See supra note 586 and accompanying text.
642. See Bourne & Lynch, supra note 5, at 19 & n.109; LYNCH & BOURNE, supra
note 3, at 337-38; see also Bourne & Lynch, supra note 5, at 47-50.
643. See supra note 174 and accompanying text. In cases where an injunction was
issued as ancillary relief in an action at Law, the order of trial reflects the
principle that Equity respects the jury right. The claim for legal relief was required to be tried first, and the judge, in fashioning injunctive relief, was required to follow the factual findings of the jury. See Bourne & Lynch, supra
note 5, at 55-56.
644. See supra note 552.
645. See MD. RULE 10-205 (b).
646. See, e.g., Prucha v. Weiss, 233 Md. 479, 480, 197 A.2d 253, 256 (1964) (anticipated libel).
647. See infra notes 648-56 and accompanying text (describing the principal steps
in that evolution). For a discussion of other steps in the evolution, see supra
note 586 and accompanying text (discussing the ability of Equity to transfer
cases with legal issues to Law courts), LYNCH & BOURNE, supra note 3, at 319
& n.124, 336 (discussing the borrowing by Law courts of certain equitable
procedures such as discovery), Bourne & Lynch, supra note 5, at 39-40, 42-43,
75-76 (discussing same), id. at 14-15, 29, 34 (discussing the borrowing by Law
courts of certain equitable defenses such as fraud), and supra note 174 and
accompanying text (discussing the ability of Law courts to issue injunctions
as ancillary relief).
648. See MILLER, supra note 282, at 2-3. The history of the chancellor and courts of
chancery from the beginning of the Province of Maryland is summarized in
CARROLL T. BOND, THE COURT OF APPEALS OF MARYLAND 4-5 (1928).
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some Equity powers to the common-law courts in 1763,649 and full
Equity powers to the common-law courts in 1815,650 together with
the abolition of the office of chancellor in 1851,651 seem to have
been based on efficiency rather than on respect for the right to jury
trial.
The grant of Equity powers to the common-law courts which
existed in each county, rather than the retention of all Equity powers in one chancellor for all of Maryland, was apparently designed
to make Equity accessible to all residents of Maryland, especially
those in counties remote from the chancellor.652 The abolition of
the office of chancellor seemed to have been an economy measure. 653 The chancellor's work could be accomplished by the common-law courts which had Equity powers. 654 The 1984 merger of
Law and Equity procedures655 also was designed for simplicity and
efficiency.656
Statutory limits on equitable power do not indicate respect for
the right to jury trial. An old lower federal court case, Baker v. Biddle,657 established a framework for analyzing the issue. English courts
were of general jurisdiction. Resulting overlaps in jurisdictions be~
tween the courts of Law and Equity were left to be defined by those
courts by their own usages. 658 In the United States, the limited jurisdiction of the federal courts was defined by constitutional provisions
and by statute, and the powers of both Law and Equity were vested
in the same courts. 659 Thus, the Equity powers of the federal courts
were limited by the interlocking provisions of the Seventh Amendment right to jury trial, and the Judiciary Act of 1789's denial of Equity jurisdiction where there was an adequate remedy at Law. 660 The
649. See 1763 Md. Laws ch. 23, § 5.
650. See 1815 Md. Laws ch. 163, § 1.
651. See MD. CONST. of 1851 art. IV, § 23.
652. CJ. ELBERT M. BYRD, THE JUDICIAL PROCESS IN MARYLAND 9 (1961) (stating that
accessibility was the motivation for an earlier constitutional amendment establishing judicial districts).
653. See 2 1851 DEBATES, supra note 9, at 502, 562, 568-69, 592.
654. See id. at 562, 632.
655. See MD. RULE 2-301 committee note.
656. See Preface to TENTATIVE DRAFr OF REvISED MARYLAND RULES OF PROCEDURE, 9
Md. Reg. 2384-85 (Nov. 26, 1982).
657. 2 F. Cas. 439 (C.C.E.D. Pa. 1831) (No. 764).
658. See id. at 445-46.
659. See id. at 446.
660. See id. at 443-45. The Seventh Amendment was proposed by the First Congress, which also enacted the adequate remedy at Law provision of the Judi-
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state courts, having general jurisdiction, followed the English tradition of judicially defined jurisdictional limits. 661 Of course, the jurisdiction of the state courts was also limited by supreme federal law662
and by whatever constitutional and statutory provisions the states
themselves chose to adopt.
While Maryland has constitutional limits, including the right to
jury trial, on the equitable powers of its trial courts, there are no
specific statutory limits on those powers. That is, there is no statute
denying Equity jurisdiction where there is an adequate remedy at
Law. 663 On the other hand, there is no statute preferring the rules
of Equity to those of Law where the two differ: 664 The only significant statutory limitations on Equity powers are general in nature,
and reserve jurisdiction to other tribunals. The jurisdiction and
powers of the circuit courts, which are the trial courts of general jurisdiction, are defined as follows:
The circuit courts are the highest common-law and equity
courts of record exercising original jurisdiction within the
State. Each has full common-law and equity powers and jurisdiction in all civil and criminal cases within its county,
and all the additional powers and jurisdiction conferred by
the Constitution and by law, except where by law jurisdiction has been limited or conferred exclusively :upon another tribunal. 665
Thus, the circuit courts have full Equity powers,666 except where ju-

661.
662.

663.

664.
665.
666.

ciary Act of 1789, ch. 20, § 16, 1 Stat. 82 (repealed 1948). Congress's intent
was to connect the two provisions. See Baker, 2 F. Cas. at 444. Technically, the
right to jury trial between 1789 and 1791, when the Seventh Amendment was
adopted, was based on other provisions of the Judiciary Act of 1789. See Judiciary Act of 1789, ch. 20, § 9 (District Court) (repealed 1948); id. § 12 (Circuit Court) (repealed 1911), id. § 13 (Supreme Court) (codified as amended
28 U.S.C. § 1872 (1997»; I Stat. at 77,80,81.
See Baker, 2 F. Cas. at 445.
In some cases, acts of Congress have made the jurisdiction of the federal
courts exclusive of the state courts. See WRIGHT, supra note 613, at 43-44.
Such acts are supreme over state law under the provisions of the Supremacy
Clause. See U.S. CaNsT. art. VI.
Cf LYNCH & BOURNE, supra note 3, at 307, 326; Bourne & Lynch, supra note
5, at 60 (equitable principle). See generaUy infra notes 704-09 and accompanying text.
Cf Bourne & Lynch, supra note 5, at 58 n.373 (citing a Connecticut statute).
MD. CODE ANN., CTS. & JUD. PROC. § 1-501 (1995).
See MILLER, supra note 282, at 1-2; PHELPS, supra note 86, at 27.

390

Baltimore Law Review

[Vol. 26

risdiction has been limited, for example, by the constitutional right
to jury trial, or where jurisdiction is exclusively granted to other
tribunals, such as the federal courts,667 health care malpractice arbitration panels,668 district courts,669 and workers' compensation commissions. 67o There are express limits on the Equity jurisdiction of
the other state trial courts, the district courts,671 but the effect of
those limits is merely to reserve the remaining Equity jurisdiction to
the circuit courts. 672
Lynch and Bourne's principle, that Equity respects the jury
right, .may be criticized on several grounds. One is that the principle is unworkable for a number of reasons. First, as we have seen,
the boundary line between Law and Equity is uncertain. 673 Indeed, a
. primary rationale for distinguishing between the two is the circular
proposition that Law uses the jury trial and Equity does not. 674
Thus, Equity'S respect for the jury trial is likely to be of little help
in defining the scope of Equity.
.
Second, the best protection for the right to jury trial has historically been the separation of Law and Equity.675 Of course, the
667.
668.
669.
670.
671.
672.
673.
674.
675.

See supra note 662.
See MD. CODE ANN., CTS. & JUD. PROC. § 3-2A-D2(a) (1995).
See id. §§ 4401, 4405.
See MD. CODE ANN., LAB. & EMPL. § 9-509(a) (1991).
See MD. CODE ANN., CTS. & JUD. PROC. § 4402(a) (1995).
See LYNCH & BOURNE, supra note 3, at 69-70.
See supra note 545 and accompanying text.
See Phelps, supra note 86, at 33, 185.
See LYNCH & BOURNE, supra note 3, at 306, 326; Bourne & Lynch, supra note
5, at 11, 29, 34, 4445. The separation of Law and Equity in modem times in
Maryland may not have offered the same limits on Equity jurisdiction that
the separation of the two systems had in England at the time of American
independence. One commentator noted the existence in the seventeenth
and eighteenth centuries of three checks on the English chancellor's encroachment on common-law jurisdiction: opposition from Law courts, opposition from Parliament, and appellate review by the House of Lords, which
was, as a practical matter, controlled by common lawyers. See PHELPS, supra
note 86, at 14-18. In Maryland, similar checks do not now exist. Law and Equity are administered by the same courts. See supra notes 648-56 and accompanying text. There is no "war between the courts." PHELPS, supra note 86, at
14-17. The state legislature has not limited Equity'S encroachment on Law.
See supra notes 663, 665-72 and accompanying text; see also infra notes 788-866
and accompanying text. There is appellate review of Equity'S exercise of jurisdiction. See generally MD. CaNST. art. IV; MD. CODE ANN., CTS. & JUD. PROC.
§§ 12-101 to -702(1995). However, there is no practical control of state appellate courts by attorneys from the common-law bar in Maryland, see 1831
Md. Laws ch. 268, §§ 1, 3, as in England, see Supreme Court of Judicature
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merger of Law and Equity removes that protection. 676
Third, Equity may be expanded by statute or judicial decision. 677
Yet, that expansion might come at the expense of Law and the jury
right. 678 Often, the courts do not even recognize the threat to jury
trial from the expansion of equitable jurisdiction. 679
Fourth, trial judges may be biased against jury trial. 68o That bias
appears paradoxical in light of the principle that Equity has
respected the right to jury trial and in light of surveys showing that
trial judges generally favor retention, not abolition, of the jury trial
in civil cases. 681 However, the bias may be explained by the following distinctions: (1) the bias may be that of trial judges,682 not the
appellate judges whose opinions are reported as respecting the
right to jury trial;683 (2) the bias may be one occasionally reflected
in denying jury trial in particular situations, such as "complex"
cases,684 not in the generality of situations; (3) the bias may not reflect institutional bias, but rather the personal self-regard of trial

676.
677.
678.
679.

680.
681.

682.
683.
684.

Act, 1873, 36 & 37 Vict., ch. 66, § 87 (repealed). The common-law and Equity bars have been integrated. However, a check on Equity jurisdiction that
exists now in Maryland, but did not then exist in England, is a democratic
influence on the selection of judges. Now in Maryland," the judge in a court
exercising Equity jurisdiction is popularly elected or is appointed by a popularly elected official. See MD. CaNST. art. lV, §§ 3, 5, 5A, 41D. In England, the
chancellor has historically been an official appointed by a hereditary monarch. See GoEBEL, supra note 105, at 493.
See LYNCH & BOURNE, supra note 3, at 307, 326; Bourne & Lynch, supra note
5, at 4, 15, 20, 4647, 78.
See Bourne & Lynch, supra note 5, at 60. See generally infra notes 788-866
and accompanyIng text; LYNCH & BOURNE,. supra note 3, at 321.
See infra note 789 and accompanying text.
See Bourne & Lynch, SUPRA note 5, at 77; see also supra note 529 and accompanying text. In many cases there may have been no question of the right to
jury trial because no jury was demanded or no question of fact was in dispute. See Bourne & Lynch, supra note 5, at 52-53,77.
See Bourne & Lynch, supra note 5, at 2-3, 59.
See, e.g., May/June 1977 ATLA BAR NEWS 5. In that survey of 6,049 state and
495 federal trial judges in which nearly 53% responded, 92.5% of state
judges and 89.3% of federal judges favored retention of the jury trial. See id.
See supra note 680 and accompanying text.
See Bourne & Lynch, supra note 5, at 23, 49 (Supreme Court of the United
States); id. at 17, 29-31, 33, 50, 59-60 (Court of Appeals of Maryland).
See LYNCH & BOURNE, supra note 3, at 333-35; Bourne & Lynch, supra note 5,
at 27 & n.162. Compare Morris S. Arnold, A Historical Inquiry in the Right to
Trial by Jury in Complex Civil Litigation, 128 U. PA. L. REv. 829 (1980), with.
James S. Campbell & Nicholas LePoidevin, Complex Cases and Jury Trials: A
Reply to Professor Arnold, 128 U. PA. L. REv. 965 (1980).
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judges who may believe that they themselves can judge a case better
than a jury could, despite believing that the jury is generally a good
thing.
Perhaps more significantly for the purposes of this Article,
Lynch and Bourne's principle that Equity respects the jury right
may also be criticized because it fails to protect the jury right, and
because it is contrary to accepted methods of constitutional
in terpretation.

1.

Not Protective of the Jury Right

Of course, the principle that Equity respects the jury right is
nominally protective of the right to jury trial. However, as described
by Lynch and Bourne, the principle fails to protect the right to jury
trial in three ways-two in theory and one in practice. First, the
principle seems to be one of policy, not of constitutional right. 685
Thus, like other policy, the principle is subject to change by the legislature or judiciary; the principle is not fundamental, like a constitutional right. 686 Second, the principle is just one of six aspects of
Lynch and Bourne's principled discretionary theory. Thus, it is not
afforded the supremacy ordinarily conferred upon constitutional
rights as against other conflicting policies. 687 Third, the principle
that Equity respects the jury right has not proven effective in
practice.
Lynch and Bourne identify the following past equitable encroachments by Equity on Law: the growth of the equitable cleanup doctrine,688 the abolition of the traditional reference by the
chancellor to a Law court for jury trial of disputed issues of fact,689
the erosion of the equitable prerequisite that there .be no adequate
remedy at Law,690 and the intervention of Equity in certain areas involving legal rights because of the presence of fraud,691 the need for
an accounting,692 or the danger of multiplicity of actions. 693 Thus,
685.
686.
687.
688.

689.
690.
691.
692.

See supra notes 636-38 and accompanying text.
See infra note 694 and accompanying text.
See infra note 695 and accompanying text.
See LYNCH & BOURNE, supra note 3, at 307; Bourne & Lynch, supra note 5, at
13, 54, 57, 60, 62, 75, 78. Other commentators have noted the expansion of
the clean-up doctrine. See supra note 564 and accompanying text.
See supra note 562 and accompanying text.
See supra note 563 and accompanying text.
See Bourne & Lynch, supra note 5, at 38-42; see also LYNCH & BOURNE,' supra
note 3, at 316, 335 n.219.
See LYNCH & BOURNE, supra note 3, at 318-19, 335 n.219, 336-37; Bourne &
Lynch, supra note 5, at 42-43. But if. LYNCH & BOURNE, supra note 3, at 332-
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the aspect of Lynch and Bourne's principled discretionary theory
that Equity respects the right to jury trial is not protective of the
right to jury trial.
2.

Contrary to the Usual Ways of Interpreting the Constitution

The principle that Equity respects the right to jury trial is also
contrary to accepted principles of constitutional interpretation.
Thus, the aspect of Lynch and Bourne's principled discretionary
theory that Equity respects the jury right fails to protect or "preserve" the jury right and is contrary to many of the usual ways of interpreting the Maryland Constitution. An equitable policy of respect
for the jury right is contrary to the nature of a written constitution.
The jury right is fundamental law-it is part of a constitution, which
is a compact of the people through an elected convention. The jury
right is not just policy subject to change by the legislature or judiciary.694 The constitutional jury right is also supreme-it prevails over
other conflicting laws and policies. 695
An equitable policy of respect for the jury right is also contrary
to the text of the constitution. The principal jury right provision expressly provides for a "right" of trial by jury, mandates recognition
of that right, and provides that it be "inviolably preserved. "696
An equitable policy of respect for the jury right is contrary to
the history of the Maryland Constitution. The purpose of the principal jury right provision was to put the right beyond the reach of
policy-making by. the legislature and, presumably, the judiciary.697
An equitable policy of respect for the jury right is contrary to
doctrine. While support for the jury right before merger of Law
and Equity was somewhat ambiguous,698 since Higgins followed the
Supreme Court's lead in Beacon, Maryland courts have clearly taken
a protective approach to the jury trial as a constitutional right. 699
That protective approach is consistent with commentators on Mary-

693.

694.
695.
696.
697.
698.
699.

33, 336 (stating that Dairy Queen limits the need for accounting in federal
courts).
See Bourne & ILynch, supra note 5, at 43-44. But if. LYNCH & BOURNE, supra
note 3, at 320 (stating that merger, joinder, and long-arm jurisdiction may
render multiplicity obsolete); Bourne & Lynch, supra note 5, at 44.
See supra notes 23-25 and accompanying text.
See supra note 21 and accompanying text.
See supra notes 49-69 and accompanying text.
See supra notes 9, 20, 116-18 and accompanying text.
See supra notes 170-83 and accompanying text.
See supra notes 184-97 and accompanying text.
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land's jury right,7<JO other than Lynch and Bourne. 701
The equitable policy of respect for the jury right is contrary to
one of the ethical matters. Ours is a limite.d government, expressly
restricted by a constitution,702 which includes a right to jury trial 703
as a limit on the policy-making branches of government.

D.

Equity Will Not Act Where the Remedy at Law is Adequate

The fourth aspect of Lynch and Bourne's principled discretionary theory is that "the scope of equity is necessarily limited by the
principle that equity will not intervene where the remedy at law is
full, expeditious and adequate. "704 This principle that there be no
adequate remedy at law705 applies in both federaF06 and Maryland707
courts. According to Lynch and Bourne, this principle is a bulwark,
protecting the right to jury trial in both federal 708 and Maryland709
courts.
Although Professor Douglas Laycock wrote that the adequate
700. See Brown, supra note 85, at 455-74; NILES, supra note 96, at 34344.
701. But if. supra notes 636-38 and accompanying text (discussing the conflict between respect for the jury right as policy and as constitutional right).
702. See supra note 382 and accompanying text.
703. See supra note 381 and accompanying text.
704. Lynch & Bourne, supra note 5, at 60; see infra notes 70fJ:.(J7.
705. This adequate remedy at Law prerequisite is the "longstanding principle of
equity" to which Lynch and Bourne referred in their article. See Bourne &
Lynch, supra note 5,' at 22. In the article, they concluded that the Supreme
Court misread its precedents, and that Beacon misread Scott. See Bourne &
Lynch, supra note 5, at 22-23. Bourne & Lynch wrote that Beacon derived
from Scott the "longstanding principle of equity" that the right to jury trial
cannot be impaired by any blending of legal and equitable claims. The authors misread Beacon. The "longstanding principle of equity" to which Beacon
referred is that "equity has always acted only when legal remedies were inadequate." Beacon Theatres, Inc. v. Westover, 359 U.S. 500, 509 (1959); see id.
at 505, 506-07,516-17 (Stewart, j., dissenting).
706. See LYNCH & BOURNE, supra note 3, at 329-33, 337; Bourne & Lynch, supra
note 5, at 4, 12-25.
707. See LYNCH & BOURNE, supra note 3, at 307, 316; Bourne & Lynch, supra note
5, at 29-77.
708. See LYNCH & BOURNE, supra note 3, at 330-33; Bourne & Lynch, supra note 5,
at 12, 21-22; see also Ross v. Bernhard, 396 U.S. 531, 539 (1970) (citing
Schoenthal v. Irving Trust Co., 287 U.S. 92, 94 (1932), and Hipp v. Babin, 60
U.S. (19 How.) 271,278 (1856».
709. See LYNCH & BOURNE, supra note 3, at 307, 326; Bourne & Lynch, supra note
5, at 29-30, 51, 61, 70; see also Shorl'!ham Developers, Inc. v. Randolph Hills,
Inc., 269 Md. 291, 303-05, 305 A.2d 465,473-74 (1973).
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remedy at Law principle 710 is dead,711 Lynch and Bourne's conclusion that the principle protects the right to jury trial has some truth
to it.7l2 Laycock's thesis was that those cases stating the principle actually reached their conclusions on other grounds. 713 However, his
focus was on the adequate remedy at Law principle as a basis for
courts choosing between legal remedies, such as damages, and equitable remedies, such as injunctive and other forms of specific relief. 714 Layc;:ock conceded that the adequate remedy at Law principle
was used occasionally to protect the right to jury trial.715 However,
Laycock concluded that the rule is not a factor in most jury trial
disputes and may even be a basis for denying the jury right. 716 Thus,
in this context, Laycock's report of the death of the adequate remedy at Law principle is an exaggeration. 717 Nonetheless, the report
of the death of the principle was not much of an exaggeration until

710. See DOUGLAS LAYCOCK, THE DEATII OF TIlE IRREPARABLE INJURY RULE 8 (1991).
Laycock equates two rules: (1) Equity will act only to prevent irreparable injury, and (2) Equity will act only if there is no· adequate legal remedy because "what makes an injury irreparable is that no other remedy can repair
it." [d. (endnote omitted); see also id. at 239.
711. See id. at vii, 5, 7, 24; if. JAMES ET AL., supra note 1, at 448 (stating the principle "had been in a state of substantial atrophy for two hundred years"
before Beacon ); Bourne & Lynch, supra note 5, at 45 n.290 (citing Blackstone, discussing the extent and variety of cases in Equity courts that suggest
that the law was a "dead letter"). But if. LYNCH & BOURNE, supra note 3, at
329 (stating that Beacon "reincarnated the concept of the adequacy of the legal remedy" in the context of the right to jury trial).
712. See supra notes 708'{)9 and accompanying text.
713. Those other grounds include courts' fear of ordering preliminary relief prior
to full trial and deliberation, deference to other tribunals such as courts, administrative agencies, or the executive branch, fear of interference with
countervailing rights such as free speech and the right to work, fear of imposing hardship on a defendant or others, deference to more particular law,
hostility to the merits of plaintiff's case, avoidance of cases that are moot or
not ripe, and avoidance of decrees that would be difficult to supervise. See
LAYCOCK, supra note 710, at 5, 110-236.
714. See id. at 12-16. Laycock was not interested at all in the adequate remedy at
Law principle as a basis for courts choosing between Law and Equity, generally. He found the distinction purely historical and dysfunctional in court systems with merged procedure. See id. at viii, ix, 11-16.
715. See id. at 213-17.
716. See infra notes 767-69 and accompanying text.
717. Cf THE OXFORD DlcrIONARY OF QUOTATIONS 550 (2d ed. 1955) (citing Samuel
Langhorne Clemens (Mark Twain) in a cable from Europe to the Associated
Press: "The report of my death was an exaggeration.").
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fairly recently.718
Lynch and Bourne's principle that Equity acts only where there
is no adequate remedy at Law may be criticized because it fails to
protect the jury right and because it is contrary to accepted principles of constitutional interpretation.
1.

Not Protective of the Jury Right

The principle that Equity acts only where there is no adequate
remedy at Law is nominally protective of the right to jury trial. That
is, if there is an adequate remedy at Law triable by jury, Equity will
not take jurisdiction. However, as described by Lynch and Bourne,
the principle is not protective of the right to jury trial. This is true
for several reasons. First, as a matter of function, the principle is
usually restrictive of the jury right. Historically, the prerequisite of
Equity that there be no adequate remedy at Law was not just a policy of deference or comity with respect to courts of Law. It was also
separate grounds for Equity jurisdiction. That is, the principle was
not a limit on, but an extension of, Equity'S power. 719 This was true
both in federal 720 and in Maryland721 courts. This tendency of the
adequate remedy at Law principle to increase the jurisdiction of Equity at the expense of jurisdiction of Law and the right to jury
triaP22 was magnified by the structural,723 source,724 definitional 725 dynamics,726 and procedural and tactical727 matters discussed below.
718. See infra notes 741-49 and accompanying text.
719. One commentator suggested the ultimate extension of Equity's power. See
Doug Rendleman, The Inadequate Remedy at Law Prerequisite for an Injunction,
33 U. FrA. L. REv. 346, 355 (1981). He found the remedy at Law might be inadequate because the jury determination might frustrate the underlying substantive law, or because three features of the jury system-new jurors for
each trial, lack of expertise, and unanimous secret deliberations-make the
jury inadequate in Equity actions which might continue for years. See id.
However, another commentator concluded that the jury cannot be considered as inadequate because the Constitution considers it a virtue. See OWEN
M. FISS. THE CIVIL RIGHTS INJUNCTION 39 (1978).
720. See LYNCH & BOURNE, supra note 3, at 332-33 n.204; Bourne & Lynch supra
note 5, at 12 & n.55, 13.
721. See LYNCH & BOURNE, supra note 3, at 316-17; Bourne & Lynch, supra note 5,
at 35, 4041, 42-43, 69-70.
722. See LYNCH & BOURNE, supra note 3, at 319, 330-31; Bourne & Lynch, supra
note 5, at 20, 21-23, 29-30, 31, 44.
723. See infra note 728 and accompanying text.
724. See infra notes 729-32 and accompanying text.
725. See infra notes 733-40 and accompanying text.
726. See infra notes 741-49 and accompanying text.
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Thus, the adequate remedy at Law principle is comparable to a college's practice regarding prerequisites for an elective course. When
an insufficient number of students register for the course, the college waters-down or abolishes the prerequisites so that more students will sign up.
Second, as a matter of structure, the principle that Equity acts
only where there is no adequate remedy at Law is not protective of
the jury right. Mter the abolition of separate courts of Law and Equity and the merger of Law and Equity procedures, most of the political and institutional checks to enforce Equity'S deference to Law
no longer exist. 728
Third, as a matter of the source of the principle, that Equity
acts only where there is no adequate remedy at Law, the principle is
not protective of the jury right. In Maryland, the· application of the
principle is discretionary with judges; it has not been enacted by the
legislature as a limitation on judicial jurisdiction. This point is developed in the old lower federal court case of Baker v. Biddle.729 That
case distinguished between the federal courts on the one hand, and
English and state courts on the other hand. The federal courts were
limited by a statute, enacted by the first Congress, which provided
that "suits in equity shall not be sustained in either of the courts of
the United States in any case where plain, adequate and complete
remedy may be had at law. "730 While that statute introduced no new
rule and was merely declaratory of the common law, it added the
authority of the legislature, such that the principle was not left en-

727. See infra no.tes 767-70 and accompanying text.
728. See supra no.te 675. The adequate remedy at Law principle was entrusted to
the Equity co.urts themselves. See LAyCOCK, supra note 710, at 20-21.
729. 2 F. Cas. 439 (C.C.E.D. Pa. 1831) (No.. 764).
730. Judiciary Act o.f 1789, ch. 20, § 16, 1 Stat. 82, repealed fly Act of June 25, 1948,
ch. 646, 62 Stat. 996. The legislative histo.ry to. the repealer provided: "Section [16] is o.bso.lete in view o.f Rules 1 and 2 o.f the FEDERAL RULES OF CIVIL
PROCEDURE abo.lishing distinctio.ns between actio.ns at law and suits in equity." HR REp. No. 308, 80th Co.ng., 1st Sess. A236 (1947). Ho.wever, the
principle that Equity will no.t intervene where there is an adequate remedy
at Law' survived the merger o.f Law and Equity in 1938. See Beaco.n Theatres,
Inc. v. Westo.ver, 359 U.S. 500, 506-07 (1959). The principle go.verns the substantive aspects of Equity, although separate equitable procedures have been
abo.lished by merger. See Grauman v. City Co.. o.f N.Y, Inc., 31 F. Supp. 172,
174 (S.D.N.Y 1939) .. One co.mmentato.r has written that the principle persists
after merger because o.f the jury right. See OWEN M. FISS, INJUNCTIONS 12
(1972).
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tirely to the discretion of the judiciary.131 On the other hand, the
English and state courts have generally not been limited by statutory enactment of the equitable prerequisite of no adequate remedy
at Law, so the principle has been left to the discretion of the
courts. 132
Fourth, as a matter of the definition of the principle that Equity acts only where there is no adequate remedy at Law, the principle is not protective of the jury right. It is not just an "adequate"
remedy at Law133 that precludes equitable jurisdiction, it is a "full,
expeditious and adequate" remedy,134 an adequate, complete, and
certain remedy,135 an "adequate, complete, and sufficient" remedy,136 a "plain, adequate and complete" remedy,131 or a "complete,
practical, and efficient" remedy.138 Any of these formulations would
seem to increase equitable jurisdiction at the expense of commonlaw jurisdiction and the jury right, when compared with a formulation that Equity will not intervene where there is an "adequate"
remedy at Law.139 Historically, the legal remedy infrequently met
one of these fuller formulations. 140

731. See Baker, 2 F. Cas. at 444. The adoption of the Seventh Amendment added
the authority of the Constitution, so the principle was not left to the discretion of the legislature. See id.
732. See id. at 445. But if. supra notes 706-D7 and accompanying text (providing
the principle in Maryland is similar to that in the federal courts).
733. Fiss has pointed out that there are inherent ambiguities in the doctrine that
Equity will act only where there is no adequate remedy at Law. First, how inadequate must the legal remedies be? Second, which type of inadequaciesthe retrospective nature of the damage action, the use of a jury, or the future financial unresponsiveness of the defendant-count for purposes of applying the doctrine? Third, which alternative remedies-damages action,
criminal prosecution or defense, habeas corpus, removal, transfer, administrative proceeding, or appeal-must be shown to be inadequate? See FIss,
supra note 719, at 38-39; see also LAYCOCK, supra note 710, at 22.
734. Bourne & Lynch, supra note 5, at 60.
735. See LYNCH &: BOURNE, supra note 3, at 317 (citing Brown, supra note 85, at
428).
736. Bourne & Lynch, supra note 5, at 40 (citing Johnson v. Bugle Coat, Apron &
Linen Serv., 191 Md. 268, 277, 60 A.2d 686,690 (1948)).
737. Bourne & Lynch, supra note 5, at 12 (citing Insurance Co. v. Bailey, 80 U.S.
(13 Wall.) 616 (1871)).
738. LAYCOCK, supra note 710, at 22.
739. See Charles Warren, New Light on the History of the Federal Judiciary Act of 1789,
37 HARv. L. REv. 49, 96 (1923).
.
740. See LAYCOCK, supra note 710, at 4, 23, 237.
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Fifth, as a matter of dynamics, the principle that Equity acts
only where there is no adequate remedy at Law is not protective of
the jury right. In applying the adequate remedy at Law principle,
the courts have confronted two questions. First, may equitable jurisdiction grow in ways that by comparison make traditional legal remedies inadequate? Second, does the improvement in the adequacy
of legal remedies erode existing equitable jurisdiction? The hornbook law answers to both of these questions worked to erode any
protection the principle had for the right to jury trial. Equitable jurisdiction could grow in ways that, in comparison, made the remedy
at Law inadequate. 741 For example, equitable clean-up jurisdiction
grew,742 and a later statute and court rule provided that damages at
Law were inadequate unless the defendant showed security for a
judgment. 743
The improvement in the adequacy of legal remedies also did
not generally oust existing equitable jurisdiction.744 For example, jurisdiction over injunctions was not supplanted by the rule permitting injunctions as ancillary relief in an action at Law,745 and equitable jurisdiction of accounting was not ousted entirely by the
availability of discovery in actions at Law. 746
Lynch and Bourne, with some exceptions, seem to endorse the
hornbook answers, which tend to erode the protection of the adequate remedy at Law principle for the jury right. 747 Thus, Lynch and
Bourne generally agree that equitable jurisdiction could grow in
ways that in comparison make the remedy at Law inadequate. 748
741. See WIlliAM F. WALSH, A TREATISE ON EQUITY 134 (1930); PHELPS, supra note
86, at 198; see also 1 POMEROy'S EQUITY JURISPRUDENCE 155-56 (Spencer W. Symons ed., 5th ed. 1941); if. HENRY L. MCCUNTOCK, HANDBOOK OF THE PRINCIPLES OF EQUITY 77 (2d ed. 1948) (stating that Equity may give relief even
where there is no precedent).
742. See supra note 564 and accompanying text.
743. See supra note 563 and accompanying text.
744. See MCCUNTOCK, supra note 741, at 115-17; PHELPS, supra note 86, at 198,25960.
745. See LYNCH & BOURNE, supra note 3, at 318-19; Bourne & Lynch, supra note 5,
at 39, 55-56.
746. See LYNCH & BOURNE, supra note 3, at 319 & n.124, 336; Bourne & Lynch,
supra note 5, at 4243.
747. The exceptions are where Maryland cases already require a more juryprotective approach.
748. See Bourne & Lynch, supra note 5, at 28-29. This growth could be by statute
or court decision. See id. at 32, 60 & n.381; see also LYNCH & BOURNE, supra
note 3, at 321; Bourne & Lynch, supra note 5, at 33 n.21O, 63 & nA03. But if.
id. at 32 n.206, 35 n.225, 50 & n.322, 51 (providing that constitutional right
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They also generally agree with the hornbook idea that the improvement in the adequacy of legal remedies does not oust existing equi•
table jurisdiction.749
Of course, Beacon in the federal courts750 and Higgins in the Maryland courts751 established a dynamic adequate remedy at Law principle, one that protects the jury right. However, Lynch and Bourne
are critical of this dynamism at every step.
.
As we have noted above, the adequate remedy at Law principle
may be seen either as a policy of deference or comity with respect
to courts of Law-protecting the right to jury trial by limiting Equity's jurisdiction-or as a separate basis for Equity jurisdiction-extending Equity'S power. 752 Before Higgins, Lynch an~ Bourne, choosing between Beacon's protection of the jury right and a more
traditional expansion of the scope of Equity, wrote that Maryland
courts should pick the expansion of Equity.753 Thus, they believed
that the protection of the jury right might be left to the discretion
of the trial judge. 754 Several factors underscored their choice of an
expansive Equity, rather than a protective jury right. These factors
include their preference' for pre-Beacon precedentS rather than for

749.

750.

751~

752.
753.
754.

to jury trial is some limit on the legislative power to classify actions as equitable).
See Bourne & Lynch, supra note 5, at 36 n.229, 77; see a40 supra notes 74546.
But if. Bourne & Lynch, supra note 5, at 44 (providing that Equity's considerable discretion in adjudicating legal claims is unlikely to be decreased by
procedural reforms, but the exercise of Equity'S discretion should consider
the right to trial by jury).
See Beacon Theatres, Inc. v. Westover, 359 U.S. 500 (1959). Lynch and
Bourne wrote that after Beacon the legal remedy will almost never be found
inadequate because such inadequacy must be assessed in light of modem
procedural reforms. The merger of Law and Equity and the permissive joinder of legal and equitable claims now allows a court to grant preliminary injunctive relief before a jury trial of legal issues, see LYNCH & BOURNE, supra
note 3, at 330-31, and final injunctive relief afterward, see Bourne & Lynch,
supra note 5, at 60-61. Discovery is available in all cases, see LYNCH & BOURNE,
supra note 3, at 319; party joinder may avoid the threat of multiple litigation,
see id. at 320; the Declaratory Judgment Act provides a new remedy for violation of legal rights, see id. at 330, 338; and the availability of masters under
the FEDERAL RULES OF CIVIL PROCEDURE gives juries assistance in complex financial matters, see id. at 333, 337.
See Higgins v. Barnes, 310 Md. 532, 530 A.2d 724 (1987).
See supra notes 704-27 and accompanying text.
See Bourne & Lynch, supra note 5, at 28-29.
See id. at 16, 17, 19,29,44,60. But if. id. at 20,29,34,44 (threat to the right
to jury trial).

/
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Beacon itself,755 their understanding that the majority OpInIOn misread precedent,756 that the opinion's reasoning was "radical,"757 and
by their sympathy for the Beacon dissent. 758
Even before Higgins, Lynch and Bourne conceded that the Maryland courts had used a dynamic adequate remedy at Law principle in certain areas, such as joinder of parties,759 joinder of claims
and remedies,76o and discovery.761 Even after Higgins preliminarily
endorsed the Beacon line of cases,762 Lynch and Bourne criticized
those cases,763 tried to limit them to their facts,764 and distinguished
them where possible,765 even while conceding that the Beacon line of
cases will likely be fully accepted in Maryland. 766
Sixth, as a matter of procedure and tactics, the principle that
Equity .acts only where there is no adequate remedy at Law is not
protective of the jury right. Professor Christopher Brown wrote that
the impact of the choice between Law and Equity on the right to
jury trial has largely escaped notice. 767 .Douglas Laycock says this is
so because in most cases it is the plaintiffs who benefit from jury
755. See id. at 17; see also id. at 29, 78. But if. infra note 1159 and accompanying
text (discussing reliance on post-Beacon lower federal court cases, including
some not protective of the jury right);
756. See supra note 705.
757. Bourne and Lynch criticized two points made by Beacon: (1) that the Declaratory Judgment Act limited Equity by providing a legal remedy, and (2) the
constitutional jury trial right limits judicial discretion. See Bourne & Lynch,
supra note 5, at 49. Neither of these points seems radical. See infra notes
1168-84 and accompanying text; see also supra notes 473-504 and accompanying text.
758. See LYNCH & BOURNE, supra note 3, at 329-30 nn.188 & 191; see also Bourne &
Lynch, supra note 5, at 21 n.121, 22 n.129; if. LYNCH & BOURNE, supra note
3, at 333 n.209, 334 n.212 (expressing sympathy with the dissent in Ross v.
Bernhard, 396 U.s. 531 (1970».
759. See Bourne & Lynch, supra note 5, at 31, 38.
760. See id. at 37 (discussing injunction as an ancillary remedy at Law).
761. See id. at 36, 38, 72.
762. See LYNCH & BOURNE, supra note 3, at 315, 327-35.
763. See id. at 329 n.188, 330 n.191, 333 n.209, 334 n.212 (quoting Justice Stewart's
dissents); see also id. at 329-31.
764. See id. at 331, 334.
765. See id. at 318-19, 336-37 (stating that equitable accounting in Maryland is
based not only on the need for discovery, but the existence of confidential
relationships and complicated accounts); id. at 335 & n.216, 337 (providing
no masters in Maryland to assist juries).
766. See id. at 335, 337.
767. See Brown, supra note 85, at 458, 473.
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sympathy or the possibility of a larger award of damages. 768 Presumably, those plaintiffs desiring a jury trial will structure their cases to
clearly be actions at Law. 769
In some cases, however, either plaintiffs or defendantS may manipulate the Law-Equity distinction to avoid jury trial. 770 In those situations, the jury rights of other parties may have escaped notice because of waiver for lack of timely demand, because the harmless
error rule precluded an interlocutory review of the denial of jury
trial, or because of the deferential scope of appellate review of the
trial judge's abuse of discretion. 771
2.

Contrary to the Usual Ways of Interpreting the Constitution

The principle that Equity will not act where the remedy at Law
is adequate was traditionally used to expand Equity at the expense
of the right to jury trial. 772 Lynch and Bourne's approval of the
principle as traditionally applied,773 and their limited acceptance of
a dynamic interpretation of that principle to protect the right to
jury trial,774 are contrary to many accepted principles of constitutional interpretation.
The adequate remedy at Law principle, as traditionally used, is
contrary to the nature of a written constitution. The constitutional
right to jury trial is supreme; it prevails over other conflicting laws
and policies,775 such as a principle which permits Equity to grow at
the expense of Law and the jury right. The adequate remedy at Law
principle, as traditionally used, is also contrary to the nature of a
"living" constitution;776 the right to jury trial, not the jurisdiction of
Equity at the jury right's expense, should be dynamic.
The adequate remedy at Law principle, as traditionally used to
permit Equity to grow at the expense of the jury right, is contrary
to the text of the Maryland Constitution. The principal jury right
provision, Article 23, expressly mandates recognition of the jury
768. See LAYCOCK, supra note 710, at 214.
769. For example, before the merger of Law and Equity, plaintiffs could sue for
damages for violation of a legal right in a Law court. See supra notes 209-11
and accompanying text
770. See LAYCOCK, supra note 710, at 214-15.
771. See supra notes 474-88 and accompanying text.
772. See supra notes 719-27, 733-46 and accompanying text.
773. See supra notes 748-49 and accompanying text.
774. See supra notes 753-66 and accompanying text.
775. See supra note 21 and accompanying text.
776. See supra note 26 and accompanying text.
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right and provides that it be "inviolably preserved. "777 In addition, it
is the jury right that is protected, not separate courts of Law and
Equity nor the right to trial by a judge. 778
The adequate remedy at Law principle, as traditionally used, is
contrary to the history of the Maryland Constitution. The purpose
of Article 23 was to put the right beyond the reach of Equity's incursions pursuant to legislative and, presumably, judicial
decisions. 779
The adequate remedy at Law principle, as traditionally used,
may also be contrary to the structure of government. A dynamic,
not an over-looked,780 jury right is needed now that most of the political and institutional checks to· enforce Equity's deference to Law
no longer exist. 781 If the adequate remedy at Law principle is used
to expand Equity at the expense of Law, the jury's checks on the
judge782 may be lost.
The adequate remedy at Law principle, as traditionally used, is
contrary to doctrine. The Court of Appeals of Maryland's decision
in Higgins, following the Supreme Court's lead in Beacon,783 requires
a dynamic adequate remedy at Law principle protecting the jury
right.7 84 That approach is consistent with the commentary of Professor Christopher Brown on the jury right in Maryland. 785
Moreover, the adequate remedy at Law principle, as traditionally used, may be contrary to some prudential concerns. If the adequate remedy at Law principle is used to expand Equity at the expense of Law, the benefits of the jury to the judge and our legal
system, such as helping to legitimize outcomes, acting as a "lightning rod," and providing a "black box" decision,786 are lost.
The adequate remedy at Law principle, as traditionally used, is
contrary to ethical matters. The adequate remedy at Law principle
used to restrict the jury right may violate the principles of limited
government, government by the people, government for the people,

777.
778.
779.
780.
781.
782.
783.
784.
785.
786.

See
See
See
See
See
See
See
See
See
See

supra notes 48-69 and accompanying text.
supra notes 77-95 and accompanying text.
supra notes 10, 21, 113, 117 and accompanying text.
supra notes 767-71 and accompanying text.
supra note 675 and accompanying text.
supra notes 160-62 and accompanying text.
supra notes 18.4-97 and accompanying text.
supra notes 750.51 and accompanying text.
Brown, supra note 85, at 448-51.
supra notes 308-20 and accompanying text.
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and free political exchange. 787
E. Equity May Expand by Statute or Judicial Decision

The fifth aspect of Lynch and Bourne's principled discretionary
theory is that "the scope of equity in Maryland may be expanded by
statute or judicial decision. "788 This expansion may be at the expense of the right to jury trial. 789 Lynch and Bourne apparently base
that conclusion on one authority: the "seldom cited"790 or "old and
little noted"791 case of Capron v. Devries. 792 It is appropriate, however,
that Capron is' "seldom cited" and "little noted."
In Capron, Devries was a trustee who obtained an order from a
court of Equity that certain real property be sold. 793 The purchaser
was Mrs. Capron, a married woman. 794 Alleging a defect in title, she
refused to accept and pay for the property.795 Therefore, the court
ordered that the property be resold at her risk. When the property
787. See supra notes 376411, 443 and accompanying text.
788. Bourne & Lynch, supra note 5, at 60; see id. at 32; cf. id. at 33 n.2ID, 63;
LYNCH & BOURNE, supra note 3, at 321 (expansion by the legislature).
789. See LYNCH & BOURNE, supra note 3, at 321; Bourne & Lynch, supra note 5, at
32.
790. LYNCH & BOURNE, supra note 3, at 321.
791. Bourne & Lynch, supra note 5, at 31.
792. 83 Md. 220, 34 A. 251 (1896). Other authorities suggested by Bourne and
Lynch for their conclusion that the scope of Equity may be expanded by
statute or judicial decision at the expense of the right to jury trial do not appear to be substantial.
The first such authority states that the original 1776 constitutional right
to jury trial was subject to restriction by the legislature. See Bourne & Lynch,
supra note 5, at 30 & n.192. However, Bourne and Lynch go on to note that
the principle 1851 constitutional right to jury trial was adopted to "protect
the jury trial right from encroachment by the legislature." Bourne & Lynch,
supra note 5, at 32 n.2ID. Then, they conclude that Capron "obviously indicates that the 1851 provision has not been construed to preclude contraction
of the right to Uury] trial by the Legislature." [d. at 33 n.210.
The second set of authorities suggested by Lynch and Bourne for their
conclusion that the scope of Equity may be expanded by statute or judicial
decision at the expense of the right to jury trial, states that the legislature
and the court of appeals have classified certain actions as equitable by statute or court rule. See LYNCH & BOURNE, supra note 3, at 316-18; Bourne &
Lynch, supra note 5, at 35. However, Bourne and Lynch state that such
power may be limited by the right to jury trial. See Bourne and Lynch, supra
note 5, at 35 & n.225; see also LYNCH & BOURNE, supra note 3, at 321.
793. See Capron, 83 Md. at 223, 34 A. at 251.
794. See id.
795. See id.
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was resold for a price lower than the earlier sale, the Equity court
ordered Mrs. Capron to pay the deficiency to the trustee. 796
On appeal, Mrs. Capron argued that the statute as applied violated her constitutional right to a jury trial in common-law cases. 797
Second, Mrs. Capron argued that as a married woman acting alone
and without her husband, she was not personally liable on an unwritten contract.
The Court of Appeals of Maryland rejected plaintiffs argument. First, it held that the legislature properly enlarged the jurisdiction of Equity to permit deficiency decrees in trustee sales. 798 Because the suit was properly within equitable jurisdiction, the right to
trial by jury in common-law cases was not applicable. 799 Second, the
court of appeals held that, according to settled authority, a married
woman was personally liable on the contract. 8OO
Capron does not support Lynch and Bourne's principle that the
scope of Equity may be expanded by statute or judicial decision at
the expense of the jury right. Capron, as Lynch and Bourne's article
recognized, has been "seldom cited" and "little noted." Furthermore, Capron apparently did not recognize that the expansion of
Equity might contract the jury right. In any event, there are other
alternative explanations for the holding in Capron.
As noted above, Lynch and Bourne themselves characterize
Capron as being "seldom cited" and "little noted."801 Capron has subsequently been cited in only two published Maryland opinions addressing situations where the legislative or judicial power has come
into possible conflict with the right to jury triapo2 In the first situa796.
797.
798.
799.
800.
801.
802.

See id.
See id. at 224, 34 A. at 251-52.
See id. at 224, 34 A. at 252.
See id.
See id.
See supra notes 790-91 and accompanying text.
In two other published Maryland opinions citing Capron, there was no conflict between legislative or judicial power and the jury right. In the first case,
Mercantile Bank v. Maryland Title Guarantor Co., 153 Md. 320, 138 A. 251, 254
(1927), the issue was not the jury right, but the power of an Equity court to
enter a deficiency judgment, without an order of payment of the balance
due, against a defaulting purchaser at a foreclosure sale. See id. In the second case, In re Anderson, 272 Md. 85, 93-94, 321 A.2d 516, 521 (1974), the issue was the power of the legislature to establish juvenile courts in Equity
with different principles, regarding the right to appeal by the State and the
protections of the double jeopardy clause, than the principles applicable in
criminal proceedings. See id.
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tion, Allender v. Ghingher,803 the Court of Appeals of Maryland approved, but distinguished, Capron from the case at hand involving a
statutory proceeding to enforce a banking corporation's legal right
to assess its stockholders. Unlike Capron, which involved a valid legislative grant of equitable jurisdiction, Ghingher involved no valid
statutory or judicial grant of equitable jurisdiction.
In the second situation, the Attorney General of Maryland approved the legislature's creation of a housing court in Baltimore
City. As part of the existing courts in Baltimore City, the housing
court was to exercise both Law and Equity jurisdiction. 804 However,
the opinion noted that the jurisdiction of the court would have to
be exercised in a manner consistent with the constitutional right to
jury tria1. 805
Capron apparently failed to recognize that the expansion of Equity jurisdiction might contract the jury right. That failure may have
been based on ignorance of the purpose of the 1851 constitutional
jury trial provision, on an alternative belief that the 1776 constitutional jury trial provision applied to the case, or on a belief that Equity'S expansion was not at the expense of the jury right.
If Capron is authority for the principle that Equity may be expanded by statute or judicial decision, thus diminishing the scope
of the jury right, the case is squarely contrary to the intent of the
framers of the 1851 constitutional jury trial provision. The proponents of the 1851 provision noted the legislature's power to repeal
or modify the original 1776 constitutional jury trial provision and
stated their intention of putting the right beyond reach of the legislature. 806 The Capron court's ignorance of the added vitality of the
right to jury trial after 1851 is perhaps understandable. While the
record of the debates on the Maryland Constitution of 1851 is readily available,807 the record is not indexed. The portion of that re803. 170 Md. 156, 183 A. 610 (1936), discussed in LYNCH & BOURNE, supra note 3, at
321 n.137 (describing Allender as acknowledging the continuing validity of
Capron); Bourne & Lynch, supra note 5, at 31-32 (describing Allender as citing
Capron with approval); see also id. at 32-33 (discussing Fooks' Ex'rs v.
Ghingher, 172 Md. 612, 192 A. 782 (1937) (emphasizing that the power of
the legislature to fix the jurisdiction of Law and Equity was limited by the
constitutional right of trial by jury, and that the boundary line between Law
and Equity was "vague and shadowy"».
804. See 61 Op. Md. Att'y Gen. 291,295-96 (1976).
805. See id. at 299.
806. See supra note 9.
807. See generally 2 1851 DEBATES, supra note 9.
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cord dealing with the jury trial provision 808 has no heading in the
text and has been cited in no published Maryland opinions. 809 Furthermore, the principal commentator on the Maryland Constitution
later called the 1851 provision possibly "surplusage" in light of the
1776 provision. 8IO
However, Capron may have applied to the original 1776 constitutional jury trial provision, not the 1851 constitutional jury trial
provision. As Capron noted in another connection, the statute conferring jurisdiction on EquityBll was enacted by the legislature in
1841. 812 Thus, the statute was enacted when the only applicable constitutional right to jury trial was the original 1776 provision, which
arguably was subject to legislative 813 and judicial power. 814 Capron
quoted the 1851 constitutional jury trial provision,815 but dismissed it
as not being a limitation on the power of the legislature to enlarge
the jurisdiction of Equity.816 Capron failed to note the likely irrelevance of the 1851 jury right to the earlier 1841 legislation. 817
Capron may not support the proposition that "either the legislature or an appellate court may contract the scope of the right to
trial by jury by expanding the scope of equity. "818 Instead, Capron
808. See id. at 766-67.
809. However, the portion of the debates dealing with the right to jury trial in
criminal cases and making the jury the judges of law as well as fact has been
cited in at least one Maryland case. See Slansky v. State, 192 Md. 94, 105, 63
A.2d 599, 603 (1949).
810. See NILES, supra note 96, at 343.
811. Mrs. Capron also argued on appeal that the statute, by enlarging the powers
of Equity, violated the constitutional grant of common-law jurisdiction of certain specified courts in Baltimore City. See Capron v. Devries, 83 Md. 220,
222, 34 A. 251, 252 (1896). The court of appeals rejected that argument. See
id.
812. See id. at 221, 34 A. at 252 (citing 1841 Md. Laws ch. 216).
813. See supra notes 38-43 and accompanying text.
814. See supra notes 44-45 and accompanying text.
815. See Capron, 83 Md. at 224, 34 A. at 252.
816. See id. Capron may have been based on a belief that Equity'S expansion was
not at the expense of the jury right. See supra notes 811-15 and accompanying text; see infra notes 818-27 and accompanying text.
817. The court of appeals assumed in another connection that a constitutional
provision regarding the common-law courts in Baltimore City was irrelevant
as a limitation on the earlier 1841 legislation. See Capron, 83 Md. -at 224, 34
A. at 252. See generally New Cent. Coal Co. v. George's Creek Coal & Iron
Co., 37 Md. 537 (1873) (stating the rule that constitutional amendments are
to apply prospectively, not retroactively, unless a retroactive intent is clear).
818. Bourne & Lynch, supra note 5, at 32.
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may be based on a belief that Equity's expansion was not at the expense of the jury right. To be sure, the 1841 statute,819 as interpreted previously,820 expanded the scope of Equity by permitting
new remedies such as resale of the property purchased by the woman, and a deficiency judgment against her separate property.
Those remedies might be considered equitable because they were
available in suits within the exclusive jurisdiction of Equity-a trustee's sale of property ordered by a court of EquityB21 or a married
woman's separate property.822 In either event, the statute permitting
the remedies would not expand Equity jurisdiction at the expense
of the right to jury trial because common-law courts never had jurisdiction in such cases. Even if those statutory remedies might be
considered legal, they would be available in an existing equitable
proceeding and would, therefore, be within Equity'S clean-up jurisdiction. 823 The statute permitting those remedies would expand Equity jurisdiction at the expense of the jurisdiction of the commonlaw courts. Traditionally, however, Equity'S clean-up jurisdiction was
not perceived as violating the right to jury trial. 824
The language of the Capron case indicates that it failed to recognize that the expansion of Equity jurisdiction might contract the
jury right:
It is now argued that the statute under which the Court
passed this order is unconstitutional. . . . It is maintained

that it is in violation of articles five and twenty~three of the
Maryland Declaration oj Rights, and of the sixth section of Article fifteen of the Constitution. These citations were intended to show the inviolable character oj the right oj trial by
jury and of [the] Magna Carta. This will not be questioned.
The section from the fifteenth Article is in these words: Sec.
6. "The right of trial by jury of all issues of fact in civil proceedings in the several Courts of Law in this State, where
the amount in controversy exceeds the sum of five dollars,
819.· See supra notes 811-12 and accompanying text.
820. See Capron, 83 Md. at 223, 34 A. at 251 (citing Fowler v. jacobs, 62 Md. 326
(1884»; Galloway v. Shipley, 71 Md. 243, 17 A. 1023 (1889).
821. See 1 POMEROy'S EQUITY JURISPRUDENCE, supra note 741, § 151; see also Brown,
supra note 85, at 429.
822. See 1 POMEROy'S EQUITY JURISPRUDENCE, supra note 741, § 159; 4 id. § 1099; see
also Brown, supra note 85, at 429.
823. See generally supra notes 250-51 and accompanying text (discussing Higgins v.
Bames, 310 Md. 532, 530 A.2d 724 (1987».
824. See supra notes 564, 741-42 and accompanying text.
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shall be inviolably preserved." It must be evident that there is
no reference to a trial of an issue of fact in another jurisdiction: a
Court of Equity, for instance. It can hardly be established that
the Legislature has not the power to enlarge the jurisdiction of equity. The system of equity jurisprudence has been
of steady growth ever since its origin; sometimes by the effect of judicial decisions; and sometimes by statute law. It is
difficult to see a reason why the Legislature could not give
it the jurisdiction to pass a decree for the payment of a sum
of money which the Court finds to be due from one suitor
to another in a proceeding pending before it . . . .825
Thus, Capron emphasized the inviolability of the right to jury trial
and noted that the matter was pending in Equity, where there was
no such right. The case did not recognize the conflict between the
expanding powers of Equity and the right to jury trial, much less
recognize the legislature's power to contract that right.
Other evidence that Capron did not recognize the conflict between the expanding powers of Equity and the jury right is suggested by its treatment of precedent. McCoy v. Johnson826 was an earlier case squarely holding that the power of the legislature to
expand Equity jurisdiction was limited by the constitutional jury
right. Although counsel for Mrs. Capron raised McCoy in argument,827 the Capron opinion did not mention McCoy. By implication,
Capron did not recognize that there was a conflict between legislative expansion of Equity and the jury right.
Rather than being decided on the ground that Equity may be
expanded by statute or judicial decision, thus contracting the jury
right, Capron may have been decided on one or more alternative
grounds. As previously noted, one such ground was that the applicable constitutional jury trial right was the original 1776 provision expressly subject to legislative power and implicitly subject to judicial
power,828 not the 1851 provision intended to put the jury right beyond the reach of the legislature. 829
A second alternative ground for Capron is that it may merely re-

825. Capron, 83 Md. at 224, 34 A. at 251-52 (emphasis added).
826. 70. Md. 490, 17 A. 387 (1889), cited in Bourne & Lynch, supra note 5, at 32
n.206, 35 nn.225-26, 50 n.322, 51 & n.324, 70 n.442.
827. See Capron, 83 Md. at 222, 34 A. at 251.
828. See supra notes 40-45, 813-17 and accompanying text.
829. See supra notes 9, 806 and accompanying text.
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flect the limited nature of appellate review. 830 An alleged denial of
the right to jury trial, like other objections, must be timely raised or
it is waived. There is no indication in Capron that the objection was
raised in the trial court, for example, by way of motions for dismissal or for reference of an issue, or transfer ·of the case to a common-law court. Review was had by appeal of a final deficiency decree,831 not by appeal of an order denying the right to jury trial or
by a mode of interlocutory review, such as mandamus.832 Also, only
prejudicial errors are reviewable on appeal. 833 The court of appeals's
finding, that the merits of the case were decided in accordance with
precedent,834 suggests that any error in denying a jury trial may have
been considered harmless, not prejudicial.
A third alternative ground for Capron is that it may merely reflect hostility to the merits of the jury claimant's case and support
for earlier precedent establishing her liability. Regarding the merits,835 the jury claimant had purchased real property at a sale decreed by a court of Equity. When she alleged a defect in title and
refused to pay for the property, the court ordered its resale at her
risk. On resale, the property brought less than at the prior sale,
therefore, the court ordered her to pay the deficiency. She did not
convince the trial court of the alleged defect of title and did not
state on appeal the grounds for the defect. In addition to alleging
that the trial court lacked power and that the statute providing for
equitable jurisdiction was unconstitutional, she relied upon the limited capacity of married women to make contracts, which would be
a legal defense, but might be considered "inequitable" on the other
side of the court. 836 The court of appeals, relying on earlier precedents, summarily rejected the argument. 837
Thus, Capron does not support Lynch and Bourne's principle
that the scope of Equity may be expanded by statute or judicial decision at the expense of the jury right. More importantly for the
purposes of this Article, that principle may be criticized because it
See supra note 487 and accompanying text.
See Capron, 83 Md. at 223, 34 A. at 251.
See supra note 485.
See supra note 487 and accompanying text.
See infra note 837 and accompanying text.
See generally Capron, 83 Md. at 221-23, 34 A. at 249-50 (argument of counsel).
Cf GINSBERG, supra note 86, at 10-11, 14, 18 (maxims of Equity favoring
"clean hands," fulfilling obligations, and equitable results).
837. See Capron, 83 Md. at 223, 34 A. at 251 (citing Fowler v. Jacobs, 62 Md. 326
(1884»; Galloway v. Shipley, 71 Md. 243, 17 A. 1023 (1889).

830.
831.
832.
833.
834.
835.
836.
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fails to protect the jury right and it contradicts the usual ways of interpreting the. Maryland Constitution.
1.

Not Protective of the Jury Right

Lynch and Bourne's principle that the scope of Equity may be
expanded by statute or judicial decision at the expense of the jury
right is obviously restrictive of the right to jury trial. The principle
is not only that Equity may be expanded by statute or judicial decision,838 but that the expansion may be at the expense of the jury
right. 839
2.

Contrary to the Usual Ways of Interpreting the Constitution

The aspect of Lynch and Bourne's principled discretionary theory that the scope of Equity may be expanded by statute or judicial
decision at the expense of the jury right is not protective of the jury
right and is contrary to many of the usual ways of interpreting the
Constitution.
The principle of legislative or judicial expansion of Equity at
the expense of the jury right is contrary to the nature of a written
constitution. The constitutional jury right is supreme as it prevails
over other conflicting laws and judicial decisions,840 such as those
expanding the scope of Equity at the expense of the jury right. The
principle of an expanding Equity is also contrary to the nature of a
"living" constitution. 841 The right to jury trial, not the jurisdiction of
Equity at the jury right's expense, should be expansive.
The principle of legislative or judicial expansion of Equity at
the expense of the jury right is also contrary to the text of the Maryland Constitution. The principal jury right provision, Article 23,
expressly mandates recognition of the jury right and provides that it
shall be "inviolably preserved. "842 Moreover, it is the jury right that
is protected, not separate courts of Law and Equity or the right to
trial by a judge.843
The principle of legislative or judicial expansion of Equity at
the expense of the jury right is also contrary to the history of the
Maryland Constitution. The purpose of Article 23 was to put the
right beyond the reach of Equity'S incursions pursuant to legislative
838.
839.
840.
841.
842.
843.

See
See
See
See
See
See

supra
supra
supra
supra
supra
supra

note 788 and accompanying text.
note 789 and accompanying text.
note 21·and accomp.mying text.
notes 26-29 and accompanying text.
notes 48-71 and accompanying text.
notes 77-95 and accompanying text.
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and, presumably, judicial decisions. 844
The principle of legislative or judicial expansion of Equity at
the expense of the jury right is also contrary to the structure of government. An expansive jury right, not an expanded Equity at the
expense of the jury right, is needed now that most of the political
and institutional checks to enforce Equity'S deference to Law no
longer exist. 845 If Equity is expanded at the expense of Law, the
jury's checks on the judge of finding fact and softening the harshness of legal doctrine may be 10st. 846
The principle of legislative or judicial expansion of Equity at
the expense of the jury right is also contrary to doctrine. We have
already seen that the Capron case, apparently Lynch and Bourne's
only authority for the principle,847 may not support it. 848 Furthermore, Lynch and Bourne admit that the power of the legislature
and the courts to expand Equity at the expense of the jury right is
limited in some way by the jury right, and that there are authorities
conflicting with their interpretation of Capron.
The primary authority that Lynch and Bourne cite for jury limits on Equity's expansion is McCoy v. Johnson. 849 That case includes
the following passage affirming the constitutional right to jury trial:
[I] t is clear the Legislature has no power to confer on
Courts of equity the jurisdiction to determine legal rights,
in regard to which Courts of law exercise exclusive jurisdiction. In such cases the Constitution guarantees suitors the
right of trial by jury, and this right the Legislature cannot
abridge or take away. The Act of 1888 [purporting to give
the court, in its discretion, power to declare legal title to
property] was borrowed, we find, word for word from the
Code of the Indian Empire, but the British Parliament is
not controlled, nor is its power limited, as is the power of
the Legislature in this State, by a written Constitution. The
jurisdiction then conferred by the Act of 1888, can only be
exercised in regard to such matters as are properly cognizable by a Court of equity; and its exercise in regard to ,these,
844.
845.
846.
847.
848.
849.

See supra notes 9, 52.(j7 and accompanying text.
See supra note 675 and accompanying text.
See supra notes 156-62 and accompanying text.
See supra notes 789-92 and accompanying text.
See supra notes 793-837 and accompanying text.
70 Md. 490, 17 A. 387 (1889), cited in Bourne & Lynch, supra note 5, at 32
n.206, 35 & n.225, 50 n.322, 51 & nn.324-25, 70 n.442.
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the Act merely provides, shall rest in the discretion of the
Court. 850
The authorities Lynch and Bourne cite as conflicting with their
interpretation of Capron are State v. Rutherforrfl51 and other cases permitting agency determinations without a jury where a right to jury
trial was preserved on appeal de novo. 852
Of course, Lynch and Bourne discuss Higgins v. Barnes,853 the
Maryland case following Beacon Theatres, Inc. v. Westover. 854 However,
Lynch and Bourne do not mention that Higgins noted a concern
that expansion of Equity jurisdiction had eroded the jury right. 855
Nor do Lynch and Bourne mention that Higgins concluded that the
constitutional jury right remains as "absolute" after merger of Law
and Equity as before, and that court rules are something short of
the Maryland Constitution. 856
850. McCoy, 70 Md. at 492-93, 17 A. at 387.
851. 145 Md. 363, 125 A. 725 (1924), overruled by In Petition for Writ of Prohibition, 312 Md. 280, 539 A.2d 664 (1988), discussed in LYNCH & BOURNE, supra
note 3, at 321-22. Rutherford does have a statement strongly supporting the
constitutional right to jury trial. See Rutherford, 145 Md. at 370, 125 A. at 728.

852.

853.
854.
855.
'856.

The case treats the jury trial as something that could be denied by specific
design of the legislature. See id. at 371, 125 A. at 728. There is also language
in Allender v. Chingher, 170 Md. 156, 167"()8, 183 A. 610, 616 (1936), strongly
supporting the constitutional right to jury trial, while suggesting that a legislative enactment or judicial decision could abridge the right. The language
in both Rutherford and Allender suggesting that the jury trial could be denied
by legislation or by judicial decision, however, is dictum and conflicts with
the idea in McCoy that the constitutional jury right is a limit on legislative
authority. In addition, the language in Rutherford and Allender is squarely contrary to the intent of the framers of the 1851 constitutional jury trial provision. See supra note 374 and accompanying text.
See LYNCH & BOURNE, supra note 3, at 322 & n. 147 (workers' compensation
appeals); see also id. at 322 & n.148 (health care malpractice claims arbitration appeals).
310 Md. 532, 530 A.2d 724 (1987), discussed in LYNCH & BOURNE, supra note 3,
at 327-37.
359 U.S. 500 (1959).
See Higgins, 310 Md. at 532, 530 A.2d at 728.
See id. at 54243,530 A.2d at 729. Higgins reached that conclusion in the context of an allegation that raising a counterclaim, permissive or compulsory
under court rules, would constitute a waiver of the right to jury trial. See id.
Other commentators on the Maryland Constitution would protect the jury
right at the expense of equity. See NILES, supra note 96. Professor Niles wrote
that "the courts will be careful to preserve the right [of trial by jury] and declare any law in substantial violation thereof unconstitutional." Id. at 344; see
also Brown, supra note 85. Professor Brown noted the trend toward Equity'S
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Lynch and Bourne also conclude that, in reconciling the jury
right with expanding Equity jurisdiction after Higgins, Maryland
cases are likely to follow federal doctrine. 857 They recognize that federal cases are generally protective of the jury in that context, with a
few narrow exceptions, such as where the legislature delegates the
determination of "public rights" to administrative agencies,858 under
"most imperative circumstances,"859 and other situations. 860
The principle of legislative or judicial expansion of Equity at
the expense of the jury right is also contrary to some prudential
concerns. The benefits a jury provides include legitimizing outcomes, being a "lightning rod," and providing a "black box"
decision. 861
The principle of legislative or judicial expansion of Equity at
the expense of the jury right is also contrary to some ethical matters. While it may be reasonable to maintain a traditional distinction
between Law and Equity, particularly a distinction mentioned in the
federal and state constitutions,862 allowing ad hoc changes to Equity
may not be reasonable under the equal protection guarantees of
the Fourteenth Arnendment863 or the Maryland Constitution. 864 A
fortiori, those changes would not satisfy equal protection strict scrutiny where the fundamental right to jury trial under the Maryland
Constitution is implicated. 865 In addition, the principle of legislative
or judicial expansion of Equity at the expense of the jury right may
violate the principles of limited government, government by the

857.
858.
859.
860.

86l.
862.
863.
864.
865.

expansion came at the expense of the jury right, see id. at 427, 448, 451, 47374, and noted that the expansion of Equity at the expense of the jury right
came about largely through oversight, see id. at 451, 473, but concluded that
the jury right should, see id. at 451, and predicated that it soon would, see id.
at 474, be protected. The Higgins court, noting that the expansion of Equity
eroded the constitutional jury right, cited Brown. See id. at 541, 530 A.2d at
728.
See LYNCH & BOURNE, supra note 3, at 323, 327.
See id. at 323 & nn.149-54. But cf. id. at 323-24 & nn.155-56 ("private rights").
Bourne & Lynch, supra note 5, at 22, 25; see also LYNCH & BOURNE, supra note
3, at 329-30.
Compare LYNCH & BOURNE, supra note 3, at 335, with Bourne & Lynch, supra
note 5, at 26-27 (complexity).
See supra notes 308-20 and accompanying text.
Cf New Orleans v. Dukes, 427 U.S. 297 (1976) (finding "grandfather clause"
is reasonable).
See supra notes 365-73 and accompanying text.
See supra notes 365-73 and accompanying text.
See supra notes 330-75 and accompanying text.

1997]

The Right to Trial by Jury

415

people, government for the people, and free political exchange. 866
F.

Judicial Economy

The sixth aspect of Lynch and Bourne's principled discretionary theory is the common-sense notion that judicial economy is better served by trial by a judge than by trial by a jury.867 Judicial economy868 is a widely shared value. 869 Lynch and Bourne conclude that
as a matter of common sense, judicial economy is better served by
trial by a judge than by trial by a jury.870 The concept that jury trials
take more time and, therefore, more effort and expense than judge
trials, is commonly accepted. 871
A jury trial may take more time from beginning to end than
trial by a judge. Even before trial, the judge may be called upon to
hear argument and rule on whether a jury trial may be had. 872 A
panel of potential jurors must be selected from the public,873 and a
jury must be selected from that panel through questioning874 and by
allowing challenges for cause and peremptory challenges. 875 Lawyers' arguments and presentation of evidence may take more time
in a case tried by a jury than in a case tried by a judge. 876 The judge
866. See supra notes 376452 and accompanying text.
867. See Bourne & Lynch, supra note 5, at 60.
868. The term "judicial economy" is broadly considered to include economy of all
resources, such as time, effort, and money, and economy of all interested
groups, including courts, parties, other trial participants, and the public.
869. See, e.g., MD. RULE 1-201(a). MD. RULE 1-201 (a) provides: "These rules shall be
construed to secure simplicity in procedure, fairness in administration, and elimination of unjustifiable expense and delay." [d. (emphasis added). FED. R Cw. P.
1 provides: "These rules ... shall be construed ... to secure the just, speedy,
and inexpensive determination of every action." [d. (emphasis added).
870. See Bourne & Lynch, supra note 5, at 60; see also id. at 2-3, 63, 64 & n.408, 69
& n.437. The value of judicial economy is recognized under several names,
including efficiency, economy, judicial administration, expedition, and avoidance of delay. See id.
871. One estimate was that a personal injury case may be tried by a judge in 40%
less time than a jury. See HANs ZEISEL ET AL., DElAY IN THE COURT 81 (1959).
But if. Geoffrey C. Hazard Jr., Book Review, 48 CAL. L. REv. 360, 370 n.22
(1960) (contending jury trials are 300% longer than bench trials); 1 DE TOGQUEVILLE, supra note 309, at 292 n.4 (providing that introduction of juries allows for diminishing the number of judges). See generally infra notes 910-16
and accompanying text.
872. See MD. RULE 2-325.
873. See MD. CODE ANN., CTS. & JUD. PROC. §§ 8-102, -212 (1995 & Supp. 1996).
874. See MD. RULE 2-512(c), (d).
875. See MD. RULE2-512(e), (h); MD. CODE ANN., CTS. &JUD. PROC. § 8-301 (1995).
876. See Casper, supra note 308, at 417.
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must instruct the jury,877 and the jury must deliberate and reach a
verdict, which ordinarily must be unanimous. 878 Moreover, jury verdicts may result in more appeals than judge trialS. 879
This common-sense notion of judicial economy, however, merits close examination. It is like faculty governance. Anyone who has
sat through a faculty meeting would agree that faculty democracy
does not appear be the most efficient way to get things done. Nevertheless, faculty democracy serves values other than efficiency, is
required by accrediting agencies, and has some efficiencies of its
own as compared with unilateral action by a dean. Also, there are
ways of improving faculty democracy.
Like faculty democracy, the jury serves values other than efficiency. Lynch and Bourne cite an early Maryland case for the proposition that a Law trial is superior to an Equity trial. 880 They also
identify other important values of the jury trial such as commonsense justice881 reached by a democratic process. 882 As developed below, the jury promotes structural,883 prudential,884 and ethical 885
values.
Many of the inefficiencies of jury trial have been reduced by
modem procedural developments, such as merger of Law and Equity, expedited procedures, summary determination, and improvements to the jury. Moreover, the merger of Law and Equity has
made the process more efficient.886 Lynch and Bourne note that
877. See MD. RULE 2-520.
878. See MD. RULE 2-251, -522.
879. See Peter H. Schuck, Mapping the Debate on Jury Reform, in VERDICT: AssESSING
THE CIVIL JURY SYSTEM 306, 317 (Robert E. Litan ed., 1993).
880. See Bourne & Lynch, supra note 5, at 30 & n.187 (citing Richardson v. Stillinger, 12 G. & J. 477 (1842». That proposition was based on the rule that
Equity has no jurisdiction where there is an adequate remedy at Law. See
Richardson, 12 G. & J. at 479-84. The rule, in tum, was apparently based on
three advantages of the Law courts as follows: (1) the jury trial, (2) the taking of testimony in open court (rather than by deposition), (3) and the admissibility of testimony of persons with an interest in the case. See id. at 480.
Modem procedural developments have eliminated those distinctions, except
for the jury trial. See MD. RULE 2-301 & committee note. Nevertheless, the
jury provides a mode of trial that is superior in many respects to a judge
trial. See infra notes 956-1124 and accompanying text.
881. See Bourne & Lynch, supra note 5, at 3.
882. See id. at 49 n.311.
883. See infra notes 936-38.
884. See infra note 952.
885. See infra notes 947-53, 964.
886. See supra note 1 and accompanying text.
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having to litigate a claim in the separate systems of Law and Equity
resulted in additional cost, delay, and inconvenience. 887 However,
merger of the separate systems eliminated those inefficiencies. 888
Modern procedures permit litigation to be expedited, while
protecting the jury right. Lynch and Bourne note that preliminary
injunctive relief may be granted before jury trial889 and final injunctive relief afterward. 890 Of course, judges have authority to shorten
time requirements891 and assign cases for trial so as to dispose of
them expeditiously.892 Lynch and Bourne also note that the legislature may expedite trial of certain cases. 893 They cite a Supreme
Court case, Pernell v. Southall Realty,894 which concluded that there
was no necessary inconsistency between the desire for speedy justice
and the right to jury trial. 895 To support that proposition, the Court
cited as examples the laws of thirteen states guaranteeing jury trial
in summary eviction proceedings. 896
Even in cases where the jury right exists, many determinations,
. such as summary judgment,897 motion for judgment,898 and issues of
887. See Bourne & Lynch, supra note 5, at 45 n.292, 54-55, 76 and accompanying
text. Equity'S clean-up doctrine could eliminate those inefficiencies in some
situations, but only at the expense of the jury right. See ill. at 45 n.292, 54,
55, 57, 60, 76.
888. See id. at 45 n.292, 54-55; see also id. at 78. See generally LYNCH & BOURNE,.
supra note 3, at 326-37.
889. See LYNCH & BOURNE, supra note 3, at 330-31, 336 & n.221; Bourne & Lynch,
supra note 5, at 25 nn.151, 161.
890. See Bourne & Lynch, supra note 5, at 61.
891. See MD. RULE 1-204(a).
892. See MD. RULE 1-211.
893. See Bourne & Lynch, supra note 5, at 64 n.408, 69 n.437 (federal bankruptcy
proceedings); id. at 69 n.435 (mechanics' lien adjudications); see also, e.g.,
MD. CODE ANN., CTs. & JUD. PROC. § 3409(e) (1995) (declaratory judgment);
ill. § 3-704(a) (habeas corpus); MD. CODE ANN., REAL PROP. § 8-332(b) (1996)
(distress); MD. CODE ANN., STATE GoV'T § 10-623(c) (1993) (access to public
records); MD. RULE 2-221 (b) (interpleader).
894. 416 U.S. 363 (1974), cited in Bourne & Lynch, supra note 5, at 35 nn.225-26.
895. See Pernell v. Southall Realty, 416 U.S. 363, 384 (1974). The Court noted that
in many cases where liability was conceded, no jury would be requested, and
that in other cases where there was no dispute of fact, summary judgment
would be granted. See ill. The Court also noted that delay might be required
by fairness and due process. See ill. at 385.
896. See id. at 384 & n.34.
897. See Fletcher v. Flournoy, 198 Md. 53, 81 A.2d 2~2 (1951); MD. RULE 2-501.
898. See MD. RULE 2-519; see also Frush v. Brooks, 204 Md. 315, 324, 104 A.2d 624,
628 (1954) (dictum).
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law, generally899 will be made by the judge, not the jury. To that extent, any efficiencies of trial by the judge will be retained.
Additionally, efforts are being made to make jury trials even
more efficient. 900 For example, judges can be better trained in trial
management, modern technology, and communications skills. 901
Lawyers can be better trained in trial advocacy and communications
skills,902 while jury selection can be improved by the use of written
questionnaires903 and lawyers' opening statements made to the entire venire. 904 Rules of evidence can be simplified and trials shortened,905 and trial exhibits can be improved by the use of modern
technology.906 There have been suggestions, generally rejected, to
modifY jury verdicts by abandoning the unanimity requirement,907
reducing jury discretion by providing statutory schedules for noneconomic damages,908 and bifurcating trials in liability and then
damages phases. 909
Maintenance of a justice system using two arbiters, judge and
jury, appears in obvious ways to be less efficient in time, effort, and
expense than using only a judge. 9lO However, commentators in re899. See MD. RULE 2-502; cf. MD. CONST., DECL. OF RIGHTS art. 23 (preserving the
right of trial by jury of issues of fact).
900. See, e.g., ABA STANDARDS RElATING JUROR USE AND MANAGEMENT (1983); see
also VERDICT, supra note 162; ABA/BROOKINGS, supra note 308.
901. See ABA/BROOKINGS, supra note 308, at 4, 12, 25.
902. See id. at 4, 21.
903. See id. at 32.
904. See id. at 4, 21, 32.
905. See id. at 15-17,22,24-25.
906. See id. at 3,16-17,19,22.
907. See id. at 26-27.
908. See id. at 4, 13, 27.
909. See id. at 27-28.
910. See supra note 871 and accompanying text. The distinction seems to be between the efficiencies of trial by the jury and trials by the judge, not between
trials at Law and in Equity. Equity is not inherently more expeditious than
Law. For example, in 19th century England it was said that "delay and expense reign supreme" in the Court of Chancery. See Charles Synge Christopher Bowen, Progress in the Administration of Justice During the Victorian Period,
in 1 SELECT ESSAW IN ANGLO-AMERICAN LEGAL HISTORY 516,516 (1907); see also
CHARLES DICKENS, BLEAK HOUSE 7-8 (Modem Library ed., 1985) (1853) (footnotes omitted).
Jamdyce and Jamdyce drones on. This scarecrow of a suit has, in
course of time, become so complicated, that no man alive knows
what it means . . . . Innumerable children have been born in the
cause; innumerable young people have married in it; innumerable
old people have died out of it. Scores of persons have deliriously
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cent years have noted a number of ways in which a jury trial may be
more efficient than a judge trial. First, because of the possible discussion of allegations that may be inadmissible as evidence and,
therefore, require disqualification of the trier of fact, a judge may
be more likely to participate in negotiations leading to settlement in
a case to be tried by a jury than in a case to be tried to that
judge. 911 Second, jury trials are much more likely than judge trials
to be concentrated and continuous, bringing a closure of case development and allowing few interruptions. 912 Third, in a complex
case, more clarity is required from the lawyers and the judge in a
jury trial than in a judge trial.913 Fourth, evidence is more likely to
be excluded in a jury trial than in a judge trial, resulting in a
shorter triaP14 Fifth, the jury reaches its verdict summarily, in a
matter of hours or days, while the judge, who must make findings
of fact and conclusions of law, may deliberate and labor over an

911.
912.
913.

914.

found themselves made parties in Jarndyce and Jarndyce, without
knowing how or why; whole families have inherited legendary hatreds with the suit. The little plaintiff or defendant, who was promised a new rocking-horse when Jarndyce and Jarndyce should be settled, has grown up, possessed himself of a real horse, and trotted
away into the other world. Fair wards of court have faded into
mothers and grandmothers; a long procession of Chancellors has
come in and gone out; the legion of bills in the suit have been
transformed into mere bills of mortality; there are not three
Jarndyces left upon the earth perhaps, since old Tom Jarndyce in
despair blew his brains out at a coffeehouse in Chancery Lane; but
Jarndyce and Jarndyce still drags its dreary length before the Court,
perennially hopeless.
DICKENS, supra, at 7-8. Indeed, one cause of the merger of Law and Equity in
England in the 19th century was the public's arousal "by the intolerable expense and delay in equitable procedure." MCCUNTOCK, supra note 741, at 17.
See MORRIS]. BLOOMSTEIN, VERDICT 120-21 (1968).
See Galanter, supra note 313, at 88.
See Patrick E. Higginbotham, Continuing the Dialogue: Civil Juries and the Allocation of Judicial Power, 56 TEX. L. REv. 47, 54 (1977). One commentator has
concluded that the jury trial requires clarity of lawyers and judges in presenting the law to the jury in every case. See Edson L. Haines, Preface to JOINER,
supra note 157, at vii-viii.
See Stephen A. Saltzburg, Improving the Qyality ofJury Decision-making, in VERDICT: AssESSING THE CML JURY SWTEM 341, 343 (Robert E. Litan ed., 1993);
Stanley E. Sacks, Preservation of the Civil Jury System, 22 WASH. & LEE L. REv.
76, 83-84 (1965); At least this is true if the time which would have been
taken for the presentation of evidence exceeds the time taken for arguments
over its admissibility.
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opinion for months. 915 Sixth, appellate review of jury-tried facts is
more strictly limited than appellate review of judge-tried facts. 916
There are even some doubts about the data that supposedly
demonstrate that trial by a judge is more efficient than trial by a
jury. Some commentators have suggested that generalizations are
difficult, because of a skewed sample of cases. That is, the small percentage of cases that do reach the jury may be the closest, hardest,
and most insoluble ones. 917 Thus, at least some of the extra time, effort, and cost in jury trials is a result of the nature of the case, not
a result of the trier being a jury as opposed to a judge.
More importantly for purposes of this Article, Lynch and
Bourne's common-sense notion that judicial economy is better
served by trial by a judge than by trial by a jury may be criticized
because it is restrictive of the jury right and because it is contrary to
the usual ways of interpreting the Maryland Constitution. Just as
faculty democracy is required by accrediting agencies, the jury trial
may be required by the Maryland Constitution.
1.

Not Protective of the Jury Right

Lynch and Bourne's common-sense notion that judicial economy is better served by trial by a judge than by trial by a jury is obviously restrictive of the right to jury trial. Lynch and Bourne make
it clear that this notion. of judicial economy may motivate either the
legislature918 or the judiciary919 to restrict the jury right.
915. See Higginbotham, supra note 913, at 55; JOINER, supra note 157, at 72-73.
Compare FED. R Cw. P. Form 31 (jury findings as to liability and damages),
with FED. R Cw. P. 52(a) (judge findings of fact and conclusions of law), and
MD. RULE 2-522(a) (judge statement of reasons and basis for determining
damages).
916. See Higginbotham, supra note 913, at 58; JOINER, supra note 157, at 74; cf.
Board of Shellfish Comm'rs v. Mansfield, 125 Md. 630, 94 A. 207 (1915) (stating that constitutional jury trial guarantee implicitly prohibits appellate review of jury-found facts); Charlton Bros. Transp. Co. v. Garrettson, 188 Md.
85, 51 A.2d 642 (1947) (holding appellate review only of legal sufficiency,
not of weight of the evidence, in jury verdict). But cf. MD. RULE 8-131(c) (applying clearly erroneous standard to appellate review of judge's evidentiary
findings). Compare U.S. CONST. AMEND. VII "[N]o fact tried by a jury, shall be
otherwise re-examined in any Court of the United States, than according to
the rules of the common law.", and Lavender v. Kurn, 327 U.S. 645 (1946)
(allowing appellate reexamination only if the verdict was not based on substantial evidence or was unreasonable), with FED. R Cw. P. 52(a) (allowing
appellate review of judge's findings of fact by a clearly erroneous standard).
917. See, e.g., Schuck, supra note 893, at 307-08.
918. See Bourne & Lynch, supra note 5, at 3 n.3, 64 n.408, 69 n.437.
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Contrary to the Usual Ways of Interpreting the Constitution

Lynch and Bourne's common-sense notion that judicial economy is better served by trial by a judge than by trial by a jury is not
protective of the jury right. Moreover, it is contrary to many of the
usual ways of interpreting the Maryland Constitution.
That common-sense notion is contrary to the nature of a written constitution. The jury right is specific, enacted, and enforceable, and it is supreme as it prevails over other conflicting laws and
policies,920 such as judicial economy. The jury right is consistent
with a "living" constitution. It has survived the merger of Law and
Equity,921 and it may be protected at the same time that litigation is
expedited. 922
The common-sense notion that judicial economy is better
served by trial by a judge than by trial by a jury is also contrary to
the text of the Maryland Constitution. The principle jury right provision, Article 23, expressly mandates that the jury right shall be inviolably preserved. 923
Article 23 does invoke judicial economy in one respect. Article
23 includes a $5,000 amount in controversy requirement,924 precluding jury trial of small claims. There is no other language in Article
23, however, which suggests that policies, such as judicial economy,
may be invoked to erode the jury right. 925 Indeed, Article 44 of the
Maryland Declaration of Rights generally rules out pleas to "necessity"
to excuse departures from the Maryland Constitution. 926 While Article 19 of the Maryland Declaration of Rights provides that legal reme919.
920.
921.
922.
923.
924.
925.

See id. at 2-3, 60, 63, 69.
See supra notes 16-21 and accompanying text.
See supra note 1 and accompanying text.
See supra notes 889-909 and accompanying text.
See supra notes 47-67 and accompanying text.
See supra note 8.
Cf U.S. CaNST. AMEND. N (right to be free of "unreasonable" searches and
seizures); MD. CONST., DECL. OF RIGHTS art. 5 (providing that inhabitants of
Maryland are entitled the benefit of English statutes in existence on July 4,
1776, "which, by experience, have been found applicable to their local and
other circumstances"); id. art. 25 (right to be free of "excessive" bail and
"excessive" fines).
926. See MD. CONST., DECL. OF RIGHTS art. 44 ("That the provisions of the Constitution of the United States, and of this State, apply, as well in time of war, as
in time of peace; and any departure therefrom, or violation thereof, under
the plea of necessity, or any other plea, is subversive of good Government,
and tends to anarchy and despotism.").
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dies should be available "speedily without delay,
we have seen
that modern procedural developments permit expeditious jury trialS. 928 Furthermore, the Maryland Constitution preserves the right to
trial by jury, not to trial by judge. 929
The common-sense notion that judicial economy is better
served by trial by a judge than by trial by a jury is contrary to the
history of the Maryland Constitution. That history shows hundreds
of years of reverence for the jury. right. 930 English deprivation of
that right, under the plea of efficiency,931 was one of the abuses
leading to the American Revolution.932
The framers of Article 23 recognized that jury trials may take
more time than trials by judges,933 but they adopted the jury right
anyway.934 The framers of Article 23 wanted to put the jury right beyond the reach of the legislature and, presumably, the judiciary.935
The common-sense notion that judicial economy is better
served by trial by a judge than by trial by a jury is contrary to the
structure of government. Eliminating the jury eliminates a check by
the people on the government, generally.936 Eliminating the jury
also eliminates the jury's check on the trial judge by finding facts
927. MD. CONST., DECL. OF RIGHTS art. 19 provides:
That every man, for any injury done to him in his p~rson or property, ought to have remedy by the course of the Law of the land,
and ought to have justice and right, freely without sale, fully without any denial, and speedily without delay, according to the Law of
the land.
Id.
928. See supra notes 889-899 and ,!-ccompanying text.
929. See supra notes 86-95 and accompanying text.
930. See supra notes 100-04, 107-D8 and accompanying text.
931. See GoEBEL, supra note 105, at &5-87 (enforcement of trade laws and collection of revenues).
932. See supra notes 105-06 and accompanying text.
933. On April 30, 1851, the constitutional convention debates regarding the number of judges to be provided for Baltimore City included the following discussion: "OJ ury trials ... imposed the heaviest burdens upon the courts ....
[I] t was jury trials, where the cal!es were argued before the court, and exceptions were taken, and the court instructs the jury, that consumes time .... "
2 1851 DEBATES, supra note 9, at 644. However, the convention record also
noted the existence of a backlog of 2,500 cases in the court of chancery because of dilatory course of proceedings.
934. The jury trial guarantee was adopted by the convention on May 7, 1851, one
week after the discussion. See supra note 933; see also 2 1851 DEBATES, supra
note 9, at 766-67.
935. See generally supra note 9 and accompanying text.
936. See supra notes 153-63 and accompanying text.
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and by softening the harshness of legal doctrine. 937 Eliminating the
jury also eliminates the jury's check, by supporting the judge, on
the popular branches of govemment. 938
The common-sense notion that judicial economy is better
served by trial by a judge than by trial by a jury is contrary to doctrine. As has been shown, the Court of Appeals of Maryland has recognized that the constitutional jury right is a limitation on the legislature's power to fix the jurisdictions of Law and Equity.939
Traditionally, Maryland courts have not been very alert to the erosion of the jury right. 940 However, Higgins v. Bames941 suggests a new
regime. Higgins expressly rejected an approach preferring the "efficiency" of a judge trial in favor of "a jealous protection of the right
of jury trial. "942 Higgins narrowly limited the discretion of trial
judges to restrict the jury right943 to situations where the jury itself
would obstruct a satisfactory disposition of the issue 944 or where
"most imperative circumstances" exist. 945
Another commentator suggested that the right to jury trial
should be limited because it is as impractical as it is instructive. The
commentator was Professor Redish in Seventh Amendment Right to
Jury Trial: A Study in the Irrationality of Rational Decision Making. 946
Redish himself noted three criticisms of the idea of limiting the
right to jury trial on the ground that it is impractical. First, that
idea may lead to determinations based on judicial whim.947 Second,
937. See supra notes 161-62 and accompanying text.
938. See supra note 163 and accompanying text.
939. See supra note 165 and accompanying text. But if. Houston v. Lloyd's Consumer Acceptance Corp., 241 Md. 10,215 A.2d 192 (1965) (holding that the
exercise of the jury right is subject to a requirement that the election of a
jury trial be in writing); NILES, supra note 96, at 18, 343 (citing Knee v. Baltimore City Pass. Ry., 87 Md. 623, 40 A. 890 (1898) (providing that reasonable
regulations of the exercise of the jury right are permitted».
940. See Brown, supra note 85, at 451, 473-74.
941. 310 Md. 532, 530 A.2d 724 (1987).
942. [d.
943. See id. at 543-44 & n.12, 550-51, 530 A.2d at 730, 733 & n.12.
944. See id. at 550-51, 530 A.2d at 733. But if. id. at 546 n.7, 530 A.2d at 731 n.7
(providing no such case was found to exist).
945. [d. at 543-44, 546, 550-51, 530 A.2d at 730, 731, 733. Complexity of the issues
is unlikely to constitute "most imperative circumstances." [d. at 546 n.7, 530
A.2d at 731 n.7.
946. See Redish, supra note 591.
947. See id. at 512. Redish recognized this problem in all situations where legal realism or sociological jurisprudence (rather than law as narrowly defined) is
the basis for decision.
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other social values competing with efficiency exist and must be balanced against it. 948 Third, that idea may not be durable. 949 Others
have criticized Redish's idea of limiting the right to jury trial because it is impractical. Moreover, a criticism directed specifically at
Redish was that his approach was elitist-to the extent judges perceive that the jury is not just like them, judges may use their power
to try to curb jurors. 950 A general criticism of the judicial economy
approach to interpreting the jury trial right is that the approach
would be rejected out of hand if it was applied to other provisions
of the Bill of Rights. Thus, the approach suggests a lack of sympathy
for the objectives of the constitutional right of jury trial. 951
The common-sense notion that judicial economy is better
served by trial by a judge than by trial by a jury is contrary to a prudential concern. The jury is a benefit to judges and our justice system by helping legitimize outcomes, by being a "lightning rod" for
animosity, and by providing a "black box" decision. 952
The common-sense notion that judicial economy is better
served by trial by a judge than by trial by a jury is contrary to certain ethical concerns. For purposes of equal protection, the jury
right is a fundamental constitutional right. Thus, any classification
significantly interfering with the exercise of the right would be

948. See id; see also supra notes 880-85 and accompanying text; cf. supra notes 91116 and accompanying text (showing conflicting views of the relative efficiency of trial judge and trial jury).
949. See Redish, supra note 591, at 513-14. Thus, the future might bring different
evaluations of efficiency or of how efficiency and other values should be
weighed.
950. See Lewis H. Larue, A Jury of One's Peers, 33 WASH. & LEE L. REv. 841, 865 &
n.86 (1976).
The judges would believe that deciding cases "on the law and the
evidence" requires a disciplined mind, the sort of mind the judge
believes himself to have. A temptation that seduces the judge is for
him to say that the best juror is a person who is just like himself.
Insofar as the jurors are not just like the judges, and insofar as the
difference is perceived by the judges as a lack of discipline, then to
that extent the judges will use their power to try to curb the jurors.
Id. (footnote omitted)
951. See Wolfram, supra note 120, at 649 n.33; see also Wilkens v. State, 293 Md.
335,444 A.2d 445, 448 (1982) (a criminal contempt case quoting Bloom v. Illinois, 391 U.S. 194, 208-09 (1968) ("Perhaps to some extent we sacrifice efficiency, expedition, and economy, but the choice in favor of jury trial has
been made, and retained, in the Constitution."».
952. See supra notes 308-20 and accompanying text.
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strictly scrutinized. 953 However, judicial economy, like other efficiency measures, is likely to satisfy only deferential rational basis review, not strict scrutiny.954 Therefore, any significant limitation on
the jury right imposed for the purpose of judicial economy would
violate equal protection.
The common-sense notion that judicial economy is better
served by trial by a judge than by trial by a jury also violates the
principles of limited government, government by the people, government for the people, and free political exchange. 955

C.

Equity is Superior to Law as a Mode oj Trial

The seventh aspect of Lynch and Bourne's principled discretionary theory is their suggestion that Equity is superior to Law as a
mode of trial. 956 Mter the merger of Law and Equity,957 that superiority is generally of trial by judge over trial by jury.958
Arguments over which is 'the better decision-maker, judge or
jury, is a litde like asking who should make decisions for a schoolthe dean or the faculty? Both unitary decision-makers like a dean,
and collegial decision-makers, like a law faculty, have strengths and
weaknesses. Both decision-makers typically consider mercy and ad
hoc matters, on the one hand, as well as justice and reason, on the
other hand. Of course, faculty decisions are usually made in a context of power-sharing with the dean, who may initially refer matters
to the faculty and who often later exercises some reviewing authority over faculty decisions. Thus, faculty decision-making provides the
checks and balances of participation by both the faculty and the
953. See supra notes 365-68 and accompanying text.
954. But cf. Reed v. Reed, 404 U.S, 71 (1971) (providing that while judicial economy was a legitimate objective, a preference of males over females to administer decedents' estates was arbitrary discrimination violating equal protection) .
955. See supra notes 376411, 443-52 and accompanying text.
956. See infra notes 959-1044 and accompanying text; cf. supra note 305 and accompanying text (stating that Equity proceedings did not include oral testimony until 1890). But cf. Bourne & Lynch, supra note 5, at 30 (citing Richardson v. Stillinger, 12 G. & J. 477 (1842) (holding that a court of Law is the
superior method of trial for most civil cases».
957. See supra note 1 and accompanying text.
958. The distinction between substantive equitable rights and remedies and substantive legal rights and remedies, a distinction which survives merger, is considered below. See infra notes 1125-1514 and accompanying text (discussing
Lynch and Bourne's approximation of pre-merger approach for actually deciding in what situations the jury right is to apply).
'
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dean. In any event, the school's decisions typically are s~bject to review by higher authority-the provost, the president, and the board,
Lynch and Bourne's suggestion, that Equity is superior to Law
as a mode of trial, appears to be based on five elements expressly
or impliedly stated in their work: expertise, decision-making process, expedition, judicial economy, and result.
First, Lynch and Bourne, by references to the "chancellor,"959
suggest that a judge has expertise that a jury does not have. Generally, a judge does not have expertise in the usual sense. An official
in an administrative agency960 or on a specialized tribunal96I develops expertise, a special claim to competency based on knowledge of
and experience with certain substantive rules and special procedures. 962 While an experienced trial judge may have expertise in the
trial of fact, at least compared with appellate judges,963 that expertise is different, but not necessarily greater, than the expertise of a
jury.964
The relative competence of judge and jury were summarized in
KaIven and Zeisel's classic study of the American jury:
On the one hand, it is urged that the judge, as a result of
training, discipline, recurrent experience, and superior intelligence, will be better able to understand the law and analyze the facts than laymen, selected from a wide range of
intelligence levels, who have no particular experience with
matters of this sort, and who have no durable official re959. See LYNCH & BOURNE, supra note 3, at 329, 331; Bourne & Lynch, supra note
5, at 29, 44, 47, 56, 62-64, 69, 75, 77. The office of chancellor no longer exists in Maryland. See supra notes 648-51 and accompanying text. Moreover,
separate courts of Equity have been abolished. See id. The last hold-out was
Baltimore City, where separate courts of Law and Equity with rotating judges
existed until 1980. See MD. CONST. art. IV, §§ 27-33 (1867) (repealed 1980).
Thus, by referring to "chancellor," Bourne and Lynch must be referring to a
judge. See LYNCH & BOURNE, supra note 3, at 329 ("In a merged system . . .
the powers of the chancellor are present in every action."). .
960. See, e.g., Owen M. Fiss, The Supreme Court, 1978 Term- Foreword: The Forms of
Justice, 93 HARv. L. REv. 1, 34-35 (1979).
961. See, e.g., Theodore Eisenberg & Stephen C. Yeazeli, The Ordinary and the Extraordinary in Institutional Litigation, 93 HARv. L. REv. 465, 481-86 (1980) (probate and bankruptcy courts).
962. See id. at 481; Fiss, supra note 960, at 1, 34-35.
963. See Anderson v. Bessemer City, 470 U.S. 564, 574-75 (1985).
964. Cf. Harry Kalven, Jr., The Dignity of the Civil Jury, 50 VA. L. REv. 1055, 1058
(1964) (stating that a jury, having common sense and the feel of the community, is an expert at deciding negligence and at pricing damages).

1997]

The Right to Trial by Jury

427

sponsibility. On the other hand, it is argued that twelve
heads are inevitably better than one; that the jury as a
group has wisdom and strength which need not characterize any of its individual members; that it makes up in common sense and common experience what it may lack in
professional training, and that its very inexperience is an asset because it secures a fresh perception of each trial, avoiding the stereotypes said to infect the judicial eye. 965
The debate over the respective competence of judge and jury is
fierce, long-standing, and filled with value judgments. 966 However, it
should not be surprising that judges and juries have different characteristics, for they complement each other in function. 967 In any
event, the debate is largely theoretical as long as there is a constitutional right to jury trial. 968
. Where complex cases are involved, however, the judge is likely
to have an expertise that the jury does not have. Thus, Lynch and
Bourne suggest that complex cases may be more suitable for trial by
judge than trial by jury.969 Lynch and Bourne recognize, however,
that this idea of a complexity exception to the right to jury trial has
not been accepted in either Maryland970 or federal97I courts for several reasons. First, after procedural reforms, complex issues may be
adjudicated in an action at law. 972 Second, the complexity idea may
965. KALVEN & ZEISEL, supra note 121, at 8. Kalven and Zeisel concede that all
judges are not alike and that all juries are not alike. For example, some juries will be more rule-minded than the average judge, while some judges will
have more of an open sentiment than the average jury. See id. at 99-100.
In Maryland, it is a jury of six, not twelve, whose heads may be better
than one. See supra note 7. It is not six heads or one head, but both in ajury
trial, which is conducted under supervision of a judge. See supra notes 157-63
and accompanying text.
966. See KALVEN & ZEISEL, supra note 121, at 3-9; see also Galanter, supra note 313,
at 69-91.
967. See supra notes 157-62 and accompanying text.
968. See supra notes 7-15 and accompanying text.
969. See LYNCH & BOURNE, supra note 3, at 334; Bourne & Lynch,~supra note 5, at
27, 42; see also id. at 24, 30-31, 60. See generally Deirdre W. Bastian Lee & Eugenia Cooper Wootton, Comment, Complex Federal Civil Litigation - Can Jury
Trials be Constitutionally Avoidea? 11 U. BALT. L. REv. 110 (1981).
970. See LYNCH & BOURNE, supra note 3, at 335 & n.218; Bourne & Lynch, supra
note 5, at 42 n.267; see also supra notes 336-39 and accompanying text.
971. See LYNCH & BOURNE, supra note 3, at 332-33, 334, 335; Bourne & Lynch,
supra note 5, at 24-25, 42 n.267. But see id. at 27 n.162.
972. See LYNCH & BOURNE, supra note 3, at 332-33; Bourne & Lynch, supra note 5,
at 42.
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run afoul of the constitutional right to trial by jury.973 Thus, Equity
is not superior to Law as a mode of trial because of any expertise.
Second, Lynch and Bourne suggest that Equity is superior to
Law as a mode of trial because the decision-making process of Equity (the judge), is better than the decision-making process of Law
(the jury). Lynch and Bourne mention only one aspect of Equity's
supposed superiority of the decision-making process-the existence
of discretion. In that respect, however, the decision-making
processes of Equity and Law are similar. In certain other respects
not mentioned by Lynch and Bourne, the decision-making
processes of the judge and the jury are different, but neither one is
clearly superior to the other. In one other respect, however, the
jury trial is clearly superior to a judge trial-the jury trial includes a
system of checks and balances.
Lynch and Bourne note that a significant characteristic of Equity is its discretion. 974 While they do not systematically describe Equity'S discretion,975 Lynch and Bourne do mention several of its aspects. That discretion permits weighing or balancing the interests of
the parties,976 as well as that of the public,977 in determining whether
973. See LYNCH & BOURNE, supra note 3, at 332-33, 335; Bourne & Lynch, supra
note 5, at 27 n.162. One commentator has concluded that a jury is required
where the issues are difficult in order to permit public scrutiny and thereby
assure that justice is not lost in the maze. See Wolfram, supra note 120, at
74647. Cf supra note 913 and accompanying text Uury trial may be preferable to a judge trial in complex cases because of the greater clarity required
of the lawyers and the judge in a jury trial).
974. See Bourne & Lynch, supra note 5, at 44, 47 n.297, 63; if. LYNCH & BOURNE,
supra note 3, at 318 ("equity and good conscience").
Other commentators have noted that this discretion is judicial, not personal, which is informed by principles of equity, law, and public policy and
which considers all of the circumstances of a case. See, e.g., PHELPS, supra
note 86, at 212-15.
975. Fiss has more systematically identified several different aspects of Equity'S discretion. First, unlike most legal relief, equitable relief is discretionary in the
sense that it is extraordinary or not of right. See FISS, supra note 719, at 1.
Second, equitable relief is discretionary because it is not controlled by precise rules. See FISS, supra note 730, at 91. Third, equitable relief is discretionary in that appellate review is limited. See id. Fourth, discretion may be exercised at many different stages of a case in Equity, including the
determinations of whether or not the equitable prerequisites have been satisfied, whether or not a substantive right has been violated, whether or not an
equitable remedy is be granted, and, if so, what the nature of that remedy is
to be. See id. at 91-93.
976. See Bourne & Lynch, supra note 5, at 62 n.393; if. LYNCH & BOURNE, supra
note 3, at 326 ("equitable inquiry" in civil coercive contempt).

1997]

The Right to Trial by Jury

429

relief should be granted. Equity's discretion also permits considering all of the circumstances in determining what relief should be
gran ted. 978
The idea that Equity is superior to Law because of Equity's discretion is a philosophical and historical oversimplification that does
not accurately reflect modern practice. Philosophically, Dean Pound
saw rules of law and the exercise of discretion as two antagonistic
ideas in the administration of justice. 979 Although rules of law are
characteristic of the common law980 and the exercise of discretion is
characteristic of Equity,981 Law and Equity react with one another982
and any boundaries between the two are accidentap83
Historically, to associate discretion with Equity and not with
Law is an oversimplification. Prior to the development of Equity,
common-law courts exercised significant powers of discretion 984 and
heard appeals to conscience. 985 Traditionally, Law courts have also
issued certain extraordinary, or discretionary remedies, such as
mandamus. 986
Indeed, Henry McClintock has hinted that Law courts could be
just as flexible as Equity in deciding cases to meet changing needs.
The common-law theory was that precedents were based on "immemorial custom." Law courts interpreted and applied precedents to
decide cases. Thus, Law courts might exercise flexibility in two different ways. First, a Law court had to determine the content of the
immemorial custom on which the precedents were based. Second, a
Law court had to interpret precedents and apply them to a particular case. 987
977. See Bourne & Lynch, supra note 5, at 43-44.
978. See LYNCH & BOURNE, supra note 3, at 314 n.65, 315; see also Bourne & Lynch,
supra note 5, at 62.
979. See Roscoe Pound, The Decadence of Equity, 5 COLUM. L. REv. 20 (1905); see also
KALVEN & ZEISEL, supra note 121, at 9; cf. DAN B. DOBBS, LAw OF REMEDIES 67
(2d ed. 1993) ("Discretion of equity courts ... makes possible decisions that
are flexible, intuitive, and tailored to the particular case. It also makes possible decisions that are unanalyzed, unexplained, and unthoughtful.").
980. See generally Pound, supra note 979, at 20-35.
981. See id. at 22.
982. See id. at 24.
983. See id. at 23.
984. See PLUCKNEIT, supra note 516, at 158, 675.
985. See id. at 680.
986. See MD. CODE ANN., CTS. & JUD. PROC. § 3-8A-Ol (1995).
987. See MCCUNTOCK, supra note 741, at 10; cf. Calvin Woodard, Is the United States
a Common Law Country? (changes in common-law theory in England and
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. Even before merger of Law and Equity, Law courts exercised
substantial discretion regarding procedural aspects of a law case,
such as ordering separate trials,988 transferring cases to another
county,989 requiring production of evidence,99o submitting a case for
a special verdict,991 ruling on a new trial motion,992 revising a judgment within thirty days of its entry,993 and directing entry of final
judgment on part of a multiple claim or multiple party action. 994
Historically, the scope of discretion in Equity courts became restricted as Equity was systematized under the influence of chancellors who were lawyers995 and as the principle of stare decisis or precedent became accepted. 996 In modern practice, because Law and
Equity are administered by the same judges, there is a tendency to
overlook historical distinctions between Law and Equity.997
Ironically, the discretionary element of the decision-making
process of Equity is also available in the jury trial of Law cases. In
that respect, the two processes have been characterized as func-

988.

989.

990.

991.

992.

993.

994.

995.
996.
997.

America), in ESSAYS ON ENGUSH LAw AND THE AMERICAN EXPERIENCE 120, 12035 (Elisabeth A. Cawthorn & David E. Narrett eds., 1994).
MD. RULE 501 (a) (1977) (repealed 1984), applicable at Law and in Equity,
was interpreted as giving the court wide discretion. See Connor v. Celanese
Fibers Co., 40 Md. App. 452, 459, 392 A.2d 116, 120 (1978), overruled on other
grounds by Eastern Stainless Steel v. Nicholson, 60 Md. App. 659, 484 A.2d
296 (1984).
MD. RULE 317 (1977) (repealed 1984), applicable generally, provided that
the circuit court, where venue was improper, might dismiss or transfer the
action.
MD. RULE 521 (1977) (repealed 1984), applicable generally, was interpreted
as within the court's discretion. See Evans v. Howard, 256 Md. 155, 161, 259
A.2d 528, 531 (1969).
MD. RULE 560(a) (1977) (repealed 1984),applicable at Law, expressly made
the method of submission of the issues to the jury within the court's discretion.
MD. RULE 567(c) (1977) (repealed 1984), applicable at Law, was interpreted
as within the discretion of the court. See Brinand v. Denzik, 226 Md. 287,
293, 173 A.2d 203, 206 (1961).
MD. RULE 625(a) (1977) (repealed 1984), applicable at Law, was interpreted
as within the discretion of the court. Hardy v. Metts, 282 Md. 1, 6, 381 A.2d
683, 686 (1978).
MD. RULE 605 (1977) (repealed 1984), applicable generally, was interpreted
as giving the court discretion. See Diener Enters., Inc. v. Miller, 266 Md. 551,
555,295 A.2d 470, 473 (1972).
See PLUCKNETT, supra note 516, at 688.
See id. at 690, 692.
See MCCUNTOCK, supra note 741, at 51.
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tional equivalents. 998 Indeed, Kalven and Zeisel have identified a
function of' the jury as applying "common-sense equities" to a case,
a role ordinarily not permitted the judge. 999 Lynch and Bourne note
the "common sense justice of civil juries." 1000
Of course, in any society with rules, discretion must have limits. lool Where the standards for the exercise of discretion are undefined, the only limit may be the conscience of the one who exercises that discretion,1002 which is like making the standard for
measuring length vary with the "chancellor's fOOt."1003
The jury trial, by providing checks and balances between judge
and jury, does limit discretion. The judge provides a check on jury
discretion by ruling on the admissibility of evidence, instructing the
jury on the law, and setting aside erroneous verdicts. lOO4 The jury
provides a check on the judge's discretion by finding facts and softening the harshness of legal doctrine. l005 In this respect, jury trial is
clearly superior to judge trial.
Generally, Lynch and Bourne do not compare other aspects of
998. See FIss, supra note 719, at 27. Fiss stated elsewhere that one aspect of equitable discretion is the use of open-ended concepts, such as "reasonable,"
which are also applied (by the jury) in common-law actions. See FIss, supranote 730, at 92.
999. See KALVEN & ZEISEL, supra note 121, at 8-9, 87, 107, 115, 285, 291, 299, 304,
346, 375, 395, 399, 443 n.18, 477 n.4, 489-95, 498-99. Kalven and Zeisel also
appeared to equate jury "equity" with jury "discretion." See id. at 498; see also
ROSCOE POUND, AN INTRODUCTION TO THE PHILOSOPHY OF LAw 66 (rev. ed.
1954) (reporting that "the jurors are chancellors"); Chayes, supra note 313,
at 1287 (" [O]ne of the virtues of the jury was thought to be its exercise of a
rough-hewn equity, deviating from the dictates of the law where justice or
changing. community mores required." (emphasis added» ; VALERIE P. HANs
& NEIL VIDMAR, JUDGING THE JURY 116 (1986) (" Uluries frequently apply a
measure of fairness and equity to a case that a judge, preoccupied with the
fine points of the law, will ignore." (emphasis added»; SPOONER, supra note
155, at 64, 81, 110-12, 191 (stating old common-law courts were courts of
conscience in which jurors decided cases according to their own notions of
natural equity).
1000. Bourne & Lynch, supra note 5, at 3; see also ABA/BROOKINGS, supra note 308,
at 9 (stating that the jury expresses "the community's sense of fairness, of
justice, of right and wrong" and balances competing values).
1001. See generally KENNETH CULP DAVIS, DISCRETIONARY JUSTICE (1971).
1002. Cf supra notes 262-66 and accompanying text (discussing discretion of the
trial judge as an approach to determining the right to jury trial after
merger).
1003. JOHN SELDEN, TABLE TALK 52 (1821).
1004. See supra note 157 and accompanying text.
1005. See supra notes 160-62 and accompanying text.
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the decision-making processes of the judge and the jury.lOO6 Those
aspects may be divided into four general categories for purposes of
comparison: the composition of the decision-maker, its inputs, its
deliberation, and its outputs. As developed below, neither the judge
nor the jury has a clear overall superiority as to prominent aspects
of decision-making in those categories.
With respect to the composition of the decision-maker, we have
already seen mixed results. Kalven and Zeisel concluded that in certain respects a judge is superior to the jury: the judge is better able
than a layperson to understand the law and the facts because of the
judge'S superior intelligence-contrasted with the jury's wide range
of intelligence-and because of the judge's training, discipline, and
experience-contrasted with the jury's lack of professional training
and its inexperience. 1007 However, Kalven and Zeisel concluded that
in other respects the jury is superior to the judge: the wisdom and
strength of twelve is greater than that of one,1008 the jury's common
sense and broad experience may offset the judge's professional
training, and the jury's fresh perception of a trial is better than the
judge's stereotypes. 1009
Other debate on the composition of the decision-maker, centered on fairness and responsibility, has reached differing concluSiOllS. Regarding fairness, some have seen the jury as more biased
and emotional than the judge, tOtO while others have seen the jury as
less elitist and more representative of the community, lOll less corruptible,1012 and more subject to scrutiny and challenge for bias
than the judge. 1013 Regarding responsibility, some have seen the
1006.
1007.
1008.
1009.
1010.

C! supra notes 969-73 and accompanying text (complex cases).
See supra note 965 and accompanying text.
C! supra note 7 Uury of six in Maryland).
See supra note 965 and accompanying text.
See John W. Wigmore, A Program far the Trial ofJury Tria~ 12 J. AM. JUD. SOC'y
166, 168 (1929). But cf. supra note 1009 and accompanying text Uudicial stereotypes); JOINER, supra note 157, at 26, 34, 66 (background biases resulting
from accumulated experiences); SEYMOUR WISHMAN, ANATOMY OF A JURY 14647 (1986) (prior lawyer roles influence judicial behavior).
1011. See HANs & VIDMAR, supra note 999, at 49-50; JOINER, supra note 157, at 65.
1012. See KALVEN & ZEISEL, supra note 121, at 7-8 (stating that 12 are more difficult
corrupt than one); SPOONER, supra note 155, at 124 (providing that jurors,
until they come to the jury box, are unknown to the parties).
1013. See HANs & VIDMAR, supra note 999, at 63-78 (stating that jurors are subject to
voir dire and challenges for cause). See generally Schuck, supra note 879, at
309-10 (providing that judges' systematic biases of social status, wealth, political activity, peer group, professional training, and socialization are more ob-
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temporary nature of the jury's role as a weakness,1014 while others
have seen it as a strength. 1015
With respect to the inputs of the decision-making process, the
judge has a clear superiority over the jury in understanding applicable law, and the judge has some superiority in gathering facts. With
regard to understanding the law, we have already seen that the
judge, who has professional training, is superior to the jury, which
lacks that training. 1016 With regard to gathering facts, the judge, unlike the jury, may question witnesses 1017 and take notes during
trial.I018 However, the collective memory of the jury may be superior
to the memory of the judge. 1019
With respect to the deliberation of the decision-maker, the jury
has a clear superiority over the judge. We have already seen that
twelve (or six) heads are usually better than one. I020 The representative nature of the juryl021 also permits the inclusion of a variety of
groups, classes, and viewpoints. 1022 The deliberation of the jury permits group interaction, such as discussion, exchange of ideas, argument, and criticism-qualities not characteristic of the deliberation
jectionable than juries' random biases).
1014. See KALVEN & ZEISEL, supra note 121, at 8. But cf. id. at 498 (stating the undomesticated status of the jury may be an advantage).
1015. See Galanter, supra note 313, at 88-90 (stating that the jury's transience permits a fresh response, resonant to the emerging moral sense of the community, compared with the judge's response, jaded by routines and stereotypes
and constrained by institutional priorities, professional networks, and career
concerns); SPOONER, supra note 155, at 124 (providing judges regularly, but
jurors rarely, are exposed to the temptations of money, fame, and power).
1016. See KALVEN & ZEISEL, supra note 121, at 8.
1017. See HANs & VIDMAR, supra note 999, at 123-24. But cf. WISHMAN, supra note
1010, at 166 (stating the questioning of witnesses may detract from the evaluator's detachment). The judge'S superiority over the jury in this respect,
however, could be eliminated by reforming trial procedure to permit jurors
to question witnesses. See HANs & VIDMAR, supra note 999, at 246.
1018. See HANs & VIDMAR, supra note 999, at 123. But cf. WISHMAN, supra note 1010,
at 137 (stating that the taking of notes may distract the evaluator from observing a witness's demeanor at a critical moment). The judge'S superiority
over the jury in this respect, however, could be eliminated by reforming trial
procedure to permit jurors to take notes. See HANs & VIDMAR, supra note 999,
at 246.
1019. See Robert MacCoun, Inside the Black Box: What Empirical Research Tells Us about
Decisionmaking by Civil Juries, in VERDICT, supra note 162, at 137, 167.
1020. See supra note 965 and accompanying text.
1021. See supra note 1011 and accompanying text.
1022. See REID HAsTIE ET AL., INSIDE THE JURY 7-8 (1983).
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of a single person. 1023 Of course, different juries and different
judges vary regarding whether they truly deliberate. One commentary noted that some juries are "verdict-driven," emphasizing voting
rather than deliberation, while others were "evidence driven," emphasizing deliberation rather than voting. 1024 Whether judges begin
with premises, rather than with conclusions, has also been questioned by legal realists. 1025
With respect to the outputs of the decision-maker, the judge's
reasoned judgment1026 appears clearly superior to the jury's "black
box" verdict. 1027 However, as developed below, that apparent superiority is not necessarily a real superiority.1028 Thus, Equity is not superior to Law as a mode of trial because of decision-making processes.
Third, Lynch and Bourne say that Equity is superior to Law as
a mode of trial because Equity is expeditious. 1029 However, as detailed above, modern procedures permit litigation to be expedited,
while protecting the jury right. 1030
Fourth, Lynch and Bourne imply that Equity is superior to Law
as a mode of trial because Equity better serves judicial economy.1031
1023. See JOINER, supra note 157, at 25-35; see also Wigmore, supra note 1010, at 171.
Wigmore concluded that the best means for reaching a judgment is to recc
oncile the conclusions of a number of persons selected at random. By analogy, Wigmore noted that the final standing of a student at a university is determined not by any single professor, but by the net result of 20 or more
professors' judgments.
The jury may also be better than the judge at generating solutions to
problems and correcting factual errors. See MacCoun, supra note 1019, at
167.
1024. See HAsTIE ET AL., SUPRA note 1022, at 163-65 (study of mock juries); if.
KALVEN & ZEISEL, supra note 121, at 488-89, 496 (providing the real decision
is usually made before deliberation begins; deliberation is the means by
which unanimity is reached).
1025. See, e.g., JEROME FRANK, LAw AND THE MODERN MIND 108-26 (1963 ed.). Kalven
and Zeisel noted that the issue of whether the evidence or the conclusion
comes first rises in the study of both jury and judge decision-making. See
KALVEN & ZEISEL, supra note 121, at 490.
1026. See MD. RULE 2-522(a) (statement of reasons required in bench trial).
1027. See Chayes, supra note 314, at 1287.
1028. See infra notes 1068-89 and accompanying text (jury sentiments about the
law); see also supra notes 314-20 and accompanying text (prudential concerns).
1029. See Bourne & Lynch, supra note 5, at 52, 53 n.349, 61, 63, 64 & n.408, 69 &
n.437.
1030. See supra notes 889-906 and accompanying text.
1031. See supra notes 867-79 and accompanying text.

1997]

The Right to Trial by Jury

435

That notion has already been set forth and criticized in detai1. 1032
Fifth, Lynch and Bourne suggest that Equity is superior to Law
as a mode of trial, because the result lO33 of trial by a judge is superior to that of trial by a jury.1034 As examples, Lynch and Bourne
make reference to two areas of law: medical malpractice 1035 and contracts. 1036 Their suggestion is subject to a number of criticisms, some
of a general nature and some directed to the two examples. Generally, the extent of the difference in result between a judge and jury
trial is difficult to assess. There seems to be a large measure of
agreement, however, between the results of the two types of trials.1037 Kalven and Zeisel's study of the jury in four thousand civil
cases found that judge and jury agreed on liability in about 78% of
the cases.1038 Contrary to the expectation that the jury favors the
plaintiff, the disagreement in the remaining 22% of the cases was
distributed fairly evenly- the jury was more favorable to the plaintiff in 12% of 'the cases, and the judge was more favorable to the
plaintiff in 10% of the cases.1039 The jury's award of damages was on
1032. See supra notes 880-958 and accompanying text.
1033. The element of result may be related to most of the other elements relating
to the superiority of Equity as a method of trial--expertise, decision-making
process, and expedition. See supra notes 959-1030 and accompanying text.
1034. See Bourne & Lynch, supra note 5, at 2-3. Bourne and Lynch recognize that
those who favor juries believe that juries give better results than judges. See
id. at 3 (quoting Parklane Hosiery Co. v. Shore, 439 U.S. 322, 34344 (1979)
(Rehnquist, j., dissenting».
1035. See Bourne & Lynch, supra note 5, at 3 n.3 (stating that the legislature found
"the 'societal costs of jury adjudication too high in the area of health care
malpractice"). But see NEIL VIDMAR. MEDICAL MALPRACTICE AND THE AMERICAN
JURY: CONFRONTING THE MYTHS ABOUT JURY INCOMPETENCE. DEEP POCKETS. AND
OUTRAGEOUS DAMAGES AWARDS (1995):
The statutory scheme provides for decision by an arbitration panel, not
by a judge. ,See MD. CODE ANN .. CTS. & JUD. PROC., §§ 3-2A~I(b), 3-2A~3(c),
3-2A~(d), 3-2A~5(a) (1995). The panel's award is subject to judicial review
with trial by a jury if properly elected. See id. § 3-2A~6(b). However, Bourne
and Lynch ~ite medical malpractice as an example of the civil jury "as a burdensome constitutional luxury, the costs of which must be lessened by restriction." Bourne & Lynch, supra note 5, at 2-3 (footnotes omitted). Presumably, Bourne and Lynch believe that trial by a judge would generally provide
a more satisfactory result than trial by a jury.
1036. See Bourne & Lynch, supra note 5, at 54 n.354.
1037. See generally Par/dane, 439 U.S. at 332 & n.19; Byrd v. Blue Ridge Rural Elec.
Coop., 356 U.S. 525, 539-40 (1958) (stating judge and jury are unlikely to
reach different results).
1038. See KALVEN & ZEISEL, supra note 121, at 64, 521-23 (prior studies).
1039. See id. at 64.
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the average about 20% higher than that of the judge. 104O
The value of these statistics, however, is problematic. While the
verdicts of the jury were, presumably, a matter of record, the decisions of the judge were hypothetical because they were rendered in
cases actually decided by the jury, and because they were as reported by the judge. 1041 The reasons for judgejury disagreement
covered a variety of items,1042 including evaluation of evidence, application of the burden of proof, facts available to the judge but not
the jury, disparity of counsel, sentiments about the parties, and sentiments about the law. 1043 Of course, any jury study is limited by its
methodology-the identification and selection of judges trying jury
cases and the selection and number of cases reported. 1044
Lynch and Bourne, using examples from the substantive legal
domains of medical malpractice and contracts to illustrate the jury's
inferiority, suggest that judgejury disagreements may be
based on sentiments about the law. 1045 Kalven and Zeisel have con1040. See id. at 64 n.13.
1041. See id. at 48. The judge and jury may have agreed because the judge subtly
conveyed to the jury the judge's feelings about the case, and because the
jury was influenced by those cues. See WISHMAN, supra note 1010, at 145-46.
On the other hand, the judge's decision may have agreed with the jury verdict, in part, because of the judge's respect for the jury system. See MacCoun,
supra note 1019, at 165.
1042. The reasons for the disagreement were those reported by the judge as categorized by the authors of the study. See KALVEN & ZEISEL, supra note 125, at
48, lQ4.05.
1043. See id. at 106-09.
1044. See id. at 33-54.
1045. Judgejury disagreements in the two areas of medical malpractice and contracts may also be affected by sentiments about the parties, as the following
discussion suggests.
Kalven and Zeisel have concluded that sentiments about the defendant
account for 11 % of judgejury disagreements. See id. at 115. Although they
were considering only party defendants in criminal trials, their conclusions
may be relevant in the civil context because they noted that juries tend to
equate criminal cases and civil cases, treating the victims in criminal cases as
plaintiffs. See id. at 493. Sentiments about the parties relate to individual
characteristics that affect jury sympathy. See id. at 194. Individual characteristics that affect credibility are considered as relating to the evidence. See id.
By hypothesis, the likely candidates for jury sympathy would be the "little guys" such as the medical malpractice plaintiff in a suit against the health
care provider (a medical professional or institution). See James Kevin MacAlister & Alfred L. Scanlan, Jr., Health Claims Arbitration in Maryland: The Experiment Has Failed, 14 U. BALT. L. REv. 481, 501 (1985). It could also be the
debtor defendant sued by a creditor (a merchant or a-financial institution).
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eluded that such sentiments account for 29% of judgejury disagreements. 1046 Those sentiments have been characterized more plainly as
the jury's quarrel with the law,1047 revolt from the law,1048 war with
the law,1049 the jury's ability to disregard substantive rules of law, 1050
the jury's power to nullify the law, 105 1 and as jury equity.1052
In the case of judgejury disagreements, Kalven and Zeisel coneluded that not only do the jury's reasons withstand public scrutiny,
but they usually are the law in other jurisdictions. 1053 In this sense,
the jury may be viewed as a "little parliament."1054 Generally, commentators have identified a number of areas where the jury may disagree with the law: the jury might ignore a slight amount of contributory negligence where that would bar plaintiff's recovery;1055 the

1046.

1047.
1048.
1049.
1050.
1051.

1052.
1053.
1054.
1055.

See Wolfram, supra note 120, at 672-705. In both situations, jury sympathy for
the little guys might be a legitimate factor in a society that prizes equal justice under law. But see supra notes 434-42 and accompanying text. In medical
malpractice cases, jury sympathy for the patient would help counterbalance
jury sympathy for the defendant, a member of a respected occupation
(medicine). See KALVEN & ZEISEL, supra note 121, at 207. In contract cases,
jury sympathy for the debtor would help offset the comparatively superior
economic status of the creditor and its consequent likely superior legal
counsel. Cf id. at 115, 351-72 (stating disparity of counsel accounts for 4% of
judgejury disagreements). A contingent fee arrangement is unlikely to be
available to a debtor defendant, although it would likely be available to a
medical malpractice plaintiff. See generally F.B. MACKINNON, CONTINGENT FEES
FOR LEGAL SERVICES 25-28 (1964). Thus, jury sentiment may tend to make the
jury verdict superior to the decision of a judge. But if. KALVEN & ZEISEL,
supra note 121, at 99-100 (stating neither all judges nor all juries are alikesome judges may be more open to sentiment than the average jury).
See KALVEN & ZEISEL, supra note 121, at 115. Note that the 29% of the cases
in which jury sentiments about the law cause judge and jury to disagree is a
percentage of the 22% of the cases in which judge and jury disagree. See
supra notes 1053-54 and accompanying text. Thus, jury sentiments about the
law caused judge and jury to disagree in only about 6% of the cases studied.
See KALVEN & ZEISEL, supra note 121, at 499.
See id. at 165, 427, 433.
See id. at 495.
See Wolfram, supra note 120, at 671.
See KALVEN & ZEISEL, supra note 121, at 311-12, 433. That phrase seems be
used in connection with juries in criminal cases. Compare HANs & VIDMAR,
supra note 999, at 149-60 (criminal cases), with id. at 160-63 (civil cases).
See Kalven, supra note 964, at 1071-72; see also supra note 998 and accompanying text.
See KALVEN & ZEISEL, supra note 121, at 497.
PATRICK DEVLIN, TRIAL BY JURY 164 (1956).
See infra note 1076 and accompanying text (noting that under Arizona law,
judges determine questions of contributory negligence); if. KALVEN & ZEISEL,
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jury might award damages for pain and suffering in an amount
which compensates plaintiff for attorney's fees where those fees are
not legally an element of damages;1056 or the jury might ignore the
law on collateral benefits, imputed negligence, and the violation of
criminal statutes to establish negligence. 1057
By hypothesis, there are a number of sentiments about the law
that may explain judgejury disagreements in the two specific areas
mentioned by Lynch and Bourne. For example, contrary to current
Maryland law,1058 a jury in a medical malpractice case might apply a
rule of strict liabilitylO59 in light of the existence of liability insurance l060 and the opportunity for spreading the risk. 1061 Similarly,
contrary to current Maryland Law,1062 a jury might apply the doctrine of res ipsa loquitur. 1063
In a contracts case for breach of an implied warranty of
merchantability of goods, a jury, contrary to current Maryland
law,I064 might find that the warranty was negated and that the
merchant was excused for the poor quality of goods because the
buyer was "looking for a bargain and got beat at it."1065 In an unlicensed home improvement contractor's suit for payment for work

1056.
1057.
1058.

1059.

1060.
1061.
1062.
1063.

1064.

1065.

supra note 121, at 108, 242-57 (discussing "contributory negligence" of the
victim as a defense to criminal rape). But see Kalven, supra note 964, at 1072
(opining that, contrary to the popular view, the jury does not ignore the
contributory negligence rule and apply comparative negligence).
See HANs & VIDMAR, supra note 999, at 161; MAcKINNON, supra note 1045, at
14546; see also Kalven, supra note 964, at 1069-71.
See Kalven, supra note 964, at 1072.
Liability for medical malpractice is based on negligence. See Shilkret v. Annapolis Emergency Hosp. Ass'n, 276 Md. 187, 190, 349 A.2d 245, 247 (1975).
A rule of strict liability exists in other tort areas. See W. PAGE KEETON ET AL.,
PROSSER & KEETON ON TORTS 538-59 (5th ed. 1984) (animals, fire, abnormally
dangerous things and activities). But cf. Kalven, supra note 964, at 1072
(opining that, contrary to the popular view, the jury has not created a strict
liability system in personal injury cases).
See, e.g., MacAlister & Scanlan, supra note 1045, at 486.
See, e.g., id. at 517.
Res ipsa loquitur does not ordinarily apply in medical malpractice cases in Maryland. See Meda v. Brown, 318 Md. 418, 428, 569 A.2d 202, 207 (1990).
Res ipsa loquitur does apply in many other jurisdictions. See KEETON ET AL.,
supra note 1059, at 252-53, 256-57.
A warranty that goods are merchantable is ordinarily implied in a contract of
sale between merchant and buyer. See MD. CODE ANN., COM. LAw I § 2-314
(1992); cf. id. § 2-316 (exclusion or modification of warranties).
Cf KALVEN & ZEISEL, supra note 121, at 246 (reason for acquittal in a criminal
case of fraud).
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completed, a jury, contrary to current Maryland law,1066 might find
that the contractor was entitled to payment because the homeowner
"had originally selected this contractor because in operating without
a license he was cheaper than a more respectable contractor would
have been. "1067
The jury should be permitted its own sentiments about the law.
The jury is a "black bOX"1068 which is expected to give its verdict
without a statement of reasons.1069 The spirit of the law, 1070 justice, 1071
or the equities lO72 may require a different result than the letter of
the law. Although the same sentiments may have an effect on the
judge, the judge is less likely than the jury to be influenced by
them. I073 The dividing line between law and fact is uncertain 1074 and
it is where the evidence is in doubt that the jury is most likely to
yield its sentiments about the law.1075 Some state constitutions expressly recognize this aspect of the jury process. For example, an
Arizona provision makes the jury the judge of questions of contributory negligence or assumption of the risk lO76 and a Maryland provision makes the jury in criminal cases the judge of law as well as of
fact. 1077
1066. A contract made by an unlicensed home improvement contractor is illegal as
against public policy and will not be enforced. See Harry Berenter, Inc. v.
Berman, 258 Md. 290, 293-96, 265 A.2d 759, 761-62 (1970).
1067. Cf. KALVEN & ZEISEL, supra note 121, at 24647 (discussing reason for acquittal
in a criminal case of acting as a home improvement contractor without a license).
1068. See supra note 314 and accompanying text.
1069. Cf. supra note 1026 and accompanying text (judge's reasoned judgment).
1070. See KALVEN & ZEISEL, supra note 121, at 8, 346.
1071. See id. at 8-9.
1072. See supra note 999.
1073. See KALVEN & ZEISEL, supra note 121, at 108-09 & n.8. But if. id. at 99-100 (stating that all judges are not alike and all juries are not alike; "some juries will
be more rule-minded than the average judge," and some judges will be
more open to sentiment than the average jury).
1074. See Indiana ex reL Anderson v. Brand, 303 U.S. 95 (1938); Dobson v. Masonite
Corp., 359 F.2d 921, 923-24 (5th Cir. 1966).
1075. See KALVEN & ZEISEL, supra note 121, at 164-65, 432-33.
1076. See ARIz. CONST. art. 18, § 5. That provision is discussed in Byrd v. Blue Ridge
Rural Elec. Coop., 356 U.S. 525, 538-39 (1958), and Herron v. Southern Pac.
Co., 283 U.S. 91, 92-94 (1931).
1077. See MD. CONST.. DECL. OF RIGHTS art. 23, which provides: "In the trial of all
criminal cases, the Jury shall be the Judges of Law, as well as of fact, except
that the Court may pass upon the sufficiency of the evidence to sustain a
conviction." [d.
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There is other support for the proposition that the jury should
be permitted its own sentiments about the law. The Maryland Constitution's Due Process Clause provides that no man ought be "deprived of his life, liberty or property, but by the judgment of his
peers, or by the Law of the land."1078 Arguably, that clause authorizes members of the jury to give judgment according to their consciences without regard to law. 1079 Furthermore, the oath prescribed
for state officers,1080 presumably including jurors,1081 is a general
oath, not an oath requiring jurors to apply the law in the instructions given them by the judge. 1082 And generally, as developed
above, a function of the jury is to apply common sense, rather than
1078. [d. art. 24.
1079. Cf SPOONER, supra note 155, at 111 (interpretation of a similar phrase in the
Magna Carta).
1080. See MD. CONST. art. I, § 9. Section 9 provides:
Every person elected, or appointed, to any office of profit or trust,
under this Constitution, or under the Laws, made pursuant thereto,
shall, before he enters upon the duties of such office, take and subscribe the following oath, or affirmation: I, ... do swear, (or affirm,
as the case may be,) that I will support the Constitution of the
United States; and that I will be faithful and bear true allegiance to
the State of Maryland, and support the Constitution and Laws
thereof; and that I will, to the best of my skill and judgment, diligently and faithfully, witllOut partiality or prejudice, execute the office of ... , according the Constitution and Laws of this State.
[d.; see also MD. ANN. CODE art. 70, § 10 (1995). Section 10 provides:
The oath to be administered to a person who has an appointment
which requires him to take an oath, but who is not embraced in
the provisions of [art. I, § 9] of the Constitution, shall be that he
will faithfully discharge his duty, unless a different form of oath is
prescribed by law or ordinance.
MD. ANN. CODE art. 70, § 10 (1995).
1081. A juror serves in an office of trust. See Schowgurow v. State, 240 Md. 121,
125, 213 A.2d 475, 478 (1965). See generally Board of Supervisors v. Attorney
Gen., 246 Md. 417, 427-28, 229 A.2d 388, 394 (1967).
1082. See Safeway Trails, Inc. v. Smith, 222 Md. 206, 218, 159 A.2d 823, 830 (1960)
(jurors' oath to "weIland truly try the issues'between the parties and a true
verdict given according to the evidence .... ").
In the context of presidential powers under Article II of the United
States Constitution, there has been a debate about whether the contents of
an official oath add anything to the powers of the officer. Compare CONGRESSIONAL RESEARCH SERVICE, CONSTITUTION OF THE U.S.: ANALYSIS AND INTERPRETATION 436 (1996), and EDWIN S. CORWIN, THE CONSTITUTION AND WHAT IT
MEANS TODAY 120 (1974), with RAOUL BERGER, EXECUTIVE PRIVILEGE 309
(1974).
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the law narrowly conceived. 1083
Jury sentiments about the law are likely to influence a verdict
only occasionally. As developed above, the judge and jury disagree
on liability in only 22% of the cases.1084 Sentiments about the law account for only 29% of the disagreements. lo85 Kalven and Zeisel suggest that so few cases are influenced by the jury's sentiments on the
law for the following reasons: the law has adjusted well to the equities-the gap between official values and popular values is a small
one;1086 the group nature of the jury decision moderates eccentric
views;1087 and the jury is invested with a public task brought under
the influence of a judge, put to work in solemn surroundings, and
not told it has the power to disagree with the law. 1088 It is only
where the evidence is in doubt that the jury is likely to yield to its
sentiments about the law. 1089
Functionally, the judge has many techniques to assure that the
result of a case, triable of right by a jury, is the same as the result of
a case not so triable. 1090 The judge may preliminarily decide a case
before trial, where the position of one party clearly lacks merit. 1091
The judge supervises the process of selecting the jury.1092 The judge
1083.
1084.
1085.
1086.

1087.
1088.

1089.
1090.

1091.

1092.

See supra note 1000 and accompanying text.
See supra note 1038 and accompanying text.
See supra note 1046 and accompanying text.
Kalven and Zeisel conclude that the jury's quarrel with the criminal law has
been, historically, over seditious libel laws and Prohibition and, generally,
over game; liquor, gambling, drunk driving, blue, regulatory, and tax laws.
See KALVEN & ZEISEL, supra note 121, at 286-97.
See id. at 498.
See id; see also MARYLAND CIVIL PATIERN JURY INSTRUCTIONS 3, 5, 20 (3d ed.
1993) (stating that the jury is instructed to base its verdict upon the evidence and upon the law as the judge gives it).
See KALVEN& ZEISEL, supra note 121, at 164-65, 432-33.
It is the judge who decides whether a case is triable of right to a jury, i.e.,
whether the case is a "civil proceeding" in one of the "Courts of Law" and
whether the $5,000 amount in controversy is satisfied. See MD. CONST., DECL.
OF RIGHTS art. 23. It is also the judge who decides whether a particular issue
is one of "fact" to be decided by the jury. See id. It is also the judge who decides whether jury trial has been properly and timely demanded. See MD.
RULE 2-325.
See, e.g., MD. RULE 2-322 (preliminary motions to dismiss for failure to state a
claim upon which relief can be granted and strike an insufficient defense);
MD. RULE 2-501 (summary judgment); MD. RULE 2-506 (voluntary dismissal);
MD. RULE 2-613 (default judgment).
See, e.g., MD. CODE ANN., CTS. & JUD. PROC. § 8-201 (1995) (plan for random
selection of jurors); id. § 8-207 (determination of prospective juror's qualifications); id. § 8-210 (excuse from jury service); id. § 8-211 (ruling on chal-
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determines the structure,1093 location,1094 and timingl095 of trial. The
judge determines what evidence may be presented at trial. 1096 The
judge instructs the jury on the law and may summarize the evidence. I097 The judge chooses whether the jury will return a general
verdict or a special verdict. I098 In the event that a party's evidence is
insufficient, the judge may grant judgment before the case goes to
the juryl099 or, after the jury's verdict, may grant a judgment notwithstanding the verdict. lloo In the event of error or the verdict being against the weight of the evidence, the judge may grant a complete, partial, or conditional new trial. llol In certain situations, the
judge may exercise revisory power over the judgment. 1102 In the
event of error or a judgment being based on insufficient evidence,
appellate judges may reverse or modify a judgment. ll03 Thus, Equity
is no.t superior to Law as a mode of trial because of the result.
1.

Not Protective of the Jury Right

Lynch and Bourne's suggestion that Equity is superior to Law
as a mode of trial seems obviously restrictive of the right to jury
trial. l104 Indeed, Lynch and Bourne call for checking the expansion
of the jury, 1\05 if not restricting it. l106

1093.
1094.
1095.
1096.
1097.
1098.
1099.
1100.
1101.
1102.
1103.

1104.
1105.

1106.

lenges to compliance with selection procedures); MD. RULE 2-512(d) (conduct of voir dire); MD. RULE 2-512(i) (designation of a foreperson).
See, e.g., MD. RULE 2-502 (separation of legal questions), Mo RULE 2-503 (consolidation of actions and separate trials).
See, e.g., MD. CONST. art. IV, § 8; MD. RULE 2-505 (removal).
See, e.g., MD. RULE 1-204(a) (shorten or extend time requirements), MD. RULE
1-508 (continuance).
See, e.g., MD. RULE 2-517 (ruling on objections to evidence); MD. RULE 2-514
(requiring production of evidence).
See MD. RULE 2-520.
See MD. RULE 2-522.
See MD. RULE 2-519.
See MD. RULE 2-532.
See MD. RULE 2-533.
See MD. RULE 2-535.
See, e.g., MD. CODE ANN., CTs. & JUo. PROC. §§ 12-301 to 304, -308 (1995) (review of circuit court judgments on appeal by the court of special appeals);
id. §§ 12-201 to 203, -307 (further review on writ of certiorari by the court of
appeals).
See supra note 973.
See Bourne & Lynch, supra note 5, at 60 ("There is no reason why Maryland
must expand the right to trial by jury in the wake of merger at a time when
its suitability for the pressures of modern litigation has been called into
question.") .
See id. at 2-3 ("When romantic notions about the contribution of juries are
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Contrary to the Usual Ways of Interpreting the Constitution

Lynch and Bourne's suggestion that Equity is superior to Law
as a mode of trial is also contrary to many of the usual ways of interpreting the constitution.
That suggestion is contrary to the nature of a written constitution. The jury right is specific, enacted, enforceable, and supreme
law l107 by which the people- themselves have chosen the jury as the
superior mode of trial. The jury right is consistent with a "living"
constitution-it has survived the merger of Law and Equity,1108 and
other procedural reforms permit the jury continued superiority.lI09
The suggestion that Equity is superior to Law as a mode of trial
is contrary to the text of the Maryland Constitution. The principal
jury right provision, Article 23, expressly mandates that the jury
right shall be inviolably preserved. IIIO On the other hand, the text
of the Maryland Constitution includes neither a requirement of
courts of Equity nor a square right to trial by judge. II II
The suggestion that Equity is superior to Law as a mode of trial
is also contrary to the history of the Maryland Constitution. Blackstone praised the jury trial as "the best criterion, for investigating
the truth of facts .... "1112 Protests in Maryland, and in the colonies
generally, charged that England had deprived the colonists in many
cases of trial by jury.11I3 The proponents of the principal constitutional jury right in 1851 strengthened the right as part of a general
program to extend democratic limitations on the power of government. 1I14 Subsequent constitutional reaffirmations of the jury right
came in the face of criticisms of the jury trial. II 15
The suggestion that Equity is superior to Law as a mode of trial
is contrary to the structure of government. As developed above, the
jury trial, which includes both judge and jury, permits the two to

1107.
1108.
1109.
1110.
1111.
1112.
1113.
1114.
1115.

tempered by experience in judicial administration, the civil jury may be legitimately regarded as a burdensome constitutional luxury, the costs of which
must be lessened by restriction.") (footnotes omitted).
See supra notes 16-21 and accompanying text.
See supra note 1 and accompanying text.
See generally supra note 960 and accompanying text.
See supra notes 46-67 and accompanying text.
See supra notes 77-95 and accompanying text.
3 BLACKSTONE, supra, note 100, at *385.
See supra notes 105-06 and accompanying text.
See supra notes 121-25 and accompanying text.
See supra note 134 and accompanying text.

444

Baltimore Law Revi,ew

[Vol. 26

check each other.lll6
The suggestion that Equity is superior to Law as a mode of trial
is contrary to doctrine. The Court of Appeals of Maryland, citing
United States Supreme Court opinions, has stated that "[t]he trial
by jury is justly dear to the American people,"Ill7 and that "Ulury
decisions of disputed legal issues are clearly favored."lll8 Moreover,
the court of appeals has rejected the "efficiency" of the judge trial
for "a jealous protection of the right to jury trial,"lll9 except in the
"most imperative circumstances." 1120
The suggestion that Equity is superior to Law as a mode of trial
is contrary to some prudential concerns. The jury trial is superior to
the judge trial because the jury helps legitimize outcomes, acts as a
"lightning rod" for animosity, and provides a "black box"
decision. 1121
The suggestion that Equity is superior to Law as a mode of trial
is contrary to some ethical matters. For purposes of equal protection, the jury right is a fundamental constitutional right; any classification significantly interfering with the exercise of the right would
be strictly scrutinized. ll22 However, a general favoritism of judge trial
as superior to jury trial would not satisfY even deferential review. ll23
The suggestion that Equity is superior to Law as a mode of trial
runs counter to the principles of limited government, government
by the people, government for the people, and free political
.
exchange. 1l24
Thus, the aspect of Lynch and Bourne's principled discretionary theory that Equity is superior to Law as a mode of trial, is not
protective of the jury right, and is contrary to many of the usual
ways of interpreting the Maryland Constitution. In addition, Lynch
and Bourne do not actually apply their theory when deciding the

1116. See supra notes 1004-05 and accompanying text. See generally supra notes 14963 and accompanying text.
1117. Allender v. Ghingher, 170 Md. 156, 183 A. 610 (1936) and supra text accompanying note 164.
1118. Higgins v. Barnes, 310 Md. 532, 541, 530 A.2d 724, 728 (1987).
1119. [d.
1120. [d. at 545, 530 A.2d at 730.
1121. See supra notes 312-20 and accompanying text.
1122. See supra note 365-75 and accompanying text.
1123. Cf supra notes 356, 359 and accompanying text (distinction between Law and
Equity, generally).
1124. See supra notes 443-52 and accompanying text.
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situations in which the jury right is to apply. Let us now turn to
those practical situations.
IV. LYNCH AND BOURNE'S APPROXIMATION OF PREMERGER APPROACH
The thesis of this Article is that Lynch and Bourne try to
"pickle," not preserve, the right to jury trialY25 The Introduction to
this Article mentions that Lynch and Bourne give lip service to the
Maryland Constitution, but then boldly propose a principled discretionary theory which they abandon in favor of an approximation of
pre-merger approach to resolve current problems. As developed below, Lynch and Bourne reluctantly accept recent Maryland cases
and some analogous federal authority.
As already developed above, Lynch and Bourne's principled discretionary theory,1126 is not the approach they actually use. It is a
hodgepodge of inconsistent policies and is restrictive (or not protective) of the right. Moreover, it is contrary to many of the usual
ways of interpreting the Maryland Constitution. 1127 Next, this article
looks at the defects in Lynch and Bourne's actual approximation of
pre-merger approach to deciding whether the jury right applies in
particular problem situations.
Lynch and Bourne's approximation of pre-merger approach
generally states that the jury right should exist as it did before the
merger of Law and Equity in 1984. That is, matters which would
have been tried at Law before merger are now to be tried by jury;
matters which would have been tried in Equity before merger are
now to be tried by judge. 1128 If Lynch and Bourne accept recent,
1125.
1126.
1127.
1128.

See supra notes 6, 59 and accompanying text.
See supra notes 10-13 and accompanying text.
See supra notes 453-1124 and accompanying text.
See generaUy supra note 14 and accompanying text. This approximation of premerger approach is apparent not only in Bourne and Lynch's discussion of
the problem situations considered below, but in the other parts of their
works. See, e.g., LYNCH & BOURNE, supra note 3, at 306 ("Maryland courts ...
tradition . . . "); id. at 316 ("Maryland jurisprudence"); id. at 318 ("premerger practice," "actions ... historically ... regarded"); id. at 321-22 ("Maryland courts . . . conflicting authorities"); id. at 324 ("practice," "tradition"); Bourne & Lynch, supra note 5, at 4 ("prior Maryland practice"); id.
at 11 ("Maryland jurisprudence"); id. at 16 ("Maryland jurisprudence"); id.
at 17 ("decisions of the Court of Appeals of Maryland"); id. at 29 ("tendency
throughout Maryland legal history," "Maryland authority," "tradition," "Maryland decisions"); id. at 29-34 (generally, Maryland cases regarding the right
to trial by jury); id. at 3444 (generally, Maryland decisions regarding equita-
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post-merger Maryland precedents and analogous federal authority,
they do so only reluctantly.1129 Lynch and Bourne's approximation
ble encroachments upon jurisdiction of courts of Law); id. at 46 ("tradition"); id. at 47 ("Maryland precedents"); id. at 78 ("Maryland's established
limitations"). But see, e.g., LYNCH & BOURNE, supra note 3, at 307 ("the federal
experience and the evolving adaptation of this experience in Maryland"); id.
at 323 ("resort to the experience of the federal courts"); id. at 324 ("federal
courts ... may provide useful guidance"); Bourne & Lynch, supra note 5, at
4 ("consider approaches ... in light of federal and state experience," as well
as "prior Maryland practice"); id. at 16 ("guidance ... in the federal cases
decided after merger and before Beacon"); id. at 60 ("re-examine ... in light
of the post-merger remedial powers").
The approximation of pre-merger approach, generally, has been criticized as eroding the jury right, as inconsistent with Higgins, and as difficult
to apply. See supra notes 249-61 and accompanying text.
1129. This reluctance to accept analogous federal precedent is most marked in
Bourne and Lynch's article. It is apparent not only in their discussion of the
problem situations considered below, but in the other parts of their article.
See, e.g., Bourne & Lynch, supra note 5, at 4 (stating much in Maryland jurisprudence supports the approach of many other states, contracting the jury
right); id. at 11 (" [T] here is limited support in Maryland jurisprudence for
the vigorous jury trial policy ultimately adopted by the federal courts."); id.
at 16 ("Beacon ... would find little sanction in Maryland jurisprudence.");
id. at 28-29 (explaining that the tendency in Maryland legal history is to expand the scope of Equity, not to expand the scope of the right to jury trial
as in the federal courts); id. at 29 ("[T]here appears to be little Maryland
authority compelling the courts to adopt doctrines comparable to those
adopted by the Supreme Court in Beacon."); id. at 68 ("Adoption of the rule
in Beacon Theatres might inappropriately restrict the scope of equitable adjudication and expand the availability of trial by jury."); id. at 78 ("Fidelity to
the historic right to trial by jury after merger demands not blind subservience to Beacon Theatres, but a common sense attentiveness to Maryland's established limitations on the appropriate exercise of equitable jurisdiction.");
cf. id. at 35 & n.225 (discussing the power of the legislature to classify actions
as equitable and its limitations); id. at 38 ("Bachman and the discovery cases
suggest that the 'inadequate remedy at law' requirement for equitable jurisdiction retains dynamism in Maryland similar to that accorded the parallel
federal notion in Beacon Theatres." (footnote omitted»; id. at 42 n.267 (discussing both a 1922 Maryland case and Dairy Queen which held that adequate remedies at Law may limit the use of equitable accounting); id. at 56
(discussing MD. RULE BF40 (repealed 1984), which in a manner very similar
to Beacon, provided for trial of a jury claim before trial of an equitable
claim). By the time of Bourne and Lynch's book, Higgins had generally
adopted the protective federal approach. But see id. at 11 ("The experience
of the federal courts ... provides substantial guidance to the Maryland judiciary .... "). See generally, e.g., LYNCH & BOURNE, supra note 3, at 307 (" [T] he
Maryland courts have relied heavily on the federal experience."); id. at 323
("[R]esort to the experience of the federal courts . . . may provide useful

1997]

The Right to Trial by Jury

447

of pre-merger approach largely ignores the constitutional aspect of
the jury right 1l30 and their own principled discretionary theory.1l3J
guidance."); id. at 324 ("[T]he federal courts ... may be useful."). However,
the authors show some reluctance in accepting analogous federal authority.
1130. Bourne & Lynch, in dealing with various problem situations, frequently refer
to the right -to trial by jury. See LYNCH & BOURNE. SUPRA note 3, at 312-38;
Bourne & Lynch, supra note 5, at 47-77. However, those references are almost entirely in the context of questioning whether or not there is a jury
right and of concluding either that there is or that there is not a jury right.
With a few exceptions, the authors' approximation of pre-merger approach is unrelated to the usual ways of interpreting the MD. CONST. Their
approach is essentially based on doctrine- principles derived from precedents-which is one of those usual ways. See supra note 15 and accompanying
text. Bourne and Lynch cite hundreds of cases from the courts of Maryland,
the federal system, and other states. See LYNCH & BOURNE, supra note 3, 31238 nn. 48-234; Bourne & Lynch, supra note 5, 47-77 nn.298490. However, the
authors' approximation of pre-merger approach is inconsistent with recent
Maryland precedents and the Higgins line of cases. Compare supra notes 18797 and accompanying text, with supra notes 248"{)1 and accompanying text.
There are some noteworthy exceptions, some respects in which the authors do properly consider a variety of the usual ways (other than doctrinal)
of interpreting the Maryland Constitution. First, on several occasions,
Bourne and Lynch cite McCoy v. Johnson, 70 Md. 490, 17 A. 387 (1889), for
the proposition that the constitutional jury right should govern where it conflicts with contrary legislation. See Bourne & Lynch, supra note 5, at 50 &
n.322, 51 & nn.324-25; see also id. at 32 n.206, 70 n.442. But see LYNCH &
BOURNE, supra note 3, at 321 (citing Capron v. Devries, 83 Md. 224, 34 A. 251
(1896». See Bourne & Lynch, supra note 5, at 60 & n.381, 63 n.403, for the
proposition that the legislature may expand Equity at the expense of the
jury right. By citing McCoy for the supremacy of the Maryland Constitution
over ordinary legislation, the authors suggest that the Maryland Constitution
should be interpreted by considering its nature as written. See generally supra
notes 16-25 and accompanying text.
Second, Bourne and Lynch recognize that the jury right will have to be
reinterpreted in light of new circumstances such as the merger of Law and
Equity. See LYNCH & BOURNE, supra note 3, at 306-07, 312, 326-37; Bourne &
Lynch, supra note 5, at 34, 29-78. See generally infra note 1132. Bourne and
Lynch generally take an approximation of pre-merger approach: the creation
of new causes of action. See LYNCH & BOURNE, supra note 3, at 313, 315. But
see id. at 312 (stating that the jury right is preserved as it existed in 1776); id.
at 337-38 (referring to new remedies); Bourne & Lynch, supra note 5, at 4750. By recognizing the need for reinterpreting the jury right in light of these
new circumstances, the authors suggest that the Maryland Constitution
should be interpreted by considering its nature as "living." See generally supra
notes 26-29 and accompanying text.
Third, Bourne and Lynch state that the Maryland Constitution preserves
the jury right as it existed in 1776. See LYNCH & BOURNE, supra note 3, at 312.
But see supra notes 506..Q32 and accompanying text (criticism of Bourne and
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Also, their approximation of pre-merger approach is more designed
to limit, or "pickle" the jury right than preserve or protect it.
Lynch and Bourne deal with a variety of problem situations in
both their article and their book chapter. In each of these situations, this Article will consider in detail three characteristics of their
approach. First, they usually try to approximate the way the jury
right was applied before the merger of Law and Equity. Second, the
authors only reluctantly accept, if at all, post-merger Maryland precedent and analogous federal authority. Third, they often overlook
ways to preserve the constitutional jury right in light of modem
procedural developments. 1132 Thus, their approximation of premerger approach generally restricts the jury right.
In considering these problem situations, keep in mind that the
constitutional right to jury trial can be violated in a number of
Lynch's strict historical test). By relying on that language in the first Maryland Constitution, Bourne and Lynch suggest that the MD. CONST. should be
interpreted by considering its text. See generally supra notes 31-95 and accompanying text.
1131. Lynch and Bourne, in dealing with the various problem situations, frequently
refer to the elements of their principled discretionary theory. See LYNCH &
BOURNE, supra note 3, at 312-38; Bourne & Lynch, supra note 5, at 47-77.
That theory is a hodgepodge of inconsistent policies. Thus, the elements of
that theory have little effect on the authors' approximation of pre-merger
approach, unless those elements are selectively invoked as in the cases of divorce and mechanics lien. See Bourne & Lynch, supra note 5, at 62-64, 68-69
(stating that a jury trial might interfere with equitable discretion, the legislature has power to expand equitable jurisdiction by statute, and judicial economy is better served by judge trial than by jury trial).
1132. Those developments include the merger of Law and Equity. See LYNCH &
BOURNE, supra note 3, at 306; Bourne & Lynch, supra note 5, at 3, 29. The
developments also include the availability, in the trial of Law actions, of certain Equity procedures, such as discovery. See LYNCH & BOURNE, supra note 3,
at 319 & n.124, 336; Bourne & Lynch, supra note 5, at 36, 45 n.291, 71-72.
Joinder devices, such as class action, intervention, and interpleader are included. See LYNCH & BOURNE, supra note 3, at 335-36; Bourne & Lynch, supra
note 5, at 73-74. Developments have been made regarding equitable remedies such as preliminary and final injunctions. See LYNCH & BOURNE, supra
note 3, at 319 n.126, 331 n.194; Bourne & Lynch, supra note 5, at 4 n.9, 37,
51-52, 55-56 & n.360, 61. Those modem procedural developments also include the liberal joinder of claims, remedies, defenses, and parties. See
Bourne & Lynch, supra note 5, at 5, 70; see also LYNCH & BOURNE, supra note
3, at 307, 320, 326, 328; Bourne & Lynch, supra note 5, at 3, 34, 38, 45 n.291,
64, 72. Modem procedural developments also include the declaratory judgment remedy, see LYNCH & BOURNE, supra note 3, at 330 n.193, 337-38;
Bourne & Lynch, supra note 5, at 46 n.293, 47-50; and the long-arm statute,
see LYNCH & BOURNE, supra note 3, at 320; see also supra note 750.
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ways. Such problem situations can be illustrated by the facts of the
Beacon case. In Beacon, Fox brought suit asking for a declaratory
judgment that it had not violated antitrust laws by exclusively contracting with movie distributors to show new movies at its theaters. 1I33 Fox also asked for an injunction against Beacon, a competitor who was interfering with those contracts by threatening Fox and
its distributors with treble damages suits under the antitrust laws. lI34
Beacon responded, filed a counterclaim for antitrust treble damages, and demanded a jury trial. 1135
The first way the jury right may be violated is by the trial court
holding that there was no right to jury trial at all. That is, because
Fox's claim for declaratory and injunctive relief was "essentially equitable, "1136 the rest of the case was within Equity's clean-up jurisdiction.1I37 The court may have also found that Beacon had waived its
right to jury trial on the legal counterclaim by joining the counterclaim to Fox's equitable claim.1I38 The Beacon Court held that there
, was a jury right as to the antitrust issues, whether they were raised
in Fox's claim for declaratory relief, or in Beacon's counterclaim for
treble damages. 1I39
The second way the jury right may be violated is by a trial
court holding, as it did in Beacon, that Fox's essentially equitable
claim should be tried by the court before jury trial of Beacon's
counterclaim. lI40 In Beacon, Fox's equitable claim and Beacon's legal
counterclaim contained a: common issue of fact, the reasonableness
of the exclusive contracts. 1I41 Thus, the effect of trying the equitable
claim first was that the court's determination of the factual issues
would preclude, by way of res judicata or collateral estoppel, a later
determination of those issues by the jury.1142 The Beacon Court held
1133.
1134.
1135.
1136.
1137.
1138.

See Beacon Theatres, Inc. v. Westover, 359 U.S. 500,502 (1959).
See id.
See id. at 502-03.
See id. at 503.
See id. at 505.
See id. at 519 (Stewart, J., dissenting). Justice Stewart noted the anomaly of a
waiver theory where, as in Beacon, the counterclaim was compulsory under

1139.
1140.
1141.
1142.

See id. at 504, 508.
See id. at 503.
See id. at 503-04.
See id. Bourne and Lynch seek a solution to the obvious lack of finality, a requirement for res judicata or collateral estoppel. See Bourne & Lynch, supra
note 5, at 21 n.120; cf. LARRy L. TEPLY & RALPH U. WHITTEN, CML PROCEDURE
94445 (1994) (stating that the doctrine of law of the case precludes relitiga-

FED. R CIV. P. 13(a).
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that the jury right required that the factual issue common to the legal and equitable claims be tried first by the jury. 1143
Beacon also suggested that a third, and less obvious way1144 that
the jury right may be violated is by delay. The trial of legal issues
was postponed until the trial of equitable issues, presumably even
when there was no factual overlap between the twO. 1145 This postponement had the effect of an equitable injunction of the legal
claims. l146 The Beacon Court suggested that the jury right required
that trial of the legal issues not be delayed, but that they be tried
ahead of the equitable issues. 1147
Let us begin with the problem situations in Lynch and
Bourne's article that was published in 1984, the year when Law and
Equity merged in Maryland. 1148
A.

The Article

Lynch and Bourne's article examines eleven problem situations.
First, the authors consider three problems of characterizing issues
as legal or equitable--declaratory judgments, land titles, and fraud.
Then, they treat actions in which separate legal and equitable
claims are joined. In three of those situations the plaintiff joins
claims or remedies- injunction with damages in tort, specific performance with damages in contract, and divorce with tort damages.
In three other situations, the plaintiff, by claim, and the defendant,
by counterclaim, join separate legal and equitable claims in one ac-

1143.
1144.

1145.
1146.
1147.
1148.

tion of issues of law at successive stages of the same case). Although the issues in Beacon were factual issues originally, the court's determination of
those issues would include not only a historical or pure fact question (were
Fox's and Beacon's theaters in competition with each other?) and a mixed
law and fact question (were the exclusive contracts between Beacon and the
film distributors reasonable?), but a question which looks very much like a
question of law (does Fox have a legal right to make exclusive contracts with
film distributors?).
See Beacon, 359 U.S. at 508, 510-1l.
Query, does the Beacon Court's statement that trial of one claim to two factfinders (part to a judge and part to a jury) is undesirable, see id. at 508 &
n.lO, support a fourth way that the jury right may be violated (by the inefficiency of separate trials)?
See id. at 508.
See id. at 507.
See id. at 507, 508.
See supra note 1 and accompanying text. At that time, there was no recent,
post-merger Maryland precedent. Nonetheless, there were good reasons to
accept the line of federal cases beginning with Beacon as persuasive authority.
See supra notes 192-97 and accompanying text.
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tion-enforcement of lien with breach of contract, quiet title with
ejectment or trespass, and contract with accounting. Finally, Lynch
and Bourne address two situations in which traditionally equitable
issues must be resolved before legal issues may be tried-historically
equitable joinder devices such as class actions, intervention, and interpleader, in which plaintiff seeks damages,. and actions in which
plaintiff seeks an equitable remedy, such as reformation or rescission as a prerequisite to damages. 1149
1.

Declaratory Judgments

Lynch and Bourne take an approximation of pre-merger l150 approach, characterizing the declaratory judgment, a modern statutory remedy,1151 as legal or equitable. Before the merger of Law and
Equity, the declaratory judgment was available at Law as well as in
Equity.1152 Mter merger, the declaratory judgment is difficult to
characterize as being either legal or equitable. 1153 Lynch and Bourne
view the declaratory judgment as a substitute either for legal relief
or for equitable relief. If alternative legal relief would have traditionally been available, the declaratory judgment action would be
triable of right by a jury. Otherwise, the declaratory judgment action must be tried by a judge. 1154
Lynch and Bourne are reluctant to accept persuasive federal
authority, such as the Beacon line of cases, which addresses the right
to jury trial in declaratory judgment actions. They are reluctant to
accept Beacon because it rejects a traditional approximation of premerger approach 1155 in favor of an approach that takes account of
modern procedural developments 1156 and protects the jury right. 1157
1149. Bourne and Lynch treat these last two problems under one heading, «Actions in Which Adjudication of Equitable Issues is a Prerequisite to Adjudication of Claims Triable by a Jury." Bourne & Lynch, supra note 5, at 72-77.
1150. Here, the pre-merger date seems to be prior to the adoption of the declaratory judgment act. See id. at 50.
115l. The Maryland Uniform Declaratory Judgments Act was adopted in 1939.
1939 Md. Laws ch. 294. But cf., e.g., McCoy v. Johnson, 70 Md. 490, 17 A. 387
(1889) (describing an earlier act providing for a declaratory judgment in
certain matters).
1152. See Himes v. Day, 254 Md. 197,206,254 A.2d 181, 186 (1969), cited in Bourne
& Lynch, supra note 5, at 50.
1153. See Bourne & Lynch, supra note 5, at 4546 & n.293, 47.
1154. See id. at 47, 50.
1155. See Beacon Theatres, Inc. v. Westover, 359 U.S. 500, 505-07, 509 (1959).
1156. See id. at 506, 507-09.
1157. See id. at 504,506,508, 510-1l.

o
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This reluctance is apparent in three ways. First, Lynch and Bourne
rely not on Beacon, which was in part a suit for declaratory relief, llSB
but on a number of lower federal court decisions after Beacon. 1159
Some of these decisions are protective of the jury right while others
are not. Beacon and other Supreme Court cases have been very protective of the jury right in declaratory judgment actions. llOO Second,
Lynch and Bourne note only a limited exception to their approximation of pre-merger approach, where they would instead use a
"basic nature of the issue" approach. ll61 In a few cases,ll62 the determination of the jury right would depend upon whether the claims
or other issues ll63 underlying the declaratory remedy are of an inherently legal nature, triable by a jury, or are of an inherently equitable nature, triable by a judge. However, the basic nature of the issue approach may be more widely used in the federal courts than
the authors suggest. In Beacon itself, the Supreme Court held that
the antitrust issues on which plaintiff sought a declaratory judgment

1158. But cJ. Bourne & Lynch, supra note 5, at 46 n.293 (citing Beacon " [f1or discussion of the declaratory judgment remedy"). Bourne and Lynch also do not
mention another Supreme Court declaratory judgment case, Simler v. Conner,
372 U.S. 221 (1963). However, the authors do mention Simler in their discussion of the declaratory judgment in LYNCH & BOURNE, supra note 3, at 338
n.231.
1159. See Bourne & Lynch, supra note 5, at 4748.
1160. See, e.g., infra notes 1484-1514.
1161. Bourne & Lynch, supra note 5, at 19. This basic nature of the issue approach
should be distinguished from a basic nature of the action approach, which
would characterize an entire action containing both legal and equitable issues as legal or equitable, depending on which predominated. See, e.g., id. at
20 (stating that the trial court in Beacon viewed the complaint, which contained claims for both declaratory and injunctive relief, as "essentially equitable"); id. at 24 (stating that the trial court in Dairy Queen viewed the complaint, which contained claims for both injunctive relief and an accounting,
as either "purely equitable" with possibly "incidental" legal issues); id. at 26
(stating that the court of appeals in Ross viewed a shareholder's derivative action as "entirely equitable"); cJ. id. at 50 (stating that the Illinois approach,
when relief in addition to a declaratory judgment is sought, is to determine
the right to jury trial by the nature of that additional relief).
1162. Bourne and Lynch cite two federal district court cases where a jury trial was
granted because the issues were "inherently legal." See id. at 48 & nn.306-07
(slander of title in a patent infringement suit and mental capacity of a party
in an insurance contract rescission action, respectively); see also id. at 52
(characterizing as legal a claim for a judgment to declare void a deed).
1163. See generally id. at 35-37 (substantive equitable and legal classification of rights
of action).
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were "essentially" jury questions. lI64 In Simler v. Conner,1I65 the Supreme Court held that a contract for legal services, upon which
plaintiff sought a declaratory judgment that the fee was unreasonable, was "essentially" a legal matter for the jury.lI66 Indeed, later in
their book, Lynch and Bourne characterize the "basic nature of the
issue" as the federal approach that should be adopted in Maryland. 1167 Third, the authors go out of their way to criticize Beacon as
"radical" for suggesting that declaratory judgment provides a legal
remedy.11 68 Yet, Lynch and Bourne elsewhere concluded that declaratory judgments are not inherently equitable. 1I69 In fact, Lynch and
Bourne suggest that they might be basically legal,1170 particularly
where the underlying issues were inherently legal. 1171 Lynch and
Bourne also criticize Beacon for requiring that judicial discretion be
exercised to preserve the constitutional jury right. lin Yet, they recognize that the jurisdiction of Equity is limited by the constitutional
right to jury tria1. 1173
In some cases, by characterizing the declaratory judgment as a
substitute for equitable relief,1174 Lynch and Bourne allow the constitutional jury right to be violated by the trial judge holding that
there is no right to jury trial at all.1175 In doing so, they overlook a
number of ways, in light of modern procedural developments, to
preserve the .jury right in declaratory judgment actions. First, the
1164. The Supreme Court rejected the lower courts' holdings that the declaratory
remedy was essentially equitable either because it was joined with a plea for
injunctive relief, or because the complaint could traditionally have been
heard only in Equity. See Beacon Theatres, Inc. v. Westover, 359 U.S. 500,
504-08 (1959).
1165. 372 U.S. 221 (1963) (per curiam).
1166. The Supreme Court rejected the lower court's holding that the declaratory
remedy was purely equitable because it was basically for cancellation of a
contingent fee contract.
1167. LYNCH & BOURNE, supra note 3, at 337-38.
1168. See Bourne & Lynch, supra note 5, at 49 (citing Beacon, 359 U.S. at 509).
1169. See Bourne & Lynch, supra note 5, at 19 & n.109.
1170. See id. at 19.
1171. See id. at 48.
1172. See id. at 49.
1173. See id. at 50-51 (citing McCoy v. Johnson, 70 Md. 490, 17 A. 387 (1889». The
Maryland Uniform Declaratory Judgments Act expressly provides that "[t]he
fact that a proceeding .is brought under this [Act] does not affect a right to
jury trial which otherwise may exist." MD. CODE ANN., CTS. & JUD. PROC. § 3404 (1995).
1174. See supra note 1154 and accompanying text.
1175. See Bourne & Lynch, supra note 5, at 4748.
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declaratory judgment may be considered as an adequate remedy at
Law that in many cases limits the jurisdiction of Equity.1176 Second,
like the Federal Rules, the revised Maryland Rules permit a determination of the jury right on an "issue-by-issue" basis, rather than on
an "action" basis.1177 Thus, even if the "court" (a judge) grants the
declaratory judgment,1178 a jury may determine the underlying factual issues. 1179 Third, where new statutory rights are created, they
may be tried by a jury if they are analogous to common-law
rights. 1180 Similarly, new statutory remedies should be triable by a
jury if they are analogous to common-law remedies. The declaratory
judgment may be similar to a judgment at Law for the defendant 1181
or for the plaintiff on the issue of liability alone. 1182 Therefore, the
declaratory judgment may be triable by a jury. Fourth, the need for
immediate relief should not preclude the jury right in a declaratory
1176. See id. at 47 & n.298 (noting that the declaratory judgment was traditionaUy availabit! in Maryland in both Law and Equity); see also LYNCH & BOURNE. supra note
3, at 330 (discussing Beacon); Bourne & Lynch, supra note 5, at 21-22, if. Maryland Theatrical Corp. v. Brennan, 180 Md. 377, 388-89, 24 A.2d 911, 917
(1942) (holding that Equity may grant a declaratory judgment, rather than
an injunction, against a public official in order to stop enforcement of an invalid law), cited with approval in Beacon Theatres, Inc. v. Westover, 359 U.S.
500, 507 n.9 (1959). See generally Bourne & Lynch, supra note 5, at 38, (suggesting that the inadequate remedy at Law requirement for equitable jurisdiction in Maryland is as dynamic as the requirement in federal courts
under Beacon).
1177. See Bourne & Lynch, supra note 5, at 6, 45, 72.
1178. See MD. CODE ANN .. Crs. & JUD. PROC. §§ 3-403(a), -409(a) (1995).
1179. See, e.g., Beacon, 359 U.S. at 508 (providing jury verdict, then judge's injunction); see also Tull v. United States, 481 U.S. 412 (1987) (providing jury trial
of violation of statute, but judge trial of amount of penalty). This development occurred after the Bourne and Lynch article. Cf LYNCH & BOURNE.
supra note 3, at 333-34; Bourne & Lynch, supra note 5, at 25-26 (discussing
Ross v. Bernhard, 396 U.S. 531 (1970) (upholding judge's determination of
the stockholder's right to sue on behalf of the corporation, then jury verdict
on tort and con tract damages».
1180. See Bourne & Lynch, supra note 5, at 27-28; see also LYNCH & BOURNE, supra
note 3, at 313-14 (discussing Curtis v. Loether, 415 U.S. 189 (1974». For a
development after the Bourne and Lynch article, see LYNCH & BOURNE, supra
note 3, at 314-15 (discussing Tull).
1181. Cf FED. R CIV. P. Form 31 (providing judgment on a jury verdict that the
plaintiff take nothing).
1182. See MD. RULE 501(a) (1977) (repealed 1984) (applicable in Law and Equity,
permitting separate trial of claims or issues); if. MD. CODE ANN., Crs. & JUD.
PROC. § 3-412 (1995) (stating that further relief based on a declaratory judgment may be granted in a later action).
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judgment action. The Maryland Uniform Declaratory Judgments Act
expressly provides for expedited treatment. 1I83 If necessary, provisional injunctive relief may be granted pending trial of the declaratory judgment action.lI84
Thus, Lynch and Bourne's approximation of pre-merger approach, their reluctance to accept persuasive federal authority, and
their overlooking of ways to preserve the jury right, all exemplify
their generally restrictive approach to the right to jury trial in declaratory judgment actions.
2.

Land Titles

Nominally, Lynch and Bourne reject an approximation of premerger approach 1185 in favor of a protective approach to the jury
right in cases involving land titles. They conclude, with only a few
exceptions, that claims of title are legal and, therefore, triable by a
jury.1I86 Lynch and Bourne's approach to' such claims, however, is
more an approximation of pre-merger approach. That is, after the
merger of Law and Equity, actions of or defenses to ejectment and
trespass, traditionally available at Law, will be triable by a jury.1I87
Actions to quiet title 1I88 or remove a cloud from title,1I89 traditionally
available in Equity, will be tried by a judge.
While Lynch and Bourne note several situations in which legal
and equitable claims were joined, and in which the jury right after
merger might be more protected than before merger, the marginal
difference seems small. In the first situation, Lynch and Bourne criticize Equity for taking jurisdiction of the whole case on the ground
that immediate equitable relief was indicated.1I90 However, even
1183. See MD. CODE ANN., Crs. & JUD. PROC. § 3-409(e) (1995).
1184. See Beacon, 359 U.S. at 508; L\NCH & BOURNE, supra note 3, at 330-31; Bourne
& Lynch, supra note 5, at 61.
1185. See Bourne & Lynch, supra note 5, at 52 (stating that the jury right should
not turn on "in what court the relief would have been sought in a bifurcated
system of courts").
1186. See id. at 51-53; see also id. at 36-37. But if. id. at 19 (stating that it is only
"possible" that Maryland considers cases involving land titles as basically legal and, therefore, triable to a jury). In their book, Bourne and Lynch say
only that "Maryland has shown a distinct preference for adjudicating title to
land at law." L\NCH & BOURNE, supra note 3, at 312.
1187. See Bourne & Lynch, supra note 5, at 51.
1188. See id. at 69.
1189. See id. at 51.
1190. See id. at 51-52 (discussing Smith v. Shiebeck, 180 Md. 412, 24 A.2d 795
(1942» .
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before merger, provisional equitable relief was available under Maryland Rules BF40 to 43 1191 as ancillary relief in an action at Law. 1192
In the second situation, Lynch and Bourne criticized Equity for taking jurisdiction on the ground that equitable relief was "primary"·
and legal relief was only "subsidiary."1193 They concede, however,
that any jury right in the case was only hypothetical under the circumstances,1194 and they later note that it was unclear whether or
not injunctive relief under Maryland Rules BF40 to 43 was limited
to "ancillary" (or subsidiary) injunctive claims in relation to more
substantial (or primary) legal daims. 1195 In the third situation,
Lynch and Bourne suggest that the jury right may be a limit on Equity's clean-up of damages claims. 1196 However, they concede that
any jury right in the case was only hypothetical under the circumstances,1197 and they are later ambivalent on whether or not the
merger of Law and Equity changed Equity'S clean-up jurisdiction. 1198
Lynch and Bourne mention no federal authority regarding the
right to jury trial in cases involving land title, although some appears persuasive. By characterizing an action as an equitable one to
quiet title, rather than as a legal one involving title ,1199 Lynch and
Bourne allow the constitutional jury right to be violated by the trial
judge holding that there is no right to jury trial at all. 12OO In doing
so, and in light of modern procedural developments, they overlook
a number of ways to preserve the jury right in cases involving land
title. First, a judge may "see through" a plaintiff's equitable suit,
styled as one to quiet title, and conclude that it was really a legal action of ejectment or trespass. 1201 Problems of mis-characterization
1191. See supra note 174.
1192. See Corkran v. Zoning Comm'r, 41 Md. App. 437, 397 A.2d 262 (1979); cf.
Bourne & Lynch, supra note 5, at 61 (noting that an interlocutory injunction
is available under MD. RULE BB70(c) in a jury uial).
1193. See Bourne & Lynch, supra note 5, at 52 (discussing Waring v. National Sav. &
Trust Co., 138 Md. 367, 114 A. 57 (1921».
1194. See id. at 52.
1195. See id. at 56.
1196. See id. (discussing Cibula v. Sause, 173 Md. 87, 194 A. 826 (1937».
1197. See id. at 53.
1198. See id. at 53-55 (clean-up in reformation or rescission cases is undermined);
id. at 60-61 (clean-up in injunction cases is undermined); cf. id. at 61-62
(clean-up in specific performance cases is not undermined). See generally infra notes 1274-75 and accompanying text.
1199. See supra notes 1187-89 and accompanying text.
1200. See Bourne & Lynch, supra note 5, at 51.
1201. Cf. Dairy Queen, Inc. v. Wood, 369 u.S. 469 (1962) (holding a complaint for
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seem almost encouraged by the breadth of the quiet title statute,
which makes the proceeding available "when [the plaintiff's] title to
the property is denied or disputed, or when any other person
claims of record or otherwise, to own the property, or any part of
it, or hold any lien encumbrance on it."1202 Moreover, the statutory
term "title" and the related term "possession" are legal conclusions
often based on the application of elaborate legal requirements 1203 or
complex factual situations. 1204 Second, Lynch and Bourne note that
the right to jury trial would exist if, as might be expected 1205 in a
suit to quiet title, the defendant counterdaimed 1206 for ejectment or
trespass. 1207 For the reasons stated above,1208 title may often be at issue and, thus, the legal counterclaim would be available. Third, the
declaratory judgment may be considered as an adequate remedy at
Law for trying title that in many cases limits the jurisdiction of EqUity.1209 Fourth, the revised Maryland Rules permit a determination

1202.
1203.

1204.
1205.
1206.
1207.

1208.
1209.

an' equitable accounting to be a legal claim for damages), discussed in
Bourne & Lynch, supra note 5, at 23-25. But cf. Bourne & Lynch, supra note
5, at 70 n.445 (providing a counterclaim for ejectment was determined to be
an equitable claim for cancellation of lease).
MD. CODE ANN., REAL PROP. § 14-108(a) (1996).
See East Wash. Ry. v. Brooke, 244 Md. 287, 294, 223 A.2d 599, 603-04 (1966)
(actual, hostile, open, notorious, exclusive, under claim of title or ownership,
and continuous and uninterrupted for 20 years).
See id.
See, e.g., Bourne & Lynch, supra note 5, at 65 n.414, 69-70 (discussing cases).
See generally Beacon Theatres, Inc. v. Westover, 359 U.S. 500, 503-04, 508
(1959).
See Bourne & Lynch, supra note 5, at 70. The revised MARYLAND RULES permit
the joinder of a legal counterclaim to an equitable claim (and an equitable
counterclaim to a legal claim). See MD. RULE 2-301, -303(c) (merger of Law
and Equity); MD. RULE 2-302, -331 (a) (joinder of counterclaims).
See supra notes 1202-04 and accompanying text.
See generally Beacon, 359 U.S. at 504, 506-09. Bourne and Lynch note the use
of the declaratory judgment in title cases. See Bourne & Lynch, supra note 5,
at 37 n.236, 51-52, 70 n.445; see also EDWIN BORCHARD, DEClARATORY JUDGMENTS 741-58 (2d ed. 1941); cf. MD. CODE ANN., CTS. & JUD. PROC. § 3-406
(1995) (deeds and land patents). But see id. § 3-409(b) (providing special
statutory remedy, perhaps such as a statutory action to quiet title, is to be
followed rather than a declaratory judgment proceeding); cf.McCoy v. Johnson, 70 Md. 490, 17 A. 387 (1889), discussed in Bourne & Lynch, supra note 5,
at 51 (stating that statutory equitable remedy in title cases violates the constitutional right to jury trial).
The declaratory judgment is an adequate remedy at Law. First, the declaratory judgment is adequate. It is available on an expedited basis. See MD.
CODE ANN., CTs. & JUD. PROC. § 3-409(e) (1995). It may be supplemented by
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of the jury right on an "issue-by-issue" basis, rather than on an "action" basis. 1210 Thus, even if the judge grants an injunction, a jury
may determine the factual issues underlying title. 1211 Fifth, Lynch
and Bourne suggest that the need for immediate relief may preclude the jury right in a case involving title to land. 1212 However, as
developed above, provisional injunctive relief is available in a case
tried by jury. 1213
Thus, Lynch and Bourne's approximation of pre-merger approach, their reluctance to even mention (much less accept) persuasive federal authority, and their overlooking of ways to preserve
the jury right, all exemplifY their generally restrictive approach to
the right to jury trial in cases involving title to land.
3.

Rescission and Restitution Based upon Fraud

Lynch and Bourne take a mixed approach to the jury right in
cases involving rescission and restitution based o~ fraud. Before the
merger of Law and Equity, Equity would rescind or reform a contract for fraud or mistake and then award restitution (damages)
under its clean-up powers. 1214 Lynch and Bourne conclude that after
merger, restitution should be triable by a jury1215 and tried by the
jury first if an earlier grant of equitable relief might otherwise foreclose the award of damages. 1216 Thus, in part they take a protective
approach to the jury right. However, Lynch and Bourne also take

1210.
1211.

1212.
1213.
1214.
12i5.
1216.

preliminary injunctive relief. See supra note 1184 and accompanying text. It
may also be supplemented by additional relief, such as a final injunction. See
MD. CODE ANN., CTS. &: JUD. PROC. § 3-412 (1995). Second, the declaratory
judgment may be considered a remedy at Law because declaratory relief is itself legal. 'See supra notes 1164-Q8 and accompanying text. It may be considered a legal reme~y also because the underlying issues of title are legal. See
supra note 1163 and accompanying text. The equitable suit to quiet title is
available only where no adequate remedy at Law exists. See Bourne & Lynch,
supra note 5, at 51, 53.
See Bourne & Lynch, supra note 5, at 6, 45, 72.
Adjudication of land titles may be "inherently legal.» See supra note 1163 and
accompanying text; if. Bourne & Lynch, supra note 5, at 48 & n.307 (providing slander of title in a patent infringement case and mental incapacity of a
party in a contract rescission action are inherently legal). Legal issues may
be tried by a jury before equitable issues are tried by a judge. See supra note
1179.
See supra note 1190 and accompanying text.
See supra note 1184 and accompanying text.
See Bourne & Lynch, supra note 5, at 53-54.
See id. at 55.
See id.
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an approximation of pre-merger approach in such cases. They predict that Maryland courts will characterize the claims of fraud and
mistake in such cases as "essentially equitable."1217 They also conclude that the remedies of rescission (and reformation) in such
cases are "purely equitable."1218
Lynch and Bourne do not mention federal authority about the
jury right in cases involving rescission and restitution based on
fraud. Some persuasive federal authority supports the part of their
approach that is protective of the jury right. Their assumption that
equitable restitution is essentially legal l219 is analogous to the holding of Dairy Queen, Inc. v. Wood,1220 that damages were an adequate
remedy at Law for an equitable accounting. The idea that restitution should be tried by the jury first if an earlier grant of equitable
relief might otherwise foreclose the award of damages is consistent
with Beacon. 1221 As developed below, persuasive federal authority supports an even more protective approach. I222
In a number of ways, Lynch and Bourne may allow the constitutional jury right to be violated in cases involving rescission or reformation and restitution based on fraud or mistake. In doing so,
they downplay or overlook ways to preserve the jury right in light of
modem procedural developments.
,
First, Lynch and Bourne suggest that fraud, at least where damages are sought, is a common-law action triable by a jury.1223 Similarly, reformation can be viewed as an interpretation of a contract, a
common-law action triable by a jury.1224 Second, Lynch and Bourne
1217. See id. at 54. They reach this conclusion after making a suggestion to the
contrary. See id. at 55.
1218. See id. at 55. Again, they reach this conclusion after making a suggestion to
the contrary. See id. at 54.
1219. See id. at 54-55.
1220. 369 U.S. 469,477-79 (1962), discussed grneraUy in Bourne & Lynch, supra note
5, at 23-25.
1221. See Beacon Theatres, Inc. v. Westover, 359 U.S. 500, 51~11 (1959), discussed
grneraUy in Bourne & Lynch, supra note 5, at 2~23.
1222. See infra notes 1223-30 and accompanying text.
1223. See Bourne & Lynch, supra note 5, at 53, 54. But see Parklane Hosiery Co. v.
Shore, 439 U.S. 322 (1979) (assuming that fraud was triable by jury, even
where fraud was joined with a claim for rescission).
1224. See Bourne & Lynch, supra note 5, at 53; cf Dairy Queen, 369 U.S. at 477
(holding a claim for an accounting was considered to be really one for damages on a debt). Dobbs says that this so-called "reformation at law" may not
suffice where third persons are involved. See 1 DAN B. DOBBS. LAw OF REMEDIES § 4.3(7) (1993). But see MD. RULE 2-212 to 231 (permitting joinder of
parties) .
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suggest that rescission, and presumably reformation, may be seen as
essentially declaratory judgments defining the contract and its enforceability,1225 which are inverted actions at Law 1226 triable by a jury.
Third, in another context they suggest that there may be an adequate remedy at Law for rescission and restitution-the action for
money had and received. 1227 Fourth, in two other contexts, Lynch
and Bourne suggest that an equitable claim might be met with a legal counterclaim 1228 and that the legal counterclaim may provide
the plaintiff with an adequate remedy at Law, a defense to the
counterclaim, triable by jury.1229 Thus, in a case where the plaintiff
asks for rescission and restitution based on fraud, the defendant
may counterclaim for damages for breach of contract, and the
plaintiff's defense to that counterclaim may establish that the contract is unenforceable. 1230 However, Lynch and Bourne forsake these
four suggestions in favor of their prediction that Maryland courts
will characterize claims of fraud and mistake as "essentially equitable"1231 and will characterize remedies of rescission and reformation
as "purely equitable."1232 One suspects they do so because of their
approximation of pre-merger approach. Fifth, as Lynch and Bourne
recognize in other contexts, the revised Maryland Rules permit a determination of the jury right on an "issue-by-issue" basis, rather
than on an "action" basis. 1233 Thus, even if the judge determines
whether rescission or reformation is appropriate, a jury may determine the factual issues underlying the fraud or contract claims, as
well as the damages remedies. 1234
1225. See Bourne & Lynch, supra note 5, at 53-54; see also BORCHARD, supra note
1209, at 514, 525; Beacon, 359 U.S. at 507, 508-09. Third persons to the contract may be joined as parties to the declaratory judgment action. See MD.
CODE ANN., Crs. & JUD. PROC. § 3-405(a)(I) (1995). But if. Bourne & Lynch,
supra note 5, at 15 n.71, 28, 39,41, 76 (stating the equitable remedies of cancellation and rescission of a contract are unavailable at Law).
1226. See Bourne & Lynch, supra note 5, at 54.
1227. See id. at 53. Dobbs says that this so-called "rescission at law" is available only
where plaintiff offers to make defendant whole and that "rescission at law"
may not suffice where third persons are involved or where plaintiff wants recovery of unique property. 1 DOBBS, supra note 1224, § 4.3(6). '
1228. See Bourne. & Lynch, supra note 5, at 68-70.
1229. See id. at 70.
1230. See Beacon, 359 U.S. at 508 (a legal counterclaim was given priority over an
equitable claim).
1231. See supra note 1217 and accompanying text.
1232. See supra note 1218 and accompanying text.
1233. See supra note 1210 and accompanying text.
1234. See supra notes 1178-79 and accompanying text.
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In these five· ways, Lynch and Bourne may allow the constitutional jury right to be violated by the trial judge holding that there
is no right to jury trial at all on certain issues. In another way, they
may allow the right to be violated by delay.1235 The trial of fraud and
mistake by the judge before the trial of damages by the jury, even
where the earlier judicial determination does not foreclose the later
jury determination, may violate the jury right because of the postponement of the trial of the legal issues.
Thus, Lynch and Bourne's approximation of pre-merger approach, their reluctance to accept persuasive federal authority, and
their overlooking of ways to preserve the jury right, all exemplify
their generally restrictive approach to the right to jury trial in cases
involving rescission and restitution based on fraud.
4. Suits to Enjoin Interference with a Business Relationship and
for Damages
Lynch and Bourne take an approximation of the pre-merger
approach,1236 which happens to be a protective one similar to Beacon,1237 in suits to enjoin interference with a business relationship,
such as for nuisance, continuing trespass,1238 wrongful discharge, or
disparagement of business and property rights,1239 and for damages.
That is, the damages claim would be heard first by a jury. The judge
would then issue injunctive relief based on the jury verdict. l240 That
approach is consistent with the practice before the merger of Law
and Equity. Under former Maryland Rule BF40, 1241 ancillary injunctive relief was permitted at Law.1242 Any delay that trial by jury might
cause could be alleviated by the judge ordering interlocutory injunctive relief. 1243
1235. See supra notes 1144-46 and accompanying text.
1236. Bourne and Lynch say their result is "obtained under established Maryland
principles." Bourne & Lynch, supra note 5, at 61.
1237. See id.
1238. See id. at 6().61.
1239. See id. at 56.
1240. See id. at 61.
1241. See supra note 174.
1242. See Bourne & Lynch, supra n·ote 5, at 55-56, 61. Here, Bourne and Lynch may
be slightly more protective of the jury than was pre-merger practice. They
would have the damages claim heard first by the jury, before injunctive relief
was issued by the judge, even if the equitable claim was more substantial
than the legal claim. It was not clear that the equitable claim in that context
was "ancillary" within the meaning of MD. RULE BF40. See id. at 56.
1243. See id. at 61. But cf. infra note 1255 and accompanying text (prior restraint
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Lynch and Bourne are reluctant to accept persuasive federal
authority, such as the Beacon line of cases, in suits to enjoin interference with a business relationship and for damages. As developed
above, Lynch and Bourne's approach is based on "established Maryland principles" which provide "a result similar to that in
Beacon." 1244
Lynch and Bourne's reluctance 1245 is apparent in three ways.
First, Lynch and Bourne fully develop Maryland pre-merger practice
under former Maryland Rule BF40 as a basis for their approach. 1246
Second, Lynch and Bourne are generally unwilling to extend the
policy of Maryland Rule BF40 to forms of equitable relief other
than injunction, such as rescission or specific performance. 1247
Third, they survey the practice of other states and note that while
"some states have taken a position similar to Beacon,"1248 "many state
courts" have rejected Beacon. 1249
Lynch and Bourne's approximation of pre-merger approach in
suits to enjoin interference with a business relationship and for
damages is generally protective of the constitutional jury right. However, by characterizing relief as injunctive and, therefore, equitable,
Lynch and Bourne may allow the constitutional jury right to be violated by the trial judge holding that there is no right to jury trial at
all as to that remedy. In doing so, they overlook several ways, in
light of modern procedural developments, to preserve the jury
right.
First, there may be a number of adequate remedies at Law, 1250
triable by jury, which should be issued instead of an injunction. The
declaratory judgmentl251 may be adequate 1252 in a suit to enjoin indoctrine).
1244. [d. at 56, 61.
1245. Much of this reluctance is set forth in an introductory section. See id. at 5560.
1246. See id. at 55-56, 61.
1247. See id. at 55-56 n.360, 56; see also id. at 61-62.
1248. [d. at 56.
1249. [d. at 57. Bourne & Lynch, however, do criticize the waiver and discretionary
approaches taken by the state courts which have rejected Beacon.
1250. As developed above, the inadequate remedy at Law requirement for equitable jurisdiction in Maryland may be as dynamic as that in the federal courts
under Beacon. See supra note 1176.
1251. The declaratory judgment may be a legal remedy triable by a jury. See supra
notes 1168-82 and accompanying text.
1252. In addition to the tort of interference with a business relationship, Bourne
and Lynch mention claims of nuisance, continuing trespass, wrongful dis-
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terference with a business relationship, particularly where the
defendant is a public official or other responsible corporate entity.1253 Indeed, an injunction against interference with a business relationship by false and malicious statements about plaintiff's business, as Lynch and Bourne assume,1254 may w:ell be prohibited by
the First and Fourteenth Amendments' prior restraint doctrine. 1255
Second, even if the declaratory judgment or other remedy at
Law is not adequate, it may be that the jury may determine p~t or
all of the claim to injunctive relief. 1256 Professor Owen Fiss has explored this idea. 1257 Because of the interdependence between rights

1253.

1254.
1255.

1256.

1257.

charge, and disparagement of business and property rights. The declaratory
judgment or other legal remedies may also be adequate for those claims.
The other legal remedies which offer specific relief, similar to an injunction,
include replevin and ejectment. See Bourne & Lynch, supra note 5, at 37-38,
51, 69-70. It also includes mandamus. See MD. CODE ANN., CTS. & JUD. PROC.
§§ 3-8A-OI, -02 (1995); MD. RULE 15-701. See generally Robert Allen Sedler, Equitable Relief, But Not Equity, 15 J. LEGAL EDUC. 293, 295 n.12 (1963).
See Maryland Theatrical Corp. v. Brennan, 180 Md. 377, 388-89, 24 A.2d 911,
917 (1942), cited in Beacon Theatres, Inc. v. Westover, 359 U.S. 500, 507 n.9
(1959). See generally BORCHARD, supra note 1209, at 428-30, 435-38. Further relief based on a declaratory judgment may be granted if necessary. See MD.
CODE ANN., CTS. & JUD. PROC. § 3-412 (1995).
See Bourne & Lynch, supra note 5, at 60.
.
See Near v. Minnesota ex rel. Olson, 283 U.S. 697 (1931). But" cf. Virginia State
Bd. of Pharmacy v. Virginia Citizens Consumer Council, Inc., 425 U.S. 748,
772 n.24 (1976) (dictum) (stating prior restraint doctrine may be inapplicable against commercial speech).
Bourne and Lynch assume that final injunctive relief would be issued by a
judge, not a jury. See Bourne & Lynch, supra note 5, at 61; see also id. at 28
(stating that an injunction, rescission, restitution, cancellation, and foreclosure are purely equitable remedies in federal courts). But cf. id. at 38-44, 7576 (arguing that equitable discovery, accounting, and multiplicity may be
supplanted by adequate remedies at Law). See generally id. at 39 (stating that
injunction, constructive trust, cancellation, rescission, and accounting are
remedies unavailable at Law); id. at 55 & n.357 (arguing that an injunction,
setting aside judgments procured by fraud, constructive trust, and rescission
are purely equitable relief); id. at 76 (arguing that rescission, cancellation,
and specific performance are within the particular remedial competence of
Equity).
See FIss, supra note 719, at 5()"58. Interestingly, Fiss explored the idea in the
context of extending the right to an injunction, not the right to a jury trial.
He concluded that the injunction should be made more readily available as
a remedy. If the right to a jury trial was a hindrance to that goal because of
the traditional distinction between Law and Equity, Fiss believed that the
right to jury trial should be extended to injunctions. See id. Mter all, it was a
historical accident that Law and Equity developed independently. See id. at
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and remedies, a determination by a jury that a right has been violated is also a determination, to some extent, about what the remedy should be. 1258 Indeed, even the terms of an injunction might be
determined by a jury if there was a full evidentiary presentation on
the remedy, including expert testimony and explanatory judicial instructions. 1259 However, both federal 1260 and Maryland 1261 courts have
assumed without analysis that the issuance of an injunction would
be for the judge, not the jury.
Thus, Lynch and Bom:ne's approximation of pre-merger approach, their reluctance to accept persuasive federal authority, and
their overlooking of ways to preserve the jury right, all exemplify to
some extent their generally restrictive approach to the right to jury
trial in suits to enjoin interference with a business relationship and
for damages.
5.

Suits Joining Claims for Specific Performance and Damages

Generally, Lynch and Bourne take an approximation of premerger approach to suits joining claims for specific performance
and damages. 1262 Before the merger of Law and Equity, specific performance was a basis for equitable jurisdiction, and Equity would

1258.
1259.

1260.
1261.

1262.

50-51. The Law courts did issue remedies like injunctions--quia timet, estrepement, and prohibition writs-and, but for historical accident, could
have issued injunctions. See id. at 45, 51. But cf. Bourne & Lynch, supra note
5, at 55-56, 61 (stating that ancillary injunctive relief at Law developed in
Maryland).
While sympathizing with Fiss's analysis, I disagree with his goal: extending the right to an injunction, rather than extending the right to a jury
trial. Cf. supra notes 77-92, 96 and accompanying text (arguing that there is a
constitutional right to trial by a jury, not to courts of Equity or to trial by a
judge).
See Fiss, supra note 719, at 55-56.
See id. at 56. However, Fiss did not believe that the jury would ever determine part or all of the injunction because of the weakness of the constitutional preference for the civil jury. See id. at 51, 56. I do not share this perception of the weakness of the preference for the civil jury right, either in
the U.S. CONST. or in the MD. CONST. See supra notes 46-67 and accompanying text (text); supra notes 103-35 and accompanying text (history); supra
notes 164-299 and accompanying text (doctrine).
See, e.g., Beacon Theatres, Inc. v. Westover, 359 U.S. 500, 508 (1959).
Cf. Higgins v. Barnes, 310 Md. 532, 552, 530 A.2d 724, 734 (1987) (specific
performance and recoupment).
The damages are those sought either for specific performance or for incidental losses for wrongful detention. See Bourne & Lynch, supra note 5, at
61.
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award damages even if specific performance was denied. 1263 Lynch
and Bourne conclude that after merger this equitable clean-up of
damages should not change. 1264 However, they would make exceptions, permitting jury trial either where there was no strong likelihood that the specific performance remedy would issue, or where
the damages were not likely to be merely incidental. 1265 These exceptions, being discretionary with the judge,1266 are not very protective of the jury right. 1267
Lynch and Bourne expressly reject persuasive federal authority,
the Beacon line of cases, which would generally require a jury in
suits joining claims for specific performance and damages. 1268 They
reject Beacon for three reasons. First, the only substantial damages
available would be as an alternative if the claim for specific performance failed. 1269 Second, damages for wrongful detention would
be only incidental and would be dwarfed by the value of performance. 1270 Third, specific performance involves "factors uniquely
within the province of the chancellor," matters which are not for a
jury. 1271
In a number of ways, Lynch and Bourne may allow the constitutional jury right to be violated in suits joining claims for specific
performance and damages. By allowing Equity clean-up damages, by
characterizing legal issues as "incidental" to equitable issues, and by
characterizing relief as specific performance and, therefore, equitable, Lynch and Bourne would allow the constitutional jury right to
be violated by the trial judge holding that there is no right to jury
trial at all of some or all issues in a case. In doing so, they overlook
some ways, in light of modern procedural developments, to preserve the jury right. First, as Lynch and Bourne recognize in other
1263.
1264.
1265.
1266.
1267.
1268.

See id. at 62.
See id. But see infra note 1275.
See Bourne & Lynch, supra note 5, at 62.
See id.
See also infra notes 1272-81 and accompanying text.
See Bourne & Lynch, supra note 5, at 61-62. Indeed, they call the requirement of jury trial in such cases "ridiculous." See id. at 62.
1269. See .id. at 62. But if. infra notes 1272-75 and accompanying text.
1270. See Bourne & Lynch, supra note 5, at 62. But if. infra note 1276 and accompanying text.
1271. Bourne & Lynch, supra note 5, at 62. But if. supra notes 959-1103 and accompanying text (criticizing Bourne and Lynch's suggestion that Equity is superior to Law as a mode of trial because a judge has expertise that a jury does
not have, because the decision-making process of the judge is better than
the decision-making process of the jury, or because of other reasons).
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contexts, the revised Maryland Rules permit a determination of the
jury right on an "issue-by-issue" basis, rather than on an "action"
basis. 1272 Thus, even if a judge determines whether specific performance is appropriate, a jury may determine the factual issues in the
contract claim (underlying both the alternative or incidental remedy of damages at Law and specific performance in Equity) and the
damages remedy.1273 Lynch and Bourne concede in several other
contexts, although not in this one,1274 that the justification for Equity's clean-up jurisdiction is eliminated by the merger of Law and
Equity.1275 Second, non-frivolous legal issues should be triable by the
jury, even if they are characterized as "incidental" equitable issues. 1276 Third, as developed above, the inadequate remedy at Law
requirement for equitable jurisdiction in Maryland may be as dynamic as that in the federal courts under Beacon. l277 There might be
a number of adequate remedies at Law, triable by jury, which
should issue instead of specific performance. Replevin may be an
adequate remedy at Law where a plaintiff claims specific perform-

1272. See Bourne and Lynch, supra note 6, at 6, 45, 72.
1273. See supra notes 1164-68 and accompanying text.
1274. See Bourne & Lynch, supra note 5, at 62 (discussing clean-up of damages after specific performance); see also id. at 75-77 (discussing judge's discretion
clean-up damages after specific performance).
1275. See id. at 52 (declaratory judgment voiding a deed after enforcement of a
lien); id. at 54-55 (damages after rescission of a contract); see also id. at 72-75
(damages in class actions, intervention, interpleader, subrogation, and receivership); cf. id. at 75-77 (judge'S discretion to clean-up damages after rescission, cancellation, accounting, and multiplicity). But see id. at 63-64
(clean-up of tort damages after divorce-related claims).
In another context, Bourne and Lynch suggest that former MD. RULE
BF40 may serve as a "model" for jury trial in cases joining legal and equitable claims. See Bourne & Lynch, supra note 5, at 55. They also suggest that
the "policy" of that rule might extend to non-injunctive equitable relief,
such as specific peformance. See id. at 55-56 & n.360. A case decided after
Bourne and Lynch's article approves of this approach, at least where a
defendant raises breach of contract as a defense or counterclaim. See Higgins
v. Barnes, 310 Md. 532, 535 & n.l, 551, 530 A.2d 724, 724 & n. 1, 725, 733-34
(1987); cf. Ross v. Bernhard, 396 U.S. 531 (1970) (discussing shareholder's
derivative action bifurcated with equitable issues tried by the judge and legal
issues tried by the jury).
1276. See Dairy Queen, Inc. v. Wood, 369 U.S. 469, 470-73 (1962), discussed in
Bourne & Lynch, supra note 5, at 23-25. This conclusion was approved, after
Bourne and Lynch's article, by Higgins, 310 Md. at 545, 530 A.2d at 730; see
also id. at 548-49, 530 A.2d at 732.
1277. See supra note 1176 and accompanying text.
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ance of a contract for personal property.1278 Ejectment may be an
adequate remedy at Law where a plaintiff claims specific performance of a contract for real property.1279 Generally, the declaratory
judgment1280 may be an adequate reqJedy at Law. 1281
Thus, Lynch and Bourne's ap~ioximation of pre-merger approach, their reluctance to accept persuasive federal authority, and
their overlooking of ways to preserve the jury right, all exemplify a
generally restrictive approach to the right to jury trial in suits joining claims for specific performance and damages.
6. Suits Joining Divorce-Related Claims with Actions at Law 1282
Lynch and Bourne attempt an approximation of pre-merger approach to suits joining divorce-related claims (limited divorce 1283 or
absolute divorce 1284 and property disposition 1285) with legal claims
(assault and battery1286 or conversion 1287) for damages. As developed
below, however, their approach is less protective than an actual approximation of pre-merger approach. Before the merger of Law
and Equity, the equitable divorce-related claims and the legal claims
would have been heard in separate proceedings-the equitable
claims by a judge and the legal claims by a jury. 1288 After merger, as1278. See Bourne & Lynch, supra note 5, at 37-38. See generally MCCUNTOCK, supra
note 741, at 107.
1279. See Bourne & Lynch, supra note 5, at 51, 69-70. See generally MCCLINTOCK,
supra note 741, at 106.
1280. The declaratory judgment may be a legal remedy triable by a jury. See supra
notes 1161-68 and accompanying text.
1281. See generally BORCHARD, supra note 1209, at 551-54. Specific performance may
not even be available to enforce a contract to provide personal services. See
MCCUNTOCK, supra note 741, at 164-65.
1282. The relationship among status (e.g., divorce), declarations of rights or obligations arising from status (e.g., alimony, child support, and division of
property), enforcement of declarations of status, rights, or obligations (e.g.,
injunction and contempt), and catch-all or peripheral tort claims (e.g., sexual abuse, battery, and intentional infliction of emotional distress) are considered in another context-the judicially-created domestic relations exception to the diversity jurisdiction of the federal courts in Ankenbrandt v.
Richards, 504 U.S. 689, 716 (1992) (Blackmun, J., concurring).
1283. See Bourne & Lynch, supra note 5, at 62-63.
1284. See id. at 64.
1285. See id.
1286. See id. at 63-64.
1287. See id. at 64.
1288. See id. at 63. See generally id. at 11, 29, 34, 4445. There was a good deal of
doubt about whether "divorce courts" had any more than the limited powers
of ecclesiastical courts in England. See Kapneck v. Kapneck, 31 Md. App. 410,
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suming the equitable divorce-related claims and the legal claims are
heard together,1289 Lynch and Bourne would give less protection to
the jury right. They conclude that the judge should hear the divorce-related claims first an~ imply that the judge should then
clean-up the legal claims for ordinary damages. Lynch and Bourne
would have the legal claims tried separately by a jury only if punitive damages were demanded. 1290
Lynch and Bourne generally reject the Beacon line of cases,1291
which would require the legal claims to be tried by the jury before
the divorce-related claims are tried by the judge. 1292 They reject Beacon because they believe the decision is an affront to the legislative
grant of divorce jurisdiction to Equity and the need for expeditious
trial. 1293
Lynch and Bourne would allow the constitutional jury right to
be violated in suits joining divorce-related claims with actions at
Law. If Equity cleaned-up the legal claims, there would be no jury
trial at all as to those issues. Lynch and Bourne overlook some ways,
in light of modern procedural developments, to preserve the jury

1289.

1290.

1291.

1292.
1293.

356 A.2d 572 (1976). However, the legislature rejected Kapneck and expressly
gave "divorce courts" all the powers of courts of Equity. See 1977 Md. Laws
ch. 221 (preamble) (codified as amended at MD. CODE ANN., FAM. LAw § 1203 (a) (1991». But if. Winston v. Winston, 290 Md. 641, 431 A.2d 1330
(1981) (holding that "divorce courts" had power to enforce divorce-related
orders by injunction for more than a century pursuant to generally applicable MARYLAND RULEs). The powers of courts of Equity, expressly recognized
by the legislature in 1977, presumably would include equitable clean-up of
legal damages. See Bourne & Lynch, supra note 5, at 13-15, 29, 45 & n.292,
4647, 52-54, 56-57, 60, 75-78. To date, however, there are no reported cases
so holding. See id. at 63.
But if. 1993 Md. Laws ch. 198, § 2 (Family Division, authorized by the legislature to be established in each circuit court where feasible, is not assigned
tort matters).
See Bourne & Lynch, supra note 5, at 63-64. Punitive damages were not within
the traditional scope of Equity jurisdiction. See id. at 33-34, 56 n.365, 61, 6364.
But if. id. at 64 nA08 (citing Katchen v. Landy, 382 U.S. 323 (1966) (authorizing equitable clean-up of legal claims in bankruptcy to effectuate the congressional scheme for expedition».
See id. at 63-64.
See id. However, there is no statutory command for expeditious treatment of
divorce-related claims. Cf id. at 64 & nA08 (Lynch and Bourne's citation to
a statute, after a sentence containing the expeditious trial proposition, is apparently a citation for the other proposition-"the legislative determination
that equity should determine ownership of marital personal property").

1997]

The Right to Trial by Jury

469

right. 1294 First, any need for expeditious trial should not preclude
the jury right in light of the availability of provisional injunctive relief.1295 Second, as Lynch and Bourne recognize in other contexts,
the revised Maryland Rules permit a determination of the jury right
on an "issue-by-issue" basis, rather than on an "action" basis. 1296
Thus, even if a judge determines the divorce-related claims, a jury
may determine the legal claims. 1297 If the divorce-related claims and
the legal claims are heard side-by-side, the jury determination
should precede the judge's determination in order to avoid any
preclusive effect of earlier judge-tried issues on later jury-tried
issues. 1298
Thus, Lynch and Bourne's attempted approximation of premerger approach, their reluctance to accept persuasive federal authority, and their overlooking of ways to preserve the jury right, all
exemplify their generally restrictive approach to the right to jury
trial in suits joining divorce-related claims with actions at Law.

7.

Suit to Foreclose a Mechanic's Lien and a Counterclaim for
Breach of Contract

Lynch and Bourne also take an approximation of pre-merger
approach 1299 to the jury right in suits joining a clai~ to foreclose a
mechanic's lien and a counterclaim for breach of contract. Before
1294. The use of the declaratory judgment in divorce cases is specifically precluded
by statute. See MD. CODE ANN., CIs. & JUD. PROC. § 3409(d) (1995). But cf.
BORCHARD, supra note 1209, at 478-81 (declarations of validity and continuity
of marriage and of illegality of divorce and remarriage).
1295. See supra note 1184 and accompanying text.
1296. See Bourne & Lynch, supra note 6, at 6, 45, 72.
1297. Cf. supra note 1290 and accompanying text (punitive damages tried separately by a jury). Lynch and Bourne concede in several other contexts that
the justification for Equity's clean-up jurisdiction is eliminated by the merger
. of Law and Equity. See supra note 1275 and accompanying text. Jury trial of
legal claims before judge trial of divorce-related claims would hardly be an
affront to the legislature because the legislature likely neither considered
that divorce-related claims would be combined with claims triable by a jury,
nor intended that the jury right would be precluded in such cases. See
Bourne & Lynch, supra note 5, at 63. If the equitable divorce-related claims
and the legal claims are not heard together, the divorce court should stay its
trial until the legal claims are tried in the other court. See MD. CODE ANN.,
CIs. & JUD. PROC. § 6-104(a) (1995).
1298. See supra note 1275 and accompanying text.
1299. Bourne & Lynch, saying they are "attentive[] to established Maryland principIes," resort to the traditional scope of equity. Bourne & Lynch, supra note
5, at 69.
.
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merger of Law and Equity, the claim to enforce a mechanic's lien
would have been brought in Equity which likely would have cleaned-up the legal counterclaim for damages for breach of contract. l3OO Lynch and Bourne conclude that the same approach
should generally be taken after merger. 1301
Lynch and Bourne reject Beacon, which would require issues
common to both the mechanic's lien and contract damages to be
heard first by a jury. 1302 They reject Beacon as "rigid," less "sensible"
than their own approach, and inconsistent with or frustrating the
policy of the legislature for prompt adjudication of the lien. 1303
Lynch and Bourne would allow the constitutional jury right to
be violated in a suit to foreclose a mechanic's lien and a counterclaim for breach of contract. If Equity cleaned-up the legal counterclaim, there would be no jury trial at all as to that counterclaim.
Lynch and Bourne may overlook some ways, in light of modern procedural developments, to preserve the jury right.
First, the statutory provision for expeditious trial should not
preclude the jury right in view of the availability of provisional injunctive relief.1304 Second, as Lynch and Bourne recognize in other
1300. See id. But see id. at 64 n.412 (citing Brown, supra note 85, at 472, for doubting that Equity would entertain a legal counterclaim). See generally id. at 6465.
1301. See Bourne & Lynch, supra note 5, at 69. Bourne and Lynch would give the
judge discretion to order a separate jury trial of contract damages if the
counterclaim exceeded the amount of the lien claim. See id. This discretion
existed in some situations before merger. See id. at 34-35 (Equity'S reference
of issues of fact to Law); id. at 72-73 (Equity's transfer of issues of fact to
Law).
1302. See id. at 68.
1303. See id. at 69. In a footnote, Bourne and Lynch analogize the clean-up jurisdiction of the court, presumably to assure prompt adjudication, to "the summary equitable jurisdiction which federal bankruptcy courts may exercise
over claims asserted in bankruptcy proceedings in furtherance of the congressional purpose of expeditious adjudication." Id. at 69 n.473; cf. id. at 35
n.226 (citing Katchen v. Landy, 382 U.S. 323, 329-30 (1966), for the proposition that bankruptcy proceedings have been historically characterized as equitable). However, in a case decided after the Bourne and Lynch article. the
Supreme Court made it clear that the bankruptcy courts are courts of Equity, not because they proceed in summary fashion, but because they have
"'actual or constructive possession' of the bankruptcy estate."
Granfinanciera, SA. v. Nordberg, 492 U.S. 33, 57 (1989) (citing Katchen, 382
U.S. at 327). Delay and expense considerations are not enough to overcome
the right to jury trial under the Seventh Amendment. See id. at 63, 64 n.18.
1304. See supra note 1184 and accompanying text.
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contexts, the revised Maryland Rules permit a determination of the
jury right on an "issue-by-issue" basis, rather than on an "action"
basis.1305 Thus, even if a judge determines whether the mechanic's
lien should be enforced, a jury may determine the factual issues in
the contract claim (underlying both the supplier's right to payment
and the owner's right to performance) and the counterclaim for
damages. 1306 The jury determination of the contract claims should
be heard before the judge determines the establishment of the lien
in order to avoid any preclusive effect of earlier judge-tried issues
on later jury-tried issues. 1307 Third, equitable jurisdiction over the
lien enforcement claim may be denied because there is an adequate
remedy at Law.
In developing the historical right to jury trial in Maryland,
Lynch and Bourne discuss the case of Richardson v. Stillinger.130s
There, the plaintiff was denied equitable jurisdiction to enforce a
statutory vendor's lien because he had an adequate remedy at Law,
an action on the note. 1309 The conclusion of Richardson may have
even more force today because of state and federal constitutional
developments. Lynch and Bourne note that Richardson, preserving
the jury right, was reached under the original Maryland Constitution's jury trial provision, which was regarded as subject to restriction by the legislature,1310 not under the current provision, which is
designed to protect the jury right from encroachment by the legislature. l311 Doctrinally, the adequate remedy at Law principle is probably more protective of the jury right after Beacon and Higgins than it
ever has been. 1312
A federal constitutional development, that of procedural due
process, has eroded the utility of the mechanic's lien. l313 While a
1305. See supra note 1210 and accompanying text.
1306. Cf Bourne & Lynch, supra note 5, at 69 (jury trial at the chancellor's discretion). Lynch and Bourne concede, in several other contexts, that the justification for Equity's clean-up jurisdiction is eliminated by the merger of Law
and Equity. See supra note 1275 and accompanying text.
1307. See supra notes 1140-42 and accompanying text.
1308. 12 G. & J. 477 (1842), discussed in Bourne & Lynch, supra note 5, at 29-30.
1309. The action would be one for damages. See Richardson, 12 G. & J. at 481-84.
1310. See Bourne & Lynch, supra note 5, at 30 & n.192.
1311. See id. at 32 & n.21O. But see id. at 33 n.210 (discussing Capron v. Devries, 83
Md. 220, 34 A. 251 (1896).
1312. See supra notes 704-71 and accompanying text.
1313. See Barry Properties, Inc. v. Fick Bros. Roofing Co., 277 Md. 15, 353 A.2d 222
(1976), superseded fly statute as stated in York Roofing, Inc. v. Adcock, 333 Md.
158,634 A.2d 39 (1993).
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supplier of construction materials or labor l314 is still permitted a
remedy against the improved property itself, the lien no longer attaches automatically without the filing and proof of a claim, and the
lien no longer relates back for priority purposes to the commencement of construction. l315 Thus, an action by a supplier on a contract
with the property owner for money damages, triable of right by a
jury, may well provide an adequate remedy at Law. 1316 A judgment
1314. Bourne and Lynch assume that it is the contractor that is the supplier of
construction materials or labor. See Bourne & Lynch, supra note 5, at 68-69.
The contractor has not only a remedy against the improved property itself,
but a cause of action on the contract against the owner. Even if the supplier
is a subcontractor, it may have a cause of action against the owner on one or
more of several theories.
First, the owner may be liable in negligence for having paid the contractor without taking precautions to see that suppliers are paid. See Diener v.
Cubbage, 259 Md. 555, 563-64, 270 A.2d 471, 476 (1970). That negligence
,would be underscored by the statute that requires the supplier to give notice
to the owner, see MD. CODE ANN., REAL PROP. § 9-104(a) (1996), and by the
owner's right under the statute to withhold the amount claimed by a supplier from payments due the contractor, see id. § 9-104(f).
Second, the owner may be liable to the subcontractor on a contract implied in law. See generally RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 4 (1981).
Under the mechanic's lien statute, the owner may be liable to pay the debt
of the contractor to the subcontractor. See generally MD. CODE ANN., REAL
PROP. §§ 9-101 to 113 (1996). But cf. Kees v. Kerney, 5 Md. 419, 421-22 (1854)
(providing the law creates no contract between owner and subcontractor).
Third, the subcontractor may be a third-party creditor or intended beneficiary implied in law by the contract between the owner and the contractor. See generally RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 302(1) cmt. (d), illus.12 (1984). But see id. § 302, illus.19. The mechanic's lien statute provides
for payment to suppliers by the owner, either directly or indirectly through
the contractor, for supplies and labor provided for the construction project
by the contractor's suppliers. See MD. CODE ANN., REAL PROP. § 9-104(f)
(1996).
Fourth, the statute may be seen as extending the contractor's liability on
the contract with the subcontractor to a new person, the owner. Compare
Aviles v. Eshelman Elec. Corp., 281 Md. 529, 379 A.2d 1227 (1977) (statute
provides a remedy only), with MD. CODE ANN., REAL PROP. § 9-111 (1996)
(statute does not preclude other action against the owner or contractor). But
cf. Barry Properties, Inc. v. Fick Bros. Roofing Co., 277 Md. 15, 36 n.ll, 353
A.2d 222, 235 n.ll (1976) (providing subcontractor is remediless against the
owner).
1315. See Kenneth B. Frank & George W. McManus, Jr., Balancing Almost Two Hundred Years of Economic Policy Against Contemporary Due Process StandardsMechanics'Liens in Maryland after Barry Properties, 36 MD. L. REv. 733, 736-38,
782-84 (1977).
1316. See Mervin L. Blades & Son, Inc. v. Lighthouse Sound Marina & Country
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creditor's remedies after an action at Law are generally as adequate
as the remedies of a supplier who established a mechanic's lien.
The Law judgment also may constitute a lien 1317 and may be enforced by sale of property.1318 In certain respects, the Law judgment
may be superior to the mechanic's lien,13I9 while in other respects,
the mechanic's lien may be superior. 1320 To the extent the supplier's
remedy at Law is adequate, the supplier's claim should be triable by
a jury. 1321
Club, 37 Md. App. 265, 269, 377 A.2d 523, 526 (1977).
1317. See MD. RULE 2-621.
1318. See MD. CODE ANN., CTS. & JUD. PROC. § 3-301 (1995); MD. RULE 2-641, 2-644.
1319. The Law action must be filed within three years of accrual of a cause of action. See MD. CODE ANN., CTs. & JUD. PROC. § 5-101 (1995). The mechanic's
lien proceeding, however, must be filed within 180 days after the supplies or
labor were furnished. See MD. CODE ANN., REAL PROP. § 9-105(a) (1996). The
Law judgment expires 12 years from its date of entry or any renewal thereof.
See MD. RuLf. 2-625; see also MD. CODE ANN., CTs. & JUD. PROC. § 5-102(a) (3)
(1995). The mechanic's lien expires one year after the petition was filed. See
MD. CODE ANN., REAL PROP. § 9-109 (1996). The Law judgment is augmented
by interest. See MD. RULE 2-604. Yet, the mechanic's lien does not bear interest. Law judgments have priority over later-filed mechanic's liens, but
mechanic's liens may not always have priority over other mechanic's liens. See
MD. CODE ANN., REAL PROP. § 9-108 (1996). The Law judgment may be satisfied from any real or personal property of the judgment debtor, even that in
the hands of a third person. See MD. RULE 2-641 to -646. The mechanic's lien,
however, can only be enforced against the real property subject to the lien.
See MD. CODE ANN., REAL PROP. § 9-102 (Supp. 1996).
1320. For example, the filing of a mechanic's lien proceeding may immediately affect title to the owner's property under the doctrine of lis pendens. See generally Janice Gregg Levy, Comment, Lis Pendens and Procedural Due Process: A
Closer Look After Connecticut v. Doehr, 51 MD. L. REv. 1054 (1992). The Law
action has no affect on the property until recording of the judgment. See
MD. RULE 2-621. The elements for establishing a mechanic's lien are relatively simple and the defenses few. See MD. CODE ANN., REAL PROP. § 9-105(a)
(1996). The elements and defenses related to the Law action may be more
complicated. The mechanic's lien statute, unlike the ordinary Law action,
provides for expedited proceedings. See MD. CODE ANN., REAL PROP. § 9106 (a) (1), (a)(3), (b)(3)(vi) (1996). The mechanic's lien statute, unlike a
Law action, provides for interim payments to a supplier by the owner. See id.
§ 9-104(f). The mechanic's lien once established, automatically attaches to
the real property. See id. § 9-106(b) (1996); cf. id. § 9-107 (regarding the filing requirement for part of land located in another county). The Law judgment constitutes a lien on real property only if recorded and indexed. See
MD. RULE 2-621.
1321. Cf. Dairy Queen Inc. v. Wood, 369 U.S. 469, 477 (1962) (provid.ing that a
claim for an accounting that was recast as a claim for a debt on a contract
or for trademark infringement would still have adequate remedies at Law).
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Fourth, because of the advantages of a Law action, a supplier
may join a claim for contract damages with a claim to establish a
mechanic's lien.1322 Since equitable relief became available as ancillary relief in an action at Law,1323 a suit joining the two claims might
be considered a dual action-a determination of the parties' respective rights and responsibilities on the contract1324 or, in tort,l325 with
liability and damages triable first by a jury, and then the establishment of the lien triable by the judge. 1326 This approach was taken in
a case decided after publication of Lynch and Bourne's article,
Kahle v. McDonough Builders, Inc. 1327

1322.
1323.

1324.

1325.

1326.

1327.

But if. Richard v. Stillinger, 12 G. &J. 326,484 (1842) (dismissing a claim on
a vendor's lien where there was an adequate remedy at Law).
Cf MD. CODE ANN., REAL PROP. § 9-111 (1996) (providing mechanic's lien procedure does not preclude another action).
See supra note 174 and accompanying text.
The claim and counterclaim may raise many of the same issues. CJ. Bourne
& Lynch, supra note 5, at 70 (providing claim to quiet title and counterclaim for ejectment or trespass to raise the common issue of title).
See supra note 1314 (discussing Diener v. Cubbage, 259 Md. 555, 270 A.2d 471
(1970) ).
A mechanic's lien, a form of non-injunctive equitable relief, was probably not
available as ancillary relief in an action at Law. See Bourne & Lynch, supra
note 5, at 55-56 n.360. However, a mechanic's lien might, nonetheless, be
considered within the policy of former MD. RULE BF40. See Bourne & Lynch,
supra note 5, at 56.
85 Md. App. 141, 582 A.2d 557 (1990). Knhle was anticipated by the court of
appeals in Higgins v. Barnes, 310 Md. 532, 550, 530 A.2d 724, 733 (1987) (discussing Singer v. Steven Kokes, Inc., 39 Md. App. 180,384 A.2d 463 (1978».
See also PAUL V. NIEMEYER & LINDA M. RICHARDS, MARYLAND RULES COMMENTARY
42 (Supp. 1988).
In their book, Bourne and Lynch state that Kahle held that the claim
foreclosing a mechanic's lien could be tried ahead of a breach of contract
counterclaim. See Bourne & Lynch, supra note 5, at 331 n.197. In Knhle, there
were no common factual issues in. the mechanic's lien claim and the contract counterclaim. See Kahle, 85 Md. App. at 151, 582 A.2d at 562. Thus, an .
earlier judicial determination of the mechanic's lien would have no preclusive effect on the jury-tried contract counterclaim. However, the earlier judicial determination might delay trial of the legal issues and might, therefore,
be a violation of the jury right, as suggested by Beacon. See supra notes 114547 and accompanying text.
Unlike Bourne and Lynch, I do not believe that Kahle held that the
mechanic's lien claim could be tried ahead of a breach of contract counterclaim. Kahie was a joint jury and bench trial. See Kahle, 85 Md. App. at 143,
582 A.2d at 558 (noting that the judge heard the mechanic's lien claim at
the same time the jury heard the contract counterclaim); if. id. at 154, 582
A.2d at 563 ("first" of two reasons for the judge hearing another claim for

1997]

475

The Right to Trial by Jury

Fifth, the declaratory judgment action may be an adequate
remedy at Law, triable by a jury,1328 in place of an equitable suit to
establish a mechanic's lien.1329
Thus, Lynch and Bourne's approximation of pre-merger approach, their rejection of persuasive federal authority, and their
overlooking of ways to preserve the jury right, all exemplify their
generally restrictive approach to the right to jury trial in a suit to
foreclose a mechanic's lien and a counterclaim for breach of
contract.

8. Actions Involving
Coun terclaims

Claims

to

Quiet

Title

and

Legal

Nominally, Lynch and Bourne take a protective approach to
the jury right in actions involving a claim to quiet title and a legal
counterclaim for ejectment or trespass. Lynch and Bourne say that
Maryland courts have expressed a strong preference for adjudicating land titles at Law, based in part on a desire to preserve the jury
right. 1330 Because the counterclaim raises the issue of title, a legal
matter triable by a jury, the plaintiff has an adequate remedy at
Law, the defense to the counterclaim. This legal issue should be
tried first by the jury. Any additional equitable relief can later be ordered by the judge. 1331
However, Lynch and Bourne's approach to such actions is really more of an approximation of pre-merger approach. That is, after the merger of Law and Equity, claims of ejectment and trespass,
traditionally available at Law, will be triable by a jury; actions to
quiet title or remove a cloud from title, traditionally available in Equity where there was no adequate remedy at Law, will be tried by a
breach of fiduciary duty with the mechanic's lien claim).
1328. The declaratory judgment may be a legal remedy triable by a jury. See supra
notes 1161-68 and accompanying text.
1329. Cf. Barry Properties, Inc. v. Fick Bros. Roofing Co., 277 Md. 15, 37, 353 A.2d
222, 235 (1976) (dictum) (declaratory judgment remedy); MD. CODE ANN.,
CTS. & JUD. PROC. § 3409(b) (1995) (providing that a special statutory proceeding should be followed rather than a declaratory judgment proceeding).
But cf. id. § 3409(c) (providing that concurrent statutory equitable proceeding is no bar to declaratory relief); MD. CODE ANN., REAL PROP. § 9-111
(1996) (providing that mechanic's lien procedure does not preclude other
action).
1330. See Bourne & Lynch, supra note 5, at 70; see also supra notes 1185-1213 and
accompanying text.
1331. See Bourne & Lynch, supra note 5, at 70.
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judge. 1332 Lynch and Bourne fail to address existing federal authority involving the right to jury trial in an action involving a claim to
quiet title and a legal counterclaim. Federal authority is, however,
quite persuasive in this area.
Lynch and Bourne may overlook some ways, in light of modern
procedural developments, to preserve the jury right in an action involving a claim to quiet title and a legal counterclaim. First, Lynch
and Bourne conclude that a claim for immediate injunctive relief in
such an action may be enough, based on pre-merger precedents, to
preclude the jury right. 1333 Thus, Lynch and Bourne might eliminate
the jury entirely. However, as they also suggest, the need for immediate relief should not preclude a jury in an action involving a legal
counterclaim. 1334 Provisional injunctive relief may be granted pend. ing trial of the land title by a jury. 1335
Second, Lynch and Bourne conclude that after trial of the
ejectment or trespass counterclaim by the jury, the trial judge may
order additional equitable relief quieting title or removing a cloud
from title.1336 Lynch and Bourne, therefore, might eliminate the jury
right as to that additional relief. The declaratory judgment, however, may be an adequate remedy at Law, triable by a jury in place
of that additional equitable relief. 1337
Third, Lynch and Bourne conclude that if the legal counterclaim to the equitable claim to quiet title was not for ejectment or
trespass and did not raise the issue of title, the order of trial would
not be significant. There would be no common issues, and an earlier judge trial of the claim to quiet title 1338 would have no preclusive effect on a later jury trial of the legal counterclaim. 1339 Thus,
Lynch and Bourne would allow the jury right to be violated by de1332. See id. at 51, 70; see also id. at 70 n.441; id. at 70 n.442 (citing McCoy v. Johnson, 70 Md. 490, 17 A. 387 (1889». But if. id. at 52 (after merger, "Maryland
precedents" may be limited by the right to jury trial, regardless of whether
suit would have been brought in Law or in Equity before merger).
1333. See id. at 37, 52.
1334. See supra note 1190 and accompanying text.
. 1335. See supra note 1184 and accompanying text.
1336. See Bourne & Lynch, supra note 5, at 70.
1337. See supra note 1209 and accompanying text; see also Waring v. National Say.
Trust Co., 138 Md. 367, 114 A. 57 (1921), discussed in Bourne & Lynch, supra
note 5, at 52.
1338. Again, the declaratory judgment may be an adequate remedy at Law, triable
. by a jury, in place of the claim to quiet title. See supra note 1209 and accompanying text.
1339. See Bourne & Lynch, supra note 5, at 70.
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lay. As we have seen, persuasive federal authority may prohibit the
postponement, not just the preclusion, of a jury trial by earlier trial
by the judge. 1340 If the legal counterclaim and equitable claim are
not tried together, the legal counterclaim should be tried before the
equitable claim.
Thus, Lynch and Bourne's apparent approximation of premerger approach, their reluctance to even mention (much less accept) persuasive federal authority, as well as their overlooking of
ways to preserve the jury right, exemplify their generally restrictive
approach to the right to jury trial in actions involving a claim to
quiet title and a legal counterclaim.
9. Suits Involving a Claim for Accounting and a Claim for a Legal
Remedy
Nominally, Lynch and Bourne also take a protective approach
to the jury right in suits involving a claim for an accounting and a
claim for a legal remedy. 1341 Using a hypothetical based on the facts
of Johnson & Higgins v. Simpson, Inc.,1342 they conclude that an em-,
ployee's claim for contractual benefits, met by the employer's counterclaim for an accounting, should be tried by a jury. Thus, they
reach the same result as the federal case, Dairy Queen, Inc. v.
WOOd. I343 However, I believe this approach to such suits is more an
approximation of pre-merger approach. 1344 Even before merger of
Law and Equity, discovery was an adequate remedy at Law for an accounting in many situations,1345 with a jury trial on the legal
claim. 1346 However, Lynch and Bourne suggest that in some situa1340. See supra notes 1142-44 and accompanying text.
1341. Bourne and Lynch discuss this situation in tenos of a legal claim for contract
damages and a counterclaim for an accounting. See Bourne & Lynch, supra
note 5, at 71. However,. their logic would also cover the converse situation: a
claim for an accounting and a counterclaim for legal relief. See id. at 71, 7576.
1342. 165 Md. 83, 166 A. 617 (1933), discussed in Bourne & Lynch, supra note 5, at
7(}71.
1343. 369 U.S. 469 (1962).
1344. There is doubt about whether a Law court would entertain a counterclaim
for an accounting before the merger of Law and Equity. See generaUy Bourne
& Lynch, supra note 5, at 64. However, the jury trial issue would arise if an
accounting was sought in a separate suit and then Equity sought to enjoin
the action at Law. See id. at 71.
'
1345. See id. at 71 & n.450 (citing Johnson v. Bugle Coat Apron & Linen Serv., 191
Md. 268, 60 A.2d 686 (1948».
1346. See Bourne & Lynch, supra note 5, at 7(}71 (discussing Johnson & Higgins).
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tions the remedy at Law may be inadequate; therefore, an equitable
accounting may be needed.1347 Lynch and Bourne identifY three factors that may justifY equitable jurisdiction-a fiduciary or confidential relationship between the parties,1348 an ongoing relationship that
raises the possibility of a multiplicity of actions,1349 and where an accounting is sought against the party in possession of the accounts. 1350 Thus, Lynch and Bourne used the Beacon and Dairy Queen

1347.
1348.
1349.
1350.

Bourne and Lynch are ambivalent about whether the right to jury trial
was the basis for the holding in Johnson & Higgins. Compare Bourne & Lynch,
supra note 5, at 31 (stating the court of appeals "did not decide whether assumption of equitable jurisdiction over what was essentially a defense to a legal action would unconstitutionally infringe the equity defendant's right to
trial by jury"), with id. at 71 (stating the court of appeals "held that accounting was not appropriate, partly because the party seeking the accounting
controlled the records and partly because adjudication of the issues common
to both actions ... would preclude the company's [sic] right to trial by jury
in the action at law").
See id. at 31, 71.
See id. at 3842. But if. id. at 3940 (providing discovery may be an adequate
remedy at Law where no other grounds of equitable jurisdiction is asserted).
See id. at 4244. But see id. at 31, 38, 44 (stating that multiplicity, as a basis for
equitable jurisdiction, has been rendered obsolete by modem joinder rules).
See id. at 4243. But if. id. at 43 (providing that discovery may be an adequate
remedy at Law).
Interestingly, Bourne and Lynch take a comparatively narrow view of equitable accounting before merger, but a comparatively broad view of equitable accounting after merger. Historically, according to commentary, Equity
had jurisdiction of an accounting, regardless of whether there was an adequate remedy at Law, where there was a trust or fiduciary relationship. See,
e.g., MCCLINTOCK, supra note 741, §§ 200-01. There was support for this view
in Maryland law. See, e.g., Legum v. Campbell, 149 Md. 148, 131 A. 147
(1925). However, Bourne and Lynch state that the relationship was not
enough. There must also have been a need for discovery of the accounts
kept by the trustee or fiduciary. See Bourne & Lynch, supra note 5, at 3940,
4243. According to commentary, Equity also had jurisdiction of an account.ing, even absent such a relationship, where the accounts were complicated,
making the remedy at Law inadequate. See, e.g., McCLINTOCK, supra note 741,
at §§ 200, 202; see also Bourne & Lynch, supra note 5, at 24, 42 n.266 (discussing Dairy Queen). However, Bourne and Lynch state that resorting to an
accounting would rarely have been appropriate where the accounts were
complex. See Bourne & Lynch, supra note 5, at 42 & n.267; if. id. at 31 n.195
(discussing whether accounts were sufficiently complex to give Equity jurisdiction). After merger, however, Bourne and Lynch suggest that equitable
accounting may be broader in Maryland than equitable accounting is in the
federal courts. See id. at 75-76; see also id. at 25 n.148. But if. id. at 71 (stating
that Maryland courts would reach the same result as the Dairy Queen Court
did in a hypothetical based on Johnson & Higgins).
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decisions as points of comparison, not as persuasive authority. 1351
Lynch and Bourne may overlook some ways, in light of modern
procedural developments, to preserve the jury right in suits involving a claim for an accounting and a claim for a legal remedy. Their
approximation of pre-merger approach is protective of the jury
right in their hypothetical based on the facts of Johnson & Higgins. 1352 If the facts were different, however, their approach would
likely not be protective of the jury right. It is in those different hypotheticals that Lynch and Bourne may overlook ways to preserve
the jury right.
In those situations where Lynch and Bourne find no adequate
remedy at Law for an accounting, they would try those claims by
the judge. 1353 Thus, Lynch and Bourne might eliminate the jury as
to the accounting claim. If the accounting claim were tried by the
judge before trying the contract claim by the jury, the jury might be
precluded from determining common facts underlying the contract
claim.1354 If the accounting claim were tried by the judge, who used
Equity's clean-up to try the legal claims as well,1355 the jury might be
. eliminated entirely. Yet, as the persuasive Dairy Queen case held,
those situations should be tried by the jury because there is an adequate remedy at Law. 1356
In some cases the claim for accounting may be, as in Dairy
Queen, just a "choice of words used in the pleadings" to cover for a
claim of damages and thereby avoid trial by jury.1357 In those cases,
1351. See Bourne & Lynch, supra note 5, at 71. Bourne and Lynch also refer to Maryland cases and state that the judge has a choice between Law or Equity. In
addition, they state that the choice is governed by the adequate remedy at
Law standard. Bourne and Lynch conclude that their analysis of the hypothetical based on the facts of Johnson & Higgins reaches "the same result as
in Dairy QJJeen." [d.
1352. See supra notes 1342-43 and accompanying text.
1353. See supra notes 1348-50 and accompanying text.
1354. Cj Bourne & Lynch, supra note 5, at 69 (actions involving a suit to foreclose
a mechanic's lien and a counterclaim for breach of contract). But if. id. at
70 (discussing actions involving a claim to quiet title and legal counterclaims).
1355. See id. at 71 ("Maryland has permitted equity to preclude the right to trial by
jury when there is an adequate remedy at law .... "); see also id. at 34, 75-76
(opining that Equity, once it exercised jurisdiction on a claim for an accounting, could clean-up legal claims). But see id. at 54-55 (stating that the
justification for Equity'S clean-up jurisdiction was eliminated by the merger
of Law and Equity).
1356. See Dairy Queen v. Wood, 369 U.S. 469, 469-79 (1962).
1357. Bourne & Lynch, supra note 5, at 24-25.
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the jury should try the so-called claim for accounting, as well as the
claim for a legal remedy. In other cases, Lynch and Bourne are less
likely than are the federal courts to find an adequate remedy at
Law for an accounting. Generally, they are more likely to use the
adequate remedy at Law doctrine to expand, rather than contract,
Equity jurisdiction. 1358 Specifically, while Lynch and Bourne do mention that discovery may be an adequate remedy at Law for an equitable accounting,1359 they do not mention other possible adequate
remedies at Law for an accounting. 1360 In addition, Lynch and
Bourne suggest that after merger, equitable accounting may be
broader in Maryland than in the federal courts. 1361 Second, in
Lynch and Bourne's hypothetical, the employer counterclaimed for
an accounting. In the Johnson & Higgins case itself, the employer alleged that the employee had embezzled money and that the contract should be rescinded. Elsewhere, Lynch and Bourne have characterized rescission as "purely equitable" and fraud, as a basis for
such relief, as "essentially equitable."1362 They would try those claims
by the judge, thereby eliminating the jury.1363 However, the characterization of those claims as rescission based on fraud, no less than
as an accounting, would violate the jury right. 1364 In both of these
situations, Maryland practice should conform with federal practice
and preserve the jury right. 1365
Thus, Lynch and Bourne's approach exemplifies their generally
restrictive approach to the right to jury trial in suits involving a
claim for an accounting and a claim for a legal remedy.
10. Actions in Which Adjudication of Equitable Issues is a Prerequisite to Adjudication of Claims Triable by Jury
In considering actions in which adjudication of equitable issues
is a prerequisite to adjudication of claims triable by jury, Lynch and
Bourne distinguish between actions in which the equitable issue is a
1358. See supra notes 704-87 and accompanying text.
1359. See Bourne & Lynch, supra note 5, at 39-40, 43, 71.
1360. See 1 POE'S PLEADING & PRACTICE §§ 106-31 (1970). But if. Bourne & Lynch,
supra note 5, at 53 (stating Equity may grant rescission, regardless of an adequate remedy at Law for money had and received).
1361. See supra note 1350.
1362. See Bourne & Lynch, supra note 5, at 54-55.
1363. Cf. supra notes 1355-56 and accompanying text (possible preclusion or cleanup).
1364. See supra notes 1223-34 and accompanying text.
1365. See infra notes 1469-83 and accompanying text.

1997]

The Right to Trial by Jury

481

narrow procedural determination and actions in which the equitable relief is more substantial. 1366 The following analysis follows that
distinction.
a .. Narrow Equitable Procedural Determinations

Lynch and Bourne classify the narrow equitable procedural determinations as "historically equitable actions which are essentially
joinder devices."1367 They include in this category class action, interpleader, shareholders' derivative suit, intervention, subrogation, receivership, and assignment. 1368 Lynch and Bourne take an approximation of pre-merger approach to actions involving legal claims in
anyone of these historically equitable actions. In other words, they
are guided by "traditional practices"1369 which provided for Equity's
reference of factual issues to Law for trial by jury,1370 to transfer
from Equity to Law of factual questions,1371 and which, by court decision 1372 or by court rule,1373 permitted jury trial of legal claims
brought by persons holding power under certain equitable doctrines. In these situations, Lynch and Bourne would generally continue to have the trial judge resolve the equitable issues first and
then have the jury hear the legal claims. 1374
Lynch and Bourne refer favorably to the federal precedent of
Ross v. Bernhard,1375 a case in the Beacon line. The Ross Court held
that the legal claims in a shareholders' derivative suit, traditionally
an equitable proceeding, were triable of right by a jury. However,
Lynch and Bourne rely on the earlier Maryland case of Allender v.
Gh~ngherm6 as much as on RoSS.1377
1366.
1367.
1368.
1369.

1370.
1371.
1372.

1373.
1374.
1375.
1376.

See Bourne & Lynch, supra note 5, at 72-77.
[d. at 73.
See id. at 72-73, 76.
See id. at 73; see also id. at 75 ("Maryland's courts"); id. at 76 ("Maryland
cases" and "Maryland practice"); id. at 77 ("established Maryland procedure").
See id. at 34-35, 72.
See id. at 72-73.
See Allender v. Ghingher, 170 Md. 156, 183 A. 610 (1936) (holding that a liquidating bank is not entitled to maintain a suit in equity to enforce stockholder liability).
See MD. RULE 240 (1977) (repealed 1984) (assignees); MD. RULE 243 (1977)
(repealed 1984) (subrogees).
See Bourne & Lynch, supra note 5, at 73, 74-75. But if. id. at 74 (limited jury
right of legal claims in interpleader).
396 U.S. 531 (1970).
170 Md. 156, 183 A. 610 (1936).

482

Baltimore Law Review

[Vol. 26

Lynch and Bourne may overlook ways, in light of modem procedural developments, to preserve the jury right in actions involving
legal claims in these historically equitable procedural actions. First,
Lynch and Bourne would have some equitable procedural issues in
these actions heard first by the judge, eliminating jury trial of those
issues. Yet, as Lynch and Bourne recognize, some of these historically equitable procedural actions, such as class action and intervention, were brought into Law from Equity1378 even before merger. 1379
Thus, issues of fact as to these equitable procedures in an action at
Law might be triable by a jury. 1380
Second, Lynch and Bourne do not consider whether there
might be an adequate remedy at Law, triable by a jury, for these
historically equitable procedural actions. For example, the declaratory judgment might be an alternative to interpleader 1381 or actions
relating to subrogation 1382 or assignment. 1383 As noted above, the declaratory judgment may be triable by a jury.1384
Third, in any event, if there is an issue common to the equitable procedure and the legal claim, that issue should be heard first
by the jury. This would avoid a loss of the jury right through an earlier determination of the issue, as an equitable one, by the judge. 1385
1377. Compare Bourne & Lynch, supra note 5, at 74-75 (both cases cited), with id. at
75 (only Allender cited), and id. at 76 (only Rnss cited).
1378. Cf. Ross, 396 U.S. at 539 (stating that historically equitable procedural actions
might have been borrowed from Equity by Law).
1379. See Bourne & Lynch, supra note 5, at 73; see also id. at 36 (discovery); id. at 45
n.291 (liberal joinder); cf. id. at 55-60 (injunction as ancillary remedy at Law,
but triable under equitable principles to the judge).
1380. Cf. id. at 47-50 (discussing jury right in a declaratory judgment, a remedy unknown at common law but now within the concurrent jurisdiction of Law
and· Equity).
1381. See BORCHARD, supra note 1209, at 363-65.
1382. See id. at 544-45.
1383. See id. at 580-81.
1384. See supra notes 1176-82 and accompanying text.
1385. See Higgins v. Barnes, 310 Md. 532, 540-41, 545, 551, 530 A.2d 724, 728, 730,
733 (1987). Higgins was decided after the Bourne and Lynch article and they
discussed it at length in LYNCH & BOURNE, supra note 3, at 327-37. See generally, e.g., Hashem v. Taheri, 82 Md. App. 269, 571 A.2d 837 (1990). Hashem
was also decided after Bourne and Lynch's article, and they noted it in
LYNCH & BOURNE, SUPRA note 3, at 336 n.222. In Hashem, the issue of whether
the plaintiff was a shareholder of the corporation in a shareholders' derivative suit was held to be triable of right by a jury because it was essential to
plaintiff's legal claims, as well as to the preliminary equitable issue of
whether he had standing to sue for the corporation. See Hashem, 82 Md.
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Fourth, Lynch and Bourne lump interpleader with the other historically equitable procedural actions in which legal claims are subject
to jury trial under Ross and Allender. 1386 Yet, Lynch and Bourne make
an exception, limiting the jury right in interpleader, because the
"policy" of the former rule,1387 which provided for trial by jury only
when demanded by the defendant, could be construed as continued
in the revised rule. 1388 However, commentaries on the revised rule
take an approach much more protective of the jury right, one consistent with Ross and Allender.1389
Thus, Lynch and Bourne's approximation of pre-merger approach, their somewhat reluctant acceptance of persuasive federal
authority, and their overlooking of ways to preserve the jury right,
all exemplify their generally restrictive approach to the right to jury
trial in actions involving legal claims in historically equitable procedural actions.

b.

More Substantial Equitable Relief

Lynch and Bourne include reformation, cancellation, resCISsion, specific performance of contracts,1390 and accounting 1391 in the
category of more substantial equitable relief. Lynch and Bourne
take an approximation of pre-merger approach to actions involving
legal claims in one of these historically equitable actions. In other
words, "Maryland cases"1392 provided for Equity's clean-up of legal
App. at 269-74, 571 A.2d at 837-40.
1386. See Bourne & Lynch, supra note 5, at 72-73, 76.
1387. See MD. RULE BU73 (1977) (repealed 1984).
1388. See MD. RULE 2-221(c); see also, Bourne & Lynch, supra note 5, at 74. Thus,
Bourne and Lynch appear to permit court rules to limit the constitutional
jury right. But if. infra notes 1585-95 and accompanying text (providing that
interpleader rules extend the constitutional jury right).
1389. See Commentary on the New Maryland Rules of Civil Procedure, 43 MD. L. REv. 669,
735 (1984) ("[I]nterpleader does not abridge any preexisting right to ajury
trial on an underlying action."). NIEMEYER & SCHUETT, supra note 1, at 136,
states generally that practice under the rule will be similar to practice under
the federal rule. Specifically, while there would not be a right to jury trial of
a historically equitable order of interpleader, see id. at 137, 140, there would
be a jury right by all the parties of legal claims and defenses (e.g., contract
and fraud) in either a "pure" interpleader action or in an action in the nature of interpleader. See id. at 138-40; see also infra notes 1576-95 and accompanying text.
1390. See Bourne & Lynch, supra note 5, at 72, 75-76.
1391. See id. at 75-76.
1392. Id. at 76; if. id. at 75 ("many cases"); id. at 76 ("lines of authority" and "Maryland practice"); id. at 77 ("established long ago" and "established Mary-
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claims in these historically equitable actions. 1393 Lynch and Bourne
would have a jury trial of the legal claims, after determination of
the equitable remedy, only at the trial judge's discretion. 1394
Lynch and Bourne distinguish federal authority, at least Ross v.
Bernhard,1395 as limited to cases where narrow equitable procedural
determinations must be made. 1396 They do not consider other federal authorities that may bear on the jury right in cases where more
substantial equitable relief is sought,1397 although they suggest they
are departing from "federal post-merger practice."1398
Lynch and Bourne may overlook ways, in light of modern procedural developments, to preserve the jury right in actions involving
legal claims in cases where more substantial equitable relief is
sought. First, before the merger of Law and Equity, Equity'S cleanup jurisdiction was justified by avoiding the cost, delay, and inconvenience of duplicate proceedings in Law and Equity.1399 Mter merger,
those justifications no longer exist to preclude the jury right. l400 Second, developed above, there may be adequate remedies at Law, triable by a jury, for these more substantial equitable remedies. 1401
land procedure").
1393. See id. at 75-77.
1394. See id. at 77. Bourne and Lynch's discussion of this point appears to contain
an inadvertent error. Before the sentence in question, Bourne and Lynch
note the broad sweep of Equity powers and conclude that those powers
would not likely be reevaluated. After the sentence in question, Bourne and
Lynch note that, traditionally, once equitable jurisdiction has attached, it
would clean-up any legal claims, regardless of the availability of a remedy at
Law. The sentence with the addition of the bracketed word, which I believe
corrects the error, follows: "It seems that such a re-evaluation would [not]
preclude the chancellor from deciding the entire case once equitable jurisdiction has attached." [d. at 77.
1395. 396 U.S. 531 (1970).
1396. See Bourne & Lynch, supra note 5, at 76-77. See generally supra notes 1368-89
and accompanying text.
1397. See, e.g., Beacon Theatres, Inc. v. Westover, 359 U.S. 500 (1959); Dairy Queen
Inc. v. Wood, 369 U.S. 469 (1962).
1398. Bourne & Lynch, supra note 5, at 77.
1399. See id. at 54-55, 76.
1400. See id. at 54-55.
1401. See supra note 1224 and accompanying text ("reformation at Law" may be adequate for reformation); supra notes 1225-26 and accompanying text (declaratory judgment may be adequate for rescission and, presumably, reformation); supra note 1281 and accompanying text (specific performance); supra
note 1227 and accompanying text (an action for money had and received
may be adequate for rescission and restitution); supra note 1278 and accompanying text (replevin may be adequate for specific performance of a con-
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Third, even if there are no adequate remedies at Law, Lynch and
Bourne might require specific findings by the trial judge that there
are strong grounds for believing that the equitable remedies will issue and that the adjudication of equitable claims is a prerequisite
for adjudication of the legal claims. 1402 Those findings may be necessary to protect the jury right in cases where the equitable claims are
not prerequisites, but are supplementary to,1403 alternatives to,1404 or
characterizations of1405 the legal claims. Fourth, even if the equitable
claims are prerequisites to the legal claims, preserving the jury right
may first require trial of any factual issues common to the equitable
and legal claims by the jury. 1406 Lynch and Bourne recognize this in
one context. 1407 If necessary, perhaps provisional injunctive relief
could be granted pending trial. I408

1402.

1403.

1404.
1405.

1406.
1407.
1408.

tract for personal property); supra note 1279 and accompanying text (ejectment may be adequate for specific performance of a contract for real
property); supra note 1360 and accompanying text (the common-law common counts of money lent, money paid, money had and received, or account stated may be adequate for accounting). In addition, the adequate legal remedies may become available with a defendant's counterclaims. Cf.
supra note 1331 and accompanying text (action to quiet title with a counterclaim for ejectment or trespass); supra notes 1341-42 and accompanying text
(claim for accounting and counterclaim for damages). See generally Beacon,
359 U.S. at 506-07, 509.
Cf. Bourne & Lynch, supra note 5, at 62 (suits joining claims for specific performance and damages). Bourne and Lynch's hypothetical, based on Damazo
v. Wahby, 269 Md. 252, 305 A.2d 138 (1973), illustrates the need for these
findings. See Bourne & Lynch, supra note 5, at 76-77. The authors hypothesize that a plaintiff seeks both the equitable remedy of setting aside a fraudulent conveyance and the legal remedy of money damages. See id. Bourne and
Lynch assume that the trial judge, after determining that the fraudulent conveyance could not be set aside, would likely clean-up the damages claim.
Thus, the jury right would be side-stepped in a case where the equitable
remedy was neither actually issued nor a prerequisite to the legal claim.
Cf. Bourne & Lynch, supra note 5, at 60-61 (discussing suits to enjoin interference with a business relationship and for damages).
Cf. id. at 62 (discussing specific performance, if chattels are unique, and
damages, if they are not).
Cf. supra note 1357 and accompanying text (discussing damages characterized as an accounting and Dairy Queen Inc. v. Wood, 369 U.S. 469, 476-78
(1962».
See supra notes 1136-39 and accompanying text.
See Bourne & Lynch, supra note 5, at 55 (rescission and damages).
See supra note 1184 and accompanying text. But cf. Bourne & Lynch, supra
note 5, at 55-56 (ancillary injunction at Law may not include non-injunctive
equitable relief).
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Thus, Lynch and Bourne's approximation of pre-merger approach, their reluctance to accept persuasive federal authority, and
their overlooking of ways to preserve the jury right, all exemplify
their generally restrictive approach to the right to jury trial in actions involving legal claims in cases where more substantial equitable relief is sought.
B.

The Book

This Article now turns to Lynch and Bourne's book,l409 written
in 1993, almost a decade after the merger of Law and Equity in Maryland. Significantly, the book came after the decision of the Court
of Appeals of Maryland in Higgins v. Barnes,1410 which adopted the
Beacon protective approach to the constitutional right to jury
trial. 1411 However, even after Higgins, Lynch and Bourne fall back on
their approximation of pre-merger approach. They are like the professor who vows to end future classes promptly when students remark upon the lateness of the hour, but who then continues to
hold classes overtime.
Again, this Article considers in detail three characteristics ()f
Lynch and Bourne's approach to problem situations. 1412 First, they
usually try to approximate the way the jury right was applied before
the merger of Law and Equity.l413 Second, if they accept recent,
post-merger Maryland precedent and persuasive federal authority, it
is only reluctantly. Third, they often overlook ways to preserve the
jury right in light of modern procedural developments. Thus, their
approximation of pre-merger approach is generally restrictive of the
jury right.
Professors Lynch and Bourne's book examines in some depth
the right to jury trial in nine problem situations. Four of those situations, which are not considered in depth here, deal with the jury
right independently of the distinction between Law and Equity.
Those situations are the right to jury trial after default; 1414 in apSee LYNCH & BOURNE, supra note 3.
See id. (discussing Higgins v. Barnes, 310 Md. 532, 530 A.2d 724 (1987».
See id. at 541-51, 530 A.2d at 729-33.
See supra note 1132 and accompanying text.
While approximating pre-merger, Bourne and Lynch, as detailed above,
largely ignore the constitutional aspect of the jury right, see supra note 1130
and accompanying text, and also abandon their own principled discretionary
theory, see supra note 1131 and accompanying text.
1414. See LYNCH & BOURNE, supra note 3, at 309-10. Bourne and Lynch call this situation "Jury Trial Right Mter Default Judgment." Id. at 309 (emphasis added).

1409.
1410.
1411.
1412.
1413.
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peals of administrative agency orders in the circuit courts,1415 in suits
against the government,1416 and in contempt cases. 1417 The other five
situations, which are considered in some depth here, do relate to
However, as they note elsewhere in their book, MD. RULE 2-613 contemplates
a two-step process-an order of default, entered after the defendant's failure
to plead, and a default judgment, entered after a determination of liability
and relief. See LYNCH & BOURNE, supra note 3, at 60W9. As Bourne and
Lynch recognize, this problem situation, in view of earlier precedents, raises
a substantial constitutional jury right question. See id. at 309.
1415. See LYNCH & BOURNE, supra note 3, at 320-24. As Bourne and Lynch recognize, this situation may raise a substantial constitutional jury right question
in view of an earlier Maryland precedent, State v. Rutherford, 145 Md. 363,
125 A. 725 (1924), (discussed in LYNCH & BOURNE, supra note 3, at 321-22). See
also LYNCH & BOURNE, supra note 3, at 323 (discussing Granfinanciera, S.A. v.
Nordberg, 492 U.S. 33 (1989) (analogous federal case); if. supra notes 340-45
and accompanying text (stating that, by analogy, the Sixth Amendment right
to jury trial in criminal cases may apply in administrative proceedings, such as
those adjudicating "public" rights, LYNCH & BOURNE, supra note 3, at 323,
which are substitutes for criminal proceedings).
The legislature's power to preclude trial by jury is not supported by the
authors' authority. See Capron v. Devries, 83 Md. 220, 34 A. 251 (1896); see
also supra notes 792-837 and accompanying text.
1416. See LYNCH & BOURNE, supra note 3, at 324. While Bourne and Lynch do not
mention it, there is a substantial debate over the constitutional right to jury
trial in suits against the federal government. Compare Lehman v. Nakshian,
453 U.S. 156, 162 n.9 (1981) (holding that there is no constitutional jury
right in an action against the United States), with Doe v. American Nat'l Red
Cross, 847 F. Supp. 643, 646 (W.D. Wis. 1994) (holding there is a jury right.
in an action against a federal agency having authority to "sue and be sued"),
and Carlson v. Green, 446 U.S. 14, 22 (1980) (dictum) (stating that there is a
jury right in action against federal official). See generally, Jason Weedon,
Note, Historically Immune Defendants and the Seventh Amendment, 74 TEx. L. REv.
655 (1996). The debate will eventually be joined in suits against the state.
1417. As Lynch and Bourne recognize, if the contempt sanction is really a criminal
one, this situation may raise a substantial constitutional jury right question.
See id. at 325 & n.163 (imprisonment for more than six months); United
Mine Workers v. Bagwell, 512 U.S. 821 (1994) (holding serious fines for contempt require a criminal jury trial); see also supra notes 34245 and accompanying text. Bagwell suggests that another constitutional defect with the contempt power is that it fuses legislative, executive, and judicial powers in the
judge. See United Mine Workers, 512 U.S. at 831. In contempt cases, it seems
that a jury is most needed. See supra notes 384, 386, 390 and accompanying
text. See generally RONALD L. GoLDFARB, THE CONTEMPT POWER 293 (1963) (coercive civil contempt abused by a party seeking indefinite imprisonment of
an opponent). For an example of a long period of confinement in a coercive civil contempt case, see Kate Shatzkin, Bouknight Case Tests Limits· of Contempt: Missing Child's Jailed Mother Refuses To Talk for 7 Years, THE SUN (BALT.),
Feb. 12, 1995, at F1.
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the distinction between Law and Equity. Those situations are as follows: (1) the right to jury trial in newly created causes of action; (2)
the right to jury trial in three situations in which legal and equitable claims or issues are combined-actions in which a historically legal claim is joined with a historically equitable claim for which
there is no adequate remedy at Law, actions in which a historically
legal claim is joined with some preliminary equitable procedural
matter, and equitable actions of accounting; and (3) the right to
jury trial in declaratory judgment actions.

1.

Newly-Created Causes of Action

Lynch and Bourne nominally take a strict historical approach
to whether new causes of action, created by the legislature or the
courts, are legal or equitable. In other words, if the new causes of
action are analogous 141S to rights and remedies at common law existing in 1776, the date of the first constitutional jury right in Maryland, those new causes are triable by a jury; if the new causes of action are analogous to equitable rights and remedies existing in
1776, the new causes are not triable by a jury. 1419 However, Lynch
and Bourne actually take a different approach to whether new
causes of action are legal or equitable. First, Lynch and Bourne
state that in most cases "the question of whether an action is triable
by jury may be resolved by looking to see whether before merger such
action was adjudicated in courts of law or in courts of equity."1420
Second, Lynch and Bourne's nominal, strict historical approach relies on one case, Pennsylvania ex rel. Warren v. Warren,1421 a case
which cited no Maryland precedent for that point and whose approach has not been followed in any subsequent, reported Maryland case. Third, Lynch and Bourne make it clear that the legislature and the courts are free to assign causes of action to Law or
Equity.1422 Thus, Lynch and Bourne essentially take an approximation of pre-merger approach to whether new causes of action are legal or equitable.
Lynch and Bourne refer favorably to the federal precedents of
1418. Here, Bourne & Lynch, by using analogies, depart from their avowed strict
historical approach. See supra notes 506-632 and accompanying text.
1419. See LYNCH & BOURNE, supra note 3, at 312-15.
1420. Id. at 312 (emphasis added); see also id. at 318.
1421. 204 Md. 476, 105 A.2d 488 (1954); see supra notes 536, 546 and accompanying
text.
1422. See LYNCH & BOURNE, supra note 3, at 316-18.
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Curtis v. Loether,1423 Tull v. United States,1424 and Chauffeurs, Teamsters
& Helpers Local No. 391 v. Terry,1425 all cases in the Beacon line. 1426
Those cases held that the jury right in new causes of action depended on historical analogies to legal rights and remedies existing
in 1791, the time the Seventh Amendment was adopted. However,
Lynch and Bourne rely as much on the earlier Maryland case, Warren, as on the federal precedents. 1427 Lynch and Bourne do note
that Higgins cited Tull with approval. 1428

Lynch and Bourne overlook several ways to preserve the jury
right in the trial of new causes of action. First, Lynch and Bourne's
cut-and-dried use of the categories of Law and Equity does not recognize a pitfall for the jury right. A party may characterize a new
cause of action in equitable rather than legal terms to avoid trial by
jury.1429 This pitfall is most apparent where a party claims rights
analogous to equitable rights 1430 or remedies analogous to equitable
remedies 1431 that Law has "borrowed" from Equity. In order to preserve the jury right, the courts should "see-through" the characterization of legal rights and remedies in equitable terms. Second, another pitfall in the use of the categories of Law and Equity is that a
party may claim new rights and remedies that are analogous to
those existing in both Law and Equity.1432 Because the constitutional
right is a jury trial, not a judge trial,1433 the courts should prefer the
1423.
1424.
1425.
1426.
1427.

1428.

1429.

1430.

1431.
1432.

1433.

415 U.S. 189 (1974).
481 U.S. 412 (1987).
494 U.S. 558 (1990).
See LYNCH & BOURNE, supra note 3, at 313-15.
See id. at 315. Bourne and Lynch also cite two other Maryland cases for support. See id. at n.75 (citing Impala Platinum, Ltd. v. Impala Sales (U.S.A.)
Inc., 283 Md. 296, 389 A.2d 889 (1978), and Fink v. Pohlman, 85 Md. App.
106,582 A.2d 539 (1990».
See Higgins v. Barnes, 310 Md. 532, 546, 530 A.2d 724, 731 (1987), discussed in
LYNCH & BOURNE, supra note 3, at 315.
Bourne and Lynch discuss this problem in another situation. See LYNCH &
BOURNE, supra note 3, at 332-33 (discussing Dairy Queen (claim for money
judgment cast in terms of an accounting».
Fraud is one example. In a footnote, Bourne and Lynch, do recognize the
possibility of an adequate remedy at Law. See id. at 316 n.82. See generaUy MeCUNTOCK, supra note 741, at 5.
In a footnote, Bourne and Lynch recognize the possibility of discovery in an
action at Law. See LYNCH & BOURNE, supra note 3, at 319 n.124.
See Chauffeurs, Teamsters & Helpers Local No. 391 v. Terry, 494 U.S. 558
(1990) (contract and trust); Tull v. United States, 481 U.S. 412 (1987) (debt
and nuisance).
See supra notes 86-95 and accompanying text.
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legal, rather than equitable, rights and remedies. 1434 Third, as de'tailed above, Lynch and Bourne say that the legislature and the
courts are free to assign new causes of action to Law or Equity. 1435
However, as developed above, the legislature and the courts are limited in doing so by the constitutional jury right. 1436
Thus, Lynch and Bourne's essential approximation of premerger approach, their reluctant acceptance of persuasive federal
authority, and their overlooking of ways to preserve the jury right,
all exemplify their generally restrictive approach to the right to jury
trial in newly-created causes of action.
2. Actions in Which Legal and Equitable Claims or Issues are
Combined
Lynch and Bourne, in considering actions in which legal and
equitable claims or issues are combined, distinguish among three
situations as follows: (1) actions in which a historically legal claim is
joined with a historically equitable claim for which there is no ade'quate remedy at Law, (2) actions in which a historically legal claim
is joined with some preliminary equitable procedural matter, (3)
and equitable actions of accounting. 1437 Those distinctions are used
here.

a. Actions in Which a Historically Legal Claim is Joined with a Historically Equitable Claim
In their book, Lynch and Bourne consider actions in which a
legal claim is joined with an equitable claim as one situation. 1438
However, in their earlier article, they treated these actions as seven
situations: three where a plaintiff claims legal and equitable relief simultaneously, three where legal claims are met by equitable counterclaims (or vice versa), and one where adjudication of a substantial equitable issue is a prerequisite to adjudication of a legal
issue. 1439
1434. See Chauffeurs, Teamsters & Helpers Local No. 391, 494 U.S. at 580 (Brennan, j.,
concurring) ("tie-breaker" in favor of jury trial).
1435. See supra note 1422 and accompanying text.
1436. See supra notes 788-866 and accompanying text.
1437. See LYNCH & BOURNE, supra note 3, at 326-37.
1438. See id. at 326-35, 337.
1439. See Bourne & Lynch, supra note 5, at 2, 55-77. However, in this last situation
tJ;ley distinguish between actions in which the equitable issue is a narrow
procedural determination and actions in which equitable relief is more substantive. See supra note 1366 and accompanying text.
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Because of Higgins, Lynch and Bourne generally follow the federal Beacon line of cases in taking a protective approach to the jury
right. l440 In other words, where legal and equitable claims are joined
and involve common facts, those facts are triable of right first by a
jury. 1441 In generally following the federal, protective approach and
in treating all actions joining legal claims with equitable claims
under one heading, Lynch and Bourne depart from the discussion
in their article. In their article, as developed above, Lynch and
Bourne took an approximation of pre-merger approach,I442 which
was applied in the seven specific situations. Interestingly, in their
book, Lynch and Bourne depart from that approach without
comment. 1443
While Lynch and Bourne generally accept the recent, postmerger Maryland precedent of Higgins and the persuasive federal
authority of Beacon, they seem to do so reluctantly. This reluctance
is apparent in three ways. First, in their general discussion, Lynch
and Bourne take a narrow view of the endorsement by Higgins of
the Beacon line of cases. l444 Second, the authors predict that Beacon
and its progeny will be accepted in Maryland,I445 rather than recognize that they already have been accepted in Maryland. l446 Third,
they quote two portions of the Beacon dissent with approval. I447
Although Lynch and Bourne generally take a protective approach to the jury right in actions in which a legal claim is joined
with an equitable claim, they overlook several ways to preserve the

1440.
1441.
1442.

1443.

1444.
1445.
1446.
1447.

Bourne and Lynch give only brief treatment to the situation where preliminary equitable relief is granted in an action for final legal relief. See id. at
61; see also LYNCH & BOURNE, SUPRA note 3, at 330-31. The preliminary injunctive relief, being tentative and temporary, would have no res judicata effect
on the later determination of the legal relief. See REsrATEMENT (SECOND) OF
JUDGMENTS § 13 (1982) (requirement of finality). See generally supra note 1142.
Also, the proceedings on the preliminary injunctive relief, being summary in
nature, should not significantly delay the jury trial.
See LYNCH & BOURNE, supra note 3, at 327-28, 331, 335, 337.
See id. ·at 328, 331.
See supra notes 1236, 1262, 1283-87, 1299, 1332, 1344, 1367-74, 1390-93 and accompanying text.
In their book, Bourne and Lynch seem to accept not just a narrow reading
of Beacon (jury trial of legal issues in a case including the plaintiff's equitable
claim and the defendant's legal counterclaim), but Beacon, its progeny, and
their implications. See LYNCH & BOURNE, supra note 3, at 328, 335, 337.
See id. at 331, 334-35. But see id. at 328, 335, 337.
See id. at 335, 337.
See supra notes 192-205 and accompanying text.
See LYNCH & BOURNE, supra note 3, at 329 n.188, 330 n.191.
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jury right in such actions. First, as already noted above in discussing
Lynch and Bourne's article, there may be adequate remedies at
Law, triable by a jury, for these equitable claims.I448 Second, the authors may have overlooked the significance of one aspect of Higgins.
They note that Higgins pointed out that the legal issue of breach of
contract was raised as well by the defendant's answer to the plaintiff's claim to specific performance of a contract, as it was by the
defendant's counterclaim for damages on the contract. I449 However,
Lynch and Bourne miss the significance of that point in Higgins. If
a plaintiff claims an equitable remedy for violation of a tort or contract duty, the defendant's answer denying the duty may raise a legal issue triable by a jury, even without a counterclaim. 1450 Thus,
there may be a right to jury trial where only an equitable remedy is
requested if the underlying claim is a legal one in which facts are
contested. Third, Lynch and Bourne conclude that the jury right is
in danger only where there is a factual overlap in the legal and equitable claims so that a determination of equitable issues by the
judge would preclude the right to later jury trial of common legal
issues. 1451 However, Beacon suggests that there may be a violation of
the jury right if there is a delay of trial of a legal claim by the jury
by the earlier trial of an equitable claim by the judge, even where
there is no preclusion. 1452
Thus, while Lynch and Bourne generally accept the protective
federal approach, their reluctance in doing so and their overlooking of ways to preserve the jury right both exemplifY their generally
restrictive approach to the right to jury trial in actions in which a
historically legal claim is joined with a historically equitable claim.

1448. Where the equitable claim is made as a pretext to avoid the jury right, the
adequate remedy at Law may be apparent. See, e.g. Dairy Queen v. Wood, 369
U.S. 469 (1962). See generaUy supra note 1358 and accompanying text.
1449. See LYNCH & BOURNE, supra note 3, at 332 (citing Higgins v. Barnes, 310 Md.
532, 535 n.l, 530 A.2d 724, 725 n.l (1987»; see also id. at 551-53, 530 A.2d at
734.
1450. Cf Beacon Theatres, Inc. v. Westover, 359 U.S. 500, 504, 506-09 (1959) (right
to jury trial on the plaintiff's claim for declaratory judgment that it was not
in violation of antitrust laws).
1451. See LYNCH & BOURNE, supra note 3, at 331.
1452. See supra notes 114446 and accompanying text. It may be that dividing a trial
between the judge and jury is inefficient, as well as a delay.
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b. Actions in Which a Historically Legal Claim is Joined with Some Preliminary Equitable Procedural Matter

Professors Lynch and Bourne consider historically legal claims
joined with some preliminary equitable procedural matter, which
they treated as a problem situation in their earlier article,1453 again
in their book. 1454 While Lynch and Bourne mention only the preliminary equitable procedural matters of preliminary injunction, class
action certification, and the shareholders' right to sue on behalf of
the corporation in a shareholders' derivative action,1455 this category
is probably much broader.1456
Because of Higgins, Lynch and Bourne follow the federal Beacon
line of cases, particularly Ross v. Bernhard,1457 in taking a protective
approach to the jury right. In other words, after the judge has resolved the preliminary equitable procedural matter, the jury may
decide legal claims. 1458
While Lynch and Bourne generally accept the recent, postmerger Maryland precedent of Higgins and the persuasive federal
authority of Ross, they do so reluctantly. This reluctance is apparent
in three ways. First, it has already been noted that in their general
discussion Lynch and Bourne take a narrow view of the degree to
which Higgins accepted Beacon and its progeny.1459 Second, the authors quote the Ross dissent with approval. l460 Third, they implicitly
criticize the recent Maryland case of Hashem v. Taheri. 1461
As already developed above in discussing their article, Lynch
and Bourne overlook a number of ways to preserve the jury right in
actions where historically legal claims are joined with some preliminary equitable procedural matter. I462
Thus, while Lynch and Bourne generally follow the protective
federal approach, their reluctance in doing so and their overlook1453. See supra notes 1367-1408 and accompanying text.
1454. See LYNCH & BOURNE. supra note 3, at 335-36; see also id. at 333-34 (discussing
Ross v. Bernhard, 396 V.S., 531 (1970».
1455. See id. at 333-36.
1456. See Bourne & Lynch, supra note 5, at 72-76. See generally supra notes 1368-89
and accompanying text.
1457. 396 V.S. 531 (1970).
1458. See LYNCH & BOURNE, supra note 3, at 336.
1459. See supra note 1446 and accompanying text.
1460. See LYNCH & BOURNE, supra note 3, at 333 n.209, 334 & n.212.
1461. 82 Md. App. 269, 571 A.2d 837 (1990), discussed in LYNCH & BOURNE, supra
note 3, at 336 n.222.
1462. See supra notes 1378-89.
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ing of ways to preserve the jury right both exemplifY their generally
restrictive approach to the right to jury trial in actions where historically legal claims are joined with some preliminary equitable procedural matter.

c.

Equitable Accounting Actions

Lynch and Bourne consider equitable accountings, which they
treated as a problem situation in their earlier article,1463 again in
their book. l464 Lynch and Bourne expressly take an approximation
of pre-merger approach to equitable accountings. That is, if an equitable accounting alone is sought in a suit after merger of Law and
Equity, there is no right to jury trial because there was no such
right before merger. I465 Lynch and Bourne suggest an exception to
this approach where a party, in order to avoid jury trial, characterizes an essentially legal action, such as contract damages, as an equitable accounting. l466
In general, Lynch and Bourne reject federal authority, the
Dairy Queen case, even though they state that it was cited sympathetically in Higgins. 1467 The Dairy Queen Court held that the availability
of masters under Federal Rule 53 to assist juries with complicated
accounts enhanced the adequacy of legal remedies and eroded the
equitable nature of accountings. I468 Lynch and Bourne say that the
counterpart of Federal Rule 53, Maryland Rule 2-543 (Auditors),
"does not contemplate the use of auditors to assist juries. "1469 Thus,
they say that Maryland and federal practice diverge with respect to
the jury right in equitable accountings. 1470 However, in one respect
Lynch and Bourne accept federal authority. As noted above, they accept the admonition of Dairy Queen that the jury right should not
be sidestepped by allowing a party to characterize an essentially legal action, such as contract damages, as an equitable accounting. 1471

1463. See supra notes 1341-65 and accompanying text (suits involving a claim for an
accounting and a counterclaim for a legal remedy, or vice versa).
1464. See LYNCH & BOURNE, supra note 3, at 318-19, 336-37; see also id. at 332-33 (discussing Dairy Queen, Inc. v. Wood, 369 u.s. 469 (1962».
1465. See LYNCH & BOURNE, supra note 3, at 318-19; see also id. at 337.
1466. See id. at 319 (referring to Dairy Queen).
1467. See LYNCH & BOURNE, supra note 3, at 335.
1468. See id. at 332-33, 337.
1469. Id. at 337; see also id. at 335 n.216.
1470. See id. at 335 n.216, 336; see also id. at 337.
1471. See supra note 1466 and accompanying text.
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As detailed above, in discussing their article, Lynch and Bourne
overlook a number of ways to preserve the jury right in equitable
accounting actions. 1472 Further, they restrict the jury right another
way in their book. Lynch and Bourne conclude that equitable accounting has greater viability in Maryland than in federal courts because Maryland Rule 2-543 (Auditors), unlike Federal Rule 53 (Masters), does not permit assistance to the jury in complicated
accountings. 1473 Respectfully, Lynch and Bourne may be wrong
about that. Maryland Rule 2-543 may permit auditors to assist juries
in complicated accountings, and Maryland practice should be as
protective of the jury right as federal practice. Maryland Rule 2-543
(Auditors), unlike Maryland Rule 2-541(b)(2) (Masters) and Maryland Rule 2-542(b) (Examiners),1474 does not expressly provide that
auditors shall only be used for matters "not triable of right before a
jury."1475 By negative implication, Maryland Rule 2-543 would permit
use of an auditor in a jury trial. While the notes to Rule 2-543 list
former Rule 595 (Auditor),1476 applicable only in Equity, as a source,.
the former rules also included Rule 525 (Auditor-Action Involving
Account),1477 applicable at Law as well as in Equity.1478
The principal commentary on the Maryland Rules provides that
"any type of matter, whether legal or equitable in nature," relating
to an account, may be referred to an auditor. 1479 Traditionally, auditors have been able to present matters as evidence to juries. 1480
More broadly, even Maryland Rule 2-541 (Masters) may contemplate
masters being used in jury trials. Maryland Rule 2-541 (b)(2), permit1472. See supra notes 1357-65 and accompanying text. In their book, Bourne and
Lynch discuss one way to preserve the jury right in equitable accounting actions-by re-characterizing, as the Dairy Queen Court did, an equitable accounting as a legal action for contract damages. See supra note 1466 and accompanying text.
1473. See supra note 1469 and accompanying text.
1474. See FED. R Crv. P. 53 (defining "master" as including referee, auditor, examiner, and assessor). An auditor is analogous to a master. See Robinson v.
Brodsky, 268 Md. 12, 24, 298 A.2d 884, 890 (1973).
1475. MD. RULE 2-541 (b)(2) , -542(b).
1476. See MD. RULE 595 (1983) (repealed 1984).
1477. See MD. RULE 525 (1983) (repealed 1984).
1478. However, the "Appendix: Tables of Comparable Rules" to the MARYLAND
RULES does not list MD. RULE 2-543 or any other revised rule as having been
derived from former MD. RULE 525 (1983) (repealed 1984).
1479. NIEMEYER & SCHUETI, supra note 1, at 432.
1480. See Attorney Gen. v. Johnson, 282 Md. 274, 275, 385 A.2d 57, 69 (1978) (dictum); if. MD. RULE 5-702 (expert testimony), MD. RULE 5-704 (opinion on ultimate issue).

496

Baltimore Law Review

[Vol. 26

ting reference to a master of any "matter or issue not triable of
right before a jury," may simply be a truism, protecting the constitutional jury right. In other words, the master may hear issues not
jury triable or may make non-binding recommendations to the jury
on issues. 1481 Permitting auditors to assist juries in complicated accountings also may be suggested by the Higgins case, which generally cited Dairy Queen with approval,1482 and which notes Maryland
courts' traditional reliance on federal courts' interpretations of analogous rules as persuasive authority. 1483
Thus, Lynch and Bourne's approximation of pre-merger approach, their reluctance to accept recent, post-merger Maryland
precedent and persuasive federal authority, and their overlooking of
ways to preserve the jury right all exemplify their generally restrictive approach to the right to jury trial in equitable accountings.

3.

Declaratory Judgments

Lynch and Bourne consider the declaratory judgment action,
which they treated as a problem situation in their earlier article, 1484
again in their book. 1485 While Lynch and Bourne nominally endorse
what they call the federal "basic nature of the issue" approach,1486
their approach is more akin to an approximation of pre-merger approach. 1487 Lynch and Bourne state the basic nature of the issue approach as the general rule in federal courts. 1488 That is, the claims
or other issues underlying the declaratory ·remedy are examined,
and a jury trial is provided for claims or other issues of a legal nature, not for those of an equitable nature.
However, Lynch and Bourne make two exceptions to the general rule. The first is for the "inverted" suit in which the declaratory
judgment plaintiff may be suing on what would otherwise be a defense to a claim that the declaratory judgment defendant might
1481. Cf NIEMEYER & SCHUETI, supra note 1, at 424-25 (stating that MD. RULE 2-541
does not limit masters to Equity, but "the court may not refer any matters to
a master that are within the province of a jury to decide"; the master acts
"subject to constitutional limitations").
1482. See generally Higgins v. Barnes, 310 Md. 532, 541, 545, 551, 530 A.2d 724, 728,
730, 733 (1987).
1483. See id. at 54243, 530 A.2d at 729.
1484. See supra notes 115~84 and accompanying text.
1485. See LYNCH & BOURNE, supra note 3, at 337-38.
1486. Id. at 338.
1487. See id.
1488. See supra notes 1161-62 and accompanying text.
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raise. 1489 Lynch and Bourne suggest that because the declaratory
judgment plaintiff's remedy often resembles the equitable remedy
of cancellation of a contract, there may be no right to jury trial. 1490
This exception may swallow the rule, particularly if the jury right
would also be denied because the declaratory judgment plaintiff's
remedy might resemble other equitable remedies, such as injunction, specific performance, reformation, or constructive trust. 1491
Thus, in this first exception, Lynch and Bourne suggest that the
"basic nature of the issue" may be the available remedy, often equitable, if there were no declaratory judgment, rather than the "basic
nature of the issue" being the underlying claim, often legal. 1492 This
first exception is an approximation of pre-merger approach,1493
which seems contrary to both the Beacon line of cases and the Higgins decision. In Simler v. Conner,1494 a Beacon line case, a lower court
held that a declaratory judgfi?ent action was basically an equitable
claim for cancellation of a contract and, thus, was not triable by a
jury.1495 The Supreme Court reversed, holding that the underlying
contract action was a traditionally legal matter triable by a jury.1496
In Higgins, a defense of breach of contract, raised in an answer
(and counterclaim) in a suit for specific performance of a contract,
was held to raise a legal issue triable by a jury. 1497
The second exception to the general rule that the right to jury
trial depends upon the "basic nature of the issue" is for cases where
"legal-type relief would not be possible at the time a declaratory
judgment action is filed .... "1498 In Lynch and Bourne's hands, this
1489. See LYNCH & BOURNE, supra note 3, at 337; see also Bourne & Lynch, supra
note 5, at 48 ("reverse" bill or claim, "defensive" use of the declaratory judgment, "inverted" suit); Beacon Theatres, Inc., v. Westover, 359 U.S. 500, 515
(1959) (Stewart, J., dissenting) ("juxtaposition of parties"); id. at 515 n.7
("[t]ransposition of parties").
1490. See LYNCH & BOURNE, supra note 3, at 337-38; see also id. at 319 & n.129.
1491. See id. at 319.
1492. See id. at 319, 337-38.
1493. See generally supra notes 1150-54 and accompanying text.
1494. 372 U.S. 221 (1963).
1495. See Simler v. Conner, 295 F.2d 534 (10th Cir. 1961).
1496. See Simler v. Conner, 372 U.S. 221 (1963) (per curiam), discussed in LYNCH &
BOURNE, supra note 3, at 338 n.231 (relying on Simler as primary authority for
the general rule that the right to jury trial depends upon the "basic nature
of the issue").
1497. See Higgins v. Barnes, 310 Md. 532, 535 n.l, 530 A.2d 724, 725 n.l (1987); see
also id. at 551-53, 530 A.2d at 733-34.
1498. LYNCH & BOURNE, supra note 3, at 338.
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exception may also swallow the rule. For example, legal relief might
not be possible because a claim for damages is not yet ripe l499 or because the case is one of inverted parties,1500 and "there was no suit
pending" on the declaratory judgment defendant's claim. 1501
The breadth of this second exception is underscored by several
things. First, Lynch and Bourne cite as authority for the exception
their earlier article,1502 which more clearly took an approximation of
pre-merger approach. 1503 Second, the authors use of the phrase "in
keeping with the traditional distinctions between law and equity"1504
betrays their sympathies, generally, for an approximation of premerger approach. Third, one of the federal cases Lynch and
Bourne cite for their general rule, the basic nature of the issue approach, may illustrate this exception to the rule as well. In Simler v.
Conner,1505 a declaratory judgment action by a client to determine
the amount of a reasonable fee owed to his attorney under a written contract was held to be a traditional common-law issue triable
by a jury. 1506 Yet, absent that holding, the case might have been seen
as one where legal relief would not be possible at the time the declaratory judgment action was filed, either because the case was one
of inverted parties and the defendant lawyer's claim was not yet
pending or because the lawyer's claim for damages was not yet ripe
in view of the ethical constraints on lawyers suing their clients for
fees. 1507
1499. See id. at 338 (discussing Connecticut Gen. Life Ins. Co. v. Candimat Co., 83
F. Supp. 1 (D. Md. 1949»; see also Bourne & Lynch, supra note 5, at 4748.
But if. LYNCH & BOURNE, supra note 3, at 330 & n.193 (stating the federal declaratory judgment act, comparable to the Maryland declaratory judgment
act, provides a legal remedy in circumstances where only an equitable remedy would have been available earlier).
1500. That is, the declaratory judgment plaintiff's claim for declaratory relief is
what otherwise would be a defense to a claim that the declaratory judgment
defendant might raise.
1501. LYNCH & BOURNE, supra note 3, at 338 (discussing Candimat); if. supra note
1490 and accompanying text (inverted suit considered as suit for equitable
cancellation) .
1502. See LYNCH & BOURNE, supra note 3, at 338 & n.232.
1503. See Bourne & Lynch, supra note 5, at 47, 50. See generally supra notes 1150-54
and accompanying text.
1504. LYNCH & BOURNE, supra note 3, at 338.
1505. 372 U.S. 221 (1963).
1506. See id. at 221-23.
1507. See MODEL CODE OF PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBIUlY EC 2-23 (1969); CANONS OF
PROFESSIONAL Enucs Canon 14 (1908).

I.'

I

1997]

The Right to Trial by Jury

499

Lynch and Bourne only reluctantly accept post-merger Maryland precedent and persuasive federal authority about the right to
jury trial in declaratory judgment actions. That reluctance is apparent in several ways. First, Lynch and Bourne do not even mention
Beacon in connection with the declaratory judgment action as a
problem situation. 1508 Second, in their general discussion, Lynch
and Bourne continue their criticism of Beacon, although that criticism is not as pointed as the criticism in their earlier article. 1509 Specifically, they criticize Beacon for holding that the declaratory judgment act may provide an adequate remedy at Law, triable by a
jury.1510 Yet, as noted above, that holding seems consistent with Maryland law. 1511 Moreover, Lynch and Bourne concede that the protective Beacon approach to the jury right will likely be fully accepted
in Maryland. 1512 Third, Lynch and Bourne do not mention that Higgins cites part of the Beacon discussion of the declaratory judgment
with approval. l513 As already detailed above, Lynch and Bourne overlook a number of ways, in light of modern procedural developments, to preserve the jury right in declaratory judgment actions. 1514
Thus, Lynch and Bourne's approximation of pre-merger approach, their reluctant acceptance of recent, post-merger Maryland
precedent and persuasive federal authority, and their overlooking of
ways to preserve the jury right all exemplify their generally restrictive approach to the right to jury trial in declaratory judgment
actions.

v. PRESERVING MARYLAND'S PROTECTIVE APPROACH TO
THE JURY TRIAL RIGHT
To return to the analogy of the college instructor, the foundation for a course should be its description in the school catalog, not
the course instructor's bold new ideas or past practice. Lynch and
Bourne propose a principled discretionary theory to the right to
1508.

1509.
1510.
1511.
1512.

1513.
1514.

Cf

LYNCH & BOURNE, supra note 3, at 329-31, 334-35 (discussing Beacon in
connection with the problem situation of actions in which legal and equitable claims or issues are combined).
See supra notes 1155-73 and accompanying text.
See LYNCH & BOURNE, supra note 3, at 330, 331.
See supra note 1176.
See LYNCH & BOURNE, supra note 3, at 334-35; cf supra notes 192-203 and accompanying text (noting Beacon and its progeny already have been accepted
in Maryland).
See Higgins v. Barnes, 310 Md. 532, 551 n.12, 530 A.2d 724,733 n.12 (1987).
See supra notes 1174-84 and accompanying text.
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jury trial in civil cases. 1515 However, in analyzing whether the jury
right applies in various situations, they ordinarily use an approxiination of pre-merger approach. 1516 To the contrary, the Maryland Constitution should· be the basis for determining the right to jury trial,
and the constitution requires a protective approach to the jury
right. 1517 This protective approach is better than other approaches
to the jury right. 15ls Maryland's protective approach generally follows the federal approach in theoryl519 and in practice,1520 but Maryland's approach may be even more protective. 1521
How then may Maryland's jury right be "inviolably preserved"
and not just "pickled"?1522 How may Maryland's jury right be part of
a constitution that is "living," applicable to new circumstances,1523 as
well as "written," limiting the branches of govemment?1524
Maryland's protective approach may be preserved in a number
of ways: by Maryland'sl525 legislature and people through constitutional amendment, by the legislature through statute, and by the
courts through cases and court rules. 1526
See supra notes 10-13, 453-1124 and accompanying text.
See supra notes 14, 1125-1514 and accompanying text.
See supra notes 16452 and accompanying text.
See supra notes 231-299 and accompanying text.
See supra note 198 and accompanying text.
See supra notes 199-205 and accompanying text.
See supra notes 223-30 and accompanying text.
See supra notes 6, 57-63 and accompanying text.
See supra notes 26-30 and accompanying text.
See supra notes 16-25 and accompanying text.
The jury right in Maryland could be affected by developments on the national level. Amendments to the United States Constitution, pursuant to Article V, might extend the federal jury right to state courts. Compare U.S.
CONST. amend. VII Uury right, which was held not applicable to the states,
in e.g., Hardware Dealers Mut. Fire Ins. Co. v. Glidden Co., 284 U.S. 151
(1931», with U.S. CONST. art. I, § 10 (guarantee of other rights, applicable to
the states, against bills of attainder, ex post facto laws, and laws impairing
the obligation of contracts). Congressional legislation might extend the federal jury right to state courts. See Dice v. Akron, C. & Y R.R. Co., 342 U.S.
359 (1952) (Commerce Clause legislation, the Federal Employers' Liability
Act); Daniel J. Leffel!, Note, Congressional Power to Enforce Due Process Rights,
80 COLUM. L. REv. 1265, 1281-82, nn.101, 102 (1980) (hypothetical legislation
under § 5 of the Fourteenth Amendment). The Supreme Court might decide that the Seventh Amendment should be applied to the states. See supra
notes 353-54 and accompanying text.
1526. Maryland's executive would appear to have only a limited role in these
processes. See MD. CONST. art. XN, § 1 (discussing governor's publication of
proposed amendment and governor's proclamation that an amendment was

1515.
1516.
1517.
1518.
1519.
1520.
1521.
1522.
1523.
1524.
1525.
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Maryland's protective approach to the jury right may be preserved by the legislature and people through constitutional amendment, pursuant to Article XIV of the Maryland Constitution. In the
past, the jury right has been received as part of the English common law in the first Maryland Constitution,1527 put beyond reach of
the legislature in the 1851 Constitution,I528 and extended in that
constitution to eminent domain cases 1529 and appeals to the circuit
courts from the judgments of justices of the peace. 1530
Maryland's protective approach to the jury right may be preserved by the legislature through statute. 1531 Indeed, the legislature
may extend the jury right beyond that guaranteed by the Maryland
Constitution. The legislature has plenary powers, except where limited by the Maryland Constitution. 1532 The legislature's powers under
the Maryland Constitution expressly include the power to pass laws
necessary and proper for carrying into execution the powers vested
by the constitution in any department of government. 1533 One of
those departments is the judiciary.1534 The legislature's power to
make laws for the judiciary, such as extending the right to trial by

1527.
1528.
1529.
1530.
1531.

1532.

1533.
1534.

adopted by voters); id. § 2 (discussing legislation taking the sense of the people regarding the call of a constitutional convention and legislation calling
such a convention, which is presumably subject to the governor's approval or
veto under MD. CaNST. art. II, § 17); id. (governor's approval or veto of ordinary legislation); see also id. DECL. OF RIGHTS art. 8 (separation of legislative,
executive, and judicial powers). But cf. id. art. II, §§ 1, 9 (governor's execution of laws); id. §§ 10-14 (governor's appointment of officers); id. § 16 (governor's convening of legislature on extraordinary occasions).
See supra note 107 and accompanying text.
See supra notes 113-17 and accompanying text.
See supra note 119 and accompanying text.
See supra note 120 and accompanying text.
See LYNCH & BOURNE, SUPRA note 3, at 317 n.106; see also Bourne & Lynch,
supra note 5, at 36 n.229 (citing Union Passenger Ry. v.. Mayor of Baltimore,
71 Md. 238, 241, 17 A. 933, 934 (1889), for the proposition that the legislature may give Law courts jurisdiction of matters traditionally heard in Equity
(semble».
This legislative power is gerierally recognized. See MD. RULE 2-511 (a)
(preserving the right of trial by jury as guaranteed by the MD. CaNST. "or as
provided by law"); cf. FED. R CIY. P. 38(a) (federal "right of trial by jury as
declared by the Seventh Amendment to the Constitution or as given by a
statute of the United States").
See Board of Supervisors of Elections v. Attorney Gen., 246 Md. 417, 428-29,
229 A.2d 388, 394 (1967). See generally Note, The Theory of State Constitutions,
1966 UTAH L. REv. 542, 553-54.
See MD. CONST. art. III, § 56.
See id. art. IV.
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jury, apparently is not generally limited by any provision of the Maryland Constitution. As already noted, there is no constitutional
right to trial by judge. 1535 The separation of powers 1536 is no limitation because the power to make procedural law for the judiciary is a
power that is expressly shared by the legislature and the judiciary. 1537
This legislative power to extend the jury right has been exercised
on a number of occasions. 1538
Maryland's protective approach to the jury right may be preserved by the courts through decisions in cases. 1539 Indeed, the
scope of the constitutional jury right is a question to be determined
by the courts. 1540
Maryland's protective approach to the jury right may also be
preserved by the courts through rule-making. 1541 The courts by rule
1535. See supra note 86-95 and accompanying text.
1536. See MD. CONST.. DECL. OF RIGHTS art. 8.
1537. See id. art. IV, § 18(a); Funger v. Mayor of Somerset, 244 Md. 141, 149-51,223
A.2d 168, 172-73 (1966); INSTITUTE OF JUDICIAL ADMINISTRATION. SURVEY OF
THE JUDICIAL SYSTEM OF MARYLAND 53-56 (1967); cf THE FEDERAUST No. 83
(Alexander Hamilton) ("A power to constitute courts is a power to prescribe
the mode of trial: and consequently, if nothing was said in the Constitution
on the subject of juries, the legislature would be at liberty either to adopt
that institution or let it alone.").
1538. See MD. CODE ANN .. REAL PROP. § 8-332(b) (1996) (distress appeals); MD. CODE
ANN .. CTS. & JUDo PROC. § 3-2A-06(b) (2) (1995) (medical malpractice arbitration appeals), noted in LYNCH & BOURNE, supra note 3, at 322 n.148; MD.
CODE ANN .. FAM. LAw §§ 5-1026(a), 5-1027(b) (1991) (paternity proceedings);
MD. CODE ANN .. HEALTH-GEN. § 10-805(e) (1994) (release from a facility of
persons with mental disorders), noted in LYNCH & BOURNE, supra note 3, at
317 n.106; MD. CODE ANN .. HEALTH-GEN. § 7-507(e) (1994) (release from a facility of persons with mental retardation); MD. CODE ANN .. LAB. & EMPL. § 9745 (d) (1991) (worker's compensation appeals), noted in LYNCH & BOURNE,
supra note 3, at 322; if. Patterson v. Mayor of Baltimore, 127 Md. 233, 96 A.
458 (1915) (stating that the right to jury trial in eminent domain was first
given by the legislature); Baltimore Belt R.R. v. Baltzell, 75 Md. 94, 23 A. 74
(Md. 1891) (the legislature may summon a special jury, rather than use a
common-law jury).
1539. See supra notes 164{)5, 170-78, 184-205 and accompanying text. But if. supra
notes 179-83 and accompanying text (some unfavorable interpretations befrn-e
the merger of Law and Equity).
1540. See Knee v. Baltimore City Passenger Ry., 87 Md. 623, 624, 40 A. 890, 891
(1898) .
1541. See Bourne & Lynch, supra note 5, at 73-74 & n.465 (citing MD. RULE BU73
(1977) (repealed 1996), and revised MD. RULE 2-221 (c) (the limited right to
jury trial in interpleader». But cf id. at 35 n.221 (citing MD. RULE 517
(1977) (repealed 1984) (abolition of Equity'S reference to Law for a jury
trial» .
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may extend the jury right beyond that guaranteed by the Maryland
Constitution. The courts' powers under the Maryland Constitution
expressly include that of making rules of "practice and procedure."1542 The legislature, which has the power to pass laws necessary and proper for carrying into execution the powers vested by
the constitution in any department,1543 has declared that the courts'
power to make rules governing "practice and procedure" shall be
"liberally construed"1544 and that practice and procedure include
(without limitation) "trials" and "unification of practice and procedure in actions at law and suits in equity, so as to secure one form
of civil action and procedure for both." 1545 Indeed, court rules have
been characterized as "legislative" in nature. 1546 Presumably, if the
legislature can extend the right to jury trial beyond its constitutional scope,1547 so may the courts, acting pursuant to their constitu-

1542. See MD. CONST. art. IV, § 18(a); if. U.S. CONST. art. III (providing no express
power of federal courts to make rules of practice and procedure); McCulloch
v. Maryland, 7 U.S. (4 Wheat.) 316, 406-11 (1819) (stating that branches of
government have incidental or implied powers related to expressly enumerated powers); Wayman v. Southard, 23 U.S. (10 Wheat.) 1,42-43 (1825); Sibbach v. Wilson & Co., 312 U.S. 1, 9-10 (1941) (providing that the federal
courts' rule-making authority is delegated by Congress).
1543. See MD. CONST. art. III, § 56.
1544. MD. CODE ANN .. CTs. & JUD. PROC. § 1-201 (a) (1995) provides:
The power of the Court of Appeals to make rules and regulations
to govern the practice and procedure and judicial administration in
that court and in the other courts of the State shall be liberally
construed. Without intending to limit the comprehensive application of the term "practice and procedure,» the term includes the
forms of process; writs; pleadings; motions; parties; depositions; discovery; trials; judgments; new trials; provisional and final remedies;
appeals; unification of practice and procedure in actions at law and
suits in equity, so as to secure one form of civil action and procedure for both; and regulation of the form and method of taking
and the admissibility of evidence in all cases, including criminal
cases.
[d.
1545. [d.
1546. See Ginnavan v. Silverstone, 246 Md. 500, 504-05, 229 A.2d 124, 126 (1967).
The rules are to be interpreted in the same manner as statutes. See Pappas v.
Pappas, 287 Md. 455, 465, 413 A.2d 549, 553 (1980); see also MD. RULE 1201 (c); if. County Fed. Sav. & Loan Ass'n v. Equitable Say. & Loan Ass'n, 261
Md. 246, 252-53,274 A.2d 363, 367 (1971) (stating a rule prevails over a conflicting prior statute).
1547. See supra notes 1531-38 and accompanying text.
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tional and delegated powers. 1548
Two questions have been raised about the courts' power to extend the right to trial by jury beyond its constitutional scope. One
question is whether the courts, whose power relates to "practice and
procedure," have power to modify the right to jury trial, which may
be a substantive matter. Thus, one case has stated that "the rules of
procedure may not abridge, enlarge or modify the substantive rights
of a litigant."1549
There are a number of possible affirmative answers to this first
question. Unlike the federal rule-makers, who are expressly prohibited from making rules which "abridge, enlarge or modify any substantive right,"1550 the state rule-makers are not prohibited by consti1548. The courts' power in this respect apparently is not generally limited by any
provision of the MD. CaNsT. Cf supra note 1535-37 (noting that the legislature's power to expand the jury right is not generally limited by any provision of the MD. CaNST.). The constitution may require extension of the right
to jury trial beyond its original scope. See infra note 1574 and accompanying
text.
1549. Mercantile-Safe Deposit & Trust Co. v. Slater, 227 Md. 459, 467, 177 A.2d 520,
524 (1962) (dictum); see also MD. RULE B11 Committee Note (1977) (repealed 1993) ("The question of the right to trial by jury is substantive rather
than procedural. However, the Committee believes it desirable that Rule B11
be included in order to make it clear to the reader that the question of the
right to trial by jury has not been overlooked."); see also Explanatory Notes of
the Reporter (Second Report) on the General Rules of Practice and Procedure, MD.
ANN. CODE, app. B, at 2107 (Cum. Supp. 1947) ("The proposed [joinder]
rules do not create a substantive right. Such rules relate only to matters of
procedure and not substantive rights."); Kenneth C. Proctor, Maryland Rules
of Practice and Procedure: Brief History-Pending and Projected Changes, 9 MD. BJ.
24, 26 (Dec. 1976) ("[In reviewing the Maryland Code, the Rules] Committee had to determine what was substance and what was practice and procedure. The test applied was-'Provisions answering the question "What is the
right and its extent?" are substantive; provisions answering the question
"How is the right enforced?" are procedural.' "); cf. MD. RULE 2-301 committee note (providing that "this Rule [one form of action] ... does not affect
the right to jury trial"); NIEMEYER & SCHUETT, supra note 1, at 155; Commentary, supra note 1389, at 742-43 (providing that the rules neither abridge nor
enlarge the right to trial by jury).
1550. Rules Enabling Act, 28 U.S.C. § 2072 (1994). The Rules Enabling Act
provides:
(a) The Supreme Court shall have the power to prescribe general
rules of practice and procedure and rules of evidence for cases in
the United States district courts (including proceedings before magistrates thereof) and courts of appeals.
(b) Such rules shall not abridge, enlarge or modify any substantive
right. All laws in conflict with such rules shall be of no further
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tution 1551 or statute 1552 from enlarging substantive rights. Thus,
although there is some authority to the contrary,1553 court rules may
extend the allegedly substantive right to jury trial.
Even if the courts' rule-making power over procedural matters
implicitly bars their power over substantive matters, the distinction
is not always clear. The rule-making power may include "matters
which, though falling within the uncertain area between substance
and procedure, are rationally capable of classification as either."1554
The right to jury trial may be rationally classified as proceduraP555
or substantive. 1556 Thus, court rules may extend the right to jury
trial, which may lie in the uncertain area between substance and
procedure.
Of course, the right to jury trial may be classified as clearly procedural. As noted above, the legislature has granted the courts
power to make rules regarding "trials" (jury trial is one mode of
trial) and unify "practice and procedure in actions at law and suits
in equity, so as to secure one form of civil action and procedure for
both."1557 Moreover, the legislature has provided that the rulemaking power be "liberally construed. "1558 Of course, the rules
force or effect after such rules have taken effect.
[d.
1551. See MD. CaNST., art. IV, § 18(a). Article IV provides:
The Court of Appeals from time to time shall adopt rules and regulations concerning the practice and procedure in and the administration of the appellate courts and in the other courts of this State,
which shall have the force of law until rescinded, changed or modified by the Court of Appeals or otherwise by law. The power of
courts other than the Court of Appeals to make rules of practice
and procedure, or administrative rules, shall be subject to the rules
and regulations adopted by the Court of Appeals or otherwise by
law.
[d.
1552. See MD. CODE ANN., CTS. & JUO. PROC. § 1-201 (a) (1995).
1553. See supra note 1549 and accompanying text.
1554. Hanna v. Plumer, 380 U.S. 460, 472 (1965). The Supreme Court held that
the manner of service of process in a federal diversity case was governed by
the FEDERAL RULES. See id. The federal rule-makers are expressly prohibited
from enlarging substantive rights. See id. at 471-73. A fortiori, the state rulemakers, who are not expressly prohibited from enlarging substantive rights,
see supra notes 1551-1552 and accompanying text, may have power over matters in the uncertain area between substance and procedure.
1555. See supra note 1545 and accompanying text.
1556. See supra note 1549 and accompanying text.
1557. Supra note 1544.
1558. See supra note 1544 and accompanying text.
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themselves provide for election, withdrawal of election, and waiver
of the right to jury trial,1559 for preservation of the right, a jury of
six persons, and no advisory verdict by a jury; 1560 moreover, the rules
provide for jury challenges. 1561 Federal practice also supports the
conclusion that the right to jury trial in this context is procedural
and, thus, may be extended by court rules. 1562
Even if the right to jury trial is classified as substantive, court
procedural rules may extend the right. As noted above, state rulemakers have not been expressly prohibited from extending the jury
right. 1563 State procedural rules govern a number of areas which
might be characterized as substantive. One commentator notes that
the rules, based on express or implied constitutional authority, include topics such as admission to the bar, attorney discipline, code
of professional responsibility, judicial discipline, judicial code of ethics, client security fund, attorney's fees, and evidence. 1564 Other provisions of the rules relate to res judicata1565 and privileges from discovery.1566 Thus, court rules may extend the right to jury trial even if
it is substantive.

1559.
1560.
1561.
1562.

1563.
1564.
1565.

1566.

See MD. RULE 2-325.
See MD. RULE 2-511.
See MD. RULE 2-512.
The Rules Enabling Act, 28 U.S.C. § 2072 (1984), formerly provided that.
"[s]uch rules shall not abridge, enlarge or modify any substantive right and
shall preserve the right of trial by jury as at common law and as declared by
the Seventh Amendment to the Constitution." Cf supra note 1550 (current
version of the Act). The Act formerly mentioned "substantive right" and
"the right of trial by jury" in separate phrases, as though they were distinct.
The Act also formerly provided that the "rules shall not abridge, enlarge or
modify" any substantive right, but provided that the rules shall "preserve"
the right to trial by jury. In the vertical choice of law context under the regime of Erie RR v. Tompkins, 304 U.S. 64 (1938), the Supreme Court has
suggested that the right to jury trial is procedural, not substantive. See Byrd v.
Blue Ridge Rural Elec. Coop. Inc., 356 U.S. 525 (1958); cf. Simler v. Conner,
372 U.S. 221 (1963) (holding the application of federal law was compelled
by the Seventh Amendment). The FEDERAL RULES deal with a number of aspects of the right to jury trial. See FED. R Crv. P. 38-39, 48.
See supra notes 1551-52 and accompanying text. But cf. supra note 1549 and
accompanying text (stating the rules may not enlarge substantive rights).
See DONNA]' PUGH ET AL.. jUDICIAL RULEMAKING 107-08 (1984).
See MD. RULE 2-231 (i) (class action); MD. RULE 2-332(c) (plaintiff's failure to
claim against impleaded third person); MD. RULE 2-506(c) (voluntary dismissal); MD. RULE 2-507 (f) (certain involuntary dismissals).
See MD. RULE 2402(c), (e) (trial preparation materials and experts).
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The second question is whether the courts should extend the
right to trial by jury beyond its constitutional scope. Lynch and
Bourne are ambivalent on this point, apparently torn between
rights, 15~7 democracy,1568 and results l569 arguments favoring jury trial
and suitability,1570 efficiency, 1571 and delay1572 arguments opposing
jury trial. Thus, at one point they state: "It does not appear that the
Maryland courts would extend the right to trial by jury to actions
which did not exist at the time of the adoption of the Constitution. "1573 However, their article recognizes that the right to jury trial
must be extended to preserve it in the face of various procedural
developments. 1574
In addition, in a later discussion of the right to jury trial of legal issues in historically equitable joinder devices, Lynch and
Bourne conclude that the Maryland Rules have extended the right
to jury trial. The extension was implicit in the case of the former
rules which provided that intervention and class actions might be
used at Law, as well as in Equity.1575 The extension was explicit in
the case of the former interpleader rule, which permitted the jury
right to be demanded by other claimants where the stakeholder itself asserted a claim to the property. 1576
Lynch and Bourne's ambivalence is most pointed in their discussion of the revised interpleader rule. On the one hand, they
See, e.g., Bourne & Lynch, supra note 5, at 59-60.
See id. at 49 n.311.
See id. at 3.
See id. at 27 n.162, 60.
See, e.g., id. at 60.
See, e.g., id. at 63.
Id. at 36. However, the article cites for that proposition a case which described the constitutional right to trial by jury. See id. (citing Impala Platinum
Ltd. v, Impala Sales (U.S.A.), Inc., 283 Md. 296, 320, 389 A.2d 887, 901
(1978) ("The constitutional guarantee of a trial by jury extends only to the
type of cases in which the right of a trial by jury existed at the time of the
adoption of the Constitution." (quoting Pennsylvania ex rel. Warren, 204 Md.
467,474, 105 A.2d 488, 491 (1954»).
1574. See id. at 16, 23, 47 (federal courts); id. at 29-30, 34, 38, 44, 50, 55, 73 (state
courts); see also NIEMEYER & SCHUE1T, supra note 1, at 204.
1575. See Bourne & Lynch, supra note 5, at 73 (citing MD. RULE 208, 209 (1977)
(repealed 1984». The article also referred to assignment and subrogation in
that connection. See Bourne & Lynch, supra note 5, at 73 (citing MD. RULE
240,243 (1977) (repealed 1984». However, the rules relating to those matters were based on earlier statutes, 1924 Md. Laws ch. 551 (repealed 1957),
and 1830 Md. Laws ch. 165 (repealed 1957).
1576. See Bourne & Lynch, supra note 5, at 73-74 & nn.457, 465.
1567.
1568.
1569.
1570.
1571.
1572.
1573.
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conclude that there was traditionally no right to jury trial in interpleader,l577 that the former rule provided no general, but only a
limited, right to jury trial,1578 and that the revised rules could be
construed as continuing only that limited right. 1579 On the other
hand, Lynch and Bourne conclude that the revised rules and Maryland practice may permit or even require trial of legal issues by a
jury in traditional equitable proceedings,1580 including
interpleader. 1581
With regard to this second question, whether the courts should
extend the jury right beyond its constitutional scope, the Maryland
Rules themselves supply a number of answers. Apparently, only two
rules by themselves extend the· jury right beyond its constitutional
scope-Maryland Rule 2-221(c) and Maryland Rule 1O-205(b).1582
Those two rules are good case studies, illustrating the purposes for
extending the right to jury trial by court rule.
Although the interpleader jury trial provision, Maryland Rule 2221(c), is rather opaque, several purposes may be seen in its allowance of a right to jury trial. Traditionally, equitable interpleader
("pure" interpleader) was available only at the request of a party
having no claim to the property, that is, a mere stakeholder. 1583 The
former Maryland Rules also made interpleader (an action "in the nature of" interpleader) available at the request of a stakeholder who
had a claim to the property.1584 Those rules gave the other claimants
a right to demand a jury trial as to the issues raised by the stakeholder's claim to the property.1585 Presumably, the stakeholder
1577.
1578.
1579.
1580.
1581.
1582.

See id. at 73-74 & n.465.
See id. at 74 n.465.
See id. at 74.
See id. at 72-73, 74-75.
See id. at 73, 76.
Other rules, by making certain equitable devices available at law, implicitly
extended the right to trial by jury. See supra note 1575 and accompanying
text. Many of those rules did not themselves extend the right, but they were
based on earlier statutes. See id; see also MD. RULE BF4043 (1977) (repealed
1984) .
1583. See Bourne & Lynch, supra note 5, at 74 n.465; see also MD. RULE BU71 (c) editor's note, MD. RULE BU72(b) editor's note (1977) (repealed 1996).
1584. MD. RULE BU70(a) (1977) (repealed 1996).
1585. MD. RULE BU73 (1977) (repealed 1996) provided:
If the original plaintiff asserts a claim to the property deposited
in court.or a claim adverse to a defendant, the court shall upon request by a defendant for trial by jury filed not later than fifteen
days after the passage of the decree of interpleader, either
(a) transfer the action to a law court pursuant to Rule 515
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waived any right to jury trial by initiating the equitable interpleader
action. 1586 Although the former interpleader jury rule contains no
explanatory note,1587 the rule-makers apparently extended the jury
right to actions "in the nature of"1588 interpleader in order to preserve the right in the face of expanding Equity jurisdiction over
those actions. 1589
The present interpleader jury provision, Maryland Rule 2221 (c), provides: "A demand for jury trial as to those issues that are
triable of right by a jury shall be filed not later than 15 days after
the entry of the order of interpleader or such other time as the
court may specify in the order of interpleader." 1590 The rule does
not appear to provide for a right to jury trial; the rule only appears
to provide for the timing of the demand for jury trial.
However, commentators have concluded that the rule does extend the right to jury trial. Lynch and Bourne believe that the rule,
like the former rule,1591 should be construed to extend the jury
right only to the other claimants as to the issues raised by the stakeholder's claim to the property in an action "in the nature of" interpleader. 1592 Other commentators believe that the rule also extends
the right to jury trial to claimants as to common-law issues among
the claimants themselves in "pure" interpleader cases, stakeholders
as to common-law issues raised by their claims to property in actions
"in the nature of" interpleader, and claimants as to common-law issues among the claimants themselves in actions "in the nature of"
interpleader. 1593 There is some support for this broader view of the
(Transfer of Action From Law to Equity and Vice Versa); or
(b) order that the claim asserted by the plaintiff be tried separately in a law court pursuant to Rule 501 (Separate Issue or Claim)
and Rule 515 (Transfer of Action From Law to Equity and Vice
Versa), and the court may make such further order relating to the
sequence of the trial of the interpleader action and the issue to be
tried before a jury as justice may require.

Id.
1586. See Bourne & Lynch, supra note 5, at 73-74 n.465.
1587. CJ. MD. RULE BU71(c) explanatory note (1977) (repealed 1996) (providing
verification that there is no collusion between the plaintiff and any defendant is a safeguard against efforts to avoid trial by jury).
1588. See infra note 1593 and accompanying text.
1589. See Bourne & Lynch, supra note 5, at 74 n.465; if. id. at 31, 73-74 (discussing
Allender v. Ghingher, 170 Md. 156, 183 A. 610 (1936».
1590. MD. RULE 2-221 (c).
1591. See supra note 1585 and accompanying text.
1592. See Bourne & Lynch, supra note 5, at 74.
1593. See NIEMEYER & SCHUETT, supra note 1, at 138-40.
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right to jury trial in the rule's source reference to federal practice,1594 which takes a broader view. 1595
Another commentary suggests that the interpleader jury provision was added in part to call attention to the right to jury trial,
which otherwise might be overlooked. 1596 Thus, the apparent purpose of this first rule, the interpleader jury trial provision, was to extend, or at least to preserve, the jury right in the face of expanding
Equity jurisdiction over actions "in the nature of' interpleader.
The second case study illustrating the purposes for extending
the right to jury trial by court rule is the guardianship jury trial provision. While the current provision, Maryland Rule 1O-205(b), has
only a modest right to jury trial, the former provision, Maryland
Rule R77 (b) (1),1597 significantly extended the right to jury trial. The
purposes of the former rule were stated by the rule's draftsmen. 1598
The current guardianship provisions of the Maryland Rules provide for the adjudication of a person's disability,1599 the appointment
of a guardian of the person,l600 and the termination of the guardianship on the ground that the disability has ceased. 1601 The rules
provide for trial by jury of the existence of the disability1602 when
the person is incapacitated because of "mental disability, disease,
1594. See MD. RULE 2-221. Source reference states that MD. RULE 2-221(a), describing the right to interpleader, is derived from FED. R CIV. P. 22(1) as well as
from the former MARYLAND RULES. Although only the source reference to
MD. RULE 2-221 (a) refers to the FEDERAL RULES, two commentators conclude
that "the remainder of the rule adopts a practice that is sufficiently similar
to the federal practice that the federal cases will be useful for interpretative
guidelines." NIEMEYER & SCHUElT, supra note 1, at 136. Of course, a source
reference is not part of the rules. See MD. RULE 1-201(e). However, the
source reference was adopted by the court of appeals. See 11:9 Md. Reg. 5-21
(April 27, 1984).
1595. See LYNCH & BOURNE, supra note 3, at 307, 313-15, 329-38; Bourne & Lynch,
supra note 5, at 20-29, 74-76.
1596. See Commentary, supra note 1389, at 735; see also Minutes of Rules cOmmittee, 15
(Md. May 11-12, 1979) (comments of Mr. Sykes); Minutes of Style Subcommittee
of Rules Committee, 3 (Md. Jan. 23, 1980); cf.MD. RULE B11 committee note
(1977) (repealed 1993) (providing that the right to jury trial was included in
rules regarding appeals from administrative agencies in order to make clear
that the right had not been overlooked), quoted in supra note 1549.
1597. See MD. RULE R77 (b) (1) (1995) (repealed 1996).
1598. See infra note 1616 and accompanying text.
1599. See MD. RULE 10-205(b).
1600. See id. 10-108(a).
1601. See id. 10-209(c).
1602. See id. 10-205 (b).
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habitual drunkenness, or addiction to drugs .... "1603 The other matters-the appointment of a guardian and the cessation of the disability-are to be determined by a judge. 1604
The former guardianship provisions of the Maryland Rules had
a significantly broader right to jury trial. Those rules provided for
jury trial of the incapacities mentioned in the current rules plus incapacities from physical disability, senility, or other mental weakness. 1605 The former rules also provided for a right to jury trial on
the cessation of the disability.1606
The former guardianship provisions of the Maryland Rules significantly extended the right to jury trial. Before those rules, a right
to jury trial existed in the case of adjudications of some disabilities,
but not others. A statutory right to jury trial existed in adjudications
of both mental disability1607 and its cessation. 1608 A statutory right to
jury trial existed in adjudications of habitual drunkenness or addiction to drugs. l609 Apparently, there was neither a statutory provision
for adjudication of cessation of disability from habitual drunkenness
or addiction to drugs nor a statutory right to jury trial in such
proceedings.
While statutes provide for adjudications of physical disability,
senility or other mental weakness, and disease,1610 such adjudications
are to be made by a court of Equity,1611 not by a jury. As noted
above, the former guardianship rules provided for a right to jury
trial in adjudications of all such disabilities and their cessation. 1612
The right was not provided for by statute; statutory rights have either been repealed 1613 or they never existed. There is also some authority that such adjudications, being special proceedings, not com1603.
1604.
1605.
1606.
1607.

1608.
1609.
1610.
1611.
1612.
1613.

10-103 (b).
id. 10-108(a), -209(c).
id. R70(b) (1995) (repealed 1996).
id. R80(a)(3) (incorporating MD. RULE R77 (1995) (repealed 1996».
1947 Md. Laws ch. 751, § 124A (repealed 1969). The term, "mental disability" in the rules is equivalent to the terms "lunatic" and "non compos mentis" in the statutes. See MD. RULE R70 explanatory note (1963) (repealed
1996), quoted in infra text accompanying note 1616; see also MD. CODE ANN.,
EST. & TRUSTS tit. 13, introductory note (1974).
See 1947 Md. Laws ch. 751, § 134 (repealed 1969).
See 1953 Md. Laws ch. 528 (repealed 1969).
See MD. CODE ANN., EST. & TRUSTS §§ 13-201 (c), -704 (1991 & Supp. 1996).
See id. § 13-704.
See supra notes 1605-06 and accompanying text.
See supra notes 1608-10; if. MD. CODE ANN., EST. & TRUSTS § 13-704 (1991)
("court" direction).
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See
See

512

Baltimore Law Review

[Vol. 26

mon-Iaw actions, are not within the constitutional guarantee of a
jury trial. 1614 Apparently, the draftsmen of an earlier version of Title
10 justified extending the right to jury trial by court rule as a part
of a general codification of disability procedures. The draftsmen
stated:
In the interest of simplification and standardization of procedure these rules purport to pull together all statutory provisions relating to incompetency, whether arising from actual mental disability (the traditional non compos mentis) or
from other causes rendering a person incompetent to care
for himself or his affairs, such as infancy, habitual drunkenness or narcotic addiction. The jurisdiction of the equity
courts over such persons and their affairs is basically the
same, and the problem is fundamentally alike in every case.
The result, however, marks a substantial change in procedure in many instances, in the interest of standardization
and also in the interest of due process. The result is intended to fit into the pattern approved by the Court of Appeals in Matter of Easton, 214 Md. 176, 133 A. (2d) 441. 1615
1614. See In re Easton, 214 Md. 176, 189-91, 133 A.2d 441, 449-50 (1957). For the
following reasons, Easton may not be good authority for the broad proposition stated in the text. First, that case dealt with a lunacy adjudication involving a guardian of property, where there was no statutory right to jury trial,
not a guardian of the person, where there was a statutory right to jury trial.
The distinction continued in R77(b)(l) (1995) (repealed 1996). The distinction is continued in the current guardianship rules. See MD. RULE 1O-205(b);
see also id. 10-103(b). Second, Easton appeared to recognize that there was a
traditional right to jury trial of adjudications of lunacy involving a guardian
of the person. See Easton, 214 Md. 176, 180, 133 A.2d 441,444. But see Beck v.
Beck, 236 Md. 261, 265, 203 A.2d 900, 902 (1964). That traditional right
should be received or preserved under MD. CONST., DECL. OF RIGHTS arts. 5,
23. There appeared to be no such traditional right to jury trial in disability
cases not involving lunacy. Third, even if lunacy guardianship proceedings
were in Equity, where there was no constitutional right to a jury trial, concurrent jurisdiction may have existed as to certain lunacy proceedings in
common-law courts, where there was such a right. See Tomlinson v. Devore, 1
Gill 345, 34849 (1843).
1615. MD. RULE R70(b) explanatory note (1963) (repealed 1996). The justification
for extending the right to jury trial was apparent, not express, because the
note spoke of procedure in general terms only. It did not expressly mention
the right to jury trial. At the time of the note, the former rules extended the
jury right beyond its statutory scope, only to adjudications of cessation of habitual drunkenness or addiction to drugs. See id. R70(b), R77 (b) (1) (1963)
(revised 1970). Later, the former guardianship rules extended the jury right

1997]

The Right to Trial by Jury

513

The extension of the right to jury trial by court rule served the purposes of standardization and due process. Standardization was
served because the jury trial is the uniform method for determining
the existence and cessation of a disability where guardianship of the
person was sought. 1616
Due process 1617 was served in two ways by the rule's extension
of the right to jury trial. First, the jury trial is an aspect of procedural fairness that has been recognized since the Magna Carta. 1618 Second, due process limits discrimination against those similarly situated. 1619 In other words, if some persons were accorded jury trials in

1616.

1617.

1618.

1619.

to adjudications of physical disability, senility or other mental weakness, and
disease, and to their cessation. See id. R70(b), R77 (b) (1) (1970) (repealed
1996). Presumably, the justification for the further extension of the jury
right is the same as the justification for the extension of the right by the
draftsmen of the note. While notes to the rules are not part of the rules, see
id. 1-201 (e), the notes were adopted by the court of appeals as a part of a report and are an aid to interpretation of the rules. See generally Alexander v.
Tingle, 181 Md. 464,468, 30 A.2d 737, 739 (1943).
But cJ. MD. RULE 10-205(a) (providing no jury right exists in guardianship
proceedings relating to minors); id. 10-304 (providing no jury right exists in
adjudications of disability where the appointment of a guardian for property
only is sought). In some disability cases, where the right to jury trial exists, it
may be waived, either by the disabled person, or by that person's attorney.
See id. 10-205(b). Also, even in cases tried by a jury, the court will itself determine some issues. See supra note 1604 and accompanying text.
Of course, the current guardianship rules promote due process in a number
of ways unrelated to the right to jury trial. See, e.g., MD. RULE 10-105, -203
(specifying requirements of notice); id. 10-205 (establishing hearing procedures).
See Magna Carta ch. 39 (pairing "judgment of his peers," which came to
mean jury trial, with "law of the land," which came to mean due process, as
limitations on sovereign power); SCHWARTZ, supra note 72, at 6-7; MD. CONST.,
DECL. OF RIGHTS art. 24. Compare McKeiver v. Pennsylvania, 403 U.S. 528, 54350 (1971) (holding that there is no right to jury trial, as an element of due
process, in juvenile delinquency proceedings), with Developments in the LawCivil Commitment of the Mentally Ill, 87 HARv. L. REv. 1190, 1294-95 (1974)
·(stating that whether the right to jury trial, as an element of due process, exists in commitment proceedings has not yet been determined). But cJ. Bringe v. Collins, 274 Md. 338, 344-45, 335 A.2d 670, 674-75 (1975) (holding
that the Seventh Amendment right to jury trial is not made applicable
against the states by the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment).
The concept of equal protection is implicit in the Due Process Clause of the
MD. CONST., DECL. OF RIGHTS art. 24. See Attorney Gen. v. Waldron, 289 Md.
704-05,426 A.2d 929,940-41 (1981); see also Celanese Corp. v. Davis, 186 Md.
463, 471-73, 47 A.2d 379, 383-84 (1946) (assuming equal protection is implied in the Maryland Due Process Clause).
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disability proceedings, so should others. 1620 The fonner guardianship
jury trial provision, therefore, extended the jury right in order to
serve the purposes of standardization and due process.
Accordingly, Maryland's protective approach to the right to jury
trial may be preserved in a number of ways: by the legislature and
people through constitutional amendment, by the legislature
through statute, and by the courts through cases and court rules.
VI.

CONCLUSION

The merger of Law and Equity in Maryland in 1984 called for a
re-evaluation of the constitutional right to trial by jury under the
new procedures. Lynch and Bourne, in a 1984 law review article
and in a 1993 book chapter, re-evaluate the right. I believe that
Lynch and Bourne try to "pickle," not preserve, the jury right. Both
their principled discretionary theory1621 and their applied approximation of pre-merger approach 1622 restrict the jury right. Both their
theory and their application largely ignore the crucial constitutional
aspect of the jury right. 1623 Instead, both their theory, by leaving the
jury right generally to the discretion of judges, and their application, by deferring largely to pre-merger judicial precedents, overemphasize the judicial role in determining whether there is to be a
jury trial. Lynch and Bourne apparently restrict the jury right because they believe it is inefficient 1624 and inferior as a mode of
trial. 1625 I have criticized those reasons for restricting the jury right,
both on their own tenns 1626 and for being contrary to the Maryland
Constitution. 1627
Rhetorically, I believe Lynch and Bourne have picked expedience (the "efficiency" of trial to judge) over law (the constitutional
right to trial by jury). I believe they have approved rule by elites
Uudges exercising their discretion and applying pre-merger judicial
1620. See supra note 1615 and accompanying text. But if. Dorsey v. Solomon, 435 F.
Supp. 725, 734-35 (D. Md. 1977) (finding that equal protection was notviolated, even though jury trial was granted in guardianship proceedings, but
was not granted in proceedings to confine persons acquitted of crimes because of insanity), modified, 604 F.2d 271 (4th Cir. 1979).
1621. See supra notes 10-13, 475-1124 and accompanying text.
1622. See supra notes 1125-1514 and accompanying text.
1623. See supra notes 15-452 and accompanying text. But see supra notes 7-9 and accompanying text.
1624. See supra notes 867-954 and accompanying text.
1625. See supra notes 956-1124 and accompanying text.
1626. See supra notes 971-1139 and accompanying text.
1627. See supra notes 920-955, and accompanying text.
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precedents) rather than democratic government (one limited by the
constitutional check of a jury drawn from the people).
To "preserve" the jury right, Maryland should follow the federal protective approach under the Beacon line of cases,1628 as it has
in the Higgins line of cases. 1629 Of course, through constitutional
amendment,1630 constitutional interpretation,1631 legislative act,1632
and court rule,1633 Maryland's approach to the jury right has been
even more protective than the federal approach.

1628.
1629.
1630.
1631.
1632.
1633.

See
See
See
See
See
See

supra
supra
supra
supra
supra
supra

notes
notes
notes
notes
notes
notes

189-205 and accompanying text.
194, 197 and accompanying text.
1527-1530 and accompanying text.
223-27, 1539-1540 and accompanying text.
1531-1538 and accompanying text.
154148 and accompanying text.

